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THE JOURNAL

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PHILOLOGY.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.
III THE *TIMAEUS*.

§ 1 *Introductory.*

It would seem then that the *Parmenides* justifies the following assertions :

(1) From first to last the theory of ideas was intended to serve as the basis of a theory of knowledge. Holding that knowledge is unattainable, unless, besides sensibles which are transient, mutable, indeterminate, there are also intelligibles which are eternal, immutable, determinate, Plato forthwith posited such intelligibles and called them ideas.

(2) In the first instance however he had looked to the theory of ideas, not only for the basis of his theory of knowledge, but also for an explanation of those paradoxes of predication with which the Eleatics had puzzled themselves and their contemporaries : and accordingly, to the fundamental proposition, 'besides sensibles there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas,' he had added two supplementary propositions, 'every plurality of things called by a common name has an idea corresponding to it,' and 'things are what they are by reason of the immanence of the idea.'

(3) But he presently found that these supplementary articles were, not only inconsistent with the fundamental principle, inasmuch as they sacrificed the unity of the idea, but also superfluous, inasmuch as the Eleatic paradoxes admitted of another and a better solution[1]. It therefore became incumbent upon him to discard the two supplementary articles and to interpret afresh the fundamental proposition—'besides sensibles there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas.'

(4) First clearing the list of the ideas by the distinct denial of *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*[2] in the cases of relations, negations, and

[1] Plato's predecessors (1) had failed to understand how the same thing could be at once great and small, like and unlike, &c; (2) had mistaken negative determination for the denial of existence. In the *Phaedo* 102 B ff Plato uses the doctrine of the idea's immanence to explain the difficulty in regard to the simultaneous predication of greatness and smallness, &c; and in the *republic* 478 B ff he makes the identification of negative determination with the denial of existence the basis of his proof of the unreality of particulars. In the *Parmenides* however he sees (1) that the terms great and small, like and unlike, describe not things, but relations, and consequently that the propositions 'Simmias is tall (in comparison with Socrates),' 'Simmias is short (in comparison with Phaedo),' are in no wise inconsistent; and (2) that negative determination is not denial of existence. See *Journal of Philology* XI 321, 330.

Surely Plato's change of position in these respects is of itself a sufficient proof that the *Parmenides* is later than the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. Unluckily the important passage *Parmenides* 130 B—E, in which Socrates is questioned about the contents of the world of ideas, has been sometimes read as a reassertion of the uncompromising doctrine which appears in *republic* X 596 A. It is of course nothing of the sort.

It will be seen that my view of the relations of the Platonic system to contemporary logic finds confirmation in Aristotle's remark, that it was Plato's logical studies which led him, in the first instance to frame the theory of ideas, and at a later period to substitute for the doctrine of immanent ideas the doctrine of transcendental numbers: *τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγὴ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν, οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον. metaph.* A 6. 987 b 29.

[2] The modification of the doctrine entails a change in the terminology. In the system of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, which assumed a separately-existent unity or idea for every group of particulars called by the same name, there was no *εἶδος* which was not *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*; in the system of the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, which recognizes a separately-existent unity in the case of *ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος*, &c, but not in the case of *ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον*, &c, the distinction between the *εἶδος* which is *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* (i.e. the separately-existent unity which is the centre of the

artificial products, he next propounded a new theory of the relation of the idea to its particulars. The idea, he conceived, stands to its particulars in the relation of model to copies.

It would seem further (5) that the theory of the relation of the idea to its particulars, thus faintly indicated in the *Parmenides*, took a dogmatic form in the *Philebus*. In that dialogue idea and particulars are resolved into 'limitants' and an 'unlimited,' whereof the unlimited is common to idea and particulars, while the limitants of the particulars approximate to, but are not identical with, the limitant of the idea.

In short, in the *Parmenides* Plato demolishes the earlier edifice and traces the plan of a new building: in the *Philebus* he is engaged in the task of reconstruction.

It must be clearly understood however that the doctrine of the *Philebus* is not, and does not pretend to be, other than a fragment[1]. Confining himself strictly to the matter in hand, Plato, in the first place, allows the material element, the unlimited, which is common to idea and particulars, to escape without analysis or investigation; and, in the second place, recognizes no other difference between idea and particulars besides the difference of their formal elements, the limitants, though other difference there must be, if the idea is to be anything more than a perfect particular. Now these omissions are too obvious to have been due to oversight. The presump-

natural kind), and the *εἶδος* which is not *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό* (i. e. the imaginary, arbitrary, unity which is the centre of the artificial group), is manifestly all-important. The former is, the latter is not, an *ἰδέα* in the technical sense of the word. Hence in the *Parmenides*, when from the new standpoint Plato discusses the ideas as they were originally conceived, the qualifying phrase is studiously introduced. Aristotle's phraseology is then exact, when he says *metaph.* A 9. 990 b 16, *οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος*: it is inexact, though intelligible enough, when he writes A 9. 991 b 6 *καὶ πολλὰ γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἴδη εἶναι*, and Λ 3. 1070 a 18 *διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἐστὶν ὁπόσα φύσει*. See *Journal of Philology* XI 322 note.

[1] That the doctrine of the *Philebus* is fragmentary, is, I think, indicated by the form of the dialogue, which has neither beginning nor end. The concluding sentences are significant: Σ. *Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με*; Π. *Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δή που σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν· ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.*

tion is then that there is some other dialogue which supplies the deficiencies of the *Philebus;* and such a dialogue I think I find in the *Timaeus.*

Accordingly in the next section I propose to trace the argument of that dialogue, dwelling upon those parts of it which seem to have a metaphysical significance, and passing lightly over those which do not affect the theory of ideas, but in neither case adding anything of my own. In the subsequent sections of this paper I hope to show, not only that the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* (together with the *Parmenides*) belong to the same stage of Platonic development, but also that, in so far as they deal with the theory of ideas, they are mutually complementary.

§ 2 *Summary of the* Timaeus.

17 A Socrates meets Timaeus, Hermocrates, and Critias on the morrow of the day on which, as recorded in the *republic,* he related to them his conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus. At the request of Timaeus he enumerates the heads of his narrative, confining himself however to that part of the *republic* which deals with the καλλίπολις, and in particular neglecting the ontological passages. Next he expresses his desire that his own description of the καλλίπολις in a condition of rest should be supplemented by a description of it in a condition of military activity. By way of gratifying Socrates' fancy, Critias proposes to relate a story which he had from his grandfather, who had it from Solon, who heard it from the priests of Sais, how that the Athenians in ancient times successfully withstood an army of invaders coming from the island of Atlantis. Critias has however arranged that, before he tells his story of a perfect state acting nobly on a large scale, the philosopher Timaeus shall describe the creation of the universe and its development down to the making of man.

27 E By way of preface to his cosmology Timaeus distinguishes:—

I That which never comes into being or becomes, but is eternally existent; this, being immutable, is the object of

intelligence having reason for its instrument; it is the region of truth and certainty:

II That which does not exist, but comes into being or becomes, and therefore also ceases to be; this is the object of opinion having sensation for its instrument; it is the region of probability and faith; having of necessity a cause, it may be subdivided into

(1) that which is fashioned by its maker on the model of that which is immutable; this is of necessity beautiful,

(2) that which is fashioned by its maker on the model of that which has come into being; this is not beautiful.

Under which of these heads is the *κόσμος*, or orderly universe, to be placed? Being visible, tangible, corporeal, and consequently the object of opinion having sense for its instrument, the orderly universe is a *γιγνόμενον*; but, as it is the most beautiful of *γιγνόμενα*, and its maker the best of makers, it is a *γιγνόμενον* fashioned on the model of that which is eternal, immutable, intelligible. It is then, not an *ὄν*, but a copy of an *ὄν*; whence it follows that in our cosmological inquiries we cannot attain to truth, and must content ourselves with probability.

29 D These preliminaries having been settled, we proceed to investigate the genesis of the universe. Finding the visible in a condition of unrest, the divine maker, whose desire was that as far as possible all things should be good like himself, proceeded to bring order out of disorder by endowing matter with mind. Mind however implies soul. The universe is therefore a rational animal, the creation of the divine intelligence.

30 C But what was the animal which the creator took as his model? Not any particular species[1], for the copy of an imperfect model can never be beautiful; but, that animal

[1] *τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν.* 30 C. Is this the original of the phrase *τὰ ἐν μέρει εἴδη*, used by Aristotle *metaph.* A 8. 989 b 12 *τῶν γὰρ ἐν μέρει τι λεγομένων εἰδῶν ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτῷ*?

whereof the species and the genera of animals are parts, for, as the universe includes ourselves and all particular animals, so the summum genus animal includes all intelligible animals, i.e. all genera and species; in fact, the creator made one visible κόσμος containing all other animals, rather than several κόσμοι, expressly in order that the resemblance to the perfect or intelligible animal, the summum genus, might be as complete as possible.

31 B The body of the κόσμος, being visible and tangible, of necessity contains fire and earth, which elements are bound together by two intermediates, air and water. Fire, air, water, and earth are terms of a proportion, so that the system cannot be dissolved except by the fiat of the creator. Further, that the universe may be one and perfect, as well as that it may be safe from injury from without, the whole of each of the elements is included in it. It is spherical, the sphere being the most perfect of figures. It has no external organs, as it is self-sufficing and self-contained, and they would therefore be useless. Rotation is its only motion.

34 B The soul of the κόσμος contains three elements, (*a*) ταὐτόν, the indivisible and unchangeable, (*b*) θάτερον, the divisible, which attaches to body, and (*c*) οὐσία, existence, which is a combination of ταὐτόν and θάτερον. These three elements having been mixed together, the mixture was distributed into parts, containing each of them ταὐτόν, θάτερον, and οὐσία, and such that they are bound together by a proportion. With these parts two circles were made, called respectively the circle of ταὐτόν and the circle of θάτερον, which circles are united so as to represent the letter χῖ. To the soul thus constructed, body, constructed as above described, was subsequently added.

36 D When then soul in its rotation comes into contact with divisible or indivisible existence, and pronounces upon identity, difference, relation, manner, mode, time, in regard to things which become and things which are, right judgment in regard to sensibles, which is announced to the soul by the circle of the Other, constitutes sure and true opinions and beliefs,

and right judgment in regard to rationals, which is announced to the soul by the circle of the Same, constitutes intelligence and science.

37 C The creator desired that the *κόσμος* should as far as possible resemble its model, the *αὐτὸ ζῷον*. Now the *αὐτὸ ζῷον* is eternal. Hence, as the *κόσμος*, being a *γεγονός*, cannot be eternal, the creator caused it to endure throughout time, time being a copy of eternity, which came into existence simultaneously with the orderly universe, and is marked by the revolutions of the sun, moon, and planets in the circle of the Other.

39 E Next, as before remarked, it was necessary that all sorts of animals should be established in the universe, because there are such in the *αὐτὸ ζῷον* which is its model. Animals may be classified under four heads, corresponding to the four elements: (*a*) the gods of heaven, (*b*) the birds of the air, (*c*) the fishes of the sea, (*d*) the beasts of the field together with man. The first of these classes includes the fixed stars, of which our earth is the first and oldest, and the planets already mentioned. To these divinities, visible and created, (together with those of the ordinary mythology,) immortal not of their own nature but by the decree of the creator, was entrusted the making of the three classes of mortal animals; since, if these had been made by the creator himself, they would have been gods. In constructing them, the divinities were instructed to imitate the action of the creator, who himself provided the divine element, the soul, making it out of the remains of the constituents of the world-soul, though in this case with less care for their purity. This divine element, divided into parcels, was next distributed by the creator amongst the fixed stars, there to be instructed about the nature of the universe, the laws of its own being, and the state of probation in which it was placed. Then the several parcels of the immortal principle were assigned to the several planets, where the divinities, the sons of the creator, added to each of them what was necessary in order to complete the human soul; and this in turn was combined with a mortal

body, made of fire, earth, water, and air, borrowed from the universe, the bonds of union being however in this case dissoluble. Hence, while the soul is immortal, the body is mortal. The animal thus constructed is capable of every variety of motion, and the soul, which is a part of it, is, in consequence of the union, liable to shocks and collisions, called sensations, which impede the circle of the Same, and shake the circle of the Other, thus occasioning delusions and mistakes, especially during the earlier part of the life of the individual, when the body is growing, and therefore constantly receiving nutrition from without. Then comes a description of the organs, through which the body moves and has sensations. These are however to be regarded, not as causes (*αἴτια*), but as instruments (*συναίτια*), subservient to the operation and the development of mind.

47 E Nevertheless, though mind is the sole cause of the orderly universe, the unintelligent principle of necessity, upon which mind works, must not be neglected. Accordingly, having hitherto regarded fire, air, water, and earth as elements incapable of analysis, we now submit them to examination, taking them severally in their original conditions, as they were before mind constructed the orderly universe out of them. From the nature of the case, our exposition will pretend, not to certainty, but to probability only.

Having hitherto recognized only the *παράδειγμα*, which is intelligible, immutable, and existent, and the *μίμημα*, which is visible and becomes, we now add to these a tertium quid, the receptacle of genesis (*γενέσεως ὑποδοχή*), led thereto by the following considerations. The four material elements, fire, air, water, and earth, are capable of transformation: e. g. water becomes under certain conditions earth, and under others air, which again may be converted into fire. Hence it would seem that what we call fire, air, water, earth, are, not *ταῦτα*, but *τὰ τοιαῦτα*; not determinate things, but indeterminate states of a thing. In other words, fire, air, water, and earth, which have so far been regarded as *στοιχεῖα*, are in fact the varying phases of one permanent medium, which, itself formless, that

it may be the more perfectly receptive, reproduces, or takes the shape of, eternal, immutable, forms: for that there are eternal, immutable, forms of fire and the like, is certain, unless we are prepared to surrender the distinction between true opinion and knowledge[1].

51 E Thus, in place of the *παράδειγμα* and the *μίμημα* hitherto recognized, this more refined analysis acknowledges—

(1) that which is eternal and immutable, incapable of passing into another or of receiving another into itself, invisible and generally insensible, intelligible; in short, the idea;

(2) that which is called by the same name as the former in virtue of its imperfect resemblance to it, the creature of genesis, mutable, coming into place and departing from it, the object of opinion which has sense for its instrument; in short, the particular;

(3) imperishable space, the seat of all that becomes, itself apprehended through a bastard sort of reasoning which cannot give certainty, but only faith; in short, the *ὑποδοχὴ τῆς γενέσεως*.

To these results we are led by two considerations: first, if what we call a thing is a copy, there must be a material in which the copy is taken; secondly, so long as two things are distinct, neither of them can pass into the other without sacrifice of its unity and independence.

[1] *ἆρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πάντα περὶ ὧν ἀεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ὄντα ἕκαστα, ἢ ταῦτα, ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν, ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχουσα ἀλήθειαν;.....ὧδε οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψῆφον· εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθὴς ἐστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἴδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὥς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὁπόσ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι.* 51 B—E. The argument that, if *νοῦς* and *δόξα ἀληθής* are distinct, there must be *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, recals *Parmenides* 135 B C, while the proof that *νοῦς* and *δόξα ἀληθής* are distinct, reflects *Theaetetus* 201 A sqq. I shall have something to say about the passage in the *Theaetetus* on another occasion.

52 D There were then before the creation of the orderly universe these three things, ὄν, χώρα, and γένεσις. Of these, χώρα, the ὑποδοχή, τιθήνη, or δεξαμένη τῆς γενέσεως, having had impressed upon it in its various parts the forms of the four so-called elements, and consequently being unequally balanced, was itself in perpetual motion, and communicated perpetual motion to its contents, whereof those which were alike tended to accumulate in the same region, so that they were ready to take shape the moment that νοῦς began the work of organization.

53 C But how are we to account for the characteristics of the four elements, and the transformations which they undergo? The characteristics and the transformations of the four elements are due to their geometrical constituents, the geometrical constituent of fire being the pyramid or tetrahedron, that of air being the octahedron, that of water the eicosahedron, and that of earth the cube. These constituents are so small that they are invisible to us so long as they are separately regarded, and become visible only when like constituents are aggregated together. Within certain limits they are capable of disruption and combination: hence the transformations which the four elements undergo, and hence too their flux, as the perpetual disruption and combination of the constituents, involves, as before shown, change of position, like seeking like.

57 C So much for the simple or primary bodies. As for the further varieties which have their origin, partly in differences in the size of the constituent triangles, partly in the intermingling of elements, they are infinitely numerous, and must be left to the physicist to classify in his leisure hours on grounds of mere probability.

57 E And here it is to be noted that flux does not cease with the generation of particulars according to their kinds: for each aggregate has interstices, and into these interstices the more refined elements force themselves, thus producing disturbance of balance in the ὑποδοχή, and consequent change of place.

From this point to the end of the dialogue, Timaeus is concerned with *γένεσις*, and in particular with (1) the combinations and the transformations of the primary elements, (2) the *παθήματα* of those combinations, (3) the parts of the animal as seen in man[1]. Consequently he does not pretend to anything more than probability in his speculations about *θερμόν* and *ψυχρόν*, *σκληρόν* and *μαλακόν*, *βαρύ* and *κοῦφον*, *λεῖον* and *τραχύ*; about pleasure and pain; about the several senses; about the organs of life, the heart, the liver, the spleen, the spinal cord, the brain, the lungs, &c; about disease and death; about animal degeneration.

The dialogue ends with the words: *καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν ἔχειν· θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῷα λαβὼν καὶ ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, οὕτω ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν, εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὤν.*

§ 3 *The σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου.*

In the foregoing section I have endeavoured to indicate the tenour of Timaeus' exposition, giving prominence to those parts of it which seem to have a metaphysical bearing, but sedulously refraining from inference or interpretation. In the comment to which I now address myself, I shall find it convenient to distinguish the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου*, which will occupy me in the present section, from the theory of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, which I propose to defer to the section next fol-

[1] This transition from metaphysic to physic is marked in the emphatic sentence—*τἄλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἔτι διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν· ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ καταθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο. ταύτῃ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐφέντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν πέρι τὰ ἑξῆς εἰκότα δίιμεν τῇδε.* 59 C D. The tripartition of the subsequent discourse is indicated at 61 C, *καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ σχήμασι κοινωνίαις τε καὶ μεταλλαγαῖς εἰς ἄλληλα πεποικιλμένα εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐπιδέδεικται· τὰ δὲ παθήματα αὐτῶν δι' ἃς αἰτίας γέγονε πειρατέον ἐμφανίζειν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν αἴσθησιν δεῖ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀεί. σαρκὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ σάρκα γένεσιν, ψυχῆς τε ὅσον θνητόν, οὕπω διειληλύθαμεν.*

lowing. In order to this, I shall have to postpone the examination of the important paragraph 34 B—37 C. That this course is legitimate, I hope to show in the sequel, when I proceed to harmonize and unite the two theories, the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου* and the theory of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, which I now propose for the moment to dissociate.

According to Timaeus, the *κόσμος* or orderly universe is a *ζῷον* made, as far as possible, to resemble that *αὐτὸ ζῷον* whereof the other *νοητὰ ζῷα* are parts. It is composed of fire, air, water, and earth: and, as it contains the whole of these elements, it is one, perfect, self-sufficing. During the pleasure of the creator it is indissoluble. It is spherical, and rotates upon its own axis. Though not eternal, it endures throughout time.

In the *κόσμος* are included other *ζῷα*. Of these, first in dignity and excellence are the *οὐράνιοι θεοί*, i.e. the earth, the fixed stars, and the planets. Like the *κόσμος*, they are indissoluble during the pleasure of the creator; and that he will not will their dissolution, is certain[1].

The remaining *ζῷα* are constructed, not by the *δημιοῦργος*, but by the *οὐράνιοι θεοί*, who, to bodies composed of materials

[1] Plainly we have here authority for the distinction between *αἰσθητά* which are *ἀίδια* and *αἰσθητά* which are *φθαρτά*, attributed to Plato by Aristotle. The universe and the heavenly bodies are *ἀίδια*, animals and plants are *φθαρτά*. See *metaph.* A 9. 990 b 8 *καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀιδίοις*. 991 a 9 *τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἴδη ἢ τοῖς ἀιδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις*: and compare Alexander's comments 58. 7 *καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀιδίως τὸ εἶναι ἔχει*. 70. 16 *ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἦσαν ἰδέαι αὐτοῖς, οἷον ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄστρων, ἐποίουν γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ παντός*. It will be observed that the *Timaeus* enables us to answer a question which must have suggested itself to many readers of the *metaphysics*: If the heavenly bodies are *ἀίδια*, are they not, in so far, put upon a level with the ideas? Plato tells us that, while the heavenly bodies are *ἀίδια* in the sense that they endure throughout time, which is an image of eternity, the ideas are *ἀίδια*, in the sense that they are not in time. See especially 37 C D.

It is perhaps worth while to note that Plato attributes, firstly, to the earth, which only rotates on its axis, a dignity superior to that of the fixed stars, which both rotate on their axes and are carried round by the rotation of the *κόσμος*, and, secondly, to the fixed stars a dignity superior to that of the planets, which furthermore change their position relatively to the fixed stars and to one another.

derived from the κόσμος and ultimately restored to it, add parcels of soul which the δημιοῦργος places at their disposal. Each parcel of soul occupies in the first instance the body of a man, but may hereafter pass into the body of a woman and of a brute in successive stages of degeneration.

It would seem further (1) that all the ζῷα—the κόσμος, the οὐράνιοι θεοί, and the θνητά—have for their material the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth; and (2) that, although the κόσμος and the οὐράνιοι θεοί on the one hand, and the θνητά on the other, are the works of different agents, the former receiving their shape from the creator directly, the latter indirectly through the οὐράνιοι θεοί, every ζῷον without exception has a corresponding παράδειγμα in that region of ὄντα, the objects of νοῦς, which is mentioned in the prefatory paragraph 28 A ff; for nothing less than this can be meant by the precise statement that, as this universe contains ourselves and the other visible animals, so its παράδειγμα includes all intelligible animals—τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα ξυνέστηκεν ὁρατά. 30 C. Hence, as the ὄντα or νοητά of the prefatory paragraph are manifestly the ideas, we shall be justified in asserting that, according to the Platonic Timaeus, (1) every ζῷον is composed of the four elements, (2) every ζῷον has, corresponding to it, an idea, ὄν and νοητόν, to which it stands in the relation of μίμημα to παράδειγμα.

Starting from these propositions, we immediately discern the need of further information (1) about the four elements of which the particular ζῷον is composed, (2) about the relation of the particular ζῷον to the idea.

Of these two desiderata, the former is supplied in the dialogue before us. Observing 47 E that, whereas we have been hitherto concerned with the triumph of νοῦς, i.e. with the conversion of τὸ πᾶν into κόσμος, or the organization of the universe, τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης now demand our attention, Timaeus proceeds to examine the four so-called elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which have hitherto been regarded as ἀρχαί not needing analysis: τὴν δὴ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς φύσιν θεατέον αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸ

τούτου πάθη. νῦν γὰρ οὐδείς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεμήνυκεν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδόσι πῦρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι, στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ἂν ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδεσι μόνον εἰκότως ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονοῦντος ἀπεικασθῆναι. 48 B. The exposition which follows is full, precise, and dogmatic. Selecting four geometrical figures, constructed out of triangles, which figures are capable of exact determination, Timaeus assigns them as παραδείγματα to the four elements in such a way that the geometrical figures may plausibly account at once for the most obvious characteristics of the elements and for the transformations which the elements undergo. In each case the figure is supposed to be impressed upon the recipient or ultimate material, which, inasmuch as it is wholly destitute of form, can be described only as χώρα or space. The 'figured spaces,' if I may coin a phrase to describe the portions of space impressed with the paradeigmatic figures, being too small to be apprehended by the senses, are perceived by us only in aggregates; and, as the figured spaces never cease to transform themselves, so that no given aggregate is strictly homogeneous, alien forms being always present in spite of the predominance of one or other of the four kinds, the so-called fire, air, water, and earth, which we perceive by the senses are only imperfect representations of the elemental forms. They are, in fact, fiery, airy, watery, and earthy aggregates, that is to say, aggregates in which fire, air, water, and earth respectively predominate, or, to put it still more precisely, aggregates in which pyramid, octahedron, eicosahedron, and cube are respectively the predominant figures[1].

[1] Thus fire, air, water, and earth,—the ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα, as they are called at 57 C,—have ideas; and their ideas either are, or have for their formal elements, the four geometrical forms, pyramid, octahedron, eicosahedron, and cube. Apparently these ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα are the only sorts of matter which, as such, have ideas, oil, salt, potter's clay, the metals, &c, being regarded 58 C ff as varieties and combinations of the primary bodies, artificially and arbitrarily distinguished. Not having ideas, the metals &c cannot be 'known,' in the strict sense of the word. Hence the remark which Timaeus interposes at 59 C in regard to those physical researches which have for their objects, not natural kinds, but *arbitrary* and *artificial* groups: τἆλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἔτι διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν· ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, τοὺς περὶ

The four so-called elements having been thus resolved into recipient space together with four geometrical forms which clearly belong to the ideal region, we may claim to have supplied from the *Timaeus* itself one of the two desiderata noted at p. 13. But whence are we to supply the other, the theory of the relation of the particular to the idea? From the *Timaeus* we learn that particulars stand to the idea in the relation in which *μιμήματα* stand to their *παράδειγμα;* but this is all. Under these circumstances it may be worth while to look for information elsewhere.

Now in the *Philebus* particular and idea are both of them resolved into (1) a material element, the *ἄπειρον*, which includes certain qualities in their indeterminate condition, and (2) a formal element, the *πέρας ἔχον*, by which the *ἄπειρον* is determined. The material element is one and the same for idea and particulars: but in the case of the *πέρας ἔχοντα* a distinction is drawn between the *μέτριον*, or perfect *πέρας ἔχον*, of the idea and the *ποσά* of the particulars, which imperfectly approximate to the *μέτριον*. Thus the relation of idea and particular consists in the identity of their material, and the approximation of their formal, elements. But, while within the limits of the doctrine which I have attempted to formulate in the foregoing sentences, the exposition of the *Philebus* is full and precise, beyond those limits it is meagre and obscure. In especial the reader vainly seeks for any analysis of the mysterious *ἄπειρον*, which is the material basis at once of idea and of particulars; and the omission is all the more perplexing because the identification of the material element of the idea with that of the particulars seems to involve the startling consequence that the idea is no more than a perfect particular.

τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ καταθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο.

That the question raised, but not answered in the *Parmenides*—Is there an idea of *πῦρ* or *ὕδωρ*?—is answered by the Platonic Timaeus in the affirmative, appears further from 51 B, where, in declaring his adhesion to the theory of ideas, he takes *πῦρ* as his example.

Besides fire, air, water, and earth, the only ideas recognized in the *Timaeus* are, to all appearance, *ζῷα*, i.e. the universe, the stars, animals, and plants.

Thus, while the *Philebus*, which contains a theory of the relation of particulars to the paradeigmatic idea, has no theory of the constituent material, the *Timaeus*, which contains a theory of the constituent material, has no theory of the relation of particulars to the paradeigmatic idea. The two dialogues are then in a manner complementary. But we must not assume, either that they were meant to be so, or that their respective doctrines may be brought into juxtaposition, until we have first discovered in the two otherwise divergent expositions a point of contact, from which we may take our departure in either direction.

Such a point of contact I think I see in the argument by which the Socrates of the *Philebus* 28 A—30 E identifies *νοῦς* with the *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως*. At the beginning of this paragraph Socrates offers to Protarchus two theories—the theory of Democritus, that the universe is governed by chance, and the theory of Anaxagoras, that it is directed by mind—and bids him choose between them. Protarchus unhesitatingly prefers the latter. Hereupon Socrates adduces reasons in confirmation of Protarchus' choice. You will admit, he says, that the bodies of all *ζῷα* consist of fire, air, water, and earth: that the portion of each of these elements which is to be found in the particular *ζῷον* is inferior in quantity, excellence, and purity to the whole element as it appears in the universe: and that the elements in us, together making up the body of the particular *ζῷον*, derive their nurture, origin, and growth from the elements which together make up the body of the *κόσμος*. Now our body has a soul. Would it not seem then that the universe must have a soul likewise? and if a soul, then a *νοῦς* to order and direct it?

This is the very echo of the *Timaeus*. Short as Socrates' statement is, it includes all the main principles and points of Timaeus' exposition.

In the one dialogue, as in the other, all existence is *κατὰ δύναμιν ἄριστον*; particularization necessarily involves inferiority; the *κόσμος* is therefore a *ζῷον, ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε*, made so *διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν*; and the other *ζῷα*

derive their souls and their bodies from the soul and the body of the *κόσμος*, differing from it however for the worse in consequence of their particularization. It can hardly be by a chance coincidence then that in both dialogues the materials out of which *σῶμα* is constructed are fire, air, water, and earth.

But the *νοῦς* which in the *Philebus* is attributed, primarily to the *κόσμος*, secondarily to the subordinate *ζῷα*, is akin to the *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως* of the table of the four *γένη*: indeed the establishment of this kinship is the very purpose of the passage before us. Would it not seem then that the fire, air, water, and earth, which in *Philebus* 29 A ff and *Timaeus* 31 B &c are the materials of all creation, whether universal or particular, must in some sort represent the *ἄπειρον* which in the table of the four *γένη*, contained in *Philebus* 24 A ff, serves as the material basis of all determinate existence? The clue once obtained, we immediately observe that the fire, air, water, and earth of the *Timaeus*, i.e. not the aggregates which in consequence of the predominance of one or other of the elements we call by one or other of these names, but the *στοιχεῖα* themselves in their purity, are introduced to account for the determinate qualities of organized things, and that, although the four elements are never called *ἄπειρον*, *ἀπειρία* is their leading characteristic, the perpetual flux of the four elements being emphatically insisted upon in contradistinction to the fixity of the *ὑποδοχή*[1]. Thus the four elements of the *Timaeus* and of *Philebus* 29 A ff are, as it were, embodiments of the *ἄπειρον* of the table of the *γένη* in *Philebus* 24 A ff.

[1] *ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν· ἀεὶ δ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τιν' ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι· φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῷδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον ἑκάστου πέρι καὶ ξυμπάντων οὕτω καλεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ πῦρ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἅπαν ὅσονπερ ἂν ἔχῃ γένεσιν· ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὖ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιονοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὖ τούτων καλεῖν.* 49 D—50 A.

The point of contact between the two dialogues having been discovered, and the indeterminate qualities of the *Philebus* having been equated with the four elements of the *Timaeus*, we may now proceed to reunite the doctrines which, for convenience of exposition, and perhaps for another reason not far to seek, Plato has thought fit to separate, namely, the doctrine of the resolution of the four elements into space impressed with four regular geometrical figures, which doctrine is prominent in the *Timaeus*, and the doctrine of the resolution of things into indeterminate qualities determined by *ποσά* approximating more or less closely to a *μέτριον*, which doctrine is prominent in the *Philebus*. Let the two be combined, and we have for the doctrine which underlies both dialogues the theory that 'space impressed with certain regular figures supplies indeterminate qualities, from which as materials, certain quantities, acting as forms, develop organisms more or less perfect according as those quantities more or less closely approximate to certain standards[1].'

If again we take account of the *Parmenides* we reach by a circuitous route the same conclusion. In that dialogue the conception of the idea as a *παράδειγμα* was found to carry with it the analysis of idea and particular into their *στοιχεῖα*, the *πέρας ἔχον* and the *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus*. Hence, as in the *Timaeus* idea and particular stand to one another in the relation of *παράδειγμα* and *μίμημα*, the analysis of idea and particular into their *στοιχεῖα*, though nowhere mentioned, is by implication a part of the system which the dialogue represents.

In fact, though the *Parmenides* is mainly concerned with preparatory criticisms, the *Philebus* with the doctrine of *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον*, and the *Timaeus*, or rather so much of it as I have considered in the present section, with the doctrine of

[1] Hence I cannot assent to Zeller's remark: "Wie aber dieses Unbegrenzte zu demjenigen, welches der Grund der Körperwelt ist, sich verhalte, scheint er nicht untersucht und dadurch den Schein ihrer (von Aristoteles angenommenen) völligen Einerleiheit hervorgerufen zu haben." *Grundriss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* 141. See to the same effect his *Philosophie der Griechen* II i 808. The theory of the relation of the *ἄπειρον* to the *ὑποδοχή* is, I hold, fully and clearly set forth in *Timaeus* 48 A—57 C.

the ὑποδοχή, all three dialogues are, so far as concerns the theory of things and their relation to ideas, in perfect agreement.

But though we have thus obtained additional justification of Aristotle's statement that Plato regarded the στοιχεῖα τῶν εἰδῶν as the στοιχεῖα πάντων τῶν ὄντων, and have furthermore succeeded in connecting the doctrine of the πέρας ἔχον and the ἄπειρον with the doctrine of the ὑποδοχή, we are still beset with difficulties. In particular there is one difficulty which I shall find it convenient to notice in this place. Probably everyone who has read my remarks upon the *Philebus* has asked—Are we then to understand that the idea differs from its particular *only* in respect of the πέρας ἔχον, being in fact no more than a perfect particular? and probably some of those who have asked the question, assuming that I answer it in the affirmative, have incontinently rejected the whole of my theory. I do not however answer the question in the affirmative. The idea differs from its particular, I apprehend, not only in respect of the πέρας ἔχον, but also in that the one is an ὄν, the other a γιγνόμενον, the one a νοητόν, the other a δοξαστόν. Whatever the difference between ὄν and γιγνόμενον, between νοητόν and δοξαστόν, may be, that difference there is between idea and particular: but in analyzing them into their constituents in the *Philebus* Plato has deliberately ignored this fundamental difference; and with good reason. For, as the idea as such cannot be brought by us face to face with the particular as such,—of this we have had emphatic warning in *Parmenides* 135,—if we would compare them, we must for the moment leave out of sight the οὐσία of the one and the γένεσις of the other. The expedient is then justifiable for the moment. But sooner or later the deficiency must be supplied: and a little consideration will show that the attempt to ascertain the difference between γιγνόμενον and ὄν cannot be longer deferred. Yet, as in the *Philebus*, so in those parts of the *Timaeus* which I have thus far taken into account, the fundamental difference between γιγνόμενον and ὄν has been studiously left out of sight. We have indeed learnt that the idea is perfect and the particular imperfect, and that the imperfection of the particular is due to

the divergence of its *πέρας ἔχον* from the *πέρας ἔχον* of the idea: but we do not know how the particular regarded as *γιγνόμενον* differs from the idea regarded as *ὄν*, because we do not know what the idea is.

Would it not seem then that, when we start from *γιγνόμενα* and advance towards *ὄντα*, we presently reach a point at which further progress becomes impossible? In other words, would it not seem that, though the theory of things rests upon the assumption of *ὄντα*, those *ὄντα* are incapable of being expressed in terms of *γιγνόμενα*?

Whither then shall we turn? It is to my friend Mr Archer-Hind that I am indebted for the suggestion worked out in the following section, namely, that Plato's 'thorough-going idealism' affords the means of reconciling *ὄντα* and *γιγνόμενα*: in fact, that, if we cannot express *ὄντα* in terms of *γιγνόμενα*, we must attempt to express *γιγνόμενα* in terms of *ὄντα*[1].

§ 4 *The ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου.*

Thus, while the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου* enables us to connect the doctrine of *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον* with the doctrine of the *ὑποδοχή*, it brings us no nearer to the discovery of the idea. It only remains then to inquire whether the theory of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* will supply the deficiency.

The soul of the universe, we read at 34 B—37 C, is composed of three elements:

[1] "In the *Timaeus*", he says in his edition of the *Phaedo*, p. 131, "Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect's apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception's existence: that is, as was said above, the *ἀγαθὸν* is the ultimate *αἰτία* of each thing." A considerable portion of the following section is no more than an expansion of this most original and instructive paragraph.

To Mr Archer-Hind I am further indebted for invaluable help in the study of the detail of the dialogue and in the composition of the present paper.

(*a*) ἡ ἀμέριστος καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσα φύσις, otherwise called ταὐτόν;

(*b*) ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή, otherwise called θάτερον;

(*c*) οὐσία, in which ταὐτόν and θάτερον are combined.

Further, soul is divided into two circles, called respectively the circle of the Same and the circle of the Other. By means of the circle of the Same soul apprehends τὸ λογιστικόν, i.e. is self-conscious, and by means of the circle of the Other it apprehends αἰσθητά, i.e. forms right opinions and beliefs about sensible things. In both cases ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ γιγνώσκεται.

Here we have indications at once of a theory of being and of a theory of sensation and thought: (1) οὐσία is resolvable into ταὐτόν and θάτερον; (2) it is in virtue of ταὐτόν θάτερον and οὐσία in itself that soul, the subject, apprehends ταὐτόν θάτερον and οὐσία in its object, whether that object is αἰσθητόν or νοητόν. Let us attempt to interpret these indications, giving our attention in the first instance to αἰσθητά, in the hope that, when we have resolved them into ταὐτόν and θάτερον, we may find ourselves in a position to construct out of ταὐτόν and θάτερον an eternal and immutable idea. This done, it will remain for us to test our theory by reference to the results which have been already obtained from the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*.

First, then, what are the αἰσθητά, the objects of sensation, which we call 'things'? If, as appears, the subject and the object of sensation are identical, whilst, as we are assured 34 B, ψυχή is prior in creation to σῶμα, it is reasonable to suppose that Plato regards 'things' not as separate entities, external to the mind, but as sensations existing within it[1].

[1] The important summary 37 A—C, after describing the circle of the Other and the circle of the Same, concludes with the emphatic sentence—τοῦτο [sc. δόξα καὶ πίστις and νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, see Proclus *ad loc.*] δὲ ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἂν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχὴν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖ. I read this as a declaration that, whereas subject and object are identical, object is to be merged in subject, not subject in object; in other words, that things are to receive a psychological explanation, rather than mind a material one.

I may note in passing that the list

Further, each of the sensations to which we wrongfully attribute externality is the same as itself and different from others, and, as appears from the description of the two circles, Plato conceives *ταὐτόν*, the Same, to attach itself to *νοῦς*, *θάτερον*, the Other, to attach itself to *χώρα*. Hence I conclude that Plato regards each sensation as an eternal mode or potentiality of thought actualized in a certain position in space, and the existence of the thing as the recurrence of such sensation, the eternal mode or potentiality of thought being the element of unity and constancy, while position in space and time is at once the element of difference and the element of inconstancy, because a recurrent sensation differs, not only from other sensations contemporaneously, but also in successive stages from itself.

But why is it that we attribute to the recurrent sensation thus analyzed a continuous existence, external to the percipient *ψυχή*? in other words, why is it that we persistently regard the recurrent sensation as a 'thing'? In order to explain this fictitious externalization, we must, I apprehend, take account of the fact that *ψυχή* is not singular but plural. All *ψυχαί* being endowed more or less perfectly with the same modes or potentialities of thought[1], when a potentiality of thought possessed in common by two or more *ψυχαί* is actualized in (approximately) the same position in space, the identity, or to speak more exactly,

of categories which occurs at 37 A, *λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς, ὅτῳ τ' ἂν τι ταὐτὸν ᾖ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅ τι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε ξυμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί*, serves to connect with the teaching of the *Timaeus* the theory, propounded in the *Parmenides*, of *τὰ πρός τι*, "whereof we Platonists do not recognize ideas."

[1] This is implied in the mythical statements, that the souls of *θνητά* were made by the *δημιοῦργος* from what remained of the ingredients used in the construction of the souls of the *ἀθάνατα*, and that when the several parcels of souls had been assigned to their respective stars they were instructed by him as to the nature of the universe and the laws of their being: *ταῦτ' εἶπε, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν κερασθὴν ἔμισγε, τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα κατεχεῖτο μίσγων τρόπον μέν τινα τὸν αὐτόν, ἀκήρατα δ' οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως. ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα. ξυστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλε ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις ἕνειμέ θ' ἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε, νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, κ.τ.λ.* 41 D.

the similarity, of the resultant actualities leads us to connect them, not with the several percipient *ψυχαί*, but with the position which they occupy in space, and therefore to attribute to the actualized potentiality an external and continuous existence.

What we call a 'thing,' is then no more than one and the same potentiality of thought actualized in (approximately) the same position in space by a plurality of minds; and, whereas we are in the habit of attributing externality to the object of sensation, the only externality which enters into the case is the mutual externality of the percipient *ψυχαί*.

Having thus effected the resolution of *αἰσθητά* into *ταὐτόν*, i.e. eternal modes or potentialities of thought, and *θάτερον*, i.e. variable position in space, which at once differentiates one so-called thing from another, and causes what we call the same thing to differ from itself in successive stages of recurrence, we must next attempt to construct out of *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον* an eternal and immutable idea. Remembering that it is the plurality of the percipient *ψυχαί* which causes an actualized mode of thought to be regarded as a 'thing,' we may fairly conjecture that the idea, which has the same elements as the thing, is a mode of thought actualized, not in a fraction of the universal mind, but in the universal mind itself: and accordingly that it is to be sought in the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, which being one and universal is not limited in the actualization of its several potentialities of thought either to one place or to one time, and consequently actualizes them eternally in the same form. Provisionally then we may say that, whereas the particular is a potentiality of thought actualized by position in space in one of the many *ψυχαί* which are contained in the universe, the idea is the same potentiality actualized by position in space in the *ψυχή* of the universe itself.

But here a difficulty meets us. As actualization implies, not only identity with itself, but also difference from another, the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* can be actualized only by division into parts: whence the pluralization which it undergoes in the mythical narrative, when it is distributed, by the *δημιοῦργος* amongst the *θεοί* or *ἀθάνατα*, and by them amongst the infi-

nitely numerous *ψυχαί* of the *θνητά*. Thus, on the one hand, if the idea is anywhere discoverable, it will be found in the one universal *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*: but, on the other hand, the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* parts with its unity and universality the moment that it comes into actual existence. Whence it would seem that we must make the attribution of ideas to the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου hypothetical*: if the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* were a unity —which it cannot be, because actualization implies plurality— it would have ideas, which would be to it what things are to the *ψυχαί* into which in fact the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* is resolved. Whereas then a sensation is an eternal mode or potentiality of thought actualized under the limitations of space and time, the idea is the same mode or potentiality of thought, actualized, if that were possible, without those limitations[1], the true actualization in the former case being manifold and variable,

[1] Plato expressly points out that *τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως* is neither in time nor in space, and is not subject to any of those determinations which *τὰ ἐν αἰσθήσει φερόμενα* undergo as soon as they come into finite existence, and which we therefore wrongfully attribute to the absolute: *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, καὶ τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται, χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη, ἃ δὴ φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει· τὸ δὲ ἦν τό τ' ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι· κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι νῦν οὐδ' εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι, τὸ παράπαν τε οὐδὲν ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσῆψεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα μιμουμένου καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου γέγονεν εἴδη.* 37 E—38 A. *τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν· πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῇ μήτε που κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι.* 52 AB.

(Comp. Arist. *physics* Δ 2. 209 b 33 *Πλάτωνι μέντοι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ παρεκβάντας εἰπεῖν, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί, εἴπερ τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ὁ τόπος, εἴτε τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεθεκτικοῦ εἴτε τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφεν.*)

It will be observed that the statements made about *τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως* in the passage quoted above from *Timaeus* 38 A agree with the statements made in *Parmenides* 155 E—157 B about the moment of transition from one condition to another, *τὸ ἐξαίφνης*, when, as it is not in time, *ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ ὄν*, the universal predicates of *γιγνόμενα* cease for the instant to be applicable. In fact, there is for the instant no actuality to which they can attach. Now this is precisely the condition of *τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως*, as described in the *Timaeus*.

while the hypothetical actualization in the latter case is one and invariable. Thus, of the two elements of actualized existences, *ταὐτόν* is the cause of such unity, constancy, and excellence as they possess, *θάτερον* is the cause of their plurality, their variability, and their imperfection. Whence, if we would know them, we must study their *ταὐτόν*: in other words, we must ascertain their idea, in which their *ταὐτόν* is hypothetically actualized without the plurality, the variability, and the imperfection which actualization implies.

It would seem then that the resolution of *οὐσία* into *ταὐτόν*, i.e. eternal potentialities of thought, and *θάτερον*, i.e. otherness in space and time, affords, not only an explanation of the belief in an external world, but also a foundation for that theory of natural kinds which was found in the *Parmenides* to make the knowledge of the infinity of particulars possible. In strictness however we are not at liberty to identify the eternal potentialities of thought with *ταὐτόν*, for, while the potentialities are plural, *ταὐτόν* is unity not yet pluralized. Whence in the last analysis we must regard the eternal potentialities of thought as aspects of *ταὐτόν*, limited in so far as they differ from one another. In the hypothetical actualization of *ταὐτόν* then we shall have an idea of ideas, occupying in the later system the position assigned in the earlier to the idea of *τἀγαθόν*, and indeed identical with it, inasmuch as all actualized existence is its degradation, of which *θάτερον* is the cause[1]. The remaining ideas are inferior to the idea of the good, in so far as they are partial expressions of it, but they are *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα*, inasmuch as they are the Same or the One hypothetically realizing itself. When however to the limitation which is implied in the plurality of the object is added the corresponding limitation of the subject, when for example man is contemplated, not by a universal mind, but by himself, the actualization of his intellectual potentiality is, not an idea, but a particular, or rather, a particular sensation.

[1] *ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν, ὥσπερ φαμὲν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐπιζητῆσαί τινας φιλοσόφων, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν.* Aristotle *metaphysics* A 6. 988 a 14.

Next let us proceed to inquire whether the idea, thus conceived, satisfies the requirements of the situation.

(1) We read in the *Parmenides* 135 C that the idea *τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι*, and in the *Timaeus* 28 A that it is *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν*. This is true of the idea as now conceived: for, as it is the perfect actualization of an eternal mode or potentiality of thought, it can never change.

(2) We read in the *Parmenides* 133 D and in the *Timaeus* 48 E &c that idea and particular are *παράδειγμα* and *μίμημα*. This is true of idea and particular as now conceived: for, according to our present view, the idea being the perfect actualization of an eternal mode or potentiality of thought, the particular is its imperfect actualization.

(3) We read in the *Parmenides* 133 A ff—a very remarkable passage to which I called attention in a former paper, *Journal of Philology* XI 294,—that we are cut off absolutely from the knowledge of the idea. This is true of the idea as now conceived: since in a finite intelligence the eternal mode or potentiality of thought cannot be perfectly actualized.

(4) We read nevertheless in the *Parmenides* 135 B, and the statement is echoed in the *Timaeus* 51 D, that, unless there are ideas, knowledge is impossible, where it is manifestly implied that, if there are ideas, knowledge of some sort or other is not beyond our reach. This is true, if the ideas are what we now conceive them: for, though their existence is only hypothetical[1],

[1] Mr Archer-Hind, who has added to his other kindnesses that of reading this paper in MS, asks—Is it correct to say that the existence of the idea is only hypothetical? Should we not rather say, that the idea is apprehended, in the shape of particulars, by the several fractions into which the universal mind is divided, and, as idea, by the aggregate of those fractions? in other words, as universal mind exists both in its parts and as the aggregate of those parts, may we not attribute actual existence, not only to the sensations in mind pluralized, but also to the idea in mind unified?

I demur to this suggestion on the grounds (1) that, if the fractions of the One are in the aggregate identical with the One, the One is in effect actualized without undergoing pluralization and its consequences; (2) that, whereas Mr Archer-Hind seems to treat mind as an *οὐσία*, it is, I conceive, to be regarded as existent only in the shape of its actualized *νοήματα*,

they give us, in virtue of the identity of their elements with the elements of particulars, the assurance that particulars may be grouped in natural kinds.

In short, the idea as now conceived is, as it should be, (1) eternal and immutable, (2) paradeigmatic, (3) incognizable, nevertheless (4) it performs the function which Plato throughout attributes to it, it makes knowledge possible. It is no doubt startling to find that the idea is only hypothetically existent, that actualization is impossible without limitation and degradation, and that the particular is the idea actualized: but these paradoxes are, I think paradoxical, not because they are unplatonic, but because they are unfamiliar. I see nothing in them to shake my conviction (1) that Archer-Hind is right in attributing to Plato the doctrine that "sensible perceptions are the finite intellect's apprehension, within the conditions of space and time, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence," and (2) that this doctrine unites in a harmonious whole the teaching of the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus*.

Lastly, I must say a few words in justification of the course which I have adopted in separating the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου* from that of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*. As according to the view which I have taken of the Platonic system things are only thoughts, the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου* and the theory of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* present to us the same matter in two aspects. Hence, when in the preceding section I neglected 34 B—37 C, I left out of account, not a part of the system—for that part of the system was represented in another form—but only a part of the exposition. Accordingly in the present section, in which I have been directly concerned with 34 B—37 C, I have in effect reviewed a portion of the theory of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου*, thus harmonizing that theory with the theory of the *ψυχή*.

being, in fact, no more than a fictitious substratum.

At the same time I acknowledge that my exposition probably makes the hypotheticality of the idea unduly prominent, inasmuch as I have distinctly recognized it, whilst Plato may have contented himself with the assertion that the idea is not actualized in time and space.

§ 5 *Applications.*

In the hope of at once strengthening my position and obtaining further results, I now proceed to note a few applications of the theory developed in the preceding section.

According to that theory, the idea is the one type to which the many particulars more or less closely approximate. It is not actualized as such in time and space, because actualization is destructive of its characteristic unity: but it is none the less eternal and immutable, because, though only hypothetically existent, it is the perfect realization of an eternal mode or potentiality of thought. The particular on the other hand is the same eternal mode or potentiality of thought actualized under the conditions of time and space in a plurality of minds, and consequently transient and mutable. Thus particulars are connected with the idea, not by immanence of the latter, but by identity of elements, the same elements which in one infinite mind would generate the idea, generating in the plurality of finite minds those imperfect representations of the idea to which we attribute external existence under the name of things.

In fact, if I may give the doctrine a somewhat paradoxical expression, idea and particular have the same elements—namely, Sameness and Otherness—*because* the particular is the idea itself, apprehended not by one infinite mind, but by the plurality of finite minds. This being so, Aristotle's statement, *metaph.* A 6. 987 b 18 *ἐπεὶ δ' αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων ᾠήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα*, receives a further and a fuller justification. Commenting upon this sentence by the light of the *Philebus*, I showed that according to that dialogue the *στοιχεῖα τῶν εἰδῶν* are the *στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων* in the sense that idea and particulars are both of them resolvable into an *ἄπειρον* and a *πέρας ἔχον*, the *ἄπειρον* of the particular being identical with the *ἄπειρον* of the idea, while the *πέρας ἔχον* of the particular, though not identical with the *πέρας ἔχον* of the idea, nevertheless approximates to it. By the light of the more complete analysis

contained in the *Timaeus*, we now see that the πέρας ἔχον of the particular, though subjectively regarded it only approximates to that of the idea, is in reality identical with it, being no other than the eternal mode or potentiality of thought which is common to both: and further, that, as Aristotle tells us, the elements of idea and particular are identical "because the idea is the cause of the particular," particulars being, as we have now learnt, no more than glimpses of the idea. Thus Aristotle's statement, which the provisional doctrine of the *Philebus* justifies with a qualification, is found to be absolutely correct as soon as we reduce πέρας ἔχοντα and ἄπειρον to their ultimates ταὐτόν and θάτερον, and add to the doctrine of natural kinds the idealism which is its metaphysical basis.

Similarly an advance may be made in respect of the theory of 'ideas as numbers.' On the strength of Aristotle's assertion that ἕν and ἀριθμοί, which are παρὰ τὰ πράγματα, are the formal elements of ideas and particulars respectively, I identified them in my paper upon the *Philebus* with the μέτριον and the ποσά which in that dialogue are the limitants of idea and particulars. At the same time I noted that Aristotle in other places identifies εἶδος and ἀριθμός, thus ignoring not only the distinction between ἕν, the formal element of the idea, and ἀριθμός, the formal element of the particular, but also the distinction between the formal element of the idea and the idea itself. Viewed in the light of the incomplete and provisional analysis of the *Philebus*, which distinguishes the formal element of the idea from the formal element of the particular, and attributes to the material element of both indeterminate qualities, Aristotle's phraseology seemed strangely inaccurate. We now see that it could make no confusion for readers who were acquainted with the doctrine of the *Timaeus;* because (1) ἀριθμοί are identical with ἕν, being the ἕν of an infinite intelligence distributed among finite intelligences, and (2) the investigation of the ἄπειρον having enabled us to transfer quality to the side of form, so that on the side of matter nothing is left but θάτερον or Otherness, the only difference between the formal element of the idea and the idea itself is

the difference between an eternal potentiality not actualized in time and space and an eternal potentiality hypothetically so actualized. In short, when Aristotle writes *εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη, metaph.* A 9. 991 b 9, i. e. "if the ideas are eternal potentialities of thought," he is inaccurate only in so far as he is not careful to add "hypothetically actualized in time and space by combination with *θάτερον*."

This view of Aristotle's identification of *εἴδη* and *ἀριθμοί* finds important confirmation in *metaph.* A 8. 990 a 30 *καίτοι κἀκεῖνος ἀριθμοὺς οἴεται καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν νοητοὺς αἰτίους, τούτους δὲ αἰσθητούς*: i.e. Plato regards both things, and their causes, the ideas, as *ἀριθμοί*; but it is *νοητοὶ ἀριθμοί* which are ideas, *αἰσθητοὶ ἀριθμοί* which are things. Here there is no ambiguity. As the phrase *ταῦτα εἶναι ἀριθμούς* plainly means, not 'things are numbers,' but 'things are determined by numbers,' or 'are reducible to numbers,' so *τὰς τούτων αἰτίας εἶναι ἀριθμούς* must mean that 'their causes, the ideas, are determined by numbers,' or 'are reducible to numbers.' It will be observed further that this passage is otherwise in perfect accord with my interpretation of the Platonic evidence: ideas and things are numbers, i.e. eternal potentialities of thought, which, if actualized in one infinite mind and therefore *νοητοί*, would be ideas, and, when actualized in the plurality of finite minds and therefore *αἰσθητοί*, are things.

The *ἕν* of which Aristotle speaks is then the eternal potentiality of thought, and, as *νοῦς* is plainly identical with *νοήματα*, may therefore be identified with infinite intelligence. This consideration gives a fuller significance to Aristotle's comparison of Anaxagoras and Plato: *φησὶ δ' εἶναι μεμιγμένα πάντα πλὴν τοῦ νοῦ, τοῦτον δὲ ἀμιγῆ μόνον καὶ καθαρόν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς τό τε ἕν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγές) καὶ θάτερον, οἷον τίθεμεν τὸ ἀόριστον πρὶν ὁρισθῆναι καὶ μετασχεῖν εἴδους τινός. metaph.* A 8. 989 b 14: as according to Anaxagoras *κόσμος* is the conjunction of *νοῦς* and *πανσπερμία*, so according to Plato *οὐσία* is the conjunction of *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον*. The parallel is thoroughly apposite. Indeed several passages in the *Timaeus*, and in

particular the sentence *οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας* 30 A, taken in conjunction with the undisguised allusion in the *Philebus* 28 E, seem to show that Plato himself recognized the resemblance.

Again, I think I see a direct reference to the doctrine of the *Timaeus* in *metaph.* A 9. 992 b 13 *οὐθένα δ' ἔχει λόγον οὐδὲ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς μήκη καὶ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεά, οὔτε ὅπως ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὔτε τίν' ἔχει δύναμιν· ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε εἴδη οἷόν τε εἶναι (οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ἀριθμοί) οὔτε τὰ μεταξύ (μαθηματικὰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα) οὔτε τὰ φθαρτά, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τέταρτον ἄλλο φαίνεται τοῦτό τι γένος.* So far as I know, commentators upon this passage content themselves with saying that these *μήκη, ἐπίπεδα* and *στερεά*, which are *μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, and distinct from ideas, mathematicals, and particulars, stand to the ideal numbers in the same relation in which geometrical magnitudes stand to mathematical numbers (Zeller *platonische Studien* 243), and that they are the "principia idealia" of geometrical magnitudes (Bonitz *commentary* 124). Zeller and Bonitz, who hold that the transformation of the Platonic system spoken of by Aristotle, "in den platonischen Schriften findet sich noch nicht," and "in ipsa Platonis philosophia vix alium quam appendicis locum potest obtinere," naturally do not go to the writings of Plato for the explanation of the Aristotelian evidence. Yet the regular solids which in the *Timaeus* are the types of the four so-called elements, together with the surfaces and the lines out of which the regular solids are generated, occupy precisely the position which is assigned to this *τέταρτον γένος*, and the account given of them in the *Timaeus* is, I think, open to Aristotle's objection. They are not *εἴδη*, for they are not numbers, but magnitudes: they are not intermediates, for they are not mathematicals, i.e. they are not the plurality of figures which the geometer represents by means of sensible diagrams: they are plainly not perishable particulars. They may fairly be described as *τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς*: for, whereas they are not *ἀριθμοί*, they perform, in respect of the material of which things are constructed, precisely the function which the

ἀριθμοί perform in respect of things. Finally, Aristotle's complaint, that Plato leaves us in the dark in regard to the place and the function of *τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, is, I apprehend, justifiable, in so far as the regular solids are *παραδείγματα*, and yet are not ideas in the strict sense of the term[1].

One or two connections between the *Timaeus* on the one hand and the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* on the other remain to be noticed.

If the idea is an eternal potentiality of thought hypothetically actualized in infinite intelligence, it is in a sense a *νόημα θεοῦ*, and, as we read in the *laws* 716 C, *ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος*. This is not, as might perhaps be imagined, inconsistent with *Parmenides* 132 B C *Ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. Τί οὖν; φάναι, ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλὰ τινός; Ναί. Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; Ὄντος. Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; Ναί. Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; Ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τἄλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.* Here, Socrates having suggested, by way of saving the original theory of the immanent idea, that the idea may be a *νόημα*, Parmenides asks him (1) whether, if the *νόημα* has an object resident in the particulars, this object is not the idea as originally conceived? (2) whether, if *τἄλλα* participate in *νοήματα*, it does not follow, either that everything consists of thoughts, or that there are thoughts which are unintelligent? Socrates is silenced by these questions, and proceeds to suggest that the idea may be a *παρά-*

[1] It will be observed that these *παραδείγματα* which I identify with Aristotle's *τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, take the place of the ideas of *βαρύ καῦφον θερμόν ψυχρόν*, &c, such qualities being as it were embodied in the four so-called elements.

δειγμα, whereupon Parmenides makes an objection, which, as I have previously shewn, is not final or fatal. Similarly in the passage which I have quoted Parmenides' objections, though fatal to Socrates' attempt to save the original theory, are not fatal to the hypothesis that the idea is a *νόημα*, provided that that hypothesis is properly interpreted: for (1) the *νόημα* of infinite mind, *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον*, which according to the *Timaeus* becomes in finite minds sensations, does not imply the immanence in particulars of the idea as originally conceived, and (2) the paradox *ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν*, becomes in the *Timaeus* a truth. In short, as in 132 D ff I see a hint that the idea is a *παράδειγμα*, so here I find an indication that it is a *νόημα* in the sense of the *Timaeus*, i.e. a *νόημα* hypothetically actualized in infinite mind.

Again, we have seen that *ταὐτόν* hypothetically actualized without pluralization in infinite mind is the idea of ideas, the good; whence in 68 E—*ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε ταύτῃ πεφυκότα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ τοῦ καλλίστου τε καὶ ἀρίστου δημιουργος ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρελάμβανεν, ἡνίκα τὸν αὐτάρκη τε καὶ τὸν τελεώτατον θεὸν ἐγέννα, χρώμενος μὲν ταῖς περὶ ταῦτα αἰτίαις ὑπηρετούσαις, τὸ δὲ εὖ τεκταινόμενος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτός*[1]—the world god, being *αὐτάρκης, τελεώτατος*, and *ἄριστος*, has the characteristics of the *ἀγαθόν*, which in *Philebus* 20 D is *τελεώτατον, ἱκανόν*, and *ὃ πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον θηρεύει*. Now the identification of the good with *ταὐτόν* hypothetically actualized in infinite mind explains two passages in the *Philebus*: first, 22 C—Σ. *Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.* Φ. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.* Σ. *Τάχ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω*[2] *ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι*

[1] Compare 33 C—34 B, where the *κόσμος*, being *αὐτάρκης* and *τέλεος*, is consequently regarded as a *εὐδαίμων θεός*.

[2] Not perceiving that we have here an anticipation of the *Timaeus*, in which the claim of the *θεῖος νοῦς* is asserted, Badham brackets this significant *πω*. Compare *Philebus* 33 B *καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων*

τί δράσομεν—where the identity of τἀγαθόν with ὁ θεῖος νοῦς is unmistakably indicated; and, secondly, 32 D—πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν—where its identity with the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως, νοῦς, the lord of heaven and earth 28 C, is obscurely hinted.

But, I may be asked, if, as has been tacitly assumed in the preceding paragraph, ταὐτόν actualized may, in virtue of the identity of νοῦς and νοήματα, be equated with the θεῖος νοῦς, what becomes of the δημιοῦργος? The δημιοῦργος, I conceive, is a mythical duplicate of ταὐτόν, just as ἀνάγκη is a mythical duplicate of θάτερον[1], these duplicates being introduced because, without some such artifice, it would be impossible for us to describe the passage of ταὐτόν and θάτερον into finite existence[2]. Similarly in the *Philebus* 23 D, where ideas as well as particulars are ranked under the head of μικτόν, νοῦς is added to the list to act as αἰτία τῆς ξυμμίξεως, i.e. δημιοῦργος, and the possibility of the further addition of πέμπτον τι διάκρισιν δυνάμενον, i.e. of the ἀνάγκη of the *Timaeus*, the duplicate of the μεριστὴ οὐσία, is plainly recognized[3]. In fact, the δημιοῦργος of the *Timaeus* and the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως of the *Philebus* are, as it were, scaffolding, to be removed when the edifice has been completed.

Lastly, I venture to hazard an interpretation of the enigmatical sentence with which the dialogue ends: καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν ἔχειν· θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῷα λαβὼν καὶ ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, οὕτω ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώ-

ἐστὶ θειότατος [sc. ὁ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίος, which is exempt both from pleasure and from pain].

[1] See in particular 47 E μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη, and compare with this passage the statement of the doctrine of ταὐτόν and θάτερον in 35 A and 37 A.

[2] In fact, generally, as the elements of the κόσμος, ταὐτόν and θάτερον, are inseparable, when Plato for the purpose of his exposition represents them, either as not yet united, or as in the act of uniting, he of necessity has recourse to the myth. See Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II i 485.

[3] Π. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου; Σ. Τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν. *Philebus* 23 D.

τατος γέγονεν, εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὤν: 'and now let us declare that at last our theory of the all is finished; this universe which has been furnished with the animals, mortal and immortal, which were necessary to its completion, has come into being in the shape of a visible animal containing the other visible animals, an image of the intelligible, a god apprehended by sense, of all such gods greatest, best, fairest, most perfect, being none other than one only-begotten firmament, this firmament of ours.' In short, the created universe is (1) *ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον*, (2) *εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ*, (3) *θεὸς αἰσθητός*, i.e. one of the *ἀίδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, (4) *μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος* sc. *τῶν γεγονότων*, (5) *εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὤν*. Now all these phrases are echoes of phrases which occur in the description of the *σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου* in the earlier part of the dialogue. Assuming that *ὁ ξυνιστὰς ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος* 29 E, Timaeus there argued that the created universe must be (1) *ζῷον ἓν ὁρατόν, πάνθ' ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ξυγγενῆ ζῷα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ* 30 D, (2) *πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει* [or *νοήσει* 28 A] *περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιουργημένον* 29 A, (3) though not eternal in the strict sense of the word, because a *γεγονός*, nevertheless coexistent with time, and therefore one of the *ἀίδιοι θεοί* 38 B, 40 B, &c, (4) *ὅλος* 33 A, *ἄριστος* (by implication) 34 B, *κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων* 29 A, *τελεώτατος* 33 B, (5) *εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανός* 31 B. He now claims to have propounded a theory of the created universe which satisfies these conditions and would therefore seem to be true. What is this theory? Surely it is the theory of which traces have been discovered in the description of the *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, the theory that the universe is One infinite intelligence actualizing itself, according to the laws of its own being, under conditions of time and space, in a plurality of finite minds. The universe thus conceived has, I think, all the marks or notes which Timaeus enumerates: it is a visible animal which includes all other animals, for they are part of its actualization; it is an image of the intelligible, for it is the intelligible actualized and degraded in the process; it is a god the object of sense, for

it endures throughout time, time being its existence; it is greatest, best, fairest, and most perfect so far as its condition will allow, for it is the actualization of the One; it is one and only-begotten, for it is the One actualized as a whole[1].

§ 6 *Concluding remarks.*

It remains for me in a few recapitulatory sentences to indicate the position which I conceive the *Timaeus* to occupy in regard to the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*.

The theory of ideas was originally intended to serve, not only as the basis of a theory of knowledge, but also as an explanation of certain facts of predication which to some of Plato's predecessors and contemporaries had seemed paradoxical. It included one fundamental principle, (1) "besides sensibles, there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas," and two subordinate articles, (2) "every plurality of things called by a common name has an idea corresponding to it," and (3) "things are what they are by reason of the immanence of the idea," the subordinate articles being added to the fundamental principle in order to make the theory available for the second of the two purposes above mentioned, namely, the explanation of certain supposed difficulties of predication.

In the *Parmenides* Plato reviews this earlier doctrine, the doctrine of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, in order to shew, firstly, that the two subordinate articles are inconsistent with the fundamental principle, secondly, that as the facts of predication above referred to are explicable without the assumption of the existence of immanent ideas, the two subordinate articles may be dispensed with. Having thus cleared the ground, he proceeds to develop the fundamental principle afresh, regarding the idea as a *παράδειγμα* or type related to its particulars through the elements *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον*, and indicating

[1] With most of the editors I have written *εἰκὼν του νοητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός*. Manuscript authority however favours *εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός*. If we adopt this reading, we shall have, in the unexpected statement that this universe is the image of its creator, a hint that things are the self-actualization of the one creative mind.

that the infinity of particulars can be known only as members of certain definite kinds into which existence, treated as a unity, divides itself.

In the *Philebus,* the analysis of idea and particulars into *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον* is developed, so as to shew that it is the divergence of the *πέρας ἔχοντα* of the particulars from the *πέρας ἔχον* of the idea which causes the imperfection of the former; but we are left in the dark both as to the *πέρας ἔχον* and the *ἄπειρον,* and as to the fundamental difference between *ὄν* and *γιγνόμενον.*

These deficiencies are supplied in the *Timaeus,* which substitutes, for the provisional analysis of idea and particulars into *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον,* a final analysis into *ταὐτόν,* the Same or unity, and *θάτερον,* the Other or plurality. The idea being the hypothetical actualization of unity, in accordance with the laws of its own being, in one infinite intelligence, the particular is the actualization of unity, in accordance with the laws of its own being, in the plurality of finite intelligences. The *κόσμος* is then the actualization, under conditions of time and space, of the One or the Good, the apparent difference between the formal element of the idea and the formal element of the particular being due to the degradation which the actualization in time and space of an eternal potentiality of thought necessarily entails. Thus the theory of *ταὐτόν θάτερον* and *οὐσία,* which, so far as I know, Archer-Hind was the first to interpret exactly, is the *θριγκός* of the later system.

In other words, time and space come into being with the *κόσμος,* and end with its existence. There is therefore for the universal mind no actual existence so long as it retains its universality. Its actual existence begins when Otherness is admitted so that it ceases to be universal. Consequently the ideas, though as potentialities they are eternal and immutable, are never actualized as ideas. In so far as they are actualized, they are actualized as particulars, imperfect, transient, mutable.

This is a hard doctrine, inasmuch as it seems to deprive the ideas of their reality. But for all that it gives Plato what he wants. It gives him, not indeed actualized, but at any rate potentially existent, those fixities of nature without which

knowledge would seem to be impossible. Each such fixity, being none the less definite because it is destined never to be realized, serves to unite in a natural kind certain particulars, which are in fact only glimpses of itself. Between the member of such a kind and the member of an artificial group, there is all the difference possible. We may find it indeed convenient to invent general names for groups of our own making and to devise definitions of them: but such groups are liable to perpetual change, and can never pretend to finality. On the other hand the natural kind is fixed from the beginning of time to the end of it, because its members are by hypothesis imperfect apprehensions of the unknown but eternal type.

The later Platonism is then a theory of natural kinds, or, more exactly, of natural types, which has for its metaphysical basis a psychological theory of the belief in an external world. If things are definite potentialities of thought actualized in the plurality of finite intelligences, knowledge is possible, though, as has been pointed out in the *Parmenides*, there is no royal road to it. Knowledge is possible, because, as infinitely numerous particulars are only ideas, finite in number, regarded in an infinity of aspects, the infinity of particulars is capable of distribution into determinate, mutually exclusive, kinds: but knowledge is difficult of attainment, because it is only by the careful study of particulars that the definite classification can be discovered, and even then our acquaintance with the characteristics of each kind may be incomplete. The study of nature will thus fall into two divisions, according as things are grouped in natural kinds or in artificial classes. The one division, that with a view to which the theory of the evolution of particulars from the idea is propounded, is scientific in so far as the distribution sought is determinate, 'god being our measure:' the other division is unscientific, since, 'man being the measure,' the distribution sought is arbitrary.

If then the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus* are partial expositions of one and the same doctrine, it is reasonable to suppose that they were written about the same time and published, so to say, simultaneously: as however the *Parmenides* lays the foundations of the system, the *Philebus*

imperfectly develops it, and the *Timaeus* supplements and explains the *Philebus*, it is reasonable to suppose that the three dialogues were intended to be studied in the order in which I have named them.

Further, I would repeat that the doctrinal results which I have elicited are in accordance with the Aristotelian evidence, in so far as the characteristics which Aristotle attributes to the later system,—the recognition of ideas in the case of ὁπόσα φύσει only, to the exclusion of ideas of τὰ πρός τι, ἀποφάσεις, and σκευαστά, and the resolution of ideas and particulars into two elements, τὸ ἕν and τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, whereof the latter was the origin both of multiplicity and of evil,—are necessary and important parts of the radical reform which Platonism undergoes in these three dialogues.

In short, whereas Zeller finds in the Platonic writings nothing other than an uncompromising realism—I use the word in its older sense, in contradistinction to nominalism—and in the divergent doctrines mentioned by Aristotle sees only fragmentary modifications, fatal to the consistency of the system[1],

[1] "Dieser Ideen," says Zeller in his *Philosophie der Griechen* II i 584, "sind es nun unbestimmt viele. Da jeder Gattungs- und Artbegriff nach Plato etwas substantielles, eine Idee ist, muss es so viele Ideen geben, als es Gattungen und Arten giebt, und da die Ideen allein das Wirkliche sind, durch das alles ist, was es ist, so kann nichts sein und es lässt sich nichts vorstellen, wovon es keine Idee gäbe, denn ein solches wäre überhaupt nicht, das absolut Nichtseiende kann aber nicht vorgestellt werden."....."Späterhin scheint Plato allerdings an den Folgesätzen seiner Lehre theilweise irre geworden zu sein, wozu er auch Anlass genug hatte: nach Aristoteles nahm er keine Ideen des künstlich Gemachten, der verneinenden und der blossen Verhältnissbegriffe an; aber der ursprüngliche Standpunkt der Ideenlehre wird damit verlassen, und wenn manche Schwierigkeiten auf diesem Weg vermieden wurden, ergaben sich dafür andere, die seinem System nicht minder gefährlich wurden." See also pp. 462, 805, and the recently published *Grundriss d. Geschichte d. gr. Ph.* 125, 141. Zeller supposes that the only dialogue written after "die uns durch Aristoteles bekannte Umgestaltung der platonischen Lehre," was the *laws*, in which, from the nature of its contents, the later metaphysic was not likely to shew itself. For myself, I cannot believe that Plato, having renounced the uncompromising realism which, on Zeller's hypothesis, he had inculcated in a long series of dialogues, omitted to record in writing the very different theory which he was now expounding in his lectures, as well as the reasons for his change of front. But even if I believed that Plato was guilty of this strange

I conceive that the crude realism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* which recognizes a really existent idea wherever a group of things is called by the same name, gives place in the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, the *Timaeus*, and, as I hope hereafter to shew, some other dialogues, to a far more elaborate theory, a theory of natural kinds, having its foundation in idealism.

omission, I should still think it worth while to attempt the reconstruction of the later system from the notices preserved by Aristotle, which are, I conceive, sufficient to shew that the new theory was a theory of natural kinds.

HENRY JACKSON.

2 *Jan.* 1884.

ON THE PROBABLE ORDER OF COMPOSITION OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*.

The object of this paper is in the first place to comment upon a passage in the Fourth Book of the *Nicomachean ethics* which seems to me to have an important bearing upon the question of the order in which the discussion of the several Virtues, considered as Means, was written; secondly, to consider my view of this passage in connection with certain other indications to be found elsewhere in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian ethics;* and lastly, having stated what I consider to have been the probable order in which the Virtues were originally described by Aristotle, to attempt an explanation which may account for the adoption by him of this particular order.

In Books III. and IV. of the *Nicomachean ethics* (as we have them) Aristotle is engaged with the successive discussion of the particular Moral Virtues. This separate analysis begins at the end of III. 5, 1114 b 26, and is thus introduced: *κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ· ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς, ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.* The discussion on Courage (III. 6—9, 1115 a 5—1117 b 20) is followed by that on Temperance, which occupies the remaining chapters of Book III. At the beginning of Book IV. are the words on which I propose to comment:

> *ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης· λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι περὶ χρήματα*

μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. IV. 1 § 1, 1119 b 19—26.

I quote from the text of Susemihl (1880): the only variation from Bekker's text is that Susemihl omits an article after *εἶναι*, which Bekker has inserted. Bekker's notes on the readings of the passage are: *ἡμῖν* om L^b || 22. *λέγομεν* L^bM^b et pr H^a || *δὲ καὶ ἐξῆς* K^b || *ἡ* om $L^bM^bO^b$ || 24. *ὁ* om M^b.

It will be observed that Aristotle begins his account of Liberality by distinguishing the sphere of it from that of the Virtues already treated of; for clearly *ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς* corresponds to Courage, and *ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων* to Temperance. We observe, moreover, that the two expressions occur in the same order as the discussion of their counterparts in the preceding Book.

But this is not all; Aristotle has added the words *οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν*, and the question immediately suggests itself—why are they added? This question can only be answered in one way, and the answer must be that in the analysis of the particular Moral Virtues *Aristotle had already treated of Justice before he came to deal with Liberality, as discussed in the present Book.* For the same reason we must go yet further, and say that the discussion of Justice *alone* intervened between the descriptions of Temperance and Liberality.

The passage which seems to contradict this view is II. 7, in which we have what appears to be, at first sight, an indication of the general order in which the author intends to deal with the particular Moral Virtues, and a distinct statement that Justice is to be taken last of all: *ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητες εἰσίν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.* II. 7 § 16, 1108 b 7—10. If we accept, then, the conclusion drawn from the addition of *οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν* to *οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων* in IV. 1 § 1, we must necessarily bracket II. 7, or at least the last

sentence of it just now quoted—it is not sufficient to obelize the last clause, *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν*, as does Sir A. Grant for the reasons (1) that the term *λογικαὶ* is used, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus applied to the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*, (2) that Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to shew how the intellectual excellences were *μεσότητες*, (3) that an interpolation is extremely likely here. As additional evidence that the whole of the last sentence is spurious, we have only to note the fact that the distinction between *two* kinds of Justice is assumed in the abrupt *περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν*, though no hint of it has been before given, in a way which is inconceivable on the supposition that the sentence was written by Aristotle.

As to the question whether we should (1) bracket the whole of II. 7, or (2) only the last section of it, the simpler supposition is that the whole chapter is spurious. For, on the assumption that § 16 only should be condemned, how are we to account for the omission of *δικαιοσύνη* from a *διαγραφή* or list of the Virtues, which the writer gives in the earlier part of the chapter which the assumption treats as genuine?

This conclusion, at which we have incidentally arrived from the consideration of IV. 1 § 1, has been adopted by Susemihl, who brackets the whole of II. 7 in his text of the *Nicomachean ethics* (1880), referring to Eucken, and to a paper by Mr D. B. Monro in the *Journal of Philology* VI. (pp. 185—188). In this paper, to which I shall again have to refer, Mr Monro decides against the genuineness of the chapter on grounds entirely different from those here adduced.

It seems difficult to see upon what system of classification Aristotle based the order of his discussion of the several Moral Virtues. Did he found it upon a *διαγραφή* of the Virtues similar to that which the author of II. 7 seems to give us, or to the *ὑπογραφή* of the *Eudemian ethics*?

Now in the latter *ὑπογραφή*, which is given for the purpose merely of illustrating the statement that the Virtues are Means—*παραδείγματος ἕνεκα* (1220 b 36)—the order of enu-

meration has clearly not been adjusted to suit the order of the subsequent separate treatment of them. The *ὑπογραφή* is as follows (1220 b 38—1221 a 12), the Virtues occupying the right-hand column:

ὀργιλότης	*ἀναλγησία*	*πραότης*
θρασύτης	*δειλία*	*ἀνδρία*
ἀναισχυντία	*κατάπληξις*	*αἰδώς*
ἀκολασία	*ἀναισθησία*	*σωφροσύνη*
φθόνος	*ἀνώνυμον*	*νέμεσις*
κέρδος	*ζημία*	*δίκαιον*
ἀσωτία	*ἀνελευθερία*	*ἐλευθεριότης*
ἀλαζονεία	*εἰρωνεία*	*ἀλήθεια*
κολακεία	*ἀπέχθεια*	*φιλία*
ἀρέσκεια	*αὐθάδεια*	*σεμνότης*
τρυφερότης	*κακοπάθεια*	*καρτερία*
χαυνότης	*μικροψυχία*	*μεγαλοψυχία*
δαπανηρία	*μικροπρέπεια*	*μεγαλοπρέπεια*
πανουργία	*εὐήθεια*	*φρόνησις.*

It is curious that *ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, δίκαιον* and *ἐλευθεριότης* occur here in identically the same order as has been assigned by me to their discussion in Aristotle's treatise from a consideration of the passage (IV. 1 § 1) which is the primary subject of this paper. At the same time it must be admitted that the order in which some of the other Moral Virtues are taken by Aristotle is different from that of the *ὑπογραφή* of Eudemus; though some of these variations, on the supposition that Aristotle had before him a similar *διαγραφή*, may well be accounted for (1) by the close connection between certain Virtues which are separated in the *διαγραφή*, and the manifest convenience of treating them in juxtaposition, e.g., particularly, *ἐλευθεριότης* and *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, and (2) by the fact that Aristotle separates from the rest those which in his view can scarcely with propriety be called Virtues, e.g., *αἰδώς* which is third in order in Eudemus' *ὑπογραφή*, but in the *Nicomachean ethics* is treated of at the end of Book IV. as we have it. The same remark would apply to the fifth in Eudemus' list, *νέμεσις*, which is placed by the author of II. 7, after *αἰδώς*, and which

may accordingly be reasonably supposed to have been treated as a Mean between two Extremes after *αἰδώς* had been disposed of.

It would seem, then, not improbable that the order of discussion of some at least of the Virtues may have been suggested to Aristotle by a *διαγραφή* of them. Mr Monro, however, in his paper above referred to, says: "It is not like Aristotle to make use of a list of the kind, much less to found an argument upon it as though it were something well known and accepted." Now it is not pretended that Aristotle would be likely to found an argument upon an apparently arbitrary classification embodied in a *διαγραφή*; but it is by no means clear that the statement, of which Mr Monro gives no proof, that it is not like Aristotle to make use of such a list, is correct. Indeed, that Aristotle should have made use of a *διαγραφή* of the kind seems to me highly probable, from the following considerations:

(1) Certain treatises of Aristotle have come down to us in a form which is so disconnected and crude, that it may reasonably be suspected that they are mere collections of lecture-notes and not finished treatises—sometimes perhaps not even being Aristotle's own notes, but those taken by pupils. If, then, it is reasonable to suppose that some of Aristotle's works were redactions from his lectures, and therefore that his lectures exercised considerable influence upon the form which his treatises took, we may apply the same principle of criticism to the *Nicomachean ethics* as has been applied to Aristotle's other treatises, and assert accordingly that their form may have been affected by the system which the author employed in his lectures. Indeed, what more natural than to suppose that Aristotle, when lecturing upon the Virtues as Means between two Extremes, should have put down for the benefit of his pupils (as a modern lecturer might write on a black-board) a list or *διαγραφή* of the Virtues along with the corresponding Extremes, for the purpose of illustrating his theory, if for nothing else—that the *διαγραφή* should have become fixed and as it were stereotyped from the time when it was first given, unconsciously perhaps, but none the less surely—that the same

list should have been found convenient, and accordingly made use of by Aristotle as a memorandum of the several subjects which were to be discussed at a later stage, so that, when he came to consider the Moral Virtues one by one, he took them in the order in which he had before enumerated them in the διαγραφή?

(2) It is clear that by some means or other before the time of Eudemus and of the writer of II. 7, the διαγραφή had actually become stereotyped, and was used by them as a classification universally recognised and familiar. This is proved by the use of the definite article with the word denoting the list by both these writers. We find, namely, in the *Eudemian ethics*, 1220 b 36, εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς, and in *Nic. eth.* II. 7, 1107 a 32, λεπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.

(3) The consideration however which to my mind proves most decisively that it is probable that Aristotle based the order of his discussion to some extent upon some διαγραφή of the Virtues, is the fact that the author of II. 7 thought so too. That chapter is undoubtedly meant as a sort of programme of what is to follow. Accordingly the order of enumeration there is that of the subsequent discussion in detail. Now although this order is different from that of Eudemus' ὑπογραφή, and therefore presumably from the list that was current in his time, the author of II. 7 nevertheless pretends that in giving Aristotle's order he is giving the order of a διαγραφή. Hence he must have supposed Aristotle's order to be itself based, in the first instance, upon a διαγραφή of this kind.

I conclude, then, that it is likely that Aristotle based the order of his treatment of the Moral Virtues to some extent upon a διαγραφή similar to the ὑπογραφή of Eudemus, without however regarding it as valuable in any other way than as a convenient memorandum of subjects.

To return now to the original subject of this paper—the order in which Aristotle actually analysed the several Moral Virtues. At all events the ὑπογραφή of Eudemus is instructive as shewing that even he did not find it necessary in an enumeration of the Virtues as Means to isolate Justice as a Mean

from the other Virtues similarly considered, in the way in which it is isolated in II. 7. Hence the view which I take that the order in Aristotle's discussion was *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, κ.τ.λ.* is in no way contradicted by the supposition that a *διαγραφή* formed the basis of the order, but is rather supported by it.

It formed, then, no part of Aristotle's plan to defer the consideration of Justice until all the other Moral Virtues had been disposed of, nor, probably, to treat it in the elaborate fashion of Book V. The conclusion, accordingly, which I have drawn from IV. 1 § 1, that the discussion of *δικαιοσύνη* was written between the descriptions of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἐλευθεριότης*, furnishes an additional reason for believing that Book V. of the *Nicomachean ethics* belongs in reality to the Eudemian treatise.

The order in which the Virtues are taken in the *Eudemian ethics* is very similar to that followed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean treatise. Eudemus, however, certainly defers the consideration of Justice to the end of the analysis, and introduces it with the words, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν, περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον* (1234 b 13). But there is in the *Eudemian ethics* no half-programme, half-*διαγραφή*, to introduce the particular consideration of the Virtues, such as we find in *Nic. eth.* II. 7. Eudemus' introduction is as follows: *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητες εἰσί τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὗται προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας* (1228 a 23—26).

With reference to II. 7 of *Nic. eth.* I would suggest that it was written later than the time when Books V. VI. VII. of the *Nicomachean ethics* were inserted in it from the Eudemian treatise, whether to supply the place of something lost, or to replace existing books; and that the chapter was the work of some well-meaning person who wished to harmonise the treatise in its new form, and to account for the late appearance in it of the discussion on Justice, thinking that such an explanation was necessary to make the mutilated ethics present a respect-

able appearance. His work, however, was clumsy and unlike Aristotle, and it has been inserted, whether by the writer himself or by some later person, in a place where its irrelevance makes it all the more incongruous. As regards the form of it, the chapter is particularly unfortunate. It is neither solely a recapitulation, nor solely a programme—it is rather a compound of the two, a recapitulation-programme. It was arrived at, no doubt, as a recapitulation; but the author has tried to justify his insertion of a recapitulation in the place where a programme might have been expected, by twisting it into a *διαγραφή*, as he calls it, hoping that so it would look more like a programme. That it is not a *διαγραφή* which deserves to be called *ἡ διαγραφή* as being the familiar and well known one is proved by the isolation of Justice and the general dissimilarity to the *ὑπογραφή* of Eudemus.

There is one other passage to which reference must be made, owing to its bearing on the view here given of the order of Aristotle's treatise as it originally stood. At the close of the last chapter of Book IV., as we have it, stand the words *νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν* (1128 b 35). I cannot think that these words are Aristotle's. They may very well be the work of the same hand who wrote II. 7, and must be rejected along with that chapter. They seem to shew that the writer of them was, like Eudemus, particularly impressed by the importance of Justice, as compared with the other Virtues, and to betray a feeling of exultation that the opportunity has at length arrived for launching into his favourite subject. At any rate, the words seem very unlike Aristotle. Aristotle's manner seems rather to be to make his transitions by means of a sentence, in which the first half summarises as briefly as possible the results of the inquiry immediately preceding or merely the subject of it, while the second half gives the subject of that which follows. This transitional sentence is typified by the transition in Eudemus' treatise which corresponds to the words we are now discussing, *περὶ μὲν οὖν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν, περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον* (1234 b 13). Instances occur *passim* in Aristotle, so that quotation is unnecessary. I should mention that these words,

νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν (1128 b 35), are already bracketed by Susemihl, after Prof. Ramsauer.

Now that I have stated the view, to which a consideration of certain significant passages in the Nicomachean and Eudemian treatises has led me, namely that (1) the Moral Virtues were originally discussed in the order, *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, κ.τ.λ.* and that (2) this order was a stereotyped one for Aristotle, it remains to inquire (1) whether there are indications in other Aristotelian treatises which support this view, (2) whether we can discover in other treatises any reason why the list of Virtues became stereotyped for Aristotle in this particular order, and (3) whether by the same inquiry we can throw any light upon the question of where the Intellectual Virtues were intended to be placed.

It will be useful in particular to collect from Aristotle's other works any lists of Virtues which may occur; for it is from the consideration of them that we may expect to obtain most information on the subject to be investigated. I shall therefore enumerate such lists of the kind as I have been able to discover.

In the *rhetoric* which is probably an earlier work than the *ethics*, we read

(*a*) I. 6 § 9, 1362 b 12. *δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς.*

(*b*) I. 9 § 5, 1366 b 1. *μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία.*

Of these two lists it will be seen that the second is the more complete and the only variation in the order (so far as the first list extends) is that *μεγαλοπρέπεια* and *μεγαλοψυχία* change places. Now we observe that in both lists the three Virtues *δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη* come together; but the order is different from that which I have assigned to them in the *ethics* in that *δικαιοσύνη* is first instead of third. The

reason, however, is not far to seek, for in the next section Aristotle says *ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν...εἶτα ἡ ἐλευθεριότης*. It is evidently accidental that *ἐλευθεριότης* is placed after *μεγαλοψυχία*, for in the short description of each, which follows, the order is *δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, φρόνησις*. By combining the slight variations in the three places, we get an order: *δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, πραότης, φρόνησις*. Allowing as above for the occurrence of *δικαιοσύνη* in the first instead of the third place, the resemblance between this order and that followed in the *ethics* is sufficiently striking. That *δικαιοσύνη* cannot have come *first* in the *ethics* is proved by the sentence *καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας* (1115 a 6). Bearing in mind that the *rhetoric* is an early work of Aristotle we can deduce from it evidence which is on the whole favourable to my view.

But the *rhetoric* is also important as showing that even at the time when it was written Aristotle had already made his distinction between the Moral and Intellectual Virtues: the last of the short descriptions of the Virtues in I. 9 begins thus: *φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας*. Hence we have an indication that in the *ethics* he would defer the consideration of the Intellectual Virtues until the Moral Virtues had been disposed of.

Turning now to the *politics* for passages enumerating in connection different Virtues, we find:

(*a*) at page 1259 b 21, *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερόν ἐστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων*.

(*b*) 1260 a 21, *οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία, ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική*.

(*c*) 1277 b 17, *καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία.*

(*d*) 1323 a 28, *οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως.*

From these passages it is clear that Aristotle continually associated in his mind the three Virtues, *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*. The last passage (*d*) gives the three in the same order which I claim for them in the *Nicomachean ethics*, while the first two passages (*a*) and (*b*) also put *δικαιοσύνη* last of the three. We notice, moreover, that the four Virtues in (*d*) are *the four Platonic Virtues*.

Turning, accordingly, to the *republic* 427 E, we find the Platonic Socrates saying of his State, *δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφή τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία*. He then goes on to inquire into the *σοφία* and *ἀνδρεία* of a State and then doubts whether he can discover *δικαιοσύνη* (which is the final object of his search—*οὗ δὴ ἕνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν*, 430 D) before he has considered *σωφροσύνη* also; when this is done he says there is only one left, namely *δικαιοσύνη*. Then follows the remark (435 B) that these Virtues are the same for the man as for the state, and the division of *ψυχή* into the *λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν, σοφία* being assigned to the *λογιστικόν, ἀνδρεία* to the *θυμοειδές*, and *σωφροσύνη* to the *ἐπιθυμητικόν, δικαιοσύνη* being the universal Virtue. For the order of arrangement, too, we may compare 442 B, foll.

Now references in the *politics* to the *republic* of Plato are what we should expect to find, even if no acknowledgment were made by the author, but the very distinct indication conveyed by *καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης* in the passage[1]

[1] The remark is true even if we read *Σωκράτης*, but the reference is still more pointed if we adopt the reading of P[4] (after Mr Cook Wilson in *Journal of Philology* x. 86), *ὁ Σωκράτης*.

(*b*) above given, in connection with the mention of three Platonic virtues, makes me more than ever inclined to believe that the inseparable association in Aristotle's mind of the three Virtues *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*, was due entirely to the influence of Plato.

Having stated in the earlier part of this paper that the order of Aristotle's original discussion was *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία κ.τ.λ.*, and that this order was that of a *διαγραφή* written or unwritten, I venture to suggest further that the reason why the Virtues occur in the *διαγραφή* in this order is that *Aristotle adopted the three Virtues directly from Plato, to head his own list.* Plato in fact had given the Virtues thus—*σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*, and Aristotle, having already at the time of the composition of the *rhetoric* made up his mind that the Intellectual Virtues should be treated separately, left out *σοφία* and took the remaining three to begin his own *διαγραφή*.

As the remaining Virtues are not treated as cardinal by Plato, and are therefore little considered by him in comparison with the Four, Aristotle need not necessarily have been indebted to Plato for the order in which he discusses them, though it is a little curious that *ἐλευθεριότης* and *μεγαλοπρέπεια* are associated with *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* in *republic* 402 C—*τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά.* Cf. also 536 A.

We have good evidence that Aristotle is indebted to Plato for the arrangement of his first three Virtues in a passage of the *Nicomachean ethics*, III. 10 § 1, 1117 b 23 *μετὰ δὲ ταύτην* (sc. *ἀνδρείαν*) *περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.* Sir A. Grant has mistaken the bearing of this passage, but Zeller (II. 2, pp. 637—8) has pointed out that Aristotle is here undoubtedly Platonising—"Wenn A. diese Erörterung mit den Worten eröffnet: *μετὰ δὲ ταύτην.....αἱ ἀρεταί*, so bezieht sich diess auf die platonische Tugendlehre." In fact Aristotle is here evidently stating *σωφροσύνη* to be the virtue of the one *ἄλογον μέρος*, i.e. Plato's *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, and *ἀνδρεία* that of the other,

i.e. the *θυμοειδές*. This is not the true Aristotelian doctrine, for (1) It is not the doctrine of the treatise *de anima*, in which we should expect to find Aristotle's matured theory. For there, in answer to the question, in what sense we are entitled to speak of *μόρια ψυχῆς*, whether each function is *ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ* (II. 2 § 7, 413 b 13), we are distinctly told that we can only *logically* separate them: *περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ τινές φασιν· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν* (II. 2 §§ 9, 10, 413 b 24). Cf. also III. 9. (2) Neither is it reconcileable with the modified Aristotelian doctrine of *Nic. eth.* I. 13, where *ψυχή* is divided into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον*, the *ἄλογον* being again subdivided into the *θρεπτικόν* and *ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου.* Here (if we assume that Aristotle is adopting the phraseology of *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, and recognising actual *μέρη* of *ψυχή*, as he certainly does elsewhere in the *ethics* and *politics*, e.g. *pol.* 1333 a 16 *διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον*, and *a fortiori* if we do not, bearing in mind that in *de anima* III. 9 § 2, 432 a 26, he expressly controverts this theory of the division of *ψυχή* into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον* as *μέρη* along with the Platonic tripartite division) we certainly cannot find two *ἄλογα μέρη* whose Virtues are respectively *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*. Prof. Ramsauer lays us under an obligation by proving, in his note upon the passage *Nic. eth.* III. 10 § 1 which shows Aristotle to be Platonising, that it is inconsistent with I. 13, and so far we can follow him; but we shall not be likely for that reason to adopt his convenient remedy of bracketing the former.

I am aware that my enumeration of more or less complete lists of Virtues given in treatises of Aristotle other than the *ethics* is probably far from being exhaustive; but its completeness or incompleteness is indeed of little moment. In the first

place the passages which I have quoted must be allowed to be the most significant, for (1) the *rhetoric* is generally admitted to be an earlier work and to contain the germ of much that was afterwards developed in the *ethics*, while (2) the passages from the *politics* and the remarks on the particular Virtues in the *ethics* have this point in common, that, while in the former Aristotle pointedly indicates the authority to whom he refers, his obligations to Plato are no less palpable in the latter. Secondly, my view of the order of discussion of the Virtues in the *ethics* does not depend for proof upon such passages: the coincidences in the case of those which I have quoted are certainly noticeable, but the really important result which follows from them is that for Aristotle the three Virtues, *ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη*, were the Virtues *par excellence*, occurred to him naturally whenever he thought fit to remark upon a particular Virtue in illustration of a general statement, and were always closely associated in his mind. It would be an almost endless task to enumerate the passages in the *ethics* in which, with the mention of Virtues, one or two are taken as types, while the rest are grouped under the term *αἱ ἄλλαι*. If one or two or three are so taken, it is from the cardinal three that Aristotle usually takes them, indulging in all possible permutations. Sometimes a fourth is associated with the three, as in Book x. *ἐλευθεριότης* (cf. x. 8 § 4, 1178 a 28, and § 6, 1178 b 14); this agrees very well with the place which it occupies at the beginning of Book iv.

There is another treatise which, though in reality a very small tract and in itself insignificant, must yet be allowed to have some importance in relation to the question which we are discussing. It is the tract *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*, which is given in the Berlin Aristotle after the *Eudemian ethics* (pp. 1249—1251). Of its authorship and date Zeller says (iii. 1, p. 648) "Auch ihr Ursprung steht nicht ganz sicher; doch macht theils ihre Aufnahme in die aristotelische Sammlung theils die ganze Art, wie sie ihren Gegenstand behandelt, wahrscheinlich, dass sie aus der peripatetischen, nicht der akademischen Schule herstammt, u. s. w."

The author of this tract has grounded his work upon the

Platonic distinction of three parts of the soul, and has attempted to classify according to this distinction not only the four cardinal Virtues, but all those which made up the Aristotelian list. Thus we find (1249 a 30) *τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἀρετή ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, τοῦ δὲ θυμοειδοῦς ἥ τε πραότης καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἥ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ὅλης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία.* The author then enumerates the corresponding vices. After defining them a little more explicitly, he considers them all in greater detail, first the virtues, and secondly the vices. Thus we have what amounts to three successive enumerations of the virtues and vices, and there is nowhere any variation in the order. The Moral Virtues are in this tract too given in the same order as we have assigned to them in the *ethics* so far as *ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία* are concerned.

Now the identity of this order with Plato's, and with Aristotle's as I have ventured to state it, is of considerable importance. For we should expect a later Peripatetic to adhere strictly to the order followed by his master; and it is surely significant that while so doing he attempts to harmonize it with the Platonic division of the Soul.

T. L. HEATH.

Trin. Coll.
Feb. 4, 1884.

STARE IN HORAT. *SAT.* I. 9. 39.

ventum erat ad Vestae, quarta iam parte diei
praeterita; et casu tunc respondere vadato
debebat, quod ni fecisset, perdere litem.
'si me amas,' inquit 'paulum hic ades.' 'inteream si
aut valeo stare, aut novi civilia iura,
et propero quo scis.' 'dubius sum, quid faciam' inquit;
'tene relinquam, an rem.'

This passage, with the whole satire on 'the bore' in which it occurs, is so familiar that no long introduction will be necessary in discussing it. 'We had arrived,' says the poet, describing his compulsory walk with the pertinacious intruder, 'at the place and the hour of legal business; it happened that my companion had to appear to a summons, under pain of losing the action. He begged me to support him in court (*adesse*). I pleaded ignorance of law and my previous engagement. After some hesitation, he went on with me.' The language, otherwise simple, presents one obvious difficulty in the words *aut valeo stare*. Prof. A. Palmer, the most recent editor, I think, writes as follows—"*valeo stare:* (1) 'If I am able to appear as an advocate in court,' *stare* = *adesse*, for which meaning Mr Beare quotes Plaut. Men. 5. 2. 47: *hinc stas illinc causam dicis.* So also Rud. 4. 4. 57: *atque nunc abs te stat: verum hinc cibit testimonium.* (2) 'If I am strong enough to stand so long': so Comm. Cruq. (3) 'If I can stop': so Porph., who says *negat se posse eum expectare.*" This simple juxta-position of the three interpretations seems to indicate that none of them

satisfies the editor. In fact, the first and third appear impossible on linguistic grounds, while the second, the only one, as I conceive, which the uses of *valere* and *stare* admit, is almost nonsense. Even if it were clear, which it is not, that *stare* could be used, as in (3), absolutely for *to wait*, still *valeo stare* could only mean 'I have the power in myself to stop,' not 'I am at liberty under the circumstances to stop.' The English 'I can stop' is ambiguous between these meanings, and this ambiguity covers the mistranslation. The first rendering avoids this objection, but only to encounter one equally strong in *stare*, the evidence alleged for *stare* = *adesse* (in the technical sense) being surely inadequate. In neither of the Plautine passages is there any difficulty in translating by the simple *stand*. The context indeed shows that 'stand on that side' and 'stand on your side' probably have in these places a metaphorical meaning, 'be on your side in the dispute,' as well as the literal 'stand by you,' but this is far different from what we require for the passage of Horace. As for (2), there is, in the first place, no reason for supposing that an *advocatus*, in the Roman sense, would necessarily have to stand a long time (it must be remembered that he did not always or commonly make a speech), and further, a man who is met out for a walk and who represents that he is "hurrying" to a sick friend would scarcely excuse himself on the ground of extreme debility from one of the commonest offices in Roman society.

If, then, the choice lay between these three, I should prefer to give the passage up. But I think we can prove the possibility of something better—"*If you love me*," *said he*, "*support me for a short time in court*." "*May I be confounded*," *said I*, "*if I have either any talent in that way or any knowledge of law*." Had the MSS. given *ista re* instead of *stare*, the meaning would have been obvious; after *valeo, nil valeo* (to which *inteream si valeo* is here equivalent), *multum valeo, plus valeo*, etc. an ablative is constantly used to express the sort of power, faculty, or efficacity which is meant. The dictionary will furnish abundant examples, such as *valere equitatu, armis, ingenio, opibus*, etc. Here *ista re* would mean *in the business you mention*, viz. *τῷ adesse*, in the function of an *advocatus*. Further, *ista re* is

actually admissible in metre, and if it were certain that Horace would have so written the words, it would not be a very bold correction to restore them. I believe, however, that even this change is not necessary. The MSS. of Plautus contain several examples which show that the contracted forms *staec* for *istaec*, *stac* for *istac*, etc. were at one time actually written, and it is probable that *iste* and its derivatives were in colloquial Latin frequently so pronounced. Now the *Sermones* of Horace are full, as might be expected, of colloquial phrases, for which we can often find parallels, if at all, only in the older colloquial Latin of the comedians. (See Prof. Palmer, *Preface*, p. xxiii, citing among many others *verba dare, serva* (look out!), *aufer, noster, sodes.*) This satire in particular, representing casual talk in the street, abounds with such phrases, as the commentaries will show, for example, *ut nunc est* 5, *cupio omnia quae vis* ib., *numquid vis?* 6, *sodes* 41, *Maecenas quomodo tecum?* 43 etc. It does not seem unlikely that even in the time of Horace pronuntiations like *'sta* for *ista* were often to be heard in careless speech, and they would be likely to hold their place especially in set phrases frequently required, such as the *nil valeo 'sta re* of our hypothesis. And if this was the pronuntiation, there could be no reason why Horace, when trying, like Plautus, to reproduce the language of ordinary life, should not do as Plautus did, and write what was actually said.

A. W. VERRALL.

PLATO *THEAETETUS* 190 C.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου.

In a paper in the *Journal of Philology* XII 297 Archer-Hind maintains that the last sentence of this extract (which I have printed as it appears in the Clarkianus) should stand *ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν τῷ μέρει περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου*, the words *ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν* being rejected as the comment of an annotator. That Archer-Hind is substantially right in his reconstruction of the text, I am convinced. But I suspect that the original had *ἐν μέρει*, rather than *ἐν τῷ μέρει*. In the present note I propose, at once, to say something in justification of this suspicion, and to attempt an answer to the question with which Peipers (*die Erkenntnisstheorie Plato's* 695) meets Wohlrab, and, mutatis mutandis, might meet Archer-Hind: "What did the annotator mean by his comment?" "Was sollte jener Leser mit den Worten *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν* beabsichtigt haben?"

I conceive that the words *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν*, which in B (Clarkianus) are part of the text, and in T (Venetus) are added by the second hand, were once a marginal note to the following effect: "over the words *ἐν μέρει*, the words *ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν*." That is to say, the writer of the marginal note records the fact that, over the words *ἐν μέρει*

which occurred in the text, his original had the note *ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν.*

The history of the passage will then be as follows: first, there was MS[1] which had

ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον
τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα
ταὐτόν ἐστιν
ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν μέρει περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου:

secondly, the scribe who copied MS[1] wrote in MS[2]

ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν μέρει περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν

i.e. he transferred to the margin the interlinear note, prefixing the words *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει* to localize it:

thirdly, the scribe who copied MS[2] wrote in MS[3]

ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου

i.e. he substituted for the words *ἐν μέρει* the whole of the marginal note upon those words, thus reducing the text to the form in which the Clarkianus presents it.

In short, I conceive that *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν* is a note which embodies an earlier note together with a reference to the text sufficient for its localization: so that, paradoxical as it may seem, the words in question, while they confess themselves to be intruders, preserve the original which they have displaced.

I read then *ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν μέρει περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου.*

HENRY JACKSON.

14 *February*, 1884.

I. נעתם Isaiah ix. 18 (19).

Commentators and lexicographers still explain this *ἀπ. εἰρ.* after LXX *συγκαυθήσεται* (Al. *συγκέκαυται*), claiming for this rendering the support of the Tgm., and justifying it etymologically by the Arabic غَتَّم *suffocating heat.* But the true reading of the Tgm. is not חרוכת ארעא, where the *ō* as characteristic vowel is in itself suspicious, but חרובת, as is attested by the Cod. Reuch., by Abulwalīd s. v. עתם, and by Ḳimḥī in his commentary, according to the excellent MS of the Cambridge University Library (Add. 482), which has חרבת. The Septuagint rendering therefore stands quite alone, and the etymological argument for it is also worthless. In *ghatm,* as in the synonymous and apparently cognate *ghamm,* the notion of heat is secondary and accidental; the determining idea of both words is clogging or obstruction of the voice and breath. Alike unsupported by etymology and exegetical tradition the LXX rendering is either a mere guess or represents some such variant as נִצְתָּה.

The later tradition is not favourable to the integrity of the text. With the Tgm. agrees the Syro-Hex. ܚܫܘܒ, which implies a form like *ἠρήμωται* in the Greek. On the other hand Pesh. ܐܬܚܒܠ, Jerome *conturbata est terra,* Saʿadia اضطرب البلد give a divergent form of Jewish tradition. It is curious, but probably accidental, that these last stand to the LXX as *συγκέχυται* to *συγκέκαυται,* two words which actually occur together as variants in Job xxx. 17.

The A. V. *is darkened* simply adopts through Kimḥī the ingenious guess of Abulwalīd after عتم IV. But in this sense the Arabic verb is denominative from عَتَمَة *late evening, the first part of the night*, which the native lexicographers derive, and apparently with justice, from the notion of tardiness. See especially the *Asās al-Balāgha*.

II. Isaiah x. 27, 28.

In the Massoretic text of v. 27 the words והבל על מפני שמן are unintelligible. In the Septuagint the words על מפני שמן appear not to be represented. For in the Vatican text the reading

ἀφαιρεθήσεται ὁ ζυγὸς αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὤμου σου
καὶ ὁ φόβος αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ σοῦ

is conflate, the first clause being a literal version and the second a paraphrase, freed from metaphor, of יסור סבלו מעל שכמך. The conflation appears clearly from the MS variations recorded by Holmes and Parsons, from which we learn that the order of the two clauses is uncertain, the Alexandrian and many other copies having

ἀφαιρεθήσεται ὁ φόβος αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ σοῦ
καὶ ὁ ζυγὸς αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὤμου σου,

while the Compl. and 15 *codices Sergii* omit *καὶ ὁ φόβος αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ σοῦ* altogether. The remainder of the LXX rendering is

καὶ καταφθαρήσεται ὁ ζυγὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ὤμων ὑμῶν

that is ועלו מצוארך יחבל

with the very slight change of ' for ו in the last word.

That this is the better reading is confirmed by rhythmical considerations. In the carefully balanced parallelism, where "yoke" answers to "burden" and "neck" to "shoulder," a verb in the second clause is certainly wanted, and the verb is in fact repeated in the parallel passage xiv. 25:

וסר מעליהם עלו
וסבלו מעל שכמו יסור

On the LXX reading the expression of the thought is complete and rounded; the third clause of the Massoretic text, with the repetition of the word "yoke," does not mend the limping second clause, but is only a third wheel in the cart.

Whence then come the words, ignored by the LXX, על מפני שמן? In verse 28 the prophet passes on abruptly to describe an Assyrian invasion of Judah from the North, beginning with the words "He has reached Aiath[1]." There is a good reason why the description should begin here, for in the 8th century, as in the time of Saul, the pass of Michmash was no doubt the frontier of the land of Benjamin. An advance upon this pass must necessarily take place by the road leading down from Dēr Dīwān (Ai or Aiath), and whether the enemy is to be conceived as marching from the heart of Mount Ephraim along the broad and easy flat that connects Ai with Bethel, or as ascending by the ancient road to Dēr Dīwān from the Jordan valley, the arrival at Ai and the formation of the army on the rolling plateau between that point and the village of Michmash would be the first thing visible to watchmen at Geba and Gibeah. The exact nature of the operations described depends on the localisation of Migron. I think it is easiest to suppose that this is the same place as the Migron which appears in 1 Sam. xiv. 2 as the furthest outpost of Saul's position at Gibeah. The name in that passage may be an appellative and not a true proper name (Thenius, Wellhausen), but that does not affect the argument; for at all events the reference in Samuel is to a well-known place, likely to retain its old designation, whether that was Migron or "The corn-floor." Saul held Migron to check a southward advance of the Philistines from Michmash; and it lay south of the pass. But this position suits our text also. The Assyrians would not attempt so dangerous an operation as the crossing of the pass of Michmash with their whole army without first seizing a point on the other side, and Migron, from what we have just seen, would be the very point to secure. Moreover the advance from Ai to the village of Michmash is a mere promenade of two or three

[1] LXX *εἰς τὴν πόλιν Αγγαι* represents a variant עַר (which they misread עֲר) for עַל. The sense is not affected.

miles by an easy road through country not held by the Judæans, so that to place Migron on this line and say "he has passed by Migron" would have little force. I take עבר ב = עבר על with ב in its frequent usage after verbs of attacking, and explain, "He has arrived at Aiath, he has fallen on Migron," *i.e.* has taken Migron by a *coup-de-main*. The passage thus secured, the heavy baggage is left on the northern side of the pass at the village of Michmash and the army defiles through the ravine.

But while the situation contemplated by the prophet can thus be clearly realised, one feels that the words בא על, "he has reached," are not quite in place in the very first clause of such a description. The opening word which naturally suggests itself is rather the familiar עלה, and only after a clause begun in some such way does a clause with בא appear natural. Now if we carry over the unintelligible על מפני שמן to v. 28 and point עָלָה = עָלָה we get the right beginning; and the ancient corruption, which so baffled the LXX that they omitted the clause, while Jewish tradition only escaped the difficulty by an allegory (Targum, "before the Messiah"), lies in מפני שמן. After עלה the מ is almost of necessity the preposition "from," but מפני can hardly be right. For this compound preposition, unless when it means "by reason of," governs the name of a person, with the one exception of Jer. i. 13, "with its face from the direction of the north," where the preceding פניו gives it a special colour. Nor again must one yield to the tempting idea that פני שמן is the corruption of some unknown place-name of South Ephraim. It is true that the ancient topography of this district is almost unknown; but no small place on the road beyond Ai would be visible from the Judæan watch-towers or could properly come into the prophet's vivid description. Beyond Ai this description must fall into generalities, and, as the Assyrian is the northern foe and here advances from the north, chap. xiv. 31 suggests מִצָּפוֹן (comp. Jeremiah's constant use of מצפון in a similar connection). The loss of a letter is a common source of corruption (*e.g.* עצת

Ps. xiv. 5 = עצמות Ps. liii. 6, see Merx, *Hiob*, p. lv) and מִפְּנֵי was the inevitable result of the loss of צ. For the remaining letters שמן we are practically shut up to read שדד (Isa. xxxi. 1)[1]. The corrupt clause then runs עָלָה מִצָּפוֹן שֹׁדֵד "the destroyer is come up from the north." There seems to be still one slight error in the passage. It is very questionable whether the Piel of חבל can be used in the sense which the passage requires. In parallelism with יסור we ought I think to read יֶחְדַּל "his yoke shall cease to gall thy neck." For חדל מן comp. Job vii. 16.

The whole passage will then run in the usual orthography

וְהָיָה בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא יָסוּר סֻבָּלוֹ מֵעַל שִׁכְמֶךָ
וְעֻלּוֹ מֵעַל צַוָּארֶךָ (צַוָּארֶיךָ) יֶחְדַּל׃
עָלָה מִצָּפוֹן שֹׁדֵד בָּא עַל (עַד) עַיָּת וגו"

In that day shall his burden depart from thy shoulder; and his yoke shall cease from off thy neck. The destroyer is come up from the north; he has reached Aiath, &c.

III. תפוח Canticles ii. 3, 5; vii. 9.

From the time of Celsius these passages have been quoted as favouring the view that the תַּפּוּחַ is not the apple (Arabic tuffāḥ) but the quince or some other fruit. Celsius pronounces for the quince, the chief arguments being from the fragrance and the restorative qualities ascribed to the *tappūăḥ*. But the quince has a distinct name not only in Arabic but in the Mishnah, and the Mishnic פָּרִישׁ is, as Löw remarks, undoubtedly a Hebrew word (*Aramäische Pflanzennamen* No. 109). Thus even Löw's concession that it is just possible that in Hebrew poetry the word *apple* may be used to cover the quince is uncalled for, if the true apple is known in Palestine and has the qualities referred to in Canticles. Both these things are easily proved. Tha'ālibī (*Laṭāifo 'l-ma'ārif*, ed. De Jong, p. 95) writes; "One of the specialities of Syria is its apples,

[1] For the possibility of מ = ד see Hos. x. 12, where ζωῆς (חיים) represents חסד.

which are proverbial for their beauty and excellence. Thirty thousand of them were brought to the Caliphs every year in cases (ḳirābāt); and it is said that they smelt sweeter in 'Irāḳ than in Syria." Similarly Moḳaddasī (ed. de Goeje p. 180) mentions apples as an article of export from Jerusalem. It has been questioned whether the sweetness and fragrance of Palestinian apples are such as to justify the language of Canticles. The passage from Tha'ālibī disposes of this objection; but one may also adduce the testimony of the Caliph Ma'mūn cited by Ḳazwīnī (ed. Wüstenfeld i. 250). The Caliph, be it remembered, presumably has in his eye the Syrian apples imported for his table. "In the apple" he says "the yellowness of the pearl is combined with the redness of gold[1] and the whiteness of silver; the eye luxuriates in its beauty, the sense of smell in its odour, and the palate in its taste." Further, as regards the restorative virtues ascribed to the tappūāḥ in Canticles, Celsius, in quoting from the Arabic, has overlooked the fact that very similar virtues are ascribed to the quince and to the apple. Both are said to strengthen the heart (see Ḳazwīnī *ut supra*, for the apple, and at p. 257 for the quince). In the *Kitābo 'l 'Oyūn* (*Frag. Hist. Ar.* ed. de Goeje i. 72) we read how, on the day when he was slain, Yazīd b. Mohallab, being weakened by a fever, sat on a chair watching the fray till the horse of his brother Ḥabīb rushed past without a rider, "and he said, By God, this is the horse of Abū Bisṭām, and I cannot think but that he is slain. And one of those who were with him said, I think it indeed is as thou sayest; and thou art smelling apples! For Yazīd had an apple by him and kept smelling it because of his weakness."

Thus the apple appears to satisfy every condition, and it is unnecessary to take the Biblical תפוח in any other sense than the word has in later Hebrew and in Arabic.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

[1] The golden hue of the apple here alluded to agrees with the phrase "apples of gold" in Prov. xxv. 11. Ḳazwīnī, *ut supra*, alludes to methods of cultivation by which the apple could be made ruddier. The citron, which some suppose to be meant by "apple of gold," bears a Persian name in all Semitic dialects, and therefore must be viewed as a late importation into Palestine.

NOTES IN LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

I.

[In the following notes, many of which have been communicated to the Oxford Philological Society, *Gloss. Labb.* = the glosses edited by Labbé, as printed in Valpy's Stephanus: *Gloss. Amplon.*, the glossaries in the Amplonian library at Erfurt, edited by Oehler in the *Neue Jahrbücher* Suppl. Band 13 (1847): *Gloss. Hild.*, the Paris glossary edited by Hildebrand: *Gloss. Ball.*, the glossary now in the library of Balliol College, assigned to the thirteenth century. This glossary is a very full collection of words, arranged on the whole, though not always with absolute precision, in alphabetical order. In general character it much resembles the compilation of Papias, and includes a large number of the words which are to be found there. So far as I have examined it I have discovered a very small number of words which may not be gleaned from other glossaries. I had thought *aequilocus* one of these, until it was published the other day from a much older collection by Löwe in the first number of the *Archiv für Lateinische Lexicographie und Grammatik.* Words marked * are not in the dictionaries either of Lewis and Short or of Georges (seventh edition). I have written (F.) after words which I have found in De Vit's Forcellini[1], but not in Georges or Lewis and Short.]

[1] I allude to the body of the work: for since these notes were written it has been pointed out to me that De Vit has collected most of the words in the printed glossaries in the *Glossarium* at the end of his lexicon. I still, however, think it worth while to asterisk words which are not to be found in Georges and Lewis and Short, the work of Georges being by far the most scholarly and critical of modern lexicons, and that of Lewis and Short being best known in England and America. It should be added that De Vit's *Glossarium* does not in the least relieve the student of the trouble of

**Ablĕgurīgo -ĭnis,* subst. fem. abstr. from *abligurrio,* voracity: Gloss. ap. Mai Class. Auct. 8 p. 54 *abligurigo consumptio, voracitas, dilapidatio.* The Balliol glossary gives *ablegurigine, voracitate.*

**Abominium -i,* subst. n., an execration, curse: Gloss. ap. Mai Class. Auct. 8 p. 58.

**Abstirpo -as,* to uproot: Gloss. Hild. and the Epinal Glossary, *averruncat abstirpat:* Gloss. Ball. *abstirpat obtruncat.*

**Abusitare, extra usum ducere:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 59.

**Adfector -ōris = interfector:* Gloss. Amplon. p. 258.

**Adhabito -as,* to live near: Gloss. Labb. *adhabito προσοικῶ* (F.).

**Admembratim,* adv., limb by limb: Gloss. Labb. *admembratim κατὰ μέλος.*

Ădordior, to begin: Gloss. Labb. *adordiri ἄρχεσθαι.*

**Aequiloquus,* adj., speaking justly: Gloss. Ball. *aequiloquus, iusta loquens.*

**Agellarius,* adj., rustic: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 8 *agellarius rusticus.*

**Albipedius,* adj., white-footed: Gloss. Amplon. p. 260 *albipedius* huitfot.

**Albura,* subst. f., whiteness: Gloss. Labb. *albura λεύκωμα.*

**Alburnus,* adj., white, or growing white: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6, *alburnum albescentem aut exalbidum:* Gloss. Ball. *alburno albescente: alburnum albidum:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 47 *alburnus albus.*

**Allătĕro:* Gloss. Ball. *adlaterati palmulis, qui circa latus palmas gerunt.*

**Allicula,* subst. f., glossed as *genus vestis:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6, Gloss. Ball.

**Altrīcŭla,* subst. f. dim. of *altrix,* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 44 *altricula parva nutrix.*

**Amatim,* adv., lovingly: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 43 *amatim, amanter, amabiliter, diligenter.*

consulting the glossaries. He has in many cases merely reprinted corrupt glosses without any attempt to emend them, or to combine them with other material.

**Amatrīcula,* subst. f. dim. of *amatrix,* Gloss. ap. Mai C'. Auct. 8 p. 43 *amatricula parva amatrix.*

**Ambusilla,* subst. f., glossed as = *venter* or *venter aqualicus:* Gloss. Ball., Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 49.

**Amplexim,* adv., jointly: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 59 *amplexim coniunctim.*

**Ancentus -ūs,* subst. m., military music intended to excite combatants: C. I. L. 10 4915 (Venafrum) *Martios ancentu gladiantes in arma vocavi:* where Mommsen says that the word ought certainly to be read for *accentus* in Ammian. 16 22 36, 24 4 22.

**Anclabilis,* verbal adj. from *anclo,* that can be drawn: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 49 *anclabilis hauribilis.*

**Anfărĭam* or *amfariam,* adv., on both sides: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6: Amplon. p. 259 (F.).

**Animicula,* subst. f. dim. of *anima:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 46 *animicula parva anima.*

**Antĕrĭtas,* subst. f., = *antiquitas:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, and 8 p. 51.

**Antĭgĕnus,* adj., born before: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, and Amplon. p. 264 *antigeni prius geniti.* Gloss. Labb. *antigena προγεννηθείς* (F.).

**Antĭgrăphŏn,* subst. n., a copy of a work. *Subscriptio* to the MSS. of Persius (the original belonging to the year 422 A.D.) *temptavi emendare sine antigrapho* (F. quotes the word from the Notae Tironianae).

**Anxiatim,* adv., anxiously: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 46 *anxiatim anxie, angenter.*

**Apĭfŏrĭum,* subst. n., a bee-hive: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 60 *apiforium locus unde volant apes, quod et apisterium et apiarium dicitur.*

**Apisterium* = foreg.

**Appallio -as,* to cloke, cover: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 59 *adpalliare tegere, velare.*

**Appressio, appressus -ūs,* abstracts from *appremo:* Gloss. Labb. *appressio, appressus, πρόσθλιψις.*

**Aquālĭcus -i,* and *aqualicum,* the stomach: Gloss. Labb. *aqualicum κοιλία χοίρου:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 *aqua-*

licum ventriculum: ib. vol. 8 p. 49 *ambusilla, venter, aqualicus.*

**Aqualium,* glossed as = *summa pars capitis:* Gloss. Ball., Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 8 p. 44: ib. vol. 7. In vol. 6 the form *aqualia* is given in the same sense.

**Aquilegium,* subst. n., a place where water collects: Gloss. Labb. *aquilegium κρουνός*: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 8 p. 45 gives (which is perhaps the same word) *aqualicium, guttarium, impluvium, imbrex, imbricium, aquagium.*

Arbiterium, = *collegium arbitrorum multorum:* Gloss. Ball., Amplon. p. 270, Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6.

**Archieunuchus -i,* a chief eunuch; Gloss. Ball.

**Arcuaticus,* adj., subject to jaundice: Class. Auct. ed. Mai vol. 7 2 121 (*folia verbenae*) *arcuaticis prosunt.*

**Arcutus,* bow-shaped, curved: Gloss. Labb., *arcutus τοξωτός, ἐπικαμπής.*

**Aretillum,* subst. n., a leak: Gloss. Labb. *aretillum ἀμπελόπρασον*: Amplon. p. 274 *aretillum porrus.*

**Argentĭlis,* adj., made of silver: Hagen's Anecdota Helvetica p. 109 (in the neuter).

**Argistērium,* subst. n.: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 57 *argisterium, stationes, nundinae.*

**Argutim,* adv.: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 46 *argutim argute, efficaciter, diserte.*

**Arilla, coccineus panniculus:* Gloss. Ball. Is this the true form of the gloss given in Placidus p. 11 (Deuerling) as *arilla coctione* (or *coactione*) *panniculario?*

**Arisso -as:* verb descriptive of the noise made by a crane: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 7, *arissat grus quando clamat, sicut et milvus iugit, canis baubat:* so (in a corrupt form) Gloss. Ball.

**Aristella,* dim. of *arista:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 48 *aristella parva arista* (F.).

**Armites, ὁπλῖται οἱ ἐν ἐσχάτῃ τάξει*: Gloss. Labb. (F.).

**Arrĭguus,* adj., = *obscene rigidus,* Gloss. Amplon. p. 274.

**Arrūmĭno -as, arrūmo -as,* to bring a report: Paulus p. 9 Müller *adrumavit, rumorem fecit, quod quidam a rumine, id est gutture, putant deduci.* The Balliol glossary gives the form *adrumino: arruminavit, rumorem attulit.*

**Artatio*, subst. fem. abstr. from *artare*: Gloss. Labb. *artatio στενοχωρία.*

**Artuosus*, adj., large-limbed (*?*): Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 43 *artuosus membratus, membrosus.*

**Arunculus*, subst., = *carbunculus*: Gloss. Amplon. p. 274

**Arvinosus*, adj. from *arvina:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 52 *arvinosus, crassus, carnulentus, esculentus.*

**Ascellula*, dim. of *ascella*, the wing of a bird or scale of a fish, Gloss. Ball., Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 7, *ascellulae pennae vel squamae.*

**Asciamalia*, subst. f., an implement combining axe and hammer: Gloss. Amplon. p. 274 *asciamalia ascius et malleus.*

**Asciatim*, adv., in the fashion of axe-work: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 45 *asciatim, dolatim, caesim, carptim, divisim.*

**Aspediscus -i*, subst., a hook: Gloss. Ball., Gloss. Amplon. p. 271 *aspediscos uncinos:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 57 *apediscus uncinus.*

**Aspergis*, subst., an instrument for sprinkling: Gloss. Labb. *asperges ῥαντιεῖς.*

**Assator*, subst. m. agent. from *assare*: Gloss. Labb. *assator ὀπτανεύς* (F.); Amplon. p. 274 *assator frixor.*

Assĭdēla, subst. f., a table at which people sit: Paul. p. 19 (Müller), Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 56 *assidela mensa ad quam adsidemus, quae et anclabris vocatur* (for *anclabris* see Paulus p. 11 Müller).

**Assuarius, qui assat:* Gloss. Amplon. p. 275.

**Assubicio -is*, to add: Gloss. Labb. *adsubicio προσεπιβάλλω* (F.).

**Assūra*, subst. f., a dish of roast meat: Gloss. Labb. *assurae παροπτά.* (In the sense of roasting, perhaps in Varro R. R. 3 9 1.)

**Aububulcus*, a shepherd: Gloss. Amplon. p. 265 *aububulcus pastor bovium* (surely for *ovium*).

**Aurator*, subst. m. agent. from *aurare*, a gilder: Gloss. Labb. *aurator χρυσωτής* (F.).

**Aurĭcus*, adj., belonging to the ear: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 47 *auricus...pertinens ad aures, ut pilos auricos dicimus qui sunt in aure.*

**Aurĭĕtas*, subst. f., the gleam of gold: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 *aurietas auri fulgor.*

**Aurĭlĕgium, congregatio auri:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 60.

**Ausio*, subst. f. abstr. from *audeo*, a venture: Gloss. Labb. *ausio τόλμημα.*

**Austro -as*, verb denom. from *auster*, to be stormy with the south wind: Gloss. Labb. *austrans νοτίζων.*

**Autumator*, subst. m. agent. from *autumo:* Gloss. Labb. *autumator ὀνομαστής.*

**Avigerulus -i*, subst. m., a seller of birds: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 47 *avigerulus qui aves gerit ad vendendum.*

**Avillus*, subst. m., a lamb just born: Paulus p. 14 Müller: Gloss. ap. Löwe Prodromus Gloss. p. 349.

**Cadulus -i*, dim. of *cadus:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 141 *cadulus, parvus cadus.*

**Caedecula*, dim. of *caedes:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 142.

**Calamaula -ae*, a reed flute: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. vol. 6 *calamaula canna de qua canitur:* so Papias. The masc. *calamaules*, a person who plays on such a pipe, is given in the Notae Tironianae.

**Calamizo -as*, glossed as = *laeta canto:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 154, Amplon. p. 285.

**Calasiris*, a long tunic in fashion among the Egyptians (see Herodotus 2 81). Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 151 *calastris* (i.e. *calasiris*) *genus tunicae:* the word should probably be restored to Paulus p. 51 (Müller) *calasis genus tunicae*, &c.

**Calculatim*, adv. from *calculare:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 139 *calculatim numeratim.*

Callopistia -ae (*καλλωπιστεία*), adornment: Servius Aen. 1 223 *est autem poetica callopistia non omnia exprimere.*

Capero -as. This word should in all probability be written *caperro:* the manuscripts of Nonius p. 8 give *caperrare est rugis frontem contrahere et asperare, tractum a caprorum frontibus crispis: Plautus Epidico* (609) *'quid illud est quod illi caperrat frons severitudine?'* So written, the line runs better than as given by Goetz and Löwe, *quid illud est quod caperet*

illi. On p. 173 the Harleian MS. of Nonius again gives *caperrat:* so the manuscript of Apuleius Met. 9 16, *caperratum supercilium.* Perhaps then the note of Placidus p. 29 (Deuerling) *caperassere, inrugare,* should be written *caperrare inrugare.*

Circumstantia. By the later rhetoricians this word is used as a translation of περίστασις in the sense of a specific circumstance or condition affecting a case: e.g. Fortunatianus 2 p. 83 (Halm) *nihil ab utroque ad probationem potest adferri deficiente circumstantia* (there being nothing specific in the case of either): Sulpicius Victor 2 (p. 314) *definitarum personarum circumstantia:* ib. 25 (p. 326) *personarum circumstantia; genus, natura, aetas, disciplina, fortuna, studium, nomen, ante facta, habitus:* Augustine Rhet. 7 (p. 141) *circumstantia rerum:* Iulius Victor 1 (p. 374) *circumstantiae partes sunt septem hae: qui, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis:* Sulp. Vict. 5 (p. 315) *incredibili circumstantia, ut si centum praemia petat qui tyrannicidia fecit centum.* So Isid. Orig. 2 15 2.

In the plural: Servius Aen. 2 384 *his circumstantiis ostendit, a paucis plures potuisse superari:* 3 613 *circumstantias omnes exsequitur, loci, personae, temporum:* Fortunatianus 2 1 (p. 103 Halm) *quot sunt circumstantiae? Persona, res, tempus, locus, modus, materia.*

* *Comparieticus,* adj., Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *comparietici consortes unius parietis.*

* *Compars:* (F.) Gloss. Hild. *conpartem participem: participem, compartem, consortem.* Is this the same gloss as that in Mai Cl. Auct. 6 printed *conpotem, conpossessorem?*

* *Conclassare, adiungere classem:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 and 7 (F.).

* *Concunctor,* to hesitate: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *concunctatus est, dubitavit.*

* *Coniero = coniuro,* Gloss. Hild. (Comp. *deiero, peiero.*)

Conrivalis (Quintil. Decl. 14 12): Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *conrivalem aemulum.*

Covinna and *covinnus.* There seems to be some evidence that *convinna* and *convinnus* were forms in use, in spite of the fact that the poets (Lucan 1 426, Martial 12 24 1, Silius 17 417)

shortened the first syllable. Mai's glossary (Cl. Auct. 6) gives *convinna vehiculi genus:* some manuscripts of Mela 3 6 5 (p. 74 Parthey) have *corvinnos, curvinnos, convinos:* the scholia to Lucan l.c. spell *quovenni, quovenna,* and *convinni.*

Crepor -ōris: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 and 7 *crepor sonus:* the Balliol glossary has *creporem ferri, seu catenarum sonum.*

Crimen alicuius in the sense of a reproach to a person. To the instances which I have quoted on Aen. 10 188 in the third edition of Conington's third volume add Seneca Contr. 2 12 1 (of an illegitimate child) *accede huc, puer, depositum, crimen meum,* 9 24 4 *adligatus (iacebat) Miltiades, crimen ingratae civitatis.*

**Decoriatio,* a stripping off of the skin: ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *decoriatio dehonestatio.*

**Deducticius,* having the status of a colonist or *deductus.* This word has been discovered by Mr A. Evans, who has kindly communicated it to me, in an inscription found by him near Scopia (Scupi) in Moesia Superior. *Q. Petronius M. F. Sca. Rufus Vet. Leg.* VII *C. P. F. Deducticius T. F. I.*

**Defrondo,* to strip of leaves: Servius Aen. 1 552 *stringere (remos) aut defrondare aut,* &c. De Vit would read this word for *defrudo* in Gloss. Labb.

**Deliciator* epulator. Gloss. Hild. Compare *delicior = epulor,* quoted by Löwe, Prodromus Glossariorum p. 381.

**Delico -as,* to draw aside: Gloss. Labb. *delicans παρελκες* (i.e. *delicas παρέλκεις*). Gloss. Hild. gives *delicat delirat: deliro* being apparently used transitively. Is this word the verb from which *delicatus* is formed?

**Delimatus, a lumine exclusus, exterminatus, expatriatus.* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 177. Read *deliminatus, a limine,* &c.

**Depegisse defixisse:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6. De Vit quotes Placidus p. 31 (Deuerling) *depegisse defixisse, a pangendo, vel transegisse, a paciscendo.*

**Deprobo,* to prove thoroughly: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *experiunt deprobant.* De Vit quotes the word from Maximus Taurinensis.

**Desiduus,* slothful: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, 8 p. 180, Hild. *desiduus desidiosus* (F.).

**Disrectum, divisum.* Gloss. Hild. This gloss confirms the view of *dirigo* which I expressed in a former number of this Journal.

**Dissuasorius,* dissuasive: Serv. Aen. 2 46 *ligno quasi dissuasorie.*

**Elactare, e lacte tollere:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, 7 and Papias.

**Eliquus,* clear, apparent. Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 7, *eliqua manifesta vel aperta.* Ib. 8 p. 194 *eliquus, purus.*

**Ēmacitas,* subst. from *ēmax,* emaciated, Papias: *emacitas macritudo.*

Ephippiare equum, ornare: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 199. Caesar (B. G. 4. 2) has the passive participle, *ephippiatos equites.*

**Exascere asperum fieri sicut vinum ascidum:* Mai 8 p. 193. Read *exacere—acidum.*

**Experio,* the active form of *experior.* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *experiunt deprobant.*

**Extrunco,* to pull up, trunk and all: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *extruncare, eruere, eradicare.*

Farcimen, ipsa species: Gloss. Amplon. and Epinal. Read *ensicii* or *insicii species.* The form *ensicium* is found in the old glossary in Mai's sixth volume, and *etsicium* and *esicium* in good MSS. of Apicius. See further Haupt's Opuscula, vol. 2 p. 181.

**Frondo,* to prune: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 7 *fronditur putatur* (? for *frondatur putatur*) Papias: *frondare, purgare, putare.*

**Gabbarus = insulsus, barbarus,* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 (F.).

**Ganeus, luxuriosus:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6.

**Garro -ōnis = garrulus:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6.

Gutta = στακτή: De Vit quotes Vulgate Ps. 44. 9 *myrrha et gutta et casia.* To this sense I suppose reference is made in a gloss ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 263 *guttum* (i.e. *guttam*) *quoddam unguentum.* May not this be the point of Cicero's joke Pro Cluent. § 71 *Guttam adspergit huic Bulbo?* Comp. the proverb *τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ φακῇ μύρον.*

**Herbacanthus,* popular name of the *acanthus,* Serv. Aen. 1 649 *acanthus, genus virgulti flexuosum, quod vulgo herbacanthum dicunt* (F.).

Imaginatio in the sense of χαρακτηρισμός, description of character or appearance: Acron on Hor. 1 Epist. 18 6 *per χαρακτηρισμόν, id est, per imaginationem, describit,* &c. Ib. 1 Epist. 20 24 *haec descriptio χαρακτηρισμός dicitur, id est, imaginatio formae hominum.*

Incohare. In the note on this word in Diomedes p. 365 (Keil) I would propose to read *Tranquillus quoque his adsentiens in libello suo plenissime de re incohata disseruit:* for *plenissime edere incohata.*

Indictivus: add Serv. Aen. 1 632 *indictiva sacrificia dicebantur quae subito ad praesens tempus indicebantur.*

**Inpers,* without share in: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 8 p. 413, quoting from Ambrose, *nec erit ulla regio vestri inpers cruoris* (F.).

**Insalio,* to salt: Gloss. Labb. *insalio ἁλίζω* (F.).

**Intrarius,* the opposite of *extrarius:* Gloss. Labb. *intrarius ἐνδόμυχος* (F.).

Iuxta in the sense of *erga.* This usage is illustrated in the current lexicons only from one inscription: add Ti. Donatus on Aen. 4 371 *tanta mala, inquit, iuxta me commissa sunt:* Aen. 5 6 *aliquid mali in illa civitate iuxta salutem Didonis esse commissum:* 6 266 *quae illic iuxta animas gerantur.*

**Lactatio* from *lactare* to inveigle,= κήλησις, allurement, enticement. This word should, I think, be restored to Cicero Tusc. 4 § 16, quoted by Nonius p. 16 s.v. *lacto.* I give the passage as it stands in the manuscripts of Nonius. *Voluptati (subiecta sunt) malevolentia laetans malo alieno, delectatio, iactatio et similia.* Cicero is apparently translating the passage of Stoical doctrine given by Diogenes Laertius 7 114 ἡδονή, ὑφ' ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις κ.τ.λ. It is clear that *malevolentia laetans malo alieno* answers to ἐπιχαιρεκακία, and that it was therefore a mistake on the part of the editors previous to Quicherat to change *laetans* into *lactans.* But in that case what is the point of quoting the passage, as Nonius does, to illustrate *lactare?* I answer that *lactare* was illustrated

by the word *lactatio*, corrupted into *iactatio*, which stands for the Greek κήλησις. (In Lucretius 5 1068 the manuscripts give *aut ubi eos lactant pedibus*, speaking of dogs and puppies. Lachmann and Munro accept Naugerius's correction *iactant*: but may not *lactant* mean 'catch at,' 'pull towards them'?)

**Lato*, to widen: Gloss. Labb. *lato* πλατύνω (F.).

**Laurolavinas*, belonging to *Laurolavinium*, Serv. Aen. 3 479 *Laurolavinatem agrum.*

Marsuppium. The form with *pp* is attested by the Ambrosian palimpsest in Plautus Epidicus 511, by *B* in Menaechmi 254, and by the Harleian MS. of Nonius p. 141. A form *marsippium*, which may also be genuine, as nearer to the Greek, is attested by *B* in Plautus Rudens 546, and Politian's MSS. of Varro R. R. 3 17 2.

**Mercedĭmĕrus*, adj., mercenary (*merces, mereo*). I infer the existence of this word from a note of Porphyrion on Horace 1 Epist. 3 6 *quid studiosa cohors operum struit? Lucilius* (he says, according to the manuscript tradition) *eos qui cum praesidibus ad salarium eunt mercede meras legiones ait.* That is, *legio* was used by Lucilius, as *cohors* by Horace, in a metaphorical sense. The epithet *mercedimeras* is obtained by simply joining *mercede meras* together. The passage of Lucilius is also quoted by Nonius p. 345 *meret, humillimum et sordidissimum quaestum capit...unde et meritorii et meretrices dicuntur... Lucilius lib. I et mercede meret religiones.* Both in Porphyrion and Nonius Ianus Dousa altered *meret* into *merentes* or *merent*, and the latter is adopted by Lucian Müller in his Lucilius (1 36). That *legiones* and not *religiones* is right, is quite clear from the note of Porphyrion, which compares the metaphorical use of *legio* with that of *cohors*. Nonius's *meret religiones* may well be a corruption of *merae legiones*, the last syllable of *merae* (*merę*) having been repeated and merged with the following word, and *merę̣religiones* having then become *meret religiones.*

Metucolosus or *metuculosus.* This, and not *meticulosus*, seems to be the true form, attested by the manuscripts of Plautus Amph. 293, Most. 1087 (Lorenz), of Priscian 1 p. 138 (Keil) and the Florentine MS. of the Digest (4 2 7 init.).

Moralitas in the sense of human nature, what might be expected of humanity: Ti. Donatus on Aen. 3 707 *moralitatem plenam expressit* (he has exactly represented human nature): and on Aen. 4 86 *miro modo moralitas expressa est.*

Paegnium, the name of the little boy in the Persa of Plautus, should, I suspect, be read in Suetonius' Life of Horace, where the MSS. give *praeterea saepe eum inter alios iocos purissimum pene* (or *paene*) *et homuncionem lepidissimum appellabat* (*Augustus*). Muretus, followed by modern editors, conjectured *purissimum penem*, the point or meaning of which I am unable to discover. *Purissimum* (or perhaps, with Lambinus, *putissimum*) *paegnium* would however give excellent sense. I may add here that the Amplonian glosses (pp. 365, 367) give *pegnius locus, lusorius: pegnium locum, luxuriosum.*

Permorari is quoted from the Notae Tironianae: add Servius on Aen. 6 127 *in his permorari corporibus.*

Persecutrix in the sense of following: Servius Aen. 5 193 *sequaces* (*undae*), *id est persecutrices.*

Poculentus and *potulentus.* These forms are treated as interchangeable by Georges and Lewis and Short. The form *poculentus* (= drinkable or connected with drink) is supported by good manuscript authority in Gellius 4 1 17 *penus est quod esculentum aut poculentum est:* Apul. Dogm. Plat. 1 15 *esculentum et poculentum:* Digest 33 9 3 4 *in penu poculenta:* Macrobius 7 15 4. Editors however print *potulentus* in the same sense in Cicero N. D. 2 § 141, Digest 1 18 18, Gellius 17 11 2. A form *posculentus* is found in the manuscripts of Gellius ll. cc., and is adopted in the first passage by Hertz. But *potulentus* seems to be found wherever the word means intoxicated; as Sueton. Otho 2, Apuleius M. 3 5, Comm. Cruq. on Hor. 1 Epist. 18 92.

I am inclined then to suppose that there were two words, one = drinkable, from *poculum* in the sense of a drink: the other from *potus*, formed on the analogy of *vinolentus* and = full of drink.

Praefiscine or *praefiscini.* Perhaps this word should be written *praefascini.* This form is actually given by Charis. p. 235, and has good manuscript authority in Apuleius Florida

3 16 75. But we also find a curious form *praeficiscini* in the *vetus codex Camerarii* (*B*) of Plautus Rudens 461 and Asinaria 491: as also in Charisius (according to the Neapolitan manuscript) p. 212. May not this form, which cannot be genuine, simply represent *praefascini?*

Proicio = deicio. Perhaps in Horace 1 S. 3 91 *calicem... Evandri manibus tritum proiecit* (so the oldest Bernese MS.) Seneca Contr. 1 3 2 (78 Bursian) *quod ducta est ad saxum, quod inde proiecta:* Petronius 52 *puer calicem proiecit:* fragm. ap. Serv. Aen. 3 57 *et sic proiciebatur* (needlessly altered to *praecipitabatur*): Ti. Donatus on Aen. 6 862 *fronte tamen parum laeta, hoc est tristi, et proiecto vultu.*

Sario, sarui, sartum: not *sarrio sarrivi sarritum,* to hoc. The spelling with one *r* is attested by the *fasti* published C. I. L. 1 p. 358 col. 1 10 and 2 10, *segetes sariuntur:* Plautus Capt. 663 *semper occant prius quam sariunt rustici.* On Cato R. R. 161 2 *sarito runcatoque,* Victorius says *in his enim antiquissimis libris, quibus ad hoc munus usus sum, semper ita scriptum observavi.* And Schneider after Victorius writes *sario* in Varro, R. R. 1 18 8, 1 29 1. In Nonius p. 8 the corrected reading of the Harleian MS. is *sariat.* In Pliny 18 158 the manuscripts give *sartam, satam:* in 8 ib. 184 *sariet:* in Mart. 3 93 20 the best manuscripts have *satire,* and Schneidewin prints *sarrire. Sarrivisse* is printed, whether rightly or not I do not know, in Columella 11 2 10. The corresponding form of the abstract substantive *sartio* is attested by the best manuscripts of Columella 2 11 (12) 1, and 11 2 9: *sartor* is found not only in Plautus Capt. 661 and Varro's Vinalia ap. Non. p. 7, but (according to Politian's manuscripts) in Varro R. R. 1 29 2 and Columella 2 12 (13) 1. *Sartura* is without doubt right in Pliny 18 254, and is supported by the St Germains' manuscript (a high authority) in Columella 11 2 27: *sartorius* is the reading of Politian's manuscripts in Columella 2 13 2. It would appear then that there is hardly any good evidence for *sarrire sarritio sarritor,* &c.

Stipa -ae, straw (*?*) of which *stipula* was the diminutive. Isidore 17 7 56 *stipa vocata quod ex ea stipentur tecta. Hinc et stipula per deminutionem.* The word is generally treated as only

another form of *stupa:* but Isidore's view is supported by Servius on Aen. 1 433 (*navibus*) *in quibus stipula interponitur vasis, quam stipam vocant.* Servius on Aen. 5. 682 (= Isidore 19 27 2) says (*stupa*) *secundum antiquam orthographiam; nam stipa dicta est a stipando: abusive etiam linum dicimus;* a note which shows that the confusion had begun in his days. The word occurs also in Festus p. 351 (Müller) *stipatoris,...unde et stipam, qua amphorae cum extruuntur firmari solent.*

Succipio and *suscipio.* The difference between these words is well understood by Ribbeck, to judge from his edition of Vergil, but has not attracted the notice of modern lexicographers. Velius Longus p. 34 (Keil) says *aliud est amicum suscipere, aliud aquam succipere:* Caper Orth. p. 98 (Keil) *suscipimus ad animum et mentem refertur, succipimus corpore.* The distinction is on the whole borne out by the evidence of good manuscripts. Lucr. 5 402 *solque cadenti Obvius aeternam succepit lampada mundi:* Vergil Aen. 1 175 *succepitque ignem foliis:* 4 391 *succipiunt famuli conlapsaque membra...referunt:* 6 249 *tepidumque cruorem Succipiunt pateris.* In Aen. 11 806 the uncials give *dominamque ruentem Suscipiunt;* but one of the Bernese cursives has *succipiunt.* In Propertius 5 9 36 the Naples manuscript has *et cava succepto flumine palma sat est.* The first part of *succipio is sŭ* or *sub:* of *suscipio sus.* Thus *succipio* means to catch from underneath, *suscipio* to raise up.

**Teucriades*, patronymic from Teucer, Serv. Aen. 3 354 in nom. pl. *Teucriadae.*

Trachālio in the Rudens of Plautus is probably the Latinized equivalent for the Greek τραχηλᾶς, "Thick-neck."

Tunicopallium should probably be restored to Lampridius, Alex. Sever. 41 1. There Peter reads *matronas autem regias contentas esse debere uno reticulo atque inauribus et bacato monili et corona cum qua sacrificium facerent, et unico pallio auro sparso* &c. The best manuscripts read *et tunico pallio* for *et unico:* indeed it is hardly likely that a lady would ever have wished to wear more than one *pallium* at a time, and the point of the passage lies in the words *auro sparso.*

HENRY NETTLESHIP.

II.

In reading part of the fifth volume of Keil's *Grammatici Latini* for Wölfflin's *Archiv*, I have come upon the following words (there are probably more), which are not in Georges or Lewis and Short[1]. The references are to Keil's pages and lines.

artificalis: Consentius 398. 22, versum omnem qui quidem a bono auctore conscriptus sit vel suapte natura sine excusatione consistere, vel a quibusdam artificalibus rationibus defendi (*ib.* 33 and 35). An ex. given is Verg. A. 5. 337, emicat Euryal*us* et &c. (Cf. Paucker Suppl. p. 39.)

defolio: Eutyches 450. 19, concilium concilior conciliaris, folium defolio defolias, spolium spolio spolias. De Vit quotes also a gloss, defolio: *ἀποφυλλίζω*, which may be found in Dositheus, Keil 7. 436. 8, (cf. Paucker Suppl. p. 173) and in "Gloss. Labb." (Cf. Cod. Harl. 5792, saec. vii?, in the British Museum.)

degulo (noun masc.): Augustini regulae 502. 4, ad hanc formulam (like latro) declinabis homo ganeo degulo caupo, &c. Diefenbach and De Vit quote degulator (cf. aleo aleator &c.). Does degulus exist?

hirmus: Pomp. Comm. in Donat. 304. 16, hirmos est continuatio...sensus per plurimos versus. The ex. given is Verg. A. 6. 724, principio caelum ac terras &c. De Vit refers to Charis. Keil 1. 282. 17; Diom. *ib.* 447. 28; Plot. Sacerd. 6. 455. 25 (all of whom give the same note and ex. as Pompeius) and Isid. Orig. 1. 36. 8 (who quotes Verg. A. 1. 160 foll.). Prof. Nettleship adds Serv. Aen. 6. 66 and 703. The greek form is not given in Liddell and Scott or Sophocles in this sense. A glossary in the Bodleian (Auct. T. II. 24, saec. viii) contains the word *hirmosus* = ponderosus.

[1] De Vit's Forcellini contains defolio hirmus praeduus scutrilla and sustulo, but it is usual to start from Georges.

matureo: Eutyches 486. 26,...strido stridis et strideo strides, sicut denso densas et denseo denses, duro duras et dureo dures, maturo maturas et matureo matures, ex quibus induruit et maturuit perfecta veniunt, haec auctoritas sola vetustatis tradidit. The same list, with the exception of matureo, is given by Priscian (Instit. Keil 2. 443. 21), and ends with 'dureo dures unde duresco.' It is possible that the word is only a grammarian's invention for the present tense.

necamel: Fragm. Bobiense de Nomine 558. 4, hic necamel, ab hoc necamele, horum necamelum. Paucker has a word saccomel. (Or cp. Probus Keil 4. 129. 11.)

peculiarius (compar. adv.): add a ref. to Macrob. Exc. Bob. 645. 30, Latini peculiarius addunt...syllabam &c.

praeduus: Eutyches 453. 30, occido occiduus, praedor praeduus, caedo incaeduus, perspicio perspicuus, divido dividuus.

praestulor: Eutyches 478. 9, in -lor desinentia...palor praestulor fabulor osculor adulor aemulor epulor, &c. In spite of the quantity suggested by the context, it is perhaps another form of praestolor, cf. Cassiodorius Keil 7. 157. 23, praesto nos per o scribimus, veteres per u scripserunt; unde et praestolari, non praestulari (so *ib.* 286. 19 and Albinus 306. 12). Cf. "Gloss. Labb," praestulari: προσκαρτερεῖν, παραμένειν[1]. De Vit argues that the penult of praestolor is common, but his proof (Ter. Eun. 5. 5. 5.) proves nothing.

scabio: Eutyches 468. 3, scabere...quod venire a positione verbi quod est scabio vel scabo, unde scabies nomen est derivatum. The context shews that a transitive verb scabio scabere is meant, not the intr. scabiare (a word given by De Vit &c.).

scutrilla: Consentius 346. 20, rana ranunculus, pistrinum pistrilla, scutris scutrilla. De Vit only refers to Mai's *Thes. nov. latin.* p. 567, scrutilla, which may not belong here.

semineutralia: Aug. reg. 514. 29 (of verbs like curro vapulo algeo).

spondiales: Iuliani Exc. in Don. 322. 24, σπονδὴ graece tractus vocatur, unde et ii qui tibiis canunt in sacris spondiales vocantur. Isid. Orig. 1. 16 (8). 2, spondeus dicitur quia tractim

[1] So the Latin-saxon glossary in C.C.C. Library, Cambridge (144, saec. viii) has "praestulatur: observatur."

sonat, nam spondeus tractus quidam dicitur, id est sonus qui fundebatur circa aures sacrificantium, unde et ii qui tibiis canebant in sacris gentilium spondiales nominabantur. Georges and De Vit quote the passage with spondaulae for spondiales, but this is Lindemann's conjecture; the MSS have spondiales (like the Oriel MS), spondeales, or spondieales. Isidore's note appears in the glossaries ascribed to Papias and S. Jerome (the latter in a 14th cent. MS in Balliol library), and both read spondiales. Two other notes are connected with these; Diom. Keil 1. 476. 8, spondeus dictus *παρὰ τὴν σπονδήν* quia in templis hoc pede quaedam carmina componebantur scilicet ut libantes sonum vocis abominosae audire non possent. a Rhadamantho autem constitutus traditur, qui Arcadiae princeps venerat, fors accipitur ab agricolis hoc successu et hoc divino ritu a musicis cumulis paribus ture incensis altaribus musicos choros geminis gressibus explicaret et aequipedi sono tibicen spondalium (lacuna here in one MS) canere iuberet, ut duabus longis melodiis...prospera deorum voluntas firmaretur (so MSS; qui...paribus, if no more, is corrupt, some MSS (so Harl. 2773, on which see Keil praef. xxxii) omit Rhad...qui, and spondalium is meaningless); Victorinus Keil 6. 44. 23, spondeus dictus a tractu cantus eius qui per longas tibias in templis supplicantibus editur. unde et spondulae appellantur quia huiusmodi tibias inflare adsuerunt (so MSS; Keil reads spondaulae; Turnebus Advers. 17. 20 and 20. 17 conj. 'spondauli like *τύμβαυλοι* or spondiauli or spondiales,' without giving his authority for the words). The same note on the spondee and the music at sacrifices was known to Terentianus Maurus (Keil 6. 366, de metris 1375). *Σπονδαύλης*, 'flute-player at a sacrifice,' occurs on several greek inscriptions (C. I. G. 2983, 2915, 5673), and it is easy in Isidore to read 'spond*au*les' and alter the sentence to the singular; at least this seems better than 'spondaulae.' Possibly, however, we may accept spondiales, and read spondialium in Diomedes, whatever we do with Victorinus 44. 23. A plural spondialia *may* be found in Cic. de Or. 2. 192, histrionis...†spondalli illa (or other corruptions) dicentis (two trochaic tetrameters from Pacuvius follow), where Salmasius' spondaulia, as Herman said, hardly suits dicentis. Spondialia is found in one MS (cod. Tross.), and was suggested by Turnebus

(Advers. 20. 17) who asserts that the Romans, as their favorite metre was trochaic, used spondialia even of trochaic verse. The grammarians quoted above seem to be confusing the σπονδή or libation (fundebatur) with the spondee, the metre of the slow movement (tractus), but Donatus and Diomedes clearly connect the word in question (spondiales, &c.) with the latter. It is difficult to say what stress should be laid on tibiis (αὐλός), without being sure of the original form of the notes before us.

tubur: Consentius 364. 10, peregrinum nomen, si quidem id iam receptum est, ut...Medorum acinaces vel gaza, Poenorum tubur, &c.' According to Delitzsch, quoted by Keil, the word means 'hill.'

tultum: Iuliani Exc. 319. 14 and 19, tultum nomen, positum pronomen[1]. Cp. cultus from colere or stultus from stolere presupposed by stolidus. Tollo, according to Fröhde, is for tol-no. A new compound of the present tulo, *sustulo,* is given by Macrob. Exc. Paris. 606. 38, sustulo sustuli, adtulo adtuli; Diom. Keil 1. 372. 4, eius perfecti (*i.e.* sustuli) instans apud veteres sustulo dicitur (so Charis. *ib.* 247); Priscian Inst. Keil 2. 419. 7, sustulo antiqui sustuli.

[1] Prof. Nettleship adds Glossarium vet. in Mai's *Auct. Class.* 6. p. 546, 'tultum: sublatum.' Cf. the modern italian *tolto.*

F. HAVERFIELD.

CICERO'S OPINION OF LUCRETIUS.

Ad Quintum Fratrem 2. 11 *Lucretii poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingenii multae tamen artis. Sed cum veneris, virum te putabo si Sallustii Empedoclea legeris, hominem non putabo.*

It occurred to me some years ago that possibly the corruption might lie in the words *artis sed cum veneris:* and that the passage, which was wrongly written *multaetamenartissedcumvenerisvirum,* should be corrected *multae tamen* (or *etiam*) *artis ipse dicam, vĕneris, virium. Virum te putabo,* &c. It will be seen that I suppose *artissedcum* to stand for *artis isse* (= *ipse*) *dicam,* and that *virium* was omitted before *virum.* For *Veneris* and *artis* comp. Horace's *fabula nullius Veneris, sine pondere et arte* (A. P. 320). As regards *tamen* and *etiam,* my doubt arises from the fact that, supposing *multaetam* to have been the original reading, it might have stood either for *multae tamen* (*multaetam̃*) or for *multae etiam.*

H. NETTLESHIP.

PROFESSOR BÜCHELER ON THE PETRONIANUM OF PHILLIPPS MS 9672.

UNDER the title *Klage eines Ostgothischen Professors* Prof. Bücheler has published in the Rheinisches Museum (1883 pp. 637—640) his interpretation of the obscure fragment transcribed by me from a Phillipps MS in this journal (IX. p. 61). Two other versions of it, I learn from him, are extant: one published in 1834 from a Leyden MS by Suringar Hist. Crit. Scholiastarum I. p. 212, the other (since my article appeared) by E. Rohde in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1881 p. 426, from a Brussels MS, no. 10057—62. The view which I suggested, that the fragment besides the actual citation from Petronius possibly imbeds some other Petronian tessellations, is thought unlikely by Bücheler, to whose judgment I most willingly bend.

The fragment is an introduction to a commentary on Cicero's Rhetorica, of no great value and probably omitted for that reason by Halm in his edition of the Rhetores Latini Minores. The best text of it is that of the Phillipps MS, with which Bücheler collates the two other versions, and thus constitutes an improved text.

The writer seems to have been a grammatical teacher or professor attached to the Palace of the Ostro-Gothic king of Italy, Theodoric. In this capacity he was attended by many pupils who had no special interest in the subjects on which he lectured, but were attracted by the mere celebrity of his name. He divides these into three classes, (1) those who pretending to be geniuses despised study (2) those who studied for themselves and disowned the authority of a professed teacher (3) those who had been trained in the declamations of the rhetorical

schools and had learnt the histrionic art of verbal flourishing. Such riff-raff (*farraginem*) he would exclude; if they profess to be followers of his camp, it is as outside followers only; they do not belong to the inner circle of the palace lecture-room: nay they attend with a palpable object—the wish, namely, to insinuate that they can claim the name and support of Theodoric for their party. Never mind: only they must be content to be classed with the illiterate rabble, and not aspire to the title of true and veritable students.

If this outline of the meaning is correct, Bücheler must, I think, be right in concluding against Peerlkamp's view ap. Suringar, that Theodoric is regarded by the writer of the fragment as a king who, whatever his own defects of education, looked with favour on learning and its professors.

R. ELLIS.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF STATIUS' SILVAE.

I. 3. 10, 11

Tum Venus Idaliis unxit fastigia sucis
Permulsitque comis blandumque reliquit honorem.

So MSS. Schrader changes *comis* to *crocis*, unnecessarily, I think; the meaning is that Venus made the house balmy with her hair, probably by smoothing her tresses there and leaving the fragrance about it. Hence *odorem*, Scriverius' conj. for *honorem*, seems likely.

I. 3. 53—55

Calcabam necopinus opes. nam splendor ab alto
Defluus et nitidum referentes aera testae
†Monstrauere solum: uarias ubi picta per artes
Gaudet humus superatque nouis asarota figuris.

It is very difficult to see what *Monstrauere* can mean here: it is forcing language to interpret 'showed off'. In another passage of the Siluae II. 5. 1 *Quid tibi constrata mansuescere profuit ira?* the MSS give *monstrata:* and I have little doubt that the right word in the passage of Statius is, as has been long ago conjectured, *Constrauere*, a verb regularly used of *flooring* or *paving*. The change of *constrata* to *monstrata* seems to support my conj. on Prop. II. 8. 21 *Andromede monstris fuerat prostrata marinis* where most MSS give *monstrata*.

II. 6. 70 *uitae modo carmen adultae*
Nectere tendebat iuuenum pulcerrimus ille
Cum tribus Eleis unam trieterida lustris.

May not this, the reading of MSS, be right? 'He was just beginning to weave the thread of mature adolescence, adding three years to fifteen.' He was eighteen years old. The fact that *carmen* in this sense is rare does not disprove its existence; nor is it merely 'thread'; it is the thread disentangled and purged, hence peculiarly applicable to the period of perfect and mature adolescence.

seseque uidendo
Torsit et inuidia mortemque amplexa iacenti
Iniecit nexus.

I would read

seseque uidendo
Torsit et inuidiT mortemque amplexa iacenti
Iniecit nexV.

'Nemesis felt a pang at the sight of him and envied such perfection and embracing him killed him as he lay with her entwining arm.' I look upon *inuidit* as a *paronomasia* suggested by *uidendo*. Cic. Tusc. Disp. III. 9. 20 *non dixi inuidiam quae tum est cum inuidetur; ab inuidendo autem inuidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ambiguum nomen inuidiae; quod uerbum ductum est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo, Quisnam florem liberum inuidit meum.*

II. 7. 54

Ac primum teneris adhuc in annis
Ludes Hectora Thessalosque currus
Et supplex Priami potentis aurum,
Et sedes reserabis inferorum.
Ingratus, Nero, dulcibus theatris,
Et noster tibi praeferetur Orpheus.
Dices culminibus Remi uagantis
Infandos domini nocentis ignes.

The difficulties raised over this passage may all be solved by remembering, what in improvised and rapid compositions like the *Siluae* is only to be expected, that a certain looseness or want of complete finish in the style has allowed Statius to introduce into Calliope's address to Lucan a sudden apostrophe

to Nero. The two vv. *Ingratus Nero—Et noster* are in fact parenthetical. Vv. 54—56 describe Lucan's juvenile Iliacon (Vita Lucani ap. Reyfferscheid Sueton. Relliq. p. 78), v. 57 his Catachthonion. Then in vv. 58, 59 the Muse suddenly turns to Nero (such apostrophes are completely in Lucan's own manner) 'Nero, the theatres you delight in will cease to find you charming, and my own Orpheus (Lucan, the composer of an *Orpheus*) will be preferred to your recitations'. Vita Lucani Reyff. p. 77 *Cum inter amicos enim Caesaris tam conspicuus fieret profectus (eius) in poetica, frequenter (Nero) offendebatur; quippe et certamine pentaeterico acto in Pompei theatro laudibus recitatis in Neronem fuerat coronatus, et ex tempore Orphea scriptum in experimentum aduersum complures ediderat poetas.* In v. 60 Calliope turns to Lucan again. It is a probable inference from vv. 58, 59 that Lucan recited his improvised poem *Orpheus* in one of the theatres.

IV. 3. 59, 60

His paruus nisi deuiae uetarent
Inous freta miscuisset Isthmos.

Bährens makes no mention in his edition (1876) of Constantius Fanensis' clever emendation (Hecatostys XC, Fano 1507)

His laurus nisi Deliae uetarent

'These hands might have dug through the Isthmus of Corinth, but that the oracle of Delos forbade'. The Homeric hymn to the Delian Apollo already speaks of the *περικαλλέα νηόν*, *Ἔμμεναι ἀνθρώπων χρηστήριον* (81) cf. 132 *χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν*, and Lucan, writing in the age of Nero of the period of the civil wars, says (VI. 425) Sextus Pompeius declined to consult *the tripods of Delos* or the caverns of Delphi, thus placing the two[1] oracles on a par. Prof. Jebb in his finished article on Delos (Journal of Hellenic Studies Vol. I p. 43) speaks of a temple on the Delian mountain Cynthus which possessed a grotto like the adyton at Delphi, and concludes

[1] *laurus* connotes *oracle* according to Servius on Aen. III. 360 *per laurus oraculum intellegimus:* but the *δάφνινος ὄρπηξ* will occur to every reader of Callimachus (H. Apoll. 1).

that it was the seat of an oracle. That Nero desisted from his enterprise of cutting through the Isthmus upon a warning from the Delian oracle is not indeed stated; but the accounts vary so considerably, some ascribing his change of purpose to Aegyptian calculations of the different levels of the two seas (Lucian Nero 4), some to the insurrection of Vindex (ib. 5), as to make such an extra motive no improbability, at least as one of the rumours of the time. I cannot think Isaac Voss right in his pedantic conj. *cliuiae,* a word of very dubious authority, and nothing can be more unlike the manner of Statius than to combine two epithets with a single substantive (*paruus Inous Isthmos*).

v. 3. 12, 13

Quis sterili mea corda situ, quis Apolline merso
Frigida damnatae praeduxit nubila †menis?

For *menis* or *mentis* most edd. give *menti:* the form of the corruption points rather to *uenae* 'my genius'.

36 *acclinis tumulo quo molle quiescis*
Iugera nostra tenens, ubi post Aeneia fata
†Stellatus Latiis ingessit montibus Albam
Ascanius, Phrygio dum pingues sanguine campos
Odit et infaustae regnum dotale nouercae.

The word *Stellatus* has puzzled everybody; it is indeed without meaning. I have little doubt that it is a corruption of *Stella, tuus,* the poet taking occasion as he so often does to pay an incidental compliment to his noble patron Stella. In the *Epithalamium Stellae et Violantillae* (1. 2) Statius speaking of Stella says *clarus de gente Latina Est iuuenis quem patriciis maioribus ortum Nobilitas gauisa tulit;* and throughout that poem references to Troy as the parent of Rome (144, 188), to Aeneas as the son of Venus (11) and father of Iulus (190), to the historic names of Laurentum and Lavinia, make it probable that Stella as well as his consort prided themselves on their historic ancestry and traced their pedigree to the early founders of the mistress of the world. It would only be a natural consequence of such assumed or real nobility that Stella should

speak of the early legends of Rome in the poems which he wrote on Violantilla under the name of Asteris before his marriage with her; and it would seem probable that in these poems he made specific allusion to Ascanius, perhaps in connexion with Alba, of which Ascanius was the traditional founder, and which Domitian had brought into prominence by making it his favorite residence and instituting poetical contests to be held there, in which Statius was thrice victorious.

53

Illic Oebalio non finderet aera disco
Graiorum uis nuda uirum, non arua rigaret
Sudor ecum aut putri sonitum daret ungula fossa.
Sed Phoebi simplex chorus et frondentia uatum
Praemia laudato genitor tibi rite †ligarem.
Ipse madens oculis, umbrarum animaeque sacerdos,
Praecinerem reditum.

In spite of the alterations made by the latest editor, I believe the whole of this passage to be as Statius wrote it, with the single exception of *ligarem*. That this is wrong is probable from *Ipse*, which implies that the poet has before kept his own personality in the background: and quite as much from the impossibility of giving the sentence anything like a clear construction. All will be intelligible if we change *ligarem* into *litarent:* 'but Phoebus' artless company and the leafy honours of poets should duly make acceptable sacrifice, my father, to thee after first setting forth thy praise'. Cf. Ennodius Epist. IX. 30 Hartel *litandum illis est laudatione praecipua a quibus sumpsit exordium.*

71

Sed nec modo se natura dolenti
Nec pietas iniusta dedit; mihi limine primo
Fatorum et uiridi genitor ceu raptus ab aeuo
Tartara dura subis. nec enim Marathonia uirgo
Parcius extinctum saeuorum crimine agrestum
Fleuerit Icarium, Phrygia quam turre cadentem
Astyanacta parens.

The meaning of these vv. I would thus paraphrase. 'But it was not merely that nature and affection were outraged in

my grief; I mourned for you as if you had died prematurely; for the grief of Erigone for her murdered father Icarius was as strong as the grief of Andromache for her slaughtered infant Astyanax; and my sorrow for your death after the maturity of life had set in was as keen as if you had been taken from me before the time.' Hence *mihi* is strongly emphasized: 'your death was no mere outrage to the feelings of natural affection which as a son I was bound to feel; for *me* it was the loss of one taken before his time; I seemed to lose not so much a father, as a child'. *Iniusta* = *iniustam*, not *in iusta*.

114

Ora supergressus Pylii senis oraque regis
Dulichii specieque comam subnexus utraque.

I have no doubt that the last words of this passage mean that Statius' father fastened his hair with a brooch *containing portraits of Nestor and Ulysses.*

117

Nec sine luce genus, quamquam fortuna parentum
Artior expensis: etenim te diuite ritu
Ponere purpureos infantia †legit amictus
Stirpis honore datos et nobile pectoris aurum.

Markland changed *Ponere* to *Sumere*, a violently improbable correction. May not *Ponere* be retained, reading after Domitius *adegit* for *legit?* 'Your birth too was not obscure, although your parents' means were short of their outlay: for your childhood forced you to lay aside the purple dress which, like the rich, you wore, the privilege of good birth, with the gold bulla on the breast, the badge of nobility.' The parents of the elder Statius were therefore sufficiently well-born to give their son the *praetexta* and golden *bulla* of a *puer nobilis* (Macrob. I. 6. 10): but from reduced means descended in position and obliged him, as a consequence, to cease wearing them[1].

[1] If this interpretation should be thought too violent, I would suggest that *cultu* should be read for *ritu*, as perhaps in Luc. VI. 509 *Inque nouos ritus pollutam duxerat artem*, where *ritus* can hardly be right after *Hos*

126

Te de gente suum Latiis adscita colonis
Graia refert †Sele, †Grauis qua puppe magister
Excidit et mediis miser euigilauit in undis,
†Maior at inde suum longo probat ordine uitae.
Maeoniden aliaeque aliis natalibus urbes
Diripiunt cunctaeque probant: non omnibus ille
Verus, alit uictas et inanis gloria falsi.

Sele is a corruption rather perhaps of *Hyele* (*iele*) than *Velie;* for Statius would be likely to use the pure Greek name, as found on the coins of this city, rather than its Roman corruption. For *grauis* it seems probable that we may read *grauidus*, which would well suit Palinurus, who fell into the sea heavy with sleep. The words *Maior at inde* are accepted by Bährens as genuine; he supposes a verse to have dropt out after v. 129, explaining, I suppose, *maior* of the greater city, Parthenope, which claimed with Velia the honour of producing Statius' father. In this he follows in the steps of Barth, to some extent too, of Markland, who for *Maior et inde* wrote *Parthenopeque*. I am much mistaken if the words[1] *Maior at inde* are not a mere depravation of *Maeonidenque*. 'Velia claims you as partly her citizen, and points to your long-continued residence as a proof that she has a right to call you her Homer.' Velia, no less than Naples, *which the poet has already mentioned* as the other city which claimed to have produced his father (v. 105—111), called the elder Statius her citizen and disputed with Naples the honour of his poetical achievements. 'For you are claimed by contending cities just as Homer is; each and all call him their alumnus, though some do so falsely.' This change from *Maeoniden* used appellatively 'a Homer' to *Maeoniden* used strictly as a proper name 'Homer', is, I think, very elegant and quite worthy of Statius. There is, I believe, nothing in the rest of the poem which contradicts this interpretation: on the contrary, if we accept the view of Markland, we have to suppose a weak reiteration in v. 129 of

scelerum ritus in 507, and Claud. In Rufin. II. 82 *Sumere deformes ritus uestemque Getarum.*

[1] a v. l. is *Maeon et inde.*

the statement already made in vv. 109—111, namely, that Statius' father was in part a Neapolitan. Let us look at the vv. immediately following, 133—137

> Atque ibi dum profers annos uitamque salutas,
> Protinus ad patrii raperis certamina lustri
> Vix implenda uiris, laudum festinus et audax
> Ingenii. stupuit primaeua ad carmina plebes
> Euboea, et natis te monstrauere parentes.

'While you rise to adolescence at Velia, your poetical gifts made you a competitor for the prize in the quinquennial contests of your (other) country[1] Naples. There your youthful compositions won the admiration of all; the Neapolitans pointed you out to their children as the rising genius of the time. This home-victory (in the provincial town Naples, which claims to have produced you) was only the prelude to greater triumphs in Greece (141—145). In this way you were introduced to the notice of the high families of the capital, and became the instructor of their children, as well as a universal referee on disputed points of archaeology (146 sqq.).'

159—162. 'You were wont to run in the yoke even with Homer, and keep pace with his hexameters by breaking up each line in prose, and never to be outrun or distanced,' i.e. you could explain Homer verse by verse with a running comment in prose which was never at fault, and could cope with every difficulty of his text as it came before you. Such is I believe the meaning of this difficult passage: and so I imagine Bährens understands it by editing *solutis uerbis* for *uersibus* of MSS. But not only is a dactyl imperative in this position, but Quintilian I. 8. 13 uses *soluere uersum* of breaking up or taking to pieces a line in order to explain the *partes orationis* it contains.

180 *arma †probatur*
Monstrasti Saliis.

For *probatur* I would read *probator*, a word found in Ovid.

[1] From *patrii* being here applied to Naples, it seems probable that the elder Statius was born there, but transferred whilst still quite young to Velia.

Statius affects nouns in *-tor -ator -trix -atrix;* in this Silva we have *speculatrix explorator moderator spectator precator.*

208

Me quoque uocales lucos inotaque tempe
Pulsantem, cum stirpe tua descendere dixi,
Admisere deae.

If, as Bährens states, *inotaque luotaque* are the best accredited tradition of the MSS here, a very easy conj. is *ignotaque* 'as yet unknown' to young Statius.

231—3

Nam quod me mixta quercus non pressit oliua
Et fugit speratus honos, †qua dulce parentis
†Inuida Tarpei caperes.

I consider Bährens to have practically cleared up this passage by writing *quam* for *qua;* but I should prefer *Inuia* to his *Intima.* 'For, as regards my disappointment in not adding to my Alban olive-wreath the oak-wreath of the Capitoline games, what joy wouldst thou have felt to grasp the unapproachable glories of the Tarpeian sire.' He probably means by *Tarpei parentis* Domitian, the institutor and president of the Capitoline contest. Suet. Dom. IV.

I. 2. 234, 5

Omnis honos cuncti ueniunt ad limina fasces.
Hic eques hic iuuenum †questus stola mixta laborat.

In Cat. LXIV. 307 this same strange *questus* occurs, and seems to be a mistake for *uestis.* May it not be so here? 'Here were the knights, there the robes of the Roman youth: the matrons' stole struggles with the rest of the crowd.' The brilliant colours of the dresses worn at that time by men are constantly alluded to by Martial.

IV. 3. 18, 19

Qui genti patriae futura semper
Sancit limina Flauiumque †caluum.

Markland's emendation *caelum* has not convinced me any more than Bährens' *cultum*. The nearest approach to the MSS is *clauum*. I suggest that Domitian when he completed and consecrated the temple which he built to the Flavii on the site of the house in the sixth Region where he was born (Suet. Dom. I *Domitianus...natus est...regione urbis sexta ad Malum Punicum domo quam postea in templum gentis Flauiae conuertit*) revived the old custom of fixing a nail into the wall. Livy in the *locus classicus* on this subject (VII. 3) says *lex uetusta est priscis litteris uerbisque scripta, ut qui praetor maximus sit, idibus Septembribus clauum pangat. Fixa fuit dextro lateri aedis Iouis optimi maximi ex qua parte Mineruae templum est. Eum clauum, quia rarae per ea tempora litterae erant, notam numeri annorum fuisse ferunt, eoque Mineruae templo dicatam legem, quia numerus Mineruae inuentum sit.* It is clear from this that the custom of fixing the nail, which was common under the Republic, was or had become in time associated with Minerva, a goddess for whom Domitian had a special veneration, and in whose honour he instituted a yearly festival as well as a *Collegium* for the performance of scenic games and contests of oratory and poetry in his Alban villa (Suet. Dom. XV., IV.). But this is not all. The nail was to be fixed in the temple-wall, according to the enactment of the law mentioned by Livy, *on the Ides of September*. Now it was on the Ides of September that Titus died and Domitian succeeded to the principate (Suet. Tit. XI.). What more likely than that on the completion of the temple which he raised to the Flavian family on the site of the house in which he first saw light, Domitian selected the Ides of September, as one of the fortunate days of his life, for its consecration, and, knowing or informed of the old custom of driving in the nail whether as a mark of time or a symbol of perpetuity (*futura semper Sancit limina*), or from some association with his patron goddess Minerva, *clauum panxit ?*

R. ELLIS.

EMENDATIONS.

I.

DEMOSTHENES *κατὰ Στεφάνου* A p. 1119. § 59.

καίτοι ὅστις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κακῶν ἀλλοτρίων κλέπτης ὑπέμεινεν ὀνομάσθῆναι, τί ἂν ἡγεῖσθε ποιῆσαι τοῦτον ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ;

Apollodorus had on a previous occasion brought an action against Phormio. In the passage before us he is accusing Stephanus of having on that occasion stolen a document, the production of which would have been injurious to Phormio's interests: and he asks what a man who would do this might be expected to do when his own interests were at stake. The difficulty is in the expression *κακῶν ἀλλοτρίων κλέπτης*. These words appear to mean 'a stealer of things injurious to other people', but are so strange that there is probably something wrong with the Greek. In their notes on this speech Mr Sandys has proposed with the approval of Mr Paley to read *καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κλέπτης*. But on this it may be remarked that, if *τῶν ἀλλοτρίων* means no more than 'other people's property', there is no point in the words, because (as we are told by the author of the fifth book of the Ethics) a man cannot steal property which is his own; while, if *τῶν ἀλλοτρίων* is interpreted as 'what it was advantageous to others that he should steal', we are putting much more meaning into the word than it will bear.

Retaining Mr Sandys' *τῶν*, we may take *κα* not as the first letters of *καί* but as the last letters of *ἕνεκα*, and read *ἕνεκα*

τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, which gives the proper antithesis to *ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ*. *τὰ ἀλλότρια* are the interests of other people. It is not likely that this suggestion would have been made, if Mr Sandys had not led the way with *τᾶν*.

II.

Xenophon Memorabilia I. 4. 1.

εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι κτλ.

For *ὡς* read *οἷς*, which restores to *τεκμαιρόμενοι* its usual meaning and construction.

III.

Aristotle Rhetoric 1416 a 21 (III. 15. 5).

ἄλλος (τρόπος) εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπεριλαμβάνονται, οὓς ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος ὁ μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.

Another way of rebutting a charge against a man is to show that it rests upon some reasoning, which if admitted would warrant a similar charge against some other man notoriously not liable to it. Instead therefore of the unmeaning words in the text, read *οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος ὁ δεῖνα μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα*. 'If, because A is a dandy, he is a rake, then B must be so too'.

IV.

Thucydides III. 11. 4.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπί τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους πρώτους ξυνεπῆγον καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες τοῦ ἄλλου περιῳρημένου ἀσθενέστερα ἔμελλον ἕξειν.

The article with *τελευταῖα* appears to be grammatically indefensible. Cf. I. 14. 3. Krüger conjectured *τάδε*. Perhaps there has been a corruption, or rather a loss, similar to that in

the passage of Demosthenes above given, and what Thucydides wrote was *αὐτὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες*, 'having left the strongest powers themselves to the last'.

V.

Aeschylus Agamemnon 961.

> *ἔστιν θάλασσα, τίς δέ νιν κατασβέσει;*
> *τρέφουσα πολλῆς πορφύρας ἰσάργυρον*
> *κηκῖδα παγκαίνιστον, εἱμάτων βαφάς.*
> *οἶκος δ' ὑπάρχει τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἄναξ,*
> *ἔχειν· πένεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται δόμος.*

Many editors have altered *οἶκος* to *οἴκοις*, which gives an easier construction but leaves the tautology, *πένεσθαι κτλ.* only repeating the words which precede it. If any change is needed, which does not seem certain, perhaps we should read

> *εἰκὸς δ' ὑπάρχειν τῶνδε σὺν θεοῖς, ἄναξ,*
> *ἔχειν·*

Cf. lines 575 and 586, where the same construction occurs.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

ON A PASSAGE OF THEOCRITUS (XVIII. 26—28).

Some of the loveliest lines in the beautiful *Epithalamium Helenae* are disfigured, as all readers of Theocritus know, by a manifest error of the MSS. The lines run thus in the traditional text:—

26 Ἀὼς ἀντέλλοισα καλὸν διέφανε πρόσωπον
27 πότνια νὺξ ἄτε λευκὸν ἔαρ χειμῶνος ἀνέντος,
28 ὥδε καὶ ἁ χρυσέα Ἑλένα διεφαίνετ' ἐν ἀμῖν.

That some error lurks in the words πότνια νὺξ ἄτε is obvious at a glance; but the passage has been a well-known *crux interpretum*, and among the many conjectures that have been suggested none can claim to be a satisfactory emendation. I do not intend to discuss nor even to enumerate them; I merely wish to propose a reading which seems to be adequate, and has not (I believe) been suggested before.

An important clue is afforded both by the drift of the sense, and by the balanced structure of the language. The maidens of Sparta have just been describing the peerless beauty of Helen,—how the fairest of them lose their charm in comparison of her (line 25),

τᾶν οὐδ' ἄν τις ἄμωμος, ἐπεί χ' Ἑλένᾳ παρισωθῇ.

This thought is expanded in the following lines (26—28 above quoted) by a series of similitudes drawn from nature. The beauty of Helen brings with it a sense of new delight wherever she comes, and her radiance eclipses all beside her, like the dawn of day or the coming of spring.

The parallelism of the language is very clearly marked. The word διέφανε is answered by διεφαίνετο, and surely καλόν

and λευκόν are both to be understood as emphatic epithets, in fact predicates of the clauses in which they occur. By speaking of the πρόσωπον of morning, the poet reminds us that what he desires to depict is the enchanting beauty of Helen's countenance. Observe also that there seems to be a *double* comparison in lines 26—27; Helen's beauty shone forth among all other maidens, like the dawn coming forth upon the night,—like fair spring when winter is done.

If this balance of language and of meaning is borne in mind, we at once dismiss any conjecture which would eject νύξ altogether from the passage; although this is done by Meineke (who follows, I believe, Hermann) in an emendation which has found its way into many texts. We want νύξ, to balance χειμῶνος.

An ingenious emendation which commended itself to the fine taste of the late C. S. Calverley simply alters ἅτε into ὅτε, and runs the twofold comparison into one. 'Fair the face with which rising dawn beams forth, O reverend night, on a fine spring morning.' This is pretty enough, but it seriously weakens the force of line 27[1]. I cannot doubt that the analogy is a double one—Helen among the maidens is like dawn after night, like spring after winter.

It has been suggested that the corruption in the text may be owing to an accidental omission of a line or more between πότνια νὺξ ἅτε—and—λευκὸν ἔαρ χειμῶνος ἀνέντος. But this possibility is excluded by the fact that the tristich 26—28 evidently corresponds to the tristich 29—31:—not to mention that the six lines that follow (32—37) may be easily arranged (as Mr Snow suggests) in another pair of tristichs.

If however there was a double comparison in lines 26—27, and if the tristich is complete in itself, it follows that the first

[1] Mr Calverley's beautiful rendering in his Translation of Theocritus (2nd ed. 1883) conceals but does not remove the objection which I urge:—

As peers the nascent Morning
Over thy shades, O Night,
When Winter disenchains the land,
And Spring goes forth in white,
So Helen shone above us,
All loveliness and light.

of the two comparisons must have been rounded off with extreme brevity. This makes us at once suspect the word ἅτε, which is not wanted to go with the second clause λευκὸν ἔαρ κ.τ.λ., since there is no ἅτε to preface the similitude of dawn in line 26. I would therefore simply strike out ἅτε, and insert τοι (the dative of the second personal pronoun) before νύξ:—

26 Ἀὼς ἀντέλλοισα καλὸν διέφανε πρόσωπον
27 πότνιά τοι νύξ, λευκὸν ἔαρ χειμῶνος ἀνέντος·
28 ὥδε καὶ ἁ χρυσέα Ἑλένα διεφαίνετ' ἐν ἁμῖν.

"Lovely the face of rising dawn when she beams upon thee, reverend night; fair is spring when winter is done: even so used matchless Helen to beam forth among us."

It will be said that the rhythm of line 27 is rough. But the roughness finds a compensation in the terseness and vigour of the comparison. And other lines may be found in Theocritus which have a somewhat similar ring: e.g.

i. 13: ὡς τὸ κάταντες τοῦτο γεώλοφον αἴ τε μυρῖκαι
vii. 24: ἦ μετὰ δαῖτα κλητὸς ἐπείγεαι; ἦ τινος ἀστῶν
xiv. 51: νῦν δὲ πόθεν; μῦς, φαντί, Θυώνιχε γεύμεθα πίσσας

If the suggestion I offer appears to give a satisfactory sense to the passage, the origin of the corruption may be traced without much difficulty. When through an itacism, perhaps by means of a copyist writing from dictation, ποτνιατοινυξλευκον had been transcribed as ποτνιατενυξλευκον, there would be a natural temptation to transpose ἅτε to a place where it would scan, and where it would no longer interfere with so obvious a combination of epithet and noun as πότνια νύξ.

E. L. HICKS.

PLATO, THEÆT. 190 c.

In the last number of this Journal, Vol. XII. p. 297, Mr R. D. Archer Hind, the editor of the Phædo, proposes an emendation of this passage which appears to me to have a high degree of probability. May I be allowed to say in reply to his stricture on my note that with his emendation (and without the words *περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου* which should now be dropped) the reference which he attributes to *καὶ* seems to me quite natural? The loss of the phrase which points the allusion (*ἐν τῷ μέρει*), and the cumbrous addition of the unnecessary words, may I think be pleaded as an excuse for an editor who felt that the reference as supposed to be conveyed in the vulgate text was 'rather strained.' Mr Archer Hind's emendation may be classed with the *λαβὴν ἄφυκτον* of the Master of Trinity. Both are *inevitable*.

L. CAMPBELL.

ON DIOGENES LAERT. IX. 1, 7.

Λαμπρῶς τε ἐνίοτε ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι καὶ σαφῶς ἐκβοᾷ ὥστε καὶ τὸν νωθέστατον ῥᾳδίως γνῶναι καὶ δίαρμα ψυχῆς λαβεῖν.

Some years ago I ventured to restore this passage by writing as above *ἐκβοᾷ ὥστε* in lieu of the vulgate *ἐκβάλλει ὥστε*, which (to say nothing of other objections) is not found in any MS. of any critical value or authority. The traditional reading, that of the excellent Naples MS. among the rest, is *ἐκβόλως τε*. Now *ἐκβοΛωστε* and *ἐκβοΑωστε* are obviously all but indistinguishable, so that from this point of view at any rate the change does not require much apology. As regards the meaning, however, the case is perhaps not equally clear. It may be as well, therefore, if only in the general interests of Greek lexicography, to draw attention to the fact that in late Greek *βοᾶν* and *κεκραγέναι* have come, by a natural process of degradation similar to that exemplified in English by 'cry' and other words, to mean often little more than to 'declare' or 'speak out'. We see them in a transitional stage in sundry passages where a softening *μονονουχί* is added—which shows that the writers are still aware that they are using a somewhat extravagant form of expression; e.g.

Diog. Laert. VIII. 1, 6: *Ἡράκλειτος γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μονονουχὶ κέκραγε καί φησι* (with quotation).

Procl. in Plat. Remp. p. 378: *μονονουχὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ ταῦτα βοῶντος, ἃ καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ὅτι κτέ.*

Marcell. v. Thucyd. 43: *ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ Ξενοφῶντός ἐστιν, ὁ χαρακτὴρ μονονουχὶ βοᾷ.*

In many cases, however, *βοᾶν* and *κεκραγέναι* are used, even of those who make statements in books, without any attempt on the part of the writer to qualify his language; e.g.

Plut. Morall. 1075 B: *αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν...γράμμασι διαρρήδην λέγουσι κτέ.*

ib. 1113 C: *ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ἔπη μέγα βοῶντός ἐστι τοῖς ὦτα ἔχουσιν ὡς κτέ.*

Clem. Alex. Strom. 717 Potter: *ὁ μὲν Σοφοκλῆς, ὥς φησιν Ἑκαταῖος...ἄντικρυς ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐκβοᾷ* (with quotation).

Ath. 601 B: *ὁ Ῥηγῖνος δὲ Ἴβυκος βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν* (with quotation).

id. 607 B: *Περσαίου τοῦ Κιτιέως ἐν τοῖς Συμποτικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι βοῶντος καὶ λέγοντος κτέ.*

Procl. in Plat. Tim. p. 24 ed. Bas.: *οὐδὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπακούοντες οὗτοι βοῶντος ὅτι κτέ.*

ib. p. 164: *ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κέκραγεν ὅτι κτέ.*

id. in Plat. Remp. p. 149: *καὶ αὐτὸν μαρτυρεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλάκις βοῶντα περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι τὴν πρόθεσιν.*

Olympiodor. in Plat. Gorg. (ed. Jahn, N. Jahrbücher, Suppl. 14 p. 540): *ἰδοὺ πῶς περὶ τῶν ἐνταῦθα...σαφῶς βοᾷ.*

id. in Aristot. Meteor. f. 50 vers.: *ἰδοὺ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης... βοᾷ ὅτι κτέ.*

Scholl. Aristot. p. 140[a] 12: *αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας κέκραγεν εἰπών* (with quotation).

I. BYWATER.

ON A POINT OF NOTATION IN THE *ARITHMETICS* OF DIOPHANTOS.

THE object of this note is the examination of one particular point in the notation used by Diophantos of Alexandria in his *Arithmetics*. Though the point itself is an isolated one it may be convenient, as a preliminary explanation, to give Diophantos' own principal statement on the subject of the notation which he adopts in the work as given in the second of the definitions prefixed to the First Book. The Greek text from which I quote is the only one which has been published—that of Bachet de Meziriac, Paris 1621—the second edition (of 1670) being so far as the text is concerned nothing more than a bad reprint of the original one. In the Greek text of Bachet the second definition stands thus[1]: *καλεῖται οὖν ὁ μὲν τετράγωνος, δύναμις, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῇ σημεῖον τὸ δ ἐπίσημον ἔχον υ, δ^υ. ὁ δὲ [ἐκ τετραγώνου ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ πλευρὰν πολλαπλασιασθέντος] κύβος, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον κ̄ ἐπίσημον ἔχον υ, κ^υ. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνου ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν πολλαπλασιασθέντος, δυναμοδύναμις, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον δέλτα δύο, ἐπίσημον * υ, δδ^υ, δυναμοδύναμις. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῷ πλευρᾶς κύβον πολλαπλασιασθέντος, δυναμόκυβος, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον τὸ δκ̄. ἐπίσημον ἔχοντα υ, δκ^υ. ὁ δὲ ἐκ κύβου ἑαυτὸν πολλαπλασιάσαντος, κυβόκυβος, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον δύο κκ̄, ἐπίσημον ἔχοντα υ, κκ^υ. ὁ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων τῶν ἰδιωμάτων κτησάμενος, ἔχων δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ πλῆθος μονάδων ἄλογος ἀριθμὸς καλεῖται, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον τὸ ς̀. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερον σημεῖον τὸ ἀμετάθετον*

[1] Respecting the text as given by Bachet, I may remark that a MS. of part of Diophantos' First Book which I have consulted in the Bodleian Library Oxford, has (1) *αὐτῷ* for *αὐτῇ ad init.* (2) at the place * *ἔχοντα* which is obviously required after *ἐπίσημον*, (3) *πολυπλασιασθέντος* for *πολλαπλασιασθέντος*, (4) *ὡρισμένων* for Bachet's strange *ὡρισμίων*.

τῶν †ὡρισμίων ἡ μονὰς, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῇ σημεῖον τὸ μ̄, ἐπίσημον ἔχον τὸ ō μ̄ō.

The greater part of this paragraph carries its own explanation with it, but the last sentence but one, to which I wish here to draw attention, has difficulties. This sentence runs in Bachet's text thus: ὁ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων τῶν ἰδιωμάτων κτησάμενος, ἔχων δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ πλῆθος μονάδων ἄλογος ἀριθμὸς καλεῖται, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον τὸ ς̀. First with respect to the sense we observe that Diophantos is speaking of the unknown quantity in algebra, the x of modern algebraical equations. He explains that he appropriates to this unknown quantity the term *ἀριθμός*, thus using it in a technical sense, not as denoting a number in general (which would necessarily include known and determinate as well as unknown numbers) but the *unknown*. The sense being thus certain we should expect to find the reading *ἄλογον* instead of *ἄλογος*; for the unknown quantity is never called *ἄλογος ἀριθμός* but simply *ἀριθμός*, and also the expression *ἔχων δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ πλῆθος μονάδων* is scarcely Greek without some word such as *ἄλογον* or *τι* to qualify it, while *πλῆθος μονάδων ἄλογον* gives exactly the meaning required, "a number of units of which no account is given" i.e. undetermined or unknown. At the same time the MS. of the first portion of the First Book of Diophantos' *Arithmetics* in the Bodleian Library has the same reading *ἄλογος* which the text of Bachet gives[1].

But what I wish particularly to draw attention to is the last clause of this sentence, *καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημεῖον τὸ ς̀*. As the text stands, this states that the symbol to be employed to represent *ἀριθμός* is the final sigma of the Greek alphabet. It is clear that if *ς̀* represents *ἀριθμός*, this sign must be different in kind from the others described in the same definition, for δ^{ν}, κ^{ν}, $\delta\delta^{\nu}$, $\delta\kappa^{\nu}$, $\kappa\kappa^{\nu}$ are clearly mere contractions of the corresponding names *δύναμις*, *κύβος*, *δυναμοδύναμις*, *δυναμόκυβος*, *κυβό-*

[1] It is conceivable that after all *ἄλογον* may be the right reading; for I think it is quite possible that a copyist might be surprised to find an unknown quantity called by such a name as *ἀριθμός* alone—a name which has a more general signification—and might have changed *ἄλογον* into *ἄλογος* in order to give *ἀριθμός* in a limited sense a limiting epithet.

κυβος respectively. Respecting the nature of the symbol of the text, ς', the opinion which seems to have been universally held by the best writers on Diophantos is as follows. I quote first from the best authority on Greek algebra. Nesselmann (*Algebra der Griechen*, pp. 290—1) says, "Wie sollte man dagegen ebenso allgemein eine Zahl darstellen, ohne ihr gleich bei der Annahme einen bestimmten Werth beizulegen? Die Buchstaben des Alphabets, als geläufige Schriftzüge, lagen hier am nächsten; aber an jeden Buchstaben knüpfte die Einbildungskraft aus Gewohnheit einen bestimmten Zahlbegriff. Es blieb nichts Anderes übrig, als entweder ein willkührlich gewähltes Zeichen sich zu schaffen, oder den einzigen Buchstaben des Griechischen Alphabets, dessen Zug keinen conventionellen Zahlenwerth in sich begriff, zu diesem Zwecke zu verwenden, nämlich das Final-sigma, ς. Und man hat das Letztere wirklich gethan. Wann aber dieser Schritt geschehen ist, und von Wem, das lässt sich jetzt aus gänzlichem Mangel an vorhandenen Quellen nicht mehr bestimmen. Nur soviel lässt sich mit ziemlicher Gewissheit behaupten, dass diese so nahe liegende Anwendung so weit hinausgeschoben wurde wegen des erwähnten für dieses Zweck ungünstigen Verhältnisses des Griechischen Alphabets zu den Zahlen." To a similar effect Moritz Cantor (*Geschichte der Mathematik*, Band I, 1880 p. 400) observes: "Die gesuchte Zahl selbst, welche eine unbekannte Menge von Einheiten enthält, heisst schlechtweg die *Zahl*, *ἀριθμός*, und wird durch ein finales Sigma, ς bezeichnet, den einzigen Buchstaben des geschriebenen Alphabets, dem an sich eine bestimmte Zahlenbedeutung nicht innewohnt, und der desshalb, auch wenn beliebig viele durch Buchstaben dargestellte Zahlen daneben vorkommen, zu einer Verwirrung nicht Anlass geben kann." Thus both authors tell us that the final sigma is used to denote the unknown quantity, representing *ἀριθμός* the complete word for it; and they imply in the passages which I have quoted that this final sigma corresponds exactly to the x of modern equations, and that we have here the beginning of algebraical notation in the strict sense of the term—notation, that is, which is purely conventional and shows in itself no necessary connection between the symbol and the thing denoted by it. I must

observe however that Nesselmann has in another place (pp. 300—1) corrected the impression which the reader might have got from the passage which I have quoted, that he regarded the use of the sign for ἀριθμός as a step towards genuine algebraical notation. He makes the acute observation that, as the same symbol occurs in many places where it represents ἀριθμός used in the ordinary untechnical sense, and is therefore not exclusively used to designate the unknown quantity, the technical ἀριθμός, it must be after all more of the nature of an abbreviation than an algebraical symbol. This view is, I think, undoubtedly correct; but the question now arises—how can the final sigma of the Greek alphabet be an abbreviation for ἀριθμός?

The difficulty of answering the question suggests a doubt which, so far as I am aware, has been expressed by no writer upon Diophantos up to the present time. Is the sign, which Bachet's text gives as a final sigma, really the final sigma at all? This question was suggested to me principally by the doubt whether the final sigma, ς, was developed as distinct from the form σ as early as the date of the MS. of Diophantos which Bachet used—or rather as early as the first copy of Diophantos, for the explanation of the sign is made by the author himself in the text of the second definition. This being extremely doubtful, if not absolutely impossible, in what way is its representation as a final sigma in Bachet's text to be accounted for? The MS. from which Bachet edited his Greek text is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and I have not yet been able to consult it: but fortunately in a paper by M. Rodet in the *Journal Asiatique* (Janvier 1878) I found certain passages quoted by the author from Diophantos for the purpose of comparison with the algebra of Mohammed ibn Mūsā Al-Khārizmi. These passages M. Rodet tells us that he copied accurately from the identical MS. which Bachet used. On examination of these passages I found that in all but two cases of occurrence of the sign for ἀριθμός it was given as the final sigma. In one of the other cases he writes for ὁ ἀριθμός (in this instance untechnical) the abbreviation ὁ ᾶς, and in the other case we find ψψοι for ἀριθμοί. In this last place Bachet reads ςς̄οι. But the same symbol ψψοι which M. Rodet gives is actually found also in three places in

Bachet's own edition. (1) In his note on IV. 3 he gives a reading from his MS. which he has corrected in his own text, and in which the signs $\mathfrak{y}\bar{\alpha}$ and $\mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{y}\bar{\eta}$ occur. They must here necessarily signify *ἀριθμὸς* $\bar{\alpha}$ and *ἀριθμοὶ* $\bar{\eta}$ because, although the sense requires the notation corresponding to $\frac{1}{x}$, $\frac{8}{x}$, not x, $8x$, we know not only from Bachet's direct statement but also from the translation of certain passages by Xylander, whose work was published in 1575, that the sign for *ἀριθμός* is in the MSS. very often carelessly written for *ἀριθμοστόν* and its sign. (2) In the text of IV. 14 there is a sentence (marked by Bachet as interpolated) which has the expression $\delta^{\upsilon}\ \bar{\theta}\ .\ \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{y}\ \bar{\varsigma}$ where again the context shows that $\mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{y}$ is for *ἀριθμοί*. (3) At the beginning of V. 12 there is a difficulty in the text; and Bachet notes that his MS. has *ὁ διπλασίων αὐτοῦ* $\mathfrak{y}$... where a Vatican MS. reads *ὁ διπλασίων αὐτοῦ ἀριθμὸν*.... Xylander also notes that his MS. had *μήτε ὁ διπλασίων αὐτοῦ* $\alpha\bar{\rho}$.... It is thus clear that the MS. which Bachet used sometimes has the sign for *ἀριθμός* in a form which is at least sufficiently like $\mathfrak{y}$ to be taken for it. This last very remarkable variation as compared with $\varsigma\varsigma^{\alpha\iota}$ seemed at first sight inexplicable; but on reference to Gardthausen, *Griechische Palaeographie* (p. 259) I found under the head "hieroglyphisch-conventionell" an abbreviation $\overset{\circ}{\mathfrak{y}}$, $\overset{\circ\circ}{\mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{y}}$ for *ἀριθμός*, *ἀριθμοί*, which the author gives as occurring in the Bodleian MS. of Euclid (D'Orville MSS. X 1 inf. 2, 30). The same statement is made by Lehmann[1] (*Die tachygraphischen Abkürzungen der griechischen Handschriften*, 1880): "Von Sigeln, welchen ich auch anderwärts begegnet bin, sind zu nennen *ἀριθμός*, das in der Oxforder Euclidhandschrift mit einer der Note *καί* ähnlichen Schlangenlinie bezeichnet wird. Die Endung wird darüber gesetzt, zur Bezeichnung des Plurals wird das einfache Zeichen verdoppelt" (p. 107). In Plate 10 Lehmann gives a facsimile of the sign which is like the form given by

[1] I give these statements on the authority of Gardthausen and Lehmann, as unfortunately, owing to the almost exact similarity (pointed out by Lehmann) between the signs for *ἀριθμός* and *καί* in the Bodleian MS. of Euclid, I have been unable from want of time to distinguish and verify completely the two uses. I can only assert that the sign as given by Lehmann is of very frequent occurrence in the margin of the MS.

Gardthausen except that the angle in the latter is more rounded by Lehmann. The form ꝗꝗ$^{\alpha\iota}$ above mentioned as given by M. Rodet and Bachet is also given by Lehmann with a remark that it seems to be only a modification of the other. If we take the form as given by Gardthausen, the change necessary is the very slightest possible. Thus by assuming this conventional abbreviation for *ἀριθμός* it is easy to see how it was thought by Bachet to be a final sigma and how also it might be taken for the isolated form given by M. Rodet.

As I have already implied, I cannot think that the symbol used by Diophantos is really a final sigma, ς. That the conventional abbreviation in the Euclid MS. and the sign in Diophantos' *Arithmetics* are identical is, I think, certain; and that neither of the two is a final sigma must be clear if it can be proved that one of them is not. Having consulted the MS. of the first ten propositions of Diophantos in the Bodleian Library, I conclude that the symbol in this work cannot be a final sigma for the following reasons.

(1) The sign in the Bodleian MS. is written thus, 'ς$^{\bar{o}}$ for *ἀριθμός*; and though the final sigma is used universally in this MS. at the end of words there is, besides a slight difference in shape between the two, a very distinct difference in size, the sign for *ἀριθμός* being always very much larger. There are some cases in which the two come close together, e.g. in the expression *εἷς ἀριθμός* where the final sigma of *εἷς* and the sign for *ἀριθμός* are consecutive, and the difference is very strongly marked.

(2) As I have shown, the breathing is prefixed before the sign. This, I think, shows clearly that the symbol was regarded as an abbreviation of certain letters beginning with *α* the first letter of *ἀριθμός*. It is interesting also to observe that in the Bodleian MS. there are certain cases in which *ἀριθμός* in its untechnical, and *ἀριθμός* in its technical sense follow each other as in *ἔταξα τὸ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀριθμοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἑνός*, where (contrary to what might be expected) the sign is used for the untechnical *ἀριθμός* and the other is written in full. This is a very remarkable piece of evidence to show that the sign is an abbreviation and in no sense an algebraical symbol. More remarkable still as evidence of this view is the fact that in the same MS. the

word *ἀριθμός* in the definition *ἀριθμὸς ὁ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων τῶν ἰδιωμάτων κτησάμενος ἔχων δὲ.....ἀριθμὸς καλεῖται* is itself denoted by the symbol, so that in the MS. there is absolutely no difference between the full name and the symbol.

My conclusion being therefore (1) that the sign given as ς in Bachet's text of Diophantos is not really a final sigma, (2) that it is an abbreviation of some kind for *ἀριθμός*, the question remains—How was this abbreviation arrived at? If it is not a hieroglyph (and I have not yet found any evidence of its hieroglyphic origin), I would suggest that it might very well be a corruption of the two letters *αρ*. If we accept the view that it may be a contraction after successive degradations for these two letters, we have then a perfect parallel between the different abbreviations used by Diophantos. The sign for *ἀριθμός* would then correspond exactly to δ^{ν} the sign for *δύναμις* and the rest. This view also explains, and is countenanced by the solitary occurrence in M. Rodet's transcription of the contraction $\bar{\alpha}^{\varsigma}$. It would also explain the remarkable variation in the few words quoted from Xylander's note on V. 12 *μήτε ὁ διπλασίων αὐτοῦ* $\bar{\alpha\rho}$ $\bar{\mu o}$ $\bar{\alpha}$.... These words given by Xylander are important because in no other sentence which he quotes in the Greek does any abbreviation of *ἀριθμός* occur. As his work is a Latin translation he rarely quotes the original Greek at all; hence we might have doubted whether the sign for *ἀριθμός* occurred in his MS. in the same form as in Bachet's. That it did occur in the same form is, however, clear from the note to III. 12. In this proposition it evidently occurred wrongly instead of the sign for the fraction *ἀριθμοστόν* (as was commonly the case in the MSS.), for after stating that the context showed the reading *ἀριθμός* to be wrong Xylander says, "Est sane in Graeco nota senarii ϛ. Sed locum habere non potest." Now ς and ϛ are so much alike that what was taken for one might easily be taken for the other. Thus we may certainly assume that the sign for *ἀριθμός* in question occurred in the same MS. as the abbreviation $\bar{\alpha\rho}$ for the same word.

TRIN. COLL.
10 *May*, 1884.

T. L. HEATH.

NOTE ON JEREMIAH VIII. 22.

A. Jerem. viii. 22: "Why is not come up the אֲרֻכָה of the daughter of my people?"

B. „ xxx. 17: "For I will cause to come up אֲרֻכָה for thee, and of thy wounds will I heal thee."

C. „ xxxiii. 6: "Behold, I cause to come up for her אֲרֻכָה and healing (מַרְפֵּא) and I will heal them."

D. Isaiah lviii. 8: "Then shall break forth as the morning thy light, and thine אֲרֻכָה shall spring forth (תִּצְמַח) speedily."

In A, B, C אֲרֻכָה is understood by Gesenius and others to be *a surgical bandage* (*a plaister* (Keil)); and עָלָה, הַעֲלָה are taken in the sense of *applicari, applicare, to be put on, to put on.* In D the *proper* sense of אֲרֻכָה is given up, as unsuitable; and a more general meaning, *sanatio, recovery,* is assigned to it. In A, B, and D, the LXX. render it by ἴαμα or ἴασις. In D, Symmachus also has ἡ ἴασίς σου, and the Vulg. *sanitas tua.* In A and B, the Peschito has ܐܣܝܐ, *sanatio;* but in D, ܙܕܝܩܐ, *justitia.*

In all four places I would adopt the sense of *cicatrization,* or the formation of a new skin over a wound, after suppuration

has ceased. Against this sense Keil (on B) says there is the objection that the word is always used in connexion with עָלָה, *to be put on*, or הֶעֱלָה, *to put on*; which is *not* the proper word to be used in speaking of the forming of a new skin over a wound. But surely a natural and spontaneous action, like that of cicatrization may more properly be said *to come up*, or (as in D) *to spring up* or *germinate*, than the application of a bandage or plaister by the hand of a surgeon. This use of עָלָה may also be supported by Ezek. xxxvii. 8: "Upon them (the dry bones) sinews and flesh *came up* (עָלָה), and the skin covered (יִקְרַם) them above"; which is translated by LXX.: *ἐπ' αὐτὰ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκες ἐφύοντο, καὶ ἀνέβαινεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ δέρματα ἐπάνω*. Also ibid. 7: "And I will lay (נָתַתִּי) upon you sinews, and will cause to come up (הַעֲלֵיתִי) upon you flesh."

Of the ancient versions which have not been already noticed, the Vulg. on A has: *non est obducta cicatrix;* and on B, C: *obducam tibi* (vel *eis*) *cicatricem.* This is, substantially, the version for which I contend; but a more exact rendering of אֲרֻכָה seems to be that of the LXX. on C: *ἀνάγω αὐτῇ συνούλωσιν* (*cicatrizationem*) *καὶ ἴαμα*; to which may now be added that of Theodotion on D, *ἡ συνούλωσίς σου*; and that of Aquila on the same place, *καὶ κατούλωσίς σου* (*ταχὺ ἀναφυήσεται*). See *Auctarium* ad Orig. Hex. p. 35. On A, I had given: 'A. Σ. *οὐλή*, from the Syro-hex. ܐܘܠܐ .ܫ.ܐ, which is put for *οὐλή*, Lev. xiii. 2 (apud Bar Hebraeum); but I now think it probable that *συνούλωσις* or *κατούλωσις* may have been intended. Συνούλωσις is also put by Symmachus for תְּעָלָה (= *emplastrum* (Gesen.) = *coalitio vulneris* (Simonis)) Jerem. xxx. 13.

From the *closing up of a wound* it is easy to see how the same Hebrew phrase came to be applied to the *repairing of the breaches* of a wall, as in 2 Chron. xxiv. 13; Nehem. iv. 7. The Greek word is applied by S. Greg. Naz. T. I. p. 407 to the heal-

ing of the divisions of the Church: *τάχιστα τοῦ διεστῶτος συνουλωθέντος, ὥσπερ ἐν σώματι.*

The root seems to be the Arabic أَرَكَ, for which Castell gives (9): *detumuit et mitigato dolore sanatum fuit* (vulnus); *aequabili et rubicunda carne coaluit;* and a derivative أَرِيكَة, *ἴασις, sanitas, coalitus et obductio vulneris.* Compare Delitzsch on Isai. p. 561 (German ed.) *note.*

F. FIELD.

NOTE ON JOSHUA xxii. 10, 11.

The question of the position of the memorial altar which was built by the Reubenites the Gadites and the half tribe of Manasseh, on returning to their settlements east of Jordan, is apparently considered by some to be undecided. But the Hebrew narrative seems to define the position in the clearest possible manner.

In Joshua xxii. 10, we read:

And when they came unto the borders of (*or* regions round about, Heb. *geliloth*) Jordan, *that are in the land of Canaan*, the children of Reuben and the children of Gad and the half tribe of Manasseh built *there* an altar by Jordan, a great altar to see to.

Whatever be the district which is described by the word *geliloth*, whether it denoted, as Stanley supposes (Sinai and Palestine, 3rd ed. p. 284 *note*), the upper stage of the Jordan valley, and whether it extended to both sides of the river or not, it is clear that the locality here defined as being 'in the land of Canaan' must have been on the west of Jordan.

But the position of the altar is fixed with still greater precision in verse 11, in the translation of which I shall venture to depart from the Authorised Version in two important particulars:

And the children of Israel heard say, Behold the children of Reuben and the children of Gad and the half tribe of Manasseh have built an altar *in the forefront of* (A. V. over against) the land of Canaan, in the borders (Heb. *geliloth*) of Jordan, *on the side that belongeth to* (lit. *on the side of;* A. V. at the passage of) the children of Israel.

The altar was therefore placed

1. אֶל מוּל with respect to the land of Canaan:

2. in the district known as the *geliloth* of Jordan; and, as this term was most probably applied to both sides of the river, the locality is further defined as being

3. on the side of (אֶל־עֵבֶר) the children of Israel.

It is important to determine in the first instance what is the precise meaning of אֶל מוּל. An examination of all the passages in which מוּל occurs has led me to the following conclusion: that one object is said to be מוּל or מִמּוּל or אֶל מוּל with regard to another, when one stands close in front of the other and both face *in the same direction*. On the other hand one object is said to be נֶגֶד with regard to another, when one is opposite to or over against the other, with an interval between them, and the two face *in opposite directions*.

In proof of this I will first examine the instances in which מוּל is used not of geographical position.

Ex. xxvi. 9: And thou shalt double (*or* fold) the sixth curtain on the forefront of (אֶל מוּל פְּנֵי, lit. *in front of the face of*) the tabernacle.

Ex. xxviii. 25: And put them (i.e. the ends of the chains) on the shoulder pieces of the ephod in the forefront thereof (אֶל מוּל פָּנָיו).

Ex. xxviii. 37: The plate of pure gold was to be 'upon the forefront of (אֶל מוּל פְּנֵי) the mitre.'

Num. viii. 2, 3: Aaron was to light the lamps 'upon the forefront of (אֶל מוּל פְּנֵי) the candlestick.'

2 Sam. xi. 15: Uriah was to be placed 'in the forefront of (אֶל מוּל פְּנֵי) the hottest battle'; that is, in front of the men who were most hotly engaged with the enemy.

In Lev. v. 8 the priest was to wring off the pigeon's head 'away from his neck (מִמּוּל עָרְפּוֹ)'; the head and neck being

with regard to each other in the position described above, the one close in front of the other.

Lastly, Micah ii. 8, 'ye strip off the robe away from (מִמּוּל) the garment,' that is, the loose upper mantle from the under garment.

We now come to the passages in which מוּל is used to describe geographical or local position.

In Num. xxii. 5, Balak says of the children of Israel, 'they dwell מִמֶּלִי in front of me.' They were then encamped in the plains of Moab opposite Jericho; so that as Balak looked down upon them to the westward they were between him and the river.

In Ex. xxxiv. 3, the flocks and herds were forbidden to feed אֶל מוּל הָהָר on the front of the mountain; that is, on its slopes. They might feed anywhere opposite to it, and separated from it by an interval.

That this view is correct is further confirmed by Josh. viii. 33, where half the people were commanded to stand on the slopes (אֶל מוּל) of Mount Gerizim, and half on the slopes of mount Ebal, to hear the blessing and the curse.

From all these passages it seems clear that the altar which the Reubenites and their companions built, being in the fore-front of (אֶל מוּל) the land of Canaan, was in the same position with regard to it as the ends of the chains to the shoulder-pieces of the ephod to which they were fastened; as the golden plate to the mitre; as the lamps to the candlestick; as Uriah to the warriors whom he led to the assault; as the pigeon's head to its neck; as the upper to the under garment; as the camp of Israel to Balak; as the flocks and herds feeding and the people standing on the mountain slopes were with regard to the mountain. The altar and the land of Canaan were therefore both on the same side of the river; that is, on the West.

Further, to remove any possible ambiguity, the altar is said to have been '*on the side of* (אֶל-עֵבֶר) the children of Israel.' This compound preposition אֶל-עֵבֶר occurs only in two other

passages, Ex. xxviii. 26, Deut. xxx. 13, the former of which is strictly parallel to the passage in Joshua: 'And thou shalt make two rings of gold, and thou shalt put them upon the two ends of the breastplate in the border thereof, which is *in the side of* (אֶל־עֵבֶר) the ephod inward.' That עֵבֶר means a side or surface is evident from Ex. xxxii. 15: 'the tables were written on both their *sides*.'

It may at first sight appear superfluous to add this further description, 'on the side of the children of Israel,' after the statement that the altar was 'in the forefront of the land of Canaan'; but I understand the expression 'on the side of the children of Israel' to refer only to the *geliloth* or 'borders,' and to define the side of the river to which they belonged.

In erecting this altar, the chief object of the Reubenites and their companions was to leave an evidence of their identity in race and religion with the tribes on the west of Jordan; and a huge cairn of stones, 'a great altar to see to,' which was plainly visible from the east side of the river, would be a striking monument to which to appeal in support of this identity.

Incidentally, the investigation of the meaning of מוּל throws light upon a passage which is rather obscured by the Authorised Version, and of which indeed it is difficult to give an adequate rendering. In Ex. xviii. 19, Jethro says to Moses, 'Be thou for the people *in front of* (מוּל) God'; that is, standing between God and the people, and facing the people; and so representing God to the people and not the people to God. The A. V. 'Be thou for the people to God-ward' just reverses the position, and makes Moses represent the people to God.

W. A. W.

PLATO, *PHAEDO* 95 A.

In his note upon *Phaedo* 95 A, Mr Archer-Hind attributes to me the suggestion "that ἵλεα conveys the notion of 'bidding farewell,' ἵλαθι having the same sense addressed to a deity as χαῖρε addressed to a mortal," as well as a confirmatory quotation from Cicero *de natura deorum* I § 124, where the phrase 'propitius sit' is similarly used. The credit is due, not to me, but to that excellent scholar, the late Richard Shilleto, who, more than twenty years ago, when I was his grateful pupil, called my attention to the passage, and thus interpreted it.

This necessary restitution gives me an opportunity of expressing the wish that some scholar could be found to collect and edit Mr Shilleto's adversaria. It is true that much of his learning has been made familiar by his pupils: but the margins and flyleaves of his books must, I should think, contain many acute and original remarks which ought not to lie buried in the Cambridge University Library.

HENRY JACKSON.

BENTLEIANA.

[THE following notes on the first six books of the Iliad are among Bentley's MSS. (B. 17. 17) in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. Those on the first two books were copied by myself for Herr Jacob Maehly and were printed by him in the Appendix to his Life of Bentley in 1868. At that time I was very much occupied with my own work and was therefore unable to transcribe the notes on Books III—VI, of which Herr Maehly rather unreasonably complained. My shortcomings have now been made up by the kindness of Mr Walter Leaf, late Fellow of Trinity College. It has not been thought worth while to give all the notes which have reference only to the digamma, or to follow too literally the occasionally careless accentuation of the MS.

W. A. W.]

I.

3 Πολλὰς δ' *ἰφθίμους ψυχάς*] Scholiastes Mtus.: *Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Ῥόδιος κεφαλὰς γράφει.* Credo, ex Iliad. λ, 55.

οὕνεκ' ἔμελλε
Πολλὰς *ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς* ἄϊδι *προϊάψειν.*

Sed rectius hic loci *ψυχάς*, quae opponuntur *αὐτοῖς*, corporibus, *κεφαλαὶ* enim tam projiciebantur canibus, quam *αὐτοί.*

4 *Αὐτοὺς δ' ἑλώρια*] Triplicem lectionem memorat Eustathius, *δ' ἑλώρια, δὲ ἑλώρια*, et *δ' ἑλλώρια*; et eadem est diversitas in MSS. nostris. Sunt qui nihil referre existiment;

primam in ἔλωρ produci posse virtute liquidae consonantis λ; ut μέλος in scazonte Persii,

Corvos poëtas et poëtrias picas
Cantare credas Pegaseïum mélos. (sic)

Ubi tamen vetus Annotator Pithoei, Alii legunt NECTAR, unde corrigo,

POTARE credas Pegaseïum NECTAR:

Nectar, id est aquam fontis caballini, seu Pegaseii. Sed Pegaseium melos, canticum, non minus sententiae, quam metro adversatur: nisi canticum fiat hinniendo. Nec melior altera lectio δὲ ἑλώρια, turpi hiatu; quales nulli olim apud ipsum Homerum. Scribo,

Ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ Ϝελώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν.

Vide Dissertationem praecedentem, v. ἔλωρ.

7 Ἀτρείδης τε ἄναξ] Homerus dedit sine ullo hiatu, Ἀτρείδης τε Ϝάναξ vide Dissert. v. ἄναξ.

14 Στέμματ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος] lege χερσὶ Ϝεκηβόλου.

19 εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ἱκέσθαι] Homero semper est Ϝοῖκος, Ϝοίκαδε; vide Dissert. Ergo hic scribendum εὖ δ' Ϝοίκαδ': Dwοικαδ, ut Anglice Dwell. Priscianus: Est quando in metris pro nihilo accipiebant, ut Ἄμμες δ' Ϝειράναν.

20 Παῖδα δέ μοι λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθε] Apion et Herodorus, narrante Eustathio, per infinitivum modum legebant, λῦσαί τε et δέχεσθαι; et deinde ἀζόμενοι casu recto per hyperbaton capiebant pro ἀζομένοις. Sed hoc durum et coactum. Ego totum locum sic constituo:

Ἀτρείδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·

(Sic distingue post δύω: ut β, 406. Αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' Αἴαντε δύω)

Ἀτρείδα τε, καὶ ἄλλοι ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,

(Sic lege in Duali, ut versu superiore: deinde)

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαντε φίλην, τάδ' ἄποινα δέχεσθε.

Liberantes mihi filiam haec munera accipite. δ' ἐμοὶ, non δέ μοι. Schol. Ms. Ἐμοὶ ἀντιδιέσταλται πρὸς τὸ ὑμῖν, διὸ ὀρθοτονεῖται. Porro legendum, τάδ' ἄποινα, haec

scilicet, quae coram ostentat: unde spectatores ea mirantur, ut *ἀγλαά*. Otiose articulus *τὰ* adderetur: et semper alias *ἄποινα* simpliciter.

21 *Ἀζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν ἑκηβόλον*] lego *Διὸς υἷα Ϝεκηβόλον*.

24 *Ἀγαμέμνονι ἤνδανε θυμῷ*] Lege cum Aeolico *Ϝ*, wau. *Ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι Ϝάνδανε θυμῷ*.

A praesenti *Ϝανδάνω* non magis formari potest *ἤνδανον*, quam a *Μανθάνω*, *ἤνθανον*; consona abjecta.

30 *Ἐνὶ οἴκῳ*] Tolle lacunam, et repone, *Ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ Ϝοίκῳ*.

38 *Τενέδοιο δὲ ἶφι ἀνάσσεις*] Lege hic, ut ubique alias apud Homerum *Τενέδοιό τε Ϝῖφι Ϝανάσσεις*. Vide Dissert.

47 *ὁ δ' ἤϊε νυκτὶ ἐοικώς*] Semper et hic et infra *Ϝεοικώς*: valeant ergo deformes hiatus.

51 *Ἐφιείς*] Ita Etymol. Magn. v. *βάλλω* et v. *ἐφιείς*. Ita Eustathius ad locum: et codices fere nostri; non *ἀφιεὶς f.* *Αὐτοῖσιν ἐφιείς*, ut Il. *o*, 443 *μάλα δ' ὦκα βέλη Τρώεσσιν ἐφίει*.

64 *Ὅς κ' εἴποι*] Aeoles semper sibi vindicant *Ϝείπω*, et *Ϝέπος*: vide Dissert. Lege ergo *ὃς Ϝείποι*.

70 *Ὅς ἤδη*] Iidem adsciscunt *Ϝείδω*, *Ϝήδεα*, *Ϝίδον* etc. Ergo hic lege concinnius paulo, *ὃς Ϝῄδη* et versu altero *Ϝήν* suam et *Ϝοι* sibi.

79 *Καί οἱ πείθονται*] Καὶ hic longa esse nequit, cum non sit in ictu. Melius igitur hic, ut ubique, *Καί Ϝοι*.

83 *σὺ δὲ φράσαι, εἴ με σαώσεις*] Tres scripti, Oxoniensis, Cantabrigiensis, et Harleianus, *εἴ με σαώσαις*. Recte: Tu delibera, cogita, utrum me servare possis. *φράσαι* non est Dic, ut hic Interpretes, sed considera. Hesychius, *φράσαι, διανοήθητι, σκέψαι*.

95 *Οὐδ' ἀπέλυσε*] Scholiastes Ms.: *Ἀθετεῖται, ὡς περιττός*: improbatur, rejicitur hic versus: ut supervacaneus.

97 *οὐδ' ὄγε πρὶν λοιμοῖο βαρείας χεῖρας ἀφέξει*] Ambiguam sententiam arguit Eustathius; an Manus pestis ab Achivis abstinebit Apollo, an Ipse manus abstinebit a peste. Prior constructio magis arridet, ut Od. *υ*, 263.

> *Κερτομίας δέ τοι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ καὶ χεῖρας ἀφέξω*
> *Πάντων μνηστήρων.*

Sed neutra interpretatio placet. Scholiastes Ms. Καὶ Ἀριστάρχειοι, καὶ αἱ Σωσιγένους, καὶ ἡ Ἀριστοφάνους, καὶ ἡ Μασσαλιωτικὴ ἡ Ῥιανοῦ καὶ σχεδὸν πᾶσαι, Omnes fere omnium editiones habent,

Οὐδ' ὅγε πρὶν Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀπώσει:

altera lectio videtur Zenodoti fuisse: ἔοικε δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα Ζηνοδότου εἶναι.

100 Τότε κέν μιν. Schol. Ms. Ζηνόδοτος, Αἴ κέν μιν. Γελοῖον δὲ διστατικὸν λέγειν τὸν μάντιν.

104 Πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐΐκτην] Ad effugiendum hiatum commode succurrit Aeolismus; semper enim exhibet Ϝείσκω; vide Dissert. et scribe ΛαμπετόϜωντι, ut Priscianus ΔημοφόϜων, ΛαοκόϜων.

106 Οὐ πώποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπας] Cum omnia formata ab Εἶπω Aeolicam literam adsumant, patet hic corrigendum esse,

Μάντι κακῶν, οὐ πώποτ' ἐμοὶ τὰ κρήγυα Ϝεῖπας.

Τὰ κρήγυα concinnius, ut versu proximo τὰ κακὰ.

110 Ὣς δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα etc.] Scholiastes Ms. Ἀθετουμένης ταύτης, οὐκ ἐλλιπὴς, ἀλλὰ σύντομος ἔσται ἡ ἑρμηνεία.

115 Οὔτ' ἄρ φρένας, οὔτε τι ἔργα] Neque hic lacunam patiemur; quippe ubique est Aeolice Ϝέργον: unde et v. 147 scribo ἘκάϜεργον.

117 Βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι] Schol. Ms. Αἱ πᾶσαι Σῶν εἶχον ὡς Νῦν τοι σῶς αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος.

119 ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε] Cautum est ab hiatu, quia semper adhaeret consonans Aeolica, Ϝέοικε. Vide Dissert.

121 φιλοκτεανώτατε] Seleucus, apud Eustath. Od. β; Aristophanis γραφή est φιλοκτεανέστατε.

124 Οὐδέ τί πω ἴδμεν] Schol. Ms.: αἱ πᾶσαι που ἔχουσιν. Recte: οὔπου nusquam, non οὔπω nunquam.

126 Λαοὺς οὐκ ἐπέοικε] Cum Aeolismi jure sit semper Ϝέοικε: non inde formari potest ἐπέοικε; sed ἐπιϜέοικε. Legendum igitur, Λαοὺς οὔτι Ϝέοικε: ut supra v. 113 ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ Ϝέοικε.

131 Θεοείκελ'] Cum ubique sit Ϝείκελος et Ϝίκελος, lege sono fortiore, θεοϜείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ.

139 Ἄξω ἑλὼν, ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι] Eustathius ad locum annotat, judicio summi critici Dionysii Longini versum hunc παρένθετον suppositititium esse. Sane αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι et mox Ἄξω ἑλών est bis idem dicere.

149 ἐπιειμένε] Omnia deducta ab ἕννυμι, ut Ϝέστο, Ϝεῖμα etc. Aeolicum Ϝ habent; ergo etiam in medio vocabulo pronuntiandum ἐπιϜειμένε.

157 Θάλασσά τε ἠχήεσσα] Inhonesto Hiatu, ut Ἀτρείδης τε ἄναξ v. 7. Sed bene sit Aeolico Wau, quod et huc pertinet,

Οὔρεά τε σκιόεντα θάλασσά τε Ϝηχήεσσα.

ut Od. δ, 72 χαλκοῦ τε στεροπὴν κατὰ δώματα Ϝηχήεντα.

159 Τιμὴν ἀρνύμενοι Μενελάῳ σοί τε, κυνῶπα,
Πρὸς Τρώων. τῶν οὔτι μετατρέπῃ οὐδ' ἀλεγίζεις

Τιμὴν hic non valet τιμωρίαν, ποινὴν; sed κῦδος, honorem, gloriam; ut ε, 552,

Τιμὴν Ἀτρείδῃσ' Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ Μενελάῳ
Ἀρνύμενοι. Unde hic v. 174 πάρ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι
οἵ κέ με τιμήσουσι, honorabunt scilicet, non ulciscentur. Male ergo hic locus ab omnibus veteribus acceptus est, irretitis prava lectione, quae nunc tandem detegetur et sanabitur. Lego,

Τιμὴν ἀρνύμενοι Μενελάῳ σοί τε, κυνῶπα,
Πρὸς Δαναῶν, τῶν οὔτι etc.

Honori tuo velificantes apud Graecos, non utique Trojanos. Sic Il. π, 84 Ὡς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο Πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν.

Inde recte sequitur, Τῶν οὔτι μετατρέπῃ, Quos Graecos nihili aestimas nec curas: ut Il. μ, 238.

Οἰωνοῖς, τῶν οὔτι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω.

Quos alites nihili aestimo. At veteres, cum constructionem τῶν Τρώων sensus ipse repudiaret, extrinsecus adsumebant τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν: Quis hoc potest pati?

163 Οὐ μὲν σοί ποτε ἶσον ἔχω γέρας] Ne formides hunc hiatum πότε ἶσον, scito Aeolice semper pronunciari Ϝῖσον.

168 Ἐπὴν κεκάμω πολεμίζων] Scholiastes Ms.: Ἡρωδιανὸς καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος ἐπεί κε κάμω: ἄλλοι κεκάμω, ὡς λελάχωσι, πεπίθοιτο. Vide Etym. Magnum in κεκάμω. Paulum aut nihil interest.

170 Οὐδὲ σ' ὀΐω, ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμος ἐὼν, ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν] Quomodo sodes ἐνθάδε hic inhonoratus, cum versu priore minaretur domum se iturum? Vetustissimum est mendum, quale v. 160 πρὸς Τρώων pro πρὸς Δαναῶν. Homerus ipse sic dederat,

οὐδὲ σ' ὀΐω
Ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμον ἐόντ' ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν,

Te hic desertum a sociis et auxiliaribus. Socii venerunt τιμὴν ἀρνύμενοι Agamemnoni; si iidem desererent, ille esset ἄτιμος. At Achilles ceteros sperat duces suo exemplo deserturos, ut Il. ι, 417.

Καὶ δ' ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἐγὶ παραμυθησαίμην
Οἴκαδ' ἀποπλείειν.

Ergo recte habet ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμον ἐόντ': ea notione qua venit etiam Od. ξ, 70 de Ulixe,

Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔβη Ἀγαμέμνονος εἵνεκα τιμῆς
Ἴλιον εἰς εὔπωλον, ἵνα Τρώεσσι μάχοιτο.

et v. 117

φὴς δ' αὐτὸν φθίσθαι Ἀγαμέμνονος εἵνεκα τιμῆς.

Quin et Agamemnonis responsio hoc firmat: Abi εἰς κόρακας; tun' me tua discessione ἄτιμον fore speras?

πάρ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι
οἵ κέ με τιμήσουσι, μάλιστα δὲ μητίετα Ζεύς.

173 φεῦγε μάλ' εἴ τοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται] Scholiastes Ms. Γράφεται εἴ τοι θυμὸς ἐέλδεται. Sed placet recepta lectio. ἐέλδεται est cupit; at ἐπέσσυται est incitatur, cum impetu fertur, quod dici convenit magis ab irato. Il. ι, 42,

εἰ δέ τοι αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται, ὥστε νέεσθαι.

193 ἕως ὁ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε] Versus ἀκέφαλος: qui saepe alibi occurrit: lego, ἕως ὅγε ταῦθ', ut paulo ante, Ἣ ὅγε φάσ-

γανον ὀξὺ. Ἕως una syllaba, ut supra v. 18 θεοί, et Od. β, 145 (148)

Τὼ δ' ἕως μέν ῥ' ἐπέτοντο.

203 Ἥ ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρείδαο] Scholiastes Ms. Ἴδῃ δίχα τοῦ σ. σχολ. Pindari Pyth. 4 ἴδῃ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴδηαι; et Eustathius quoque. Ex codicibus nostris tres ἴδῃ, et duo ἴδῃς, sed utrumque mendosum sit necesse est; nam ubique cum digammo est Fίδον. Hiatus quoque ἵνα ὕβριν alterum mendum hic indicat. Dedit sine dubio poeta,

Ἥ ἵν' ἐφ' ὕβριν ὁρῇς Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρείδαο.

ut Od. ρ, 487:

Καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσιν
Παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας,
Ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

et Od. ν, 214:

Ζεὺς σφείας τίσαιθ' ἱκετήσιος, ὅστε καὶ ἄλλους
Ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾷ καὶ τίνυνται ὅστις ἁμάρτῃ.

204 τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελέσθαι οἴω] τετελέσθαι praeteritum, est perfectum esse, non, ut sensus flagitat, perfectum iri. Recte igitur Aristarchus, notante Ms. Scholiaste, τελέεσθαι, Futurum.

230 ὅστις σέθεν ἀντίον εἴποι] Atqui certissimum est, ubique cum digammo venire. Dedit ergo Poeta, ὅστις σέθεν ἀντία Fείποι.

236 Περὶ γάρ ῥά ἑ χαλκὸς ἔλεψε] Ubique est Fε se Fεθεν sui; quod hiatui succurrit.

235 Τομὴν ἐν ὄρεσσι λέλοιπεν] Virgilius,

Numquam fronde levi fundet virgulta nec umbras,
Cum semel in silvis imo de stirpe recisum
Matre caret, posuitque comas et brachia ferro.

Unde verisimile est, notante Fulvio Ursino, κόμην hic legisse Maronem, non τομήν. Sine dubio rectum est κόμην; ut Od. ψ, 195,

καὶ τότ' ἔπειτ' ἀπέκοψα κόμην τανυφύλλου ἐλαίης.

Κόμην, φύλλα καὶ λεπτοὺς κλαδίσκους, ait Eustath. Numquam

φύλλα καὶ ὄζους iterum fundet, postquam *φύλλα καὶ ὄζους* (id ipsum est *κόμην*) in montibus reliquit.

258 *Οἳ περὶ μὲν βουλῇ Δαναῶν, περὶ δ' ἐστὲ μάχεσθαι*] Codices vulgati *βουλῇ*. Sed Scholiastes Ms., *Γράφεται βουλῇ καὶ βουλήν*. Rectum est *βουλήν* ut Iliad. *ν*, 631

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ τέ σε φασὶ περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,

Od. *α*, 66. *Ὃς περὶ μὲν νόον ἐστὶ βροτῶν, περὶ δ' ἱρὰ θεοῖσιν.*

271 *Κατ' ἐμαυτὸν*] Recte Eustathius ex veteribus, *κατ' ἔμ' αὐτόν*; non uno verbo *ἐμαυτόν*: sic enim semper Homerus.

288 *Πάντεσσι δ' ἀνάσσειν*] Semper est *Fάναξ* et *Fανάσσει*. Lege ergo, per asyndeton, *πάντεσσι Fανάσσειν*, quod irati est. Poteris etiam, *πάντων δὲ Fανάσσειν*, vel *πᾶσιν δέ*.

294 *Εἰ δή σοι πᾶν ἔργον ὑπείξομαι, ὅττι κεν εἴπῃς*] Locus mendosus, licet omnes codices sic habeant; semper enim est *Fείκω*: unde Il. *ψ*, 602,

Ἀντίλοχε, νῦν μέν τοι ἐγὼν ὑποFείξομαι αὐτός

et ita passim. Semel tantum *ὑπείξεαι* Od. *μ*, 117, *οὐδὲ θεοῖσιν ὑπείξεαι*: sed emendatio facillima est,

Καὶ πόνος· οὐδὲ θεοῖς ὑποFείξεαι ἀθανάτοισι.

Lege ergo hic, ejecto *δή*,

Εἴ σοι πᾶν Fέργον ὑποFείξομαι, ὅττι κε Fείπῃς.

Vel fortasse, *εἰ δή σοί τι Fέπος ὑπο*—ut Il. *β*, 361,

οὗτοι ἀπόβλητον Fέπος ἔσσεται, ὅττι κε Fείπω.

296 *Σήμαιν'· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι σοι πείσεσθαι ὀΐω*] Versus hic nothus videbatur nonnullis veterum; ut ex Dionysio Longino refert Eustathius. Sane sententia constat, si a textu absit.

298 *χερσὶ μὲν οὔτι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα κούρης*] Hiatus ille facile effugiendus est, *οὔτοι*: sic enim duo ex codicibus nostris. Deinde scholiastes Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος, Μαχήσομαι*: *Ἡρακλέων δὲ Μαχέσσομαι, ὅπερ ἄμεινον*. Eustathius, *Ἡ Μασσαλιωτικὴ καὶ Σινωπικὴ ἔκδοσις Μαχήσομαι, Ἡρακλέων δὲ Μαχέσσομαι*. Recte hic Heracleon: cum enim centies veniat *μαχέσασθαι* syllaba brevi; et *μαχέσσασθαι*, ut mox v. 304 *μαχεσσαμένω*; certe in hac editione eandem formam perpetuo servare debuit; non, ut nunc fit, alias *μαχησ.* alias

μαχεσσ. Quis enim credat Poetam ipsum nulla de causa variasse? Haec varietas ex diversis veterum editionibus in praesentem textum irrepsit. Lege ergo hic,

χερσὶ μὲν οὕτοι ἔγωγε μαχέσσομαι εἵνεκα κούρης.

301 Τῶν οὐκ ἄν τι φέροις ἀνελών] Duo ex nostris codices divisim, ἂν ἑλών. Unde legendum existimo,

Τῶν οὐχ ἕν τι φέροις ἂν ἑλὼν ἀέκοντος ἐμεῖο.

303 Αἶψά τοι αἷμα κελαινὸν] Eustathius elegantem lectionem ex veteribus affert, Αἶψά τῳ αἷμα κελαινὸν. Τῳ i.e. τινί, cuidam, cuicumque: ἀορίστως, sive Agamemnon ipse, sive alii id ausuri veniant.

342 ἦ γὰρ ὅγ' ὀλοῇσι φρεσὶ θύει] Versus λαγαρός, qui sic sanandus,

Τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἦ γάρ ῥ' ὅγ' ὀλοϝῇσι φρεσὶ θύει.

344 μαχέοιντο Ἀχαιοί] Apage istum hiatum: auctor dederat, μαχεοίατ' Ἀχαιοί.

350 ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον] ut οἶνος ubique est ϝοῖνος, ita et hic ἐπὶ ϝοίνοπα πόντον. At Scholiastes Ms. Γράφεται, inquit, ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον.

351 χεῖρας ὀρεγνὺς] Schol. Ms. Τινὲς γράφουσι, χεῖρας ἀνασχών.

395 Ἠὲ καὶ ἔργῳ] Omnino corrigendum, ἠέ τι ϝέργῳ. Vide Il. ε, 879.

400 Καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη] Schol. Ms. et ex eo Eustath.: Ζηνόδοτος καί τινα τῶν ἀντιγράφων, καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων. Scholiast. Pindari Olymp. 8. Καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων· οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι, Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη. Sed Lucianus in Dial. Martis et Mercurii et in Ζεὺς τραγῳδός habet Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη. Si pro fabula haec accipis, nihil interest; si pro physica allegoria, praestat Ἀπόλλων.

404 Ὅ γὰρ αὖτε βίῃ οὖ πατρὸς ἀμείνων] Zenodotus, narrante Eustathio, versum hic inseruit,

ὅ γὰρ αὖτε βίῃ πολὺ φέρτατός ἐστι
Τῶν, ὁπόσοι ναίουσ' ὑπὸ Τάρταρον εὐρώεντα.

Sic locum depravatum ad suos numeros restituo.

409 Καὶ ἀμφ' ἅλα ἕλσαι Ἀχαιούς] Ut evites deformem hiatum, lege, ἀμφ' ἅλαδ' ἕλσαι: ut alibi εἰς ἅλαδε, ἐξ οὐρανόθεν.

424 Χθιζὸς ἔβη μετὰ δαῖτα· θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἕποντο] Schol. Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος, ἐπὶ δαῖτα· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κατὰ δαῖτα: καὶ ἕποντο διὰ τοῦ ᾱι ἕπονται.

425 αὖθις ἐλεύσεται] Plures codices et Eustathius in notis Αὖτις. Hesych. Αὖτις, πάλιν, ἐκ δευτέρου. Αὖθις plura significat, αὖτις hoc solum.

434 προτόνοισιν ὑφέντες] Scholiastes Ms. Ζηνόδοτος μὲν ὑφέντες, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι Ἐφέντες.

435 εἰς ὅρμον προέρυσσαν ἐρετμοῖς] Ridiculum mendum: lege, προέρεσσαν ἐρετμοῖς.

Navem προερύειν protrahere in mare; navem προερέσσειν propellere in portum, in terram. Iterum, Od. ι, 73

Νῆας δ' ἐσσυμένως προερύσσαμεν ἠπειρόνδε.

lege cum Aristarcho προερέσσαμεν: ut recte jam habetur Od. ν, 279 σπουδῇ δ' εἰς λιμένα προερέσσαμεν. At rursus mendose Od. ο, 496 (497) τὴν δ' εἰς ὅρμον προέρυσσαν; ubi codex ex melioribus προέρεσσαν.

438 ἐκ δ' ἑκατόμβην βῆσαν ἑκηβόλῳ] (sic).

444 ὄφρ' ἱλασσώμεθ' ἄνακτα] Sic hodie editum, sed perperam sine dubio, cum semper sit Ϝάνακτα. Lege

ὄφρ' ἱλασόμεσθα Ϝάνακτα.

Scholiastes Ms. ἱλασόμεσθα πλεονασμῷ τοῦ σ̄ et duo codd. ἱλασόμεσθα ἄν.

474 Μέλποντες ἑκάεργον· ὁ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ' ἀκούων] Scholiastes Ms. ἀθετεῖται ὁ στίχος; versus hic pro spurio habetur.

482 μεγάλ' ἴαχε νηὸς ἰούσης] Cum Aeolicum sit Ϝίαχω, et Ϝιαχή, necessario corrigendum, μέγα Ϝίαχε νηὸς ἰούσης.

483 διαπρήσσουσα κέλευθα] Ita editio prima Florentiae, unde in alias est propagatum κέλευθα. Sed codices nostri universi rectius,

διαπρήσσουσα κέλευθον: et sic Eustath. in Notis citat. Ita habetur et Od. β, 429.

484 *κατὰ στρατὸν*] Schol. Ms. *Μετὰ στρατὸν.* *Ἀρίσταρχος κατὰ, οὐ Μετὰ.* Codd. plures *Μετὰ.*

485 *ἐπ' ἠπείροιο ἔρυσσαν*] (sic).

513 *Καὶ ἤρετο δεύτερον αὖθις*] Plures codd. *Καὶ εἴρετο δεύτερον αὖτις.* Recte.

519 *Ἥρῃ*] Schol. Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος κατ' εὐθεῖαν (οὐ κατὰ δοτικὴν) Ἥρη ὅταν μ' ἐρέθῃσιν.*

522 *Μή σε νοήσῃ*] Schol. Ms. *αἱ πᾶσαι Μή τι νοήσῃ· ὡς Μή τι φόβον ἀγόρευε.*

529 *ἐπερῥώσαντο ἄνακτος*] unus ex Harleianis, *ἄνακτι.* Eleganter. Sic *ἐπερῥώοντο* Od. *υ*, 107 dativo jungitur.

532 *εἰς ἅλα ἅλτο*] Legendum *εἰς ἅλαδ' ἅλτο.* vide v. 409.

534 *ἐξ ἑδέων*] *σχολ.* Ms. *ἄλλοι μετὰ τοῦ ρ̄, ἐξ ἑδρέων.* Codices nostri variant; alii *ἑδέων* ab *ἕδος*, alii *ἑδρέων* ab *ἕδρη.* Hoc placet; sed pronunciandum *δισυλλάβως*, *ἑ | δρέων*, ut *βου | λέων* etc.

535 *Ἀλλ' ἀντίοι ἔσταν ἅπαντες*] Schol. Ms. *ἔσταν. ἄμεινον Ἦλθον γράφειν, ἐναντίον τῷ Μεῖναι.*

543 *ὅττι νοήσεις*] Codd. meliores *Νοήσῃς.*

548 *Οὔτε θεῶν πρότερος τόν γ' εἴσεται*] Pro simplice Gamma reponendum Digamma; *τὸν Ϝείσεται.*

549 *Ὃν δ' ἂν ἐγών*] Sic Romana Eustathii, sed prima Florentina et scripti nostri omnes, *ὃν δέ κ' ἐγών.* Eodem sensu utrumque, sed detur suum jus pluribus suffragiis.

555 *Μή σε παρείπῃ*] Cum semper Aeolica consonante veniant *Ϝέπος*, *Ϝείπω* et cetera ex illis formata; etiam in media voce remanebit *παρϜείπῃ*: et idcirco *Παρειπὼν* semper primam syllabam producit apud Nostrum ut Il. z, 62, *Αἴσιμα παρειπών*; et 337

Νῦν δέ με παρειποῦσ' ἄλοχος. Scribendum igitur ubique *ΠαρϜειπών.* Et hoc loco pro *Παρείπῃ*, certa emendatione, *Μή σε παρέλθῃ*; eadem prorsus sententia ut supra vers. 132

Κλέπτε νόῳ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεαι, οὐδέ με πείσεις.

et Od. λ, 291.

Ὅς σε παρέλθοι
Ἐν πάντεσσι δόλοισι.

559 *ὀλέσῃς δὲ πολέας*] Schol. Ms. *Ζηνόδοτος πολεῖς.* Sed *πολέας* per crasin disyllabos est.

565 *ἀλλ' ἀκέουσα κάθησο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ*] Saepissime lacuna sive hiatus venit ante *ἐμός.* Ergo veri mihi simillimum est, Aeolenses dixisse pro libitu vel *ἐμὸς* vel *μεός.* unde Latini suum Meus: nam bona pars Linguae Latinae ab Aeolica profluxit. Lego igitur,

Ἀλλ' ἀκέουσα κάθησο, μεῷ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ.

567 *ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ*
Ἄσσον ἰόντε ὅτε κέν τοι ἀάπτους χεῖρας ἐφείω] *Ἰόντε* duali, quî comprehendere potest omnes deos quotquot in caelo? Hoc et ratio et ipse usus prohibet. Corrigo,

Μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ
Ἄσσον ἰόντες ὅτ' ἄν τοι ἀάπτους χεῖρας ἐφείω.

ὅτ' ἂν id ipsum est, quod *ὅτε κεν.* *Ἄσσον ἰόντες* numero plurali, cominus pugnantes, ut Il. *ο*, 105, ubi Juno ipsa loquitur,

νήπιοι, οἳ Ζηνὶ μενεαίνομεν ἀφραδέοντες,
Ἠέ τί μιν μέμαμεν καταπαύσεμεν ἄσσον ἰόντες,
Ἢ Fέπει ἠὲ βίῃ.

Ceterum Eustathius ad locum, *Ἀρίσταρχος ἀάπτους, Ἀριστοφάνης ἀέπτους.* At Scholiastes Ms. *ἀάπτους· αἱ πᾶσαι ἀέπτους ἔχουσι.* Sic Hesychius, *Ἄεπτον, ἰσχυρὸν, ἀνίκητον.* Ergo ubi plus decies venit, *ἄαπτοι χεῖρες,* ceterae editiones habebant *ἄεπτοι.* Fieri potest, ut utrumque mendosum sit.

569 *καθῆστο ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ*] Ad evitandum hiatum lege *Καί ῥ' ἀκέουσα καθέζετ' ἐπιγνάμψασα.* Sic supra 536 *ὣς ὁ μὲν ἔνθα καθέζετ' ἐπὶ θρόνου,* et saepe alias.

572 *Μητρὶ φίλῃ ἐπίηρα φέρων λευκωλένῳ Ἥρῃ*] Rursus venit *ἐπίηρα* v. 578 ut hodie omnes codices, junctim verbo uno. At Scholiastes Ms. *ἐπὶ ἦρα· Ἀρίσταρχος ὑφ' ἓν, ἐπίηρα.* Hesychius utrumque habet: *Ἦ ῥα; ἤτοι ὄντως, ἢ ἔφη· καὶ Ἥρα, χάριν, βοήθειαν, ἐπικουρίαν. Πατρὶ φίλῳ ἐπίηρα φέρων Διΐ.*

Lege *ἐπὶ ϝῆρα φέρειν* ex hoc versu 578. Recte, si Aeolica litera legas *Fῆρα*, ut Od. *γ*, 164. *ἐπ' Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ϝῆρα φέροντες.* et Od. *π*, 374 *Λαοὶ δ' οὐκ ἔτι πάμπαν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ϝῆρα φέρουσιν.* Porro Scholiastes Ms. *λευκωλένῳ Ἥρῃ· ἄμεινον γράφειν, τετιημένῃ ἦτορ.* quae lectio sine dubio hic loci praeferenda.

576 *ἐσθλῆς ἔσσεται ϝῆδος*] *Fανδάνω* et omnia derivata *Fάδον*, *Fηδύς*, *Fῆδος*, plane cogunt nos corrigere *ἐσθλῆς ἔσται Fῆδος.*

577 *Μητρὶ δ' ἐγὼ παράφημι*] Recte Scholiastes Ms. *πάρφημι*: sic alibi *παρφάμενος*, *παρφάσθαι* et *πάρφασις*. Numquam *παραφ.*

580 *Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητής*, sic v. 609 et Il. *μ*, 275] Rectius, ut opinor, nominativo Aeolico *-τὰ* pro *-τὴς*, ut *ἱππότα Νέστωρ* et centum alia, *Ἀστεροπητὰ.*

581 *ἐξ ἑδέων*] Rectius alii codices, *ἐξ ἑδρέων* ut et supra v. 534.

582 *Ἀλλὰ σὺ τόν γ' ἐπέεσσι*] Repone ut ante, *τὸν Fεπέεσσι.*

585 *Μητρὶ φίλῃ ἐν χερσὶ τίθει*] Scholiastes Ms. *πᾶσαι ἐνικῶς, ἐν χειρὶ.* Recte ut respondeat v. 591 (596)

Μειδήσασα δὲ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο χειρὶ κύπελλον.

598 *Ὠνοχόει*] Sic hodie omnes libri. Sed Schol. Ms. *Οἰνοχόει Ιακῶς πᾶσαι.* Omnes editiones sine incremento *Οἰνοχόει.* Video vestigium aeolicae *F*. Quippe non ut ab *οἴχομαι ᾤχετο*, ita ab Aeolico *Foινοχοῶ* fieri potest *ᾠνοχόει*; sed Ionice *Foινοχόει*, vel cum incremento *Ἐ Foινοχόει.*

599 *Ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως*] Sic hodie legitur sed legendum Aeolice *γέλος*: ut in dativo *γέλῳ ἔκθανον. Γέλωτα* quidem semel Od. *ν*, 8

Ἀλλήλῃσι γέλωτα καὶ εὐφροσύνην παρέχουσαι,

verum ibi emendandum, *Ἀλλήλῃσι γέλον τε καὶ.*

606 *Οἱ μὲν κακκείοντες*] Scholiastes Ms. *Οἱ μὲν δὴ κείοντες· οὕτω πᾶσαι.*

608 *Ποίησ' εἰδυίῃσι πραπίδεσσι*] Hoc mendosum est. Nam derivatae ab *εἴδω*, et scio et video, habent Digamma. Sed

Scholiastes Ms. Ἰδυίῃσι. Ἰωνικῶς διὰ τοῦ ῑ. Lege ergo Ἥφαιστος ποίησε Fιδυίῃσι πραπίδεσσι.

ut Il. σ, 380 Ὄφρ' ὅγε ταῦτ' ἐπονεῖτο Fιδυίῃσι πραπίδεσσι et 482 Ποίει δαίδαλα πολλὰ Fιδυίῃσι πραπίδεσσι.

II.

3 κατὰ φρένα, ὡς Ἀχιλῆα] Sanabitur hiatus, legendo φρέν' ὅπως.

4 Τιμήσῃ, ὀλέσῃ δὲ πολέας] Schol. Ms. Τιμήσει', τοῦτο εὐκτικόν. ὀλέσῃ, τοῦτο ὑποτακτικόν. Τιμήσειε, optativi modi, ὀλέσῃ subjunctivi.

39 θήσειν γὰρ ἔτ' ἔμελλεν] Lege, ut saepe alias, θήσειν γάρ ῥ' ἔτ'.

53 βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἷζε γερόντων] Schol. Ms. Αἱ πλείους καὶ χαριέστεραι καὶ ἡ Ἀριστάρχου βουλὴ δίχα τοῦ ῡ. βουλὴν δὲ Ζηνοδότου. Eadem fere ex hoc Eustathius. Ἷζε plerumque apud Nostrum sedebat: est ubi tamen sedere fecit, ut Il. ω, 553.

95 ὕπο δ' ἐστοναχίζετο γαῖα] Alii codices rectius, ὑπὸ δὲ στεναχίζετο.

109 ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα] Omnes omnino codices habent,

ἔπε' Ἀργείοισι μετηύδα, ut Il. ι, 16. Quod rectius; illud alterum devenit ab editione Florentina.

113 Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ'] Schol. Ms. τὸ ἐντελὲς, ἐκπέρσαντί μοι, ὡς (Od. ε, 62) χρυσείῃ κερκίδ' ὕφαινεν.

117 Ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ λύσει] Elegantius est, quod et Barnesio visum,

πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα.

Ἠδ' ἔτι καλλύσει: notissimo et Homerico Aeolismo pro καταλύσει.

127 Τρώων δ' ἄνδρα Fέκαστον ἑλοίμεθα] Schol. Ms. ἕκαστον, Ἰξίων ἕκαστοι διὰ τοῦ ῑ. Recte Ixion, si (quod crediderim) scripsit ἕκασται, singulae decuriae unum ex Trojanis.

133 Ἰλίου ἐκπέρσαι] Scholiastes Ms. Ἄμεινον Ἴλιον, ἤπερ Ἰλίου. Ego non accedo; sic alibi Πύλου αἰπὺ πτολίεθρον, et alia multa.

137 εἵαται ἐν μεγάροις] Sic Hen. Stephanus edidit: sed codices scripti omnes, et editio Florentina, et Eustath. Εἵατ' ἐνὶ μεγάροις. Atqui εἵατ' ubique est pro εἵατο praeterito perfecto. Quare aut legendum censeo Εἵαται ἐν μεγάροις, aut εἶνται ἐνὶ μ. sedent.

141 Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι Τροίην] Schol. Ms. Οὗτος ὁ στίχος ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, διὸ ἔν τισιν οὐ φέρεται. Idem hinc dicit Eustathius. Nec tamen causam video, cur expungi debeat; cum verbis sublatis res tamen indicetur.

165 Μηδὲ ἔα] Lege μηδὲ δ' ἔα, ut infra 346, vel Μηδ' ἐάα.

192 Ἀτρείδαο] Schol. Ms. αἱ χαριέστεραι, Ἀτρείωνος.

193—197 Νῦν μὲν πειρᾶται] Schol. Ms. οὗτοι οἱ πέντε ἀθετοῦνται, ὡς μὴ προτρεπτικοὶ εἰς καταστολήν. Unum tamen ex quinque citat Aristoteles Rhet. II. 2 numero plurali,

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων:

et sic duo codices ex nostris. Sed recte habet διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος: propter versum sequentem: φιλεῖ δέ Fε. nam ἕ est αὐτόν, non αὐτούς. Schol. Ms. Διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος· οὕτως αἱ πᾶσαι πλὴν τῆς Ζηνοδότου. Nempe Zenodoti editio habebat διοτρεφέων βασιλήων.

205 ᾧ ἔδωκε] Schol. Ms. ἔδωκε· ἱκανὸν τὸ δῶκε.

206 σκῆπτρον] Dion Chrysost. Orat. 1. ἵνα σφίσιν ἐμβασιλεύῃ. Sed Codd. aliquot in margine adscribunt Νόθος, et sic editio prima Florentina.

211 ἕζοντο, ἐρήτυθεν δὲ καθ' ἕδρας] Lege, ut aboleatur hiatus, Ἄλλοι μέν ῥ' ἕζοντό τ', ἐρήτυθέν τε καθ' ἕδρας.

216 Αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνήρ] Tres codices cum editione Florentina, δ' ἀνήρ. Recte, nam prior syllaba ambiguae est quantitatis: vel lege Αἴσχιστος δ' ὅγ' ἀνήρ; vel αἴσχιστος δ' ἄρ' ἀνήρ.

218 συνοχωκότε, αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε] Lege συνοχωκότες, αὐτάρ. Nihil apud hunc Poetam frequentius, quam pluralia cum dualibus jungi.

232 'Η*è γυναῖκα νέην*] *νέην* novam non juvenem; ut Od. λ, 446 *νύμφην νέην* novam nuptam. Sed oratio *σολοικίζει*; *ἢ ἐπιδεύεαι χρυσοῦ, ἢ γυναικὸς νέης*; non *γυναῖκα νέην*. Forte legendum,

'Η*è γυναικὶ νέῃ ἶνα μίσγεαι ἐν φιλότητι.*

252 Οὐ*δέ τί πω—κερτομέων ἀγορεύεις*] Schol. Ms. Οἱ *πέντε στίχοι ὡς περιττοὶ ἀθετοῦνται.*

258 *εἴ κ' ἔτι σ' ἀφραίνοντα κιχήσομαι, ὥς νύ περ ὧδε*] Schol. Ms. *εἴ κ' ἔτι· αἱ μὲν Ἀριστάρχου εἶχον, εἰ δέ τι κιχήσομαι. Πτολεμαῖος κιχείομαι γράφει. ὥς νύ περ ὧδε. Ἡ Σινωπητικὴ, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ. ἡ Μασσαλιωτικὴ, ὕστερον αὖτις. ἡ δὲ κατὰ Φιλήμονα, ἐν Δαναοῖσιν.* Placet postremum; *ἐν Δαναοῖσι*, publice, in conventu. Sic Il. *ι*, 643 [(so in his Poet. Gr.)] *ὅς μ' ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν.*

266 *ἔκπεσε δάκρυ*] Schol. Ms. *τινὲς γράφουσιν Ἔκφυγε*; idem habet Eustathius.

269 *ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπεμόρξατο δάκρυ*] Cum semper sit *Fιδών*, necessario hic corrigendum *ἀχρεῖον ὁρῶν*. Alii codices *ἀπομόρξατο*. Utrumque habet Hesychius. Sed rectius *ἀπομόρξατο*, et sic Etymol. Mag.

274 *Νῦν δὲ τὸ δὴ μέγ' ἄριστον*] Aliqui codices cum editione Florentina *τόδε μέγ' ἄριστον*; alii *τόδ' αὖ*. Utrumvis melius quam *τὸ δή*, quod ex Romana Eustathii profluxit.

278 'Α*νὰ δ' ὁ πτολίπορθος Ὀδυσσεύς*] Schol. Ms. *ὁ πτολίπορθος· οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος. τινὲς δὲ χωρὶς τοῦ ἄρθρου, κακῶς.*

287 *ἐνθάδε τοι στείχοντες*] Ita sola habet editio Florentina. Codices nostri omnes et Eustathius *ἐνθάδ' ἔτι*. Recte.

288 *Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ'*] Nec *ἐκπέρσαντ'* cum Apostropho valet *ἐκπέρσαντε* numero duali, nec *ἐκπέρσαντα* accusativo singulari, sed dativo, *ἐκπέρσαντι*: *ὑπέσχον τοι* (i.e. *σοι*) *ἐκπέρσαντι*. Vide supra 113.

307 *ὅθεν ῥέεν ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ*] Sic omnes nostri codices. Sed Eustathius variam lectionem profert; *ὅθεν*, inquit, *ἢ ὅθι*. Placet posterius, ubi non unde. Quî fieri potuit, ut rivus aquae ex arbore fluxerit? Lucret. Prostrati in gramine molli Propter aquae rivum sub ramis arboris altae.

314 κατήσθιε τετριγῶτας] Eustathius Zenodoto tribuit τιτίζοντας vel ut alibi habet τεττίζοντας.

315 Μήτηρ δ' ἀμφιποτᾶτο ὀδυρομένη] τᾶτο ὀ tam turpi hiatu sine dubio mendosum est; quod demonstrat facilitas emendationis

Μήτηρ δ' ἀμφιποτᾶτ' ὀλοφυρομένη φίλα τέκνα.

316 λάβεν ἀμφιαχυῖαν] Schol. Ms. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμφίαζω, ἀμφίαχα, ἀμφιαχῶν.

330 Κεῖνός θ' ὡς ἀγόρευε] Etymologicon Magnum v. Κεῖνος. Zenodotus, inquit, κεῖνός θ' ὡς (sic): sed Aristarchus κεῖνος τόσσ'. Hoc posterius placet.

339 Ποῦ δὴ συνθεσίαι] Omnes codices et Eustathius in Notis Ἦ δή, ut Il. ε, 472. Ἕκτορ, πῆ δή τοι μένος οἴχεται. Ποῦ venit ex editione Florentina.

355 πρίν τινα πὰρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ κατακοιμηθῆναι] Schol. Ms. ἐν τοῖς Ἀριστάρχου ὑπομνήμασι Πρίν τινά περ. οὐ καλῶς. Sed quid illud est, μή τις, πρίν τινα? ne aliquis, priusquam aliquem? Quid porro est, πὰρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ, apud Trojanorum uxorem? an una mulier omnium Trojanorum uxor erat? Lego

Πρίν τινι πὰρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ.

Nemo domum prius redeat, quam uxorem aliquam Trojanorum captivam sibi sortiatur. Il. σ, 122 καί τινα Τρωϊάδων καὶ Δαρδανίδων.

397 Ὅταν ἔνθ' ἢ ἔνθα γένωνται] Schol. Ms. Γένωνται, οἱ ἄνεμοι. οἱ δὲ ἀηθεῖς μεταγράφουσι, Γένηται: scilicet τὰ κύματα.

409 ἤδεε γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν] Hunc versum Aristarchus ἀθετεῖ, apud Athenaeum et ex eo Eustathium. Recte, meo quidem judicio. Venit enim Menelaus αὐτόματος, ut minor frater et cotidianus conviva; non quod ἐπονεῖτο Agamemnon, nunc magis solito. Nullus umquam conventus aut convivium in Menelai tentorio habetur, sed semper in Agamemnonis.

411 τοῖσι δ' ἐπευχόμενος] Omnes nostri, uno excepto, τοῖσιν δ' εὐχόμενος. Rectius, nam ἐπευχόμενος est fere καυχώμενος, glorians, non precans.

434 *κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν* Ἀγαμέμνων] Sic unus codex, sed ceteri omnes rectius Ἀγάμεμνον, ut ubique alias.

435 *Μηκέτι νῦν δῆθ' αὖθι*] Schol. Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος, *Μηκέτι νῦν δῆθ' αὖθι*; Ζηνόδοτος, *Μηκέτι νῦν δὴ ταῦτα*; Καλλίστρατος, *Μηκέτι δὴ νῦν ταῦτα.*

448 *παγχρύσεοι ἠερέθοντο*] Duo codices et Eustathius in notis, *ἠερέθονται.* Cum enim Palladis *αἰγὶς* esset *ἀγήραος* et *ἀθανάτη*, omnino ex Homeri persona *ἠερέθονται* dicendum erat, non *ἠερέθοντο*; quasi jam tum periisset.

451 *ἐν δὲ φρένας ὦρσεν ἑκάστου*] Omnes omnino codices, editio Florentina et Eustathius in notis *ὦρσεν ἑκάστῳ.* Recte. Sic Il. λ, 11

μέγα δὲ σθένος ἔμβαλ' ἑκάστῳ καρδίῃ.

Et sic ξ, 151. Sed ubique legendum, *ὦρσε Ϝεκάστῳ.*

453 *Πόλεμος γλυκίων γένετ' ἠὲ νέεσθαι*] Ut adjectivum aeque congruat cum *νέεσθαι* ac cum *πόλεμος*, omnino scribendum est *γλύκιον γένετ'*. Et sane diu post Homeri saeculum *η* et *ω* inventa sunt; *ε* et *ο* tam longas syllabas quam breves notabant,

ΜΕΝΙΝ ΑΕΙΔΕ ΘΕΑ ΠΕΛΕΙΑΔΕΟ ΑΚΗΙΛΕΟΣ

462 *ἀγαλλόμεναι πτερύγεσσιν*] Schol. Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος, *Ἀγαλλόμενα, ἵν' ᾖ πρὸς τὸ ἔθνη. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ Ἀγαλλόμεναι ἄχαρι.* Eadem Eustathii sententia. Sed recte omnino *ἀγαλλόμενα*, quia statim sequitur *προκαθιζόντων*, non *προκαθιζουσῶν.* Florentina princeps Editio, et omnes codices, uno dempto, *ἀγαλλόμενα.*

510 *ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι βαῖνον*] Sic quidem scripti et editi; sed cum *καὶ* non in *ἄρσει* sit sive prima pedis syllaba, sed in *θέσει*, brevis esse debet; lege ergo *ἐείκοσι*, ut passim.

516 *τῶν δὲ τριήκοντα*] Codex Etonensis et duo ex Harleianis, *τοῖς δὲ.* Recte. Sic infra 524, 534, 542, 545, 556, 568, 603, 630, 633, 637, 733.

518 *υἱέες Ἰφίτου μεγαθύμου*] Semper alias Ἴφιτος hic corripit secundam syllabam; et apud Virgilium

Iphitus et Pelias mecum, quorum Iphitus aevo—

Ergo hic versus destituitur, ut λαγαρός, cavus, elumbis. Non patiar hanc maculam diutius Homero inseri. Lege cum genitivo Aeolico Ἰφιτόφι μεγαθύμου Ναυβολίδαο, ut Il. λ, 351. πλάγχθη δ' ἀπὸ χαλκόφι χαλκός, et saepe alibi, β, 731. Ceterum a Ϝῖφι est Ϝίφιτος, ut a Ϝοῖνος Ϝοινεὺς, Ϝοινόμαος, lege ergo υἱέε Ϝιφιτόφι.

522 ποταμὸν Κηφισσὸν δῖον ἔναιον] Lege Κηφισσοῦ.

525 στίχας ἔστασαν] Tres codices Ἴστασαν. Recte. Ἴστασαν, statuerunt, ἔστασαν, steterunt.

528 Μείων, οὔτι τόσος γε ὅσος] Apage hiatus omnes ex Homero. Lege, οὔτι τόσοσγ' ὅσος; vel οὔτιγε τόσος ὅσος.

529 Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείων etc.] Zenodotus et Aristarchus hos versus obelo confodiunt. Vide apud Eustathium et Didymum ad Il. β, 528 et ι, 395.

553 ἐπιχθονίων γένετ' ἀνήρ] Plures codices cum editione Florentina, ἐπιχθόνιος. Recte; et sic Herodotus in vita Homeri. Il. ω, 505

ἔτλην δ' οἷ' οὔπω τις ἐπιχθόνιος βροτὸς ἄλλος.

571 Ὀρνειάς τ' ἐνέμοντο Ἀραιθυρέην τ' ἐρατεινήν] Ne aures vulneret hiatus iste μοντο Ἀρ; legendum

Ὀρνειάς τ' ἐνέμοντ' ἄρ', Ἀραιθ. Ex duabus syllabis αραρ, excidit, ut fieri solet, altera.

611 ἐπιστάμενοι πολέμοιο] Omnes codices, editiones Florentina et Romana, et Eustathius in Notis πολεμίζειν. Recte. Od. ι, 49

ἐπιστάμενοι μὲν ἀφ' ἵππων
Ἀνδράσι μάρνασθαι.

621 Υἷες, ὁ μὲν Κτεάτου, ὁ δ' Εὐρύτου] Sic scripti et editi. Quidam emendant Κτεάτοιο, ὁ δ', alii ὁ δὲ Εὐρύτου. Sed utrinque hiatus fit. Lego, Υἷες ὁ μὲν Κτεάτου, ὁ δ' ἄρ' Εὐρύτου.

625 οἱ δ' ἐκ Δουλιχίοιο Ἐχινάων θ'] Corrigo,
Δουλιχίοιό τ' Ἐχινάων θ'.

651 Ἐνναλίῳ *ἀνδρειφόντῃ*] Scribe et pronuntia,
Ἐνναλιῳνδρειφοντῃ, more Aeolico: ut Sappho,
πυκνὰ δινῆντες πτέρ' ἀπ' ὠρανῳθέρος διὰ μέσσω
i.e. *ὠρανῷ αἰθέρος*.

665 Ἀπείλησαν *γάρ οἱ ἄλλοι*] Schol. Ms. *οἱ ἀντωνυμία ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἄρθρον. οἱ*, ait, pronomen est, non articulus. Ergo vertunt omnes *οἱ* sibi. Falluntur omnes ignorantia Aeolismi: *οἱ* sibi semper est *Foι*. Ergo hic lege *γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι*: non *γάρ οἱ ἄλλοι*.

680 *τῶν δὲ τριήκοντα*] Lego *τοῖς δὲ*, vide supra ad 516; et sic hic nonnulli codices.

681 Νῦν δ' *αὖ τοὺς ὅσσοι*] Oratio est *ἀνακόλουθος*. Legerim Νῦν *αὖ τῶν ὅσσοι*, ut redditio sit v. 685 *τῶν αὖ*. Vel certe nominativo casu, ut paulo ante v. 676, *οἵ δ' ἄρα Νίσυρον, ...τῶν αὖ Φείδιππος*: et fere ubique. Non veri absimile est Homerum dedisse, Νῦν δ' *αὖθ' ὅσσοι περ τὸ Πελασγικόν*.

720 *τόξων εὖ εἰδότες ἶφι μάχεσθαι*] Semper est *Fἶφι*. Ergo hic versui et metro obstat, immo ipsi sensui. Explicat Eustathius hoc modo, *εἰδότες μάχεσθαι διὰ τόξων*. Sed corrigo

Τόξων *εὖ Feιδότες, ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι*: et periti *τοξικῆς* et periti *ἐγχείης*. Haec diversa fere sunt, vide Il. *ε*, 277, *ν*, 716, *ο*, 472.

731 Ἀσκληπιοῦ *δύο παῖδε*] versus *λαγαρός* et deformis; semper enim Ἀσκληπιὸς penultima est brevi. Lege ergo,

Ἀσκληπιόφιν *δύο παῖδε*; vide supra 518.

734 *οἵ τ' ἔχον* Ὀρμένιον] Lege ex codicibus scriptis et editione Flor. *οἵ δ' ἔχον*, ut locis ceteris.

748 *δύω καὶ εἴκοσι νῆας*] Corrige *δύω καὶ ἐείκοσι*, vide supra 510.

751 *οἵ δ' ἀμφ' ἱμερτὸν Τιταρήσιον ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο*] Vide singularem reperti hujus praestantiam; virtute Aeolicae *F*au dico legendum,

Τιτάρησσον *Fέργ' ἐνέμοντο*.

Τιτάρησσος, sic centum fere alia, Καβησσὸς, Σαλμυδησσὸς,

Λυρνησσὸς, Τάρτησσος etc. Et tamen ex hoc corrupto omnes fere Graeci cum Strabone Τιταρήσιος habent. Melius Lucanus noster VI. 376

Defendit Titaressos aquas: lapsusque superne
Gurgite Peneï pro siccis utitur arvis.

Et Seneca Troadibus v. 847

Quasque profundit subiturus aequor
Segnibus terras Titaressos undis.

Apollonius Rhodius 1, 65:

Ἤλυθε δ' αὖ Μόψος Τιταρήσιος: id est Mopsus ἀπὸ Τιταρήσσου.

804 ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα] Sic codices nostri omnes. Sed Eustathius in Notis Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλῳ γλῶσσα. Recte: non enim ἄλλων πολυσπερέων ἀνθρώπων.

III.

2 ὄρνιθες ὥς] Apage illud Μείουρον θες ὡς; cum ὡς significat sicut, instar semper est Fὡς.

13 Κονίσαλος ὤρνυτ' ἀελλὴς] Schol. Ms. Ἀριστοφάνης. Κονισάλου ὤρνυτ' ἀέλλη. Recte, ut videtur. Nusquam alibi apud Nostrum Ἀελλής.

16 θεοειδής] semper cum digammo venit εἶδος, ergo et hic et alibi passim venustius θεοFειδής.

18 Αὐτὰρ ὁ δοῦρε δύω] Schol. τῷ αὐτὰρ παρὰ Ζηνοδότῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἐπάγεται τὸ ἄρθρον. Legebant igitur αὐτὰρ δοῦρε. Sed rectius αὐτὰρ ὅ.

28 φάτο γὰρ τίσασθαι ἀλείτην] sic nostri omnes scripti, et Etymologus, v. Ἀλείτης. Tamen quod Hen. Stephanus vidit, legendum τίσεσθαι; sensu ipso postulante. Sic γ 366

Ἦτ' ἐφάμην τίσεσθαι Ἀλέξανδρον κακότητος.

ergo καί μιν ἔγωγ' ἐφάμην Ἀϊδωνῆϊ προιάψειν,

et aliter passim. Ibidem Digamma sedem suam postulat, ὀφθαλμοῖσι Fιδών.

35 ὦχρος δέ μιν εἶλε παρειάς] Schol. Ms. ἔν τισι θηλυκῶς Παρειάς· Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ οὐδετέρως παρειά. Ἰωνικῶς ὡς ἡ

πλευρά, τὰ πλευρά. Eadem fere ex hoc Eustathius. Probat etiam παρειά Etymologus, v. παρειά. Et cum dicat Aeolenses πάρηα dicere, genere neutro; veri haud absimile est Homerum Aeolensem sic scripsisse. Sed haec lis Grammaticorum in lingua deperdita jam tolli non potest.

40 αἴθ' ὄφελές τ' ἄγονός τ' ἔμεναι] sic editi, sed codices uno excepto omnes Αἴθ' ὄφελες ἄγονός τ' ἔμεναι. Recte: nam prius τ' sine ullo sensu est; ad metrum scilicet sustinendum: quasi vero non in ictu et caesura passim breves syllabae finales producuntur; scilicet in prima syllaba pedis, seu Dactyli sive Spondei.

42 καὶ ἐπόψιον ἄλλων] Libri scripti, editiones Flor. et Rom. ὑπόψιον. Schol. Ms. ὑπόψιον· Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ ἐπόψιον γράφει. Etymol. m. Ὑπόψιον, Ἡρωδιανὸς δὲ διὰ τοῦ ε̄ ἐπόψιον.

46 Ἧ τοιόσδε ἐὼν] Amabant, credo, hiatus; non solum tolerabant. Dedit poeta Ἧ τοιοῦτος ἐών: ut passim. Vel τοῖοσπερ, ut γ, 159, Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς, τοίηπερ ἐοῦσ' ἐν νηυσὶ νεέσθω.

52 οὐκ ἂν δὴ μείνειας ἀρηΐφιλον Μενέλαον] Sic codices: sed malim Ἄι κεν δὴ μείνειας, si maneres—tum scires: ut θ, 535

Αὔριον ἦν ἀρετὴν διαείσεται, αἴ κ' ἐμὸν ἔγχος
Μείνῃ ἐπερχόμενον.

et θ, 34 Αἴ κεν δὴ κακὸν οἶτον ἀναπλήσαντες ὄλωνται.

57 Λάϊνον ἕσσο χίτωνα] Ἕσσο ut reliqua ἕστο etc. ubique F habent (sic). Lege Λανὸν Fέσσο. Hesychius.

100 καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἀρχῆς] Locus mendosus. Ἀρχή non est Inceptum, sed aut initium aut imperium. Corrigo

εἵνεκ' ἐμῆς ἔριδος, καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης.

propter Alexandri noxam, injuriam, peccatum. Sic Helena in Z, 356

εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς, καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης.

120 δίπλακα μαρμαρέην] Eustath. ἐν ταῖς Ἀριστάρχου, Ζηνοδότου, καὶ Ἀριστοφάνους ἐκδόσεσι, φασὶ γράφεσθαι Δίπλακα πορφυρέην. Iterum Il. χ, 440 Δίπλακα μαρμαρέην

ubi codices scripti et Eustath. in notis *πορφυρέην* habent. Od. vero τ, 242, et scripti et editi,—*καὶ δίπλακα δῶκα Καλὴν, πορφυρεὴν.*

137 *μαχήσονται*] Lege *μαχέσσονται*, ut alibi.

144 *Αἴθρη Πιτθῆος*] *τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος διαβάλλουσι τινές.* Plutarchus in Theseo.

150 *Γήραϊ δὴ πολέμοιο πεπαυμένοι*] Schol. Ms. *γράφεται καὶ γήρεϊ ὡς οὔδεϊ.* Scilicet ut *οὖδας* ubique est *οὔδεϊ*, ita *γῆρας* esse potest *γήρεϊ.*

154 *Οἱ δ' ὡς οὖν εἶδον Ἑλένην*] Tres codices Harleiani, *εἴδονθ' Ἑλένην.* Hoc est, *εἴδοντο*, ut Il. π, 278,

Τρῶες δ' ὡς εἴδοντο Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμον υἱόν.

155 *ἦκα πρὸς ἀλλήλους*] Eustath. *τινὲς γράφουσιν ὦκα.* Sed praestat lectio *Fῆκα.*

189 *ἤματι τῷ ὅτε ἦλθον*] Jam diu, opinor, displicent tibi hiatus: corrige igitur ex quattuor Harleianis et uno Coll. Benedicti

ἤματι τῷ ὅτε τ' ἦλθον.

ὅτε τε, id quod *ὅτε*, passim.

195 *Αὐτὸς δὲ κτίλος ὣς ἐπιπωλεῖται στίχας ἀνδρῶν*] Quot sunt in hoc versiculo peccata! licet ita citatus sit a vetere scholiaste Nicandri, et Timon de Acanthe, apud Diogenem Laertium in Cleon:

τίς δ' οὗτος κτίλος ὣς ἐπιπωλεῖται στίχας ἀνδρῶν.

Primum ex Aeolismo: oportet enim, ut semper *ὡς* sicut, tanquam, *κτίλος Fὡς* esse, metro repugnante. Quale vero illud, obit ordines virorum, tanquam Aries? Nondum vidi arietem virorum ordines moderantem. Quae vero *ταυτολογία*! Obit, tanquam Aries, et comparo eum Arieti. Ex ipsa sententia locum restituo: versu priore dixerat, Arma ejus humi posita sunt: quorsum hoc: nisi ut inferret Inermem eum obire ordines militum. Lego igitur

Αὐτὰρ ψιλὸς ἐὼν ἐπιπωλεῖται στίχας ἀνδρῶν.

sic δ, 230, simili orationis filo,

Ἵππους μὲν γὰρ ἔασε καὶ ἅρματα ποικίλα χαλκῷ.
Αὐτὰρ ὁ πεζὸς ἐὼν ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν.

λ, 264 Αὐτὰρ ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν.

et ζ, 214

ἔγχος μὲν κατέπηξεν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ,
Αὐτὰρ ὁ μειλιχίοισι προσηύδα ποιμένα λαῶν.

Ceterum nihil refert, quod est *αὐτὰρ ψιλὸς*, non *ὁ ψιλὸς*, ob asperitatem duplicis literae. Sic enim supra γ, 18, *Αὐτὰρ ὁ δοῦρε δύω*, meliores *ἐκδόσεις* habuerunt sine articulo, *αὐτὰρ δοῦρε*.

204 *νημερτὲς ἔειπες*] Non placet *τες πες*. Melius tres codices *νημερτὲς ἔειπας*.

209 *Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν*] Rectius codices scripti omnes et Eust. in Notis

Ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἐν ἀγρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν.

Typothetae incuria exciderat *ἐν* ex editione Florentina: inde alii ex conjectura dederunt *ἀγειρομένοισιν*.

210 *Στάντων μὲν Μενέλαος*] Lego

Στάντες μέν

ut congruat cum versu sequente, Ἀμφὼ δ' ἑξομένω.

212 *μύθους καὶ μήδεα πᾶσιν ὔφαινον*] Casaubonus ad Theocritum c. ix corrigit *ἔφαινον*. Recte. *ἔφαινον μύθους*, in concione loquebantur. Sic Il. σ, 295, *Νήπιε, μηκέτι ταῦτα νοήματα φαῖν' ἐνὶ δήμῳ*. Sed *ὑφαίνειν* est dolos, fabulas, contexere. Scholiastes: Ὕφαινον, *φανερὰ ἐποίουν, ἔλεγον*. Legebat *ἔφαινον*.

220 *φαίης κεν ζάκοτόν τινα ἔμμεναι*] Iterum hiatu versus corrumpitur; omnes scripti uno excepto, et Eustath. in Notis, *ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἔμμεναι*. Sine dubio vere.

221 Ἀλλ' *ὅτε δή ῥ' ὄπα τε μεγάλην*] *ῥ' ὄπα* habet editio Florentina. Sed omnes scripti Ἀλλ' *ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε*. Recte. Neque enim hic ullus usus *τοῦ ῥὰ*: quod metro solum inservit, nihil sententiae.

224 *Οὐ τότε γ' ὧδ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάμεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες*] Bene sit Aeolismo, qui omnes versus aut sanat aut uti spurios detegit.

'Αγασσάμεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες: atqui more Homerico, qui ubique obtinet, debuit esse 'Αγασσάμεθα Fεῖδος Fιδόντες. Sententia egregie finitur in versu priore, Οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' 'Οδυσῆΐ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος: in hoc autem nullus est sensus. Sic Od. ο, 320. Δρηστοσύνῃ οὐκ ἄν μοι ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος. Et τ, 286. Οἷδ' 'Οδυσέυς, οὐδ' ἄν τις ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος. Et ψ, 126—οὐδέ κέ τίς τοι Ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐρίσειε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. In his omnibus locis sententia clauditur.

240 Ἤ δεῦρο μὲν ἔποντο] δεῦρο ultimam producit, quae scilicet in ictu est. Olim tamen erant, qui hic legebant δεύρω. Hesychius, Δεύρω, δεῦρο. Et sic Codex Academicus *, Ἤ δεύρω μὲν. Attice erat δευρί, longa finali, sed crediderim ab Homero esse

Ἤ μὲν δεῦρ' ἔσποντο.

Ἕσποντο, ut versu priori ἑσπέσθην.

244 ἐν Λακεδαίμονι αὖθι].

252 ἴν' ὅρκια πιστὰ τάμηται] Tres codices τάμητε, duo τάμηαι. Utrumvis probe; modo non adsciscas τάμηται.

257 τοὶ δὲ νέωνται] Quattuor ex nostris Codd. νεέσθων. Recte, ut supra v. 74.

270 ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἔχευαν] Schol. Ms. ἔχευον διὰ τὸ ō: ἴν' ᾖ ἀναλογοῦν τῷ μίσγον. Recte: et sic reperio in tribus scriptis et Edit. Florentina.

286 ἀποτινέμεν ἤν τιν' ἔοικεν] Mendose, quia semper est Fέοικεν. Harleianus unus Ἧντ' ἐπέοικε; sed nec hoc stare potest. Lege Ἧν τε Fέοικε. Vide α, 126.

301 ἄλοχοι δ' ἄλλοισι μιγεῖεν] Schol. Ms. ad Il. ε, 406 citat ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν. Eustath. hic δαμεῖεν ἢ μιγεῖεν: Harleianus unus, μιγεῖεν, et intra lineas pro varia lectione δαμεῖεν; alter in ipso textu δαμεῖεν. Hoc placet; quod praeter stuprum etiam servitutem denotet.

346 ἀσπίδα πάντοσε ἴσην] Ut effugias illum hiatum, vel legas πάντοσε Fίσην; ut semper est Fίσος: vel πάντοσ' εἴσην, ut aliquot codices hic et alibi habent.

* I.e. the Cambridge MS. in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Barnes's CCC, called "Coll. Benedicti" on l. 189 (p. 144).

348 *οὐδ' ἔῤῥηξεν χαλκόν*] Eustath. Ἄλλοι *γράφουσι, χαλκός.* Scholiastes Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος *χαλκόν. ἄμεινον δὲ χαλκός, ὡς Ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ὤρνυτο χαλκῷ, ἤγουν δόρατι.* Recte, ut videtur; et tum *οἱ* erit *τῷ ἔγχει.*

349 Ἀσπίδι *ἐν κρατερῇ*] Edit. Flor. et 4 codices *ἀσπίδι ἐνὶ κρατερῇ.* Harleianus unus recte, Ἀσπίδ' *ἐνὶ κρατερῇ.*

351 *ὅ με πρότερος κάκ' ἔοργε*] Atqui semper est *Fέοργε.* Corrige ergo *πρότερος κάκ' ἔρεξε,* ut mox 354

Ξεινοδόκον *κακὰ ῥέξαι.*

357 Διὰ *μὲν ἀσπίδος ἦλθε*] Saepe redit hic versiculus: qui si vere ab Homero est, Licentia nescio qua pronuntiabitur Δῖα *μὲν,* ut Ἄρες *ἄρες.* Non enim tribrachys pro dactylo hic ponitur ad exprimendam celeritatem; non magis quam molossus pes trium longarum ad tarditatem exprimendam. Quid si legat quis Διαπρὸ *μὲν,* pede proceleusmatico, ut Capitibu' mutantes pinus, Parietibus textum caecis iter?

359 Ἀντικρὺ *δὲ παραὶ λαπάρην*] Ἀντικρὺ dicitur et *ἀντικρύς,* ut *μεσσηγὺ μεσσηγύς, εὐθὺ εὐθύς* &c. Priora *ῠ* corripiunt. Ergo rectius scribetur *ἀντικρὺς,* ubi ultima longa est.

367 Νῦν *δέ μοι ἐν χείρεσσ' ἐάγη*] Sic editio Florentina et Codex unus: sed sex habent *ἐν χείρεσσιν ἄγη ξίφος*: ut Il. *π,* 801

Πᾶν *δέ οἱ ἐν χείρεσσιν ἄγη δολιχόσκιον ἔγχος.*

Lege igitur, Νῦν *δέ μοι ἐν χείρεσσι Fάγη.* Vide Dissert.

376 *κεινὴ δὲ τρυφάλεια ἄμ' ἕσπετο*] Ne versum deturpet hiatus iste, lege, *κεινὴ δὲ τρυφάλεια συνέσπετο χειρὶ παχείῃ.*

400 Ἤ *πή με προτέρω*] Scholiastes Ms.: *τὸ ἦ περισπαστέον, τό δὲ πή ὀξυντέον.*

409 *εἰσόκε σ' ἢ ἄλοχον*] Eustath. ad Od. δ, 12, Ἀθετεῖται *κατὰ τοὺς παλαιούς, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν Δούλας τὰς θεραπαίνας ἀλλὰ Δμωὰς ἢ Δμωΐδας.*

411 *κείνου πορσυνέουσα λέχος*] Duo codices *πορσανέουσα,* a *πορσαίνω.* Ita legerunt Hesych. Etymol. M. et Eustathius.

441 *φιλότητι τραπείομεν εὐνηθέντε*]

442 *οὐ γὰρ πώποτέ μ' ὧδε ἔρως φρένας*] Eustathius ad locum, aliam lectionem memorat, *Οὐ γὰρ πώποτέ μ' ὧδε φρένας ἔρος ἀμφεκάλυψεν.* Recte, et sic effugimus hiatum. Ubique *ἔρος ἔρον*, non *ἔρως ἔρωτα.* Vide *ξ* 294 et 314 [315].

443 *οὐδ' ὅτε σε πρότερον*] Omnes codd. uno excepto *πρῶτον*; ut sententia quoque postulat. Eustathius etiam in Not. *πρῶτον*, et Strabo.

453 *ἐκεύθανον εἴ τις ἴδοιτο*] Ob necessitatem *τῆς F*, apparet emendandum esse *εἴ κε Fίδοιντο.* Et sic 450 [459] pro *ἦν τιν' ἔοικε* lege *ἦν τε Fέοικε*, vide supra 286.

IV. Δ.

2 *Χρυσέῳ ἐν δαπέδῳ*] Sic scripti et editi. Sed legendum

χρυσέῳ ἐνὶ δαπέδῳ.

Nam *χρυσέῳ* disyllabon est, ut versu sequente *χρυσέοις.* Il. *α*, 15 *χρυσέῳ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ.*

3 *Νέκταρ ἐῳνοχόει*] Eustath. ad locum *Ζηνόδοτος ἐνῳνοχόει.* Utrinque peccatum est ignorantia *τῆς F.* Lege

Νέκταρ ἐFοινοχόει: vide Il. *α*, 598.

24 *Ἥρῃ δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλου*] Sic *θ*, 461. Eustath. ad Od. *δ*, *Οὐκ ἔχαδε. οὕτω τινές. ἀλλ' ἡ πλείων χρῆσις τῶν ἀντιγράφων, οὐ κέχαδε.* Sed plures nunc codices *οὐκ ἔχαδε*; [" non pili interest " struck out] et sic Hesych. et Etymologus.

27 *Πόνον, ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον ἰδρῶθ' ὃν ἵδρωσα*] Scholiastes Ms. *Ἰδρῶ θ', ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱδρῶ τε: ἀεὶ γὰρ δισσυλλάβως ὁ ποιητής.* Recte hoc: semper enim *ἱδρῶ* casu accusativo, nusquam *ἱδρῶτα.*

41 *ὅθι τοι φίλοι ἀνέρες ἐκγεγάασι*] Duo codices Harleiani cum Editione Florentina, *ἐγγεγάασι.* Recte. Vide 3, 493 et alibi. Hesychius, *Ἐγγεγάασι, εἰσὶ, γεγάασι.*

52 *τάων οὔτι ἐγώ*] Ne admittatur Hiatus, cavent duo codices Harleiani, *τάων οὔτοι ἐγώ.*

66 *πειρᾶν θ' ὥς κεν Τρῶες*] Omnes codices scripti *Πειρᾶν δ' ὡς.*

71 *πειρᾶν δ' ὥς κεν*] Saepe quidem Infinitivus pro Imperativo ponitur, verum hic loci nihil opus erat. *ἐλθὲ,*

πείρα δ' ὥς κεν δή, ut Od. *δ*, 545

πείρα, ὅπως κεν δὴ σὴν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἵκηαι.

75 *οἷον δ' ἀστέρα ἧκε*] Sic editi scriptique inconcinno hiatu. Sed quam prompta emendatio,

οἷον δ' ἀστέρ' ἔηκε, ut *α*, 48, *μετὰ δ' ἰὸν ἔηκε.*

82 *Ἦ ῥ' αὖτις*] Hoc interrogative efferendum, Numquid rursus erit bellum, an Juppiter pacem statuet? Non ut vulgo aut bellum erit aut pax. *Ἦ ῥα*, num, numquid, ut mox 93 *Ἦ ῥά νύ μοί τι πίθοιο.*

84 *Ζεὺς, ὅστ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται*] Non placent duo illi genitivi. Unus Harleianus,

Ζεὺς, ὅστ' ἀνθρώποις: atque eadem varietas Il. *τ*, 224.

91 *Λαῶν, οἵ οἱ ἕποντο ἀπ' Αἰσήποιο ῥοάων*] Eustath. *Λαῶν, γράφεται Ἀνδρῶν.* Nostri codices *Λαῶν.* Porro lege

Οἵ Fοι ἕποντ' ἄρ' ἀπ' Αἰσήποιο ῥοάων

[originally *ἕποντο παρ'*, altered to the above].

94 *ἐπιπροέμεν ταχὺν ἰόν*] Scholiastes Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος, ἐπὶ προέμεν. Μενεκράτης δὲ, ὑφ' ἕν.* Ita plerique codices, unus tamen Harleianus *ἐπὶ προέμεν.*

96 *μάλιστα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βασιλῆι*] Lego *μάλιστ' ἄρ' Ἀλεξ.*

109 *τοῦ κέρα ἐκ κεφαλῆς*] Scholiastes Ms. *κέρα, συναλοιφὴ τοῦ κέραα.* Ergo non est hic hiatus, cum syllaba $\overline{\rho\alpha}$ longa sit.

115 *Μενέλαον ἀρήϊον ἀρχὸν ἀχαιῶν*] Non placet *ἀρχὸν ἀχαιῶν* continuo post *υἷες ἀχαιῶν.* Quattuor scripti *Ἀρήϊον Ἀτρέος υἱόν*, ut supra v. 98. Recte.

117 *Ἀβλῆτα, πτερόεντα, μελαινέων ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων*] *Μελαινέων* habet Scholiastes Ms. Sed Eustathius, *ἀθετοῦσιν*, inquit, *οἱ παλαιοί.* Eum vide.

125 *Λίγξε βιὸς, νευρὴ δὲ μέγ' ἴαχεν*] Lego *Fίαχε*, ut ubique:

Λίγξε βιὸς, νευρὴ μέγα Fίαχεν, ἅλτο δ' ὀϊστός.

131 *Παιδὸς ἐέργει μυῖαν, ὅθ' ἡδέϊ λέξατο ὕπνῳ*] Unde natum est illud *λέξατο*? Cum Editiones Florentina, Romana, scrip-

tique ad unum omnes λέξεται. Praeterea ubique est ϝηδέα. Lego igitur

Παιδὸς ἐέργει μυῖαν, ὁ ϝηδέϊ λέξεται ὕπνῳ.

ὁ, id quod ὅς qui, passim.

134 ἐν δ' ἔπεσε ζωστῆρι ἀρηρότι πικρὸς ὀιστός] Lego ad evitandum hiatum; ἐν δ' ἔπεσε ζωστῆρ' [ἄρ' ἀρηρότι struck through] ἐπαρηρότι. Vide Il. μ, 456, Od. ε, 236.

135 Διὰ μὲν ἅρ] An Διαπρὸ μὲν? Vide γ, 357.

151 ὡς δ' εἶδεν νεῦρόν τε] Lege ὡς δὲ ϝίδεν. Tres Harleiani, ὡς δὲ ἴδεν.

158 ἅλιον πέλει ὅρκιον αἷμά τε ἀρνῶν] Lege ex codice Harleiano πέλοι ὅρκιον αἷμα κατ' ἀρνῶν.

178 τελέσει' Ἀγαμέμνων] Sic edunt: cum codices habeant τελέσει. Sed Eustathius in Notis bis τελέσοι.

213 εἶλκεν ὀϊστόν] Schol. Ms. τὸ ἕλκεν Ἰακῶς. Nostri omnes libri, cum augmento εἶλκεν.

219 πάσσε, τά οἵ ποτε πατρὶ] Sic libri: sed quid οἱ πατρί, sibi patri? Lege Πάσσε, τὰ ϝῷ ποτὲ. ᾧ πατρί, suo patri.

232 καί ῥ' οὓς μὲν σπεύδοντας ἴδοι] Cum semper sit ϝίδοι, lege ὄρα et sic v. 240.

262 σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας, ὥσπερ ἐμοί] Sic omnes libri: sed vel lege σὸν—ἐμόν vel σοὶ—ἐμοί.

264 οἷος πάρος εὔχεο εἶναι] Duo codices tollunt hiatum,

οἷος πάρος εὔχεαι εἶναι.

Πάρος, τὸ πάρος γε saepe cum verbo praesentis temporis.

265 τὸν δ' αὖ Ἰδομενεὺς] Lege cum 4 Harleianis et Edit. Florentina, τὸν δ' αὖτ'.

269 ἔχευσαν] Erratum typographicum per editiones propagatum. Omnes libri cum Edit. Flor. et Rom. ἔχεναν.

277 τὼ δέ τ' ἄνευθεν ἐόντι] Lege τὼ δ' ἔτ'.

280 ἀρηιθόων αἰζηῶν] Omnes codices cum Edit. Flor. Eust. in Notis, διοτρεφέων αἰζηῶν: ut supra β, 660. Unus Harleianus in margine, γρ. ἀρηιθόων.

286 *Σφῶϊ μὲν, οὐ γὰρ ἔοικ', ὀτρυνέμεν οὔτι κελεύω*] Lege et distingue, *σφῶϊ μὲν, οὐδὲ Fέοικ' ὀτρυνέμεν, οὔτι κελεύω.* Vide 359.

287 *ἀνώγετον ἴφι μάχεσθαι*] Lege *ἀνώγετε Fῖφι μάχεσθαι.* Plurale verbum cum nomine duali, passim.

295 *ἀμφὶ μέγαν Πελάγοντα, Ἀλάστορά τε, Χρόμιόν τε*] Vertunt Magnum Pelagontem. Quo vero pacto magnum? Pelagon, Alastor, Chromius nomina sunt mera; ut illi *ε*, 677,

ἔνθ' ὅ γε Κοίρανον εἷλεν, Ἀλάστορά τε Χρόμιόν τε,
Ἄλκανδρόν θ', Ἅλιόν τε, Νοήμονά τε, Πρύτανίν τε.

Hic Alastor et Chromius Lycii sunt pro Trojanis pugnantes, ibi Pylii sunt contra Trojanos. Corrige

Ἀμφὶ Μέγην, Πελάγοντά τ', Ἀλάστορά τε, Χρόμιόν τε.

Μέγης nomen proprium, ut saepe alias, unde *Μεγάδης*.

300 *ἀναγκαίῃ πολεμίζῃ*] Suavius paullo codex unus cum Editione Florentina, *Ἀναγκαίῃ πολεμίζοι.*

335 *ὁρμήσειε καὶ ἄρξειαν πολέμοιο*] Sic editi et scripti. Sed Homerus vix potuit aliter, quam

ὁρμήσειε καὶ ἄρξειε πτολέμοιο.

341 *Σφῶϊν μέν τ' ἐπέοικε*] Lege, ut jam antea, *Σφῶϊν μέν ῥα Fέοικε.*

345 *κρέα ἔδμεναι*] Non est hiatus, sed *κρέα* est ultima longa, a *κρέαα*, ut *κέρα*, a *κέραα*. Vide supra 109.

367 *Πὰρ δέ οἱ ἑστήκει*] Supra 329 *εἱστήκει*, ubi aliquot codices *ἑστήκει*, ut et hic pro *ἑστήκει*, aliquot *εἱστήκει*. Non flocci interest: tantum in ambobus locis idem verbum servetur.

372 *φίλον πτωκαζέμεν ἦεν*] Quattuor Harleiani, Eustathius in Notis, Hesychius, et Etymologus, *πτωσκαζέμεν*. Recte.

374 *ὡς φάσαν, οἵ μιν ἴδοντο*] Ex Aeolismo oportet *Fίδοντο*. Quam prompta vero emendatio, *ὣς φάσαν οἵ Fε Fίδοντο. ἕ, μίν* eodem prorsus sensu et usu.

382 *οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ᾤχοντο ἰδέ*] Harleianus unus *Ἠδέ*. Lege *ᾤχοντ' ἠδέ.*

392 *ἆψ ἀνερχομένῳ*] Reponunt *Ἄψ οἱ ἀν*. Poterant quoque sic *Ἄψ ἂρ ἀνερ*. ut ζ, 187 *τῷ δ' ἂρ ἀνερχομένῳ πυκινὸν δόλον*.

412 *τέττα, σιωπῇ ἧσο, ἐμῷ*] Lege *ἧσο, μεῷ*, ut supra.

423 *Ζεφύρου ὑποκινήσαντος*] Schol. Ms. *Πτολεμαῖος ἀναστρέφει τὴν πρόθεσιν. καλῶς*. Scilicet scribebat *Ζεφύρου ὕπο κινήσαντος*.

435 *ἀκούσασαι ὅπα ἀρνῶν*] Omnes codices cum Edit. Florent. et Eustath. *ἀκούουσαι*, quod suavius, ut σ, 53, Od. τ, 204. Porro unde venit in eosdem codd. deformis ille hiatus, *ὅπα ἀρνῶν*? Lege

Ἀζηχὲς μεμακυῖαι, ἀκούουσαι ὀπὸς ἀρνῶν.

Sic *ὀπὸς ἔκλυον* π, 76, χ, 451. *Ἀκούειν* cum genitivo passim.

455 *τῶν δέ τε τηλόσε δοῦπον*] Scholiastes Ms. *τηλόσε, εἰς μακράν. ἄμεινον δὲ τηλόθι γράφειν, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ποιμένα ἀποδιδόναι*. Et quidem *τηλόθι* pro varia lectione unus Harleianus.

480 *πρῶτον γάρ νιν*] Omnes libri *μίν*. Neque usquam alibi venit *νίν*.

482 *πέσεν αἴγειρος ὥς*] Schol. Ms. *αἴγειρος ὥς· ποιητικὴ ἡ ἀναστροφὴ οὐ μετρική*. Nesciebat scilicet metro consultum esse per *F*, *αἴγειρος Fὡς*.

506 *Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἴαχον, ἐῤῥύσαντο δὲ νεκρούς*] Aliquot codices *εἰρύσαντο*. Sed nunquam vidi versum tam male natum, numeros tam inconcinnos. Duo Harleiani et C. C. *ἐρύσαντο*. Lego

Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγα Fίαχον, Fερύσαντο δὲ νεκρούς.

Semper est *Fιάχειν*, *Fιαχή*.

508 *Περγάμου ἐκκατιδῶν*] Sic iterum η, 21. Atqui semper est *Fιδών*, quod cum nescirent, supposuerunt *ἐκκατιδῶν*. Homerus tamen dedit

Περγάμου ἐκκαθορῶν,

ut λ, 337; *ἐξ Ἴδης καθορῶν*.

509 *μήδ' εἴκετε χάρμης*] Lege *μὴ Fείκετε*.

516 *μεθιέντας ἴδοιτο*] Lege *μεθιέντας ὁρῷτο* ut τ, 132.

V. E.

3 Ἀργείοισι *γένοιτο, ἰδέ*] Duo codices *ἠδέ*. Lege *γένοιτ' ἠδέ*.

4 *Δαΐδ οἱ ἐκ κόρυθος*] Sic codices uno dempto omnes, *δαΐδ* non *δαΐεν*. Et causas narrat omissionis *τοῦ ν* Eustathius ad locum. Frustra. Nimirum *ν* prohibetur a *F*, *Δαΐδ Foι*: at v. 7 recte *δαΐεν ἀπὸ κρατός*.

12 *τώ οἱ ἀποκρινθέντε ἐναντίω ὁρμηθήτην*] Codices aliquot *ἐναντίον*; omnes fere cum Edit. Flor. *ὥρμηθήτην*. Lego

τώ Foι ἀποκρινθέντες ἐναντίον ὥρμηθήτην.

Sic *ἀποκριντέντες* (sic) Eust. in Not. et Codex Harleianus pro varia lectione.

30 *χειρὸς ἑλοῦσ' ἐπέεσσι*] Cum ubique sit *Fέπος*, dedit hic Poeta, *χειρὸς ἑλοῦσα Fέπεσσι*.

47 *στυγερὸς δ' ἄρα μιν σκότος εἶλε*] Duo Harleiani *μόρος εἶλε*.

50 *ἕλ' ἔγχεϊ ὀξυόεντι*] Lege *ἔγχει ὀξ.* ne fiat hiatus. Etymol. voce Ἄργεϊ. *Αὗται αἱ δοτικαὶ*, &c. Hi dativi ante consonantem dividuntur, ante vocalem non dividuntur.

90 *οὔτ' ἄρα ἔρκεα ἴσχει*] Versus hiulcus. Lege *οὔτ' ἄρ θ' ἔρκεά γ' ἴσχει*. Ἄρ *θ'* ut versu praecedente *ἄρ τε*.

106 *ὣς ἔφατ' εὐχόμενος*] Unus Harleianus et Eustath. Text. et Not. *ὣς φάτ' ἐπευχόμενος*. Recte, ut 119 *καὶ ἐπεύχεται*.

115 *κλῦθί μοι*] Melius alii codices, *κλῦθί μευ*.

118 *δὸς δέ τέ μ' ἄνδρα ἑλεῖν*] Si legis *ἀνέρ' ἑλεῖν*, effugies hiatum. Sed *ἑλεῖν* est *ὕστερον πρῶτον*, ut notat Scholiastes: quare forte verius, *Δὸς δέ τέ μ' ἄνδρα Fιδεῖν*.

159 *ἔνθ' υἱοὺς Πριάμοιο*] Omnes libri et Editio Flor. et Eust. in Notis Τῖας Πριάμοιο.

161 *ἐξ αὐχένα ἄξει*] Plures codices *ἄξῃ*: lege, *ἐξ αὐχένα Fάξῃ*.

162 *πόρτιος ἠὲ βοὸς*] Sic libri omnes: sed sensus ipse flagitat *ἠδὲ βοός*.

183 *σάφα δ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ θεός ἐστι*] Lege *σάφα δ' οὐ Fοῖδ'*.

211 *φέρων χάριν ἕκτορι δίῳ*] Schol. Ms. *ἔν τισι, Τρώεσσι φέρων χάριν ἱπποδάμοισι.*

219 *πρίν γ' ἐπὶ νὼ τῷδ' ἀνδρί*]

221 *ὀχέων ἐπιβήσεο, ὄφρα ἴδηαι*] Lege *ἐπιβήσεαι, ὄφρα Fίδηαι.* Conscendes, idem quod conscende.

227 *δέξαι, ἐγὼ δ' ἵππων ἀποβήσομαι*] Schol. Ms. *ἀποβήσομαι, Ζηνόδοτος ἐπιβήσομαι.* Et sic Harleianus unus pro varia lectione. Inepte.

247 *υἱὸς μεγαλήτορος Ἀγχίσαο*] Editio princeps, scripti quos vidi omnes habent, *υἱὸς μὲν ἀμύμονος Ἀγχίσαο.* Rectius.

255 *ὀκνείω δ' ἵππων ἐπιβαινέμεν*] Eustathius in Notis et unus Harleianus *ἐπιβήμεναι* ut saepe alibi. Placet.

270 *τῶν οἱ ἓξ ἐγένοντο ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γενέθλης*] Eustathius in Notis, Editio princeps, omnes codices *γενέθλη.* Unus tantum Harleianus in margine *γρ. γενέθλης.* Ceterum hiatus iste *νοντο ε* sine dubio mendosus. Lego *τῶν Foι ἓξ ἐγένοντ' εἰνὶ μεγάροισι γενέθλης.*

γενέθλη stirps, ut Od. *ν*, 130 *Φαίηκες, τοί πέρ τοι ἐμῆς ἔξεισι γενέθλης.* Hesychius *γενέθλης, γενεᾶς, γενέσεως.* Ceterum ad evitandum hiatum lego *ἐγένοντ' εἰνὶ*, ut alibi non raro pro *ἐνὶ*: vel *ἐγένοντ' ἂρ ἐνί.*

273 *ἀροίμεθα κἂν κλέος ἐσθλόν*] Κἂν nusquam alibi venit apud nostrum. Eustath., Editio princeps, scripti omnes *ἀροίμεθά κεν.* Unus Harleianus *κε.* Sic *θ*, 196, *Εἰ τούτω κε λάβοιμεν, ἐελποίμην κεν Ἀχαιούς.*

293 *Αἰχμὴ δ' ἐξεχύθη*] Schol. Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξελύθη, Ζηνόδοτος δὲ ἐξεσύθη.* Recte Zenodotus: sic infra 661 *αἰχμὴ δὲ διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα.*

297 *Αἰνείας δ' ἐπόρουσε*] Plerique codices cum Eustathio *ἀπόρουσε*, descendit, desiliit de curru. Recte. Sic *ε*, 837.

311 *καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο Fάναξ*] Sic omnes scripti editique. Et sic infra 388 *καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο Ἄρης.* Sed uterque versus mendosus; quod in posteriore hiatus ostendit.

Lego, *καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλωλε Fάναξ*, et *καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλωλεν Ἄρης*. Nam *ἀπόλοιτο* non est periisset, sed periret, pereat.

317 *ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἔλοιτο*] Omnes codices *ἐκ θυμόν*, ut mox 346.

318 *ὑπεξέφερεν πολέμοιο*] Omnes libri *ὑπεξέφερε*, sine *ν*. Lego

ὑπεξέφερε πτολέμοιο.

338 *Ἀμβροσίου διὰ πέπλου, ὅν οἱ χάριτες κάμον αὐταί*] Versus nothus. Oportuit *ὅν Foι* contra metrum. Manus autem nuda erat, non sub peplo. Nec peplum hic describendum erat, sed supra v. 315.

340 *ἰχὼρ οἷός πέρ τε ῥέει*] Sic Libri et Grammatici veteres. Sed malim *ἰχὼρ οἷόν πέρ τε ῥέει*, genere neutro, ut *σκώρ*, *ἐέλδωρ*. Vide v. 416.

343 *ἡ δὲ μέγα ἰάχουσα ἀπὸ ἕο*] Versus prorsus deformis cum triplice hiatu. Lego, *Ἡ δὲ μέγα Fιάχουσά γ' ἀπὸ Fέο.*

346 *ἐκ θυμὸν ἕληται*] Omnes codices *ἔλοιτο*, ut supra 317.

349 *Ἡ οὐχ ἅλις*] Lege ut semper alias, *ἦ οὐ Fάλις.*

350 *Εἰ δὲ σύ γ' ἐς πόλεμον πωλήσεαι*] Schol. Ms. *ἔν τισι γράφεται, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐς πόλεμον.* Videtur rectius; licet hodie codices *σύ γ'*.

356 *ἠέρι δ' ἔγχος ἐκέκλιτο καὶ ταχέ' ἵππω*]

358 *πολλὰ λισσομένη*] Melius alii *πολλά Fε λισσομένη.*

359 *φίλε κασίγνητ' ἐκκόμισαί τέ με, δὸς δέ μοι ἵππους*] Numeri immodulati. Omnes omnino codices et Eustath. Not.

φῖλε κασίγνητε, κόμισαί τέ με.

Schol. Ms. *κόμισαι, ἐπιμελήθητι, ἐξ οὗ καὶ κομιδή.* Ceterum unus codex recte, *κόμισαί τέ με, δός τέ μοι ἵππους.*

363 *ὣς φάτο, τῇ δ' Ἄρης*] Duo Cantabrigienses et Harleianus unus *ὣς φάτο· τῇ δ' ἂρ Ἄρης.* Recte. Una syllaba absorpsit alteram.

366 *τὼ δ' οὐκ ἄκοντε πετέσθην*] Plures et meliores codices, *ἀέκοντε*, hoc est *ἀFέκοντε*. Cum enim semper sit apud Home-

rum *Fεκών*, radicalis consonans *F* non potest in compositione elidi.

374 *ὡς εἴ τι κακὸν ῥέζουσαν ἐνωπῇ*] Sic iterum *φ*, 510. Schol. [Ms. *τινὲς ἐνιπῇ*. Nostri hodie libri, ut et Hesych. Etymol. *ἐνωπῇ*.

388 *καί νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο Ἄρης*] Sic quidem codices, et sic Etymol. *v.* *Ατος. Lege tamen *ἀπόλωλεν Ἄρης*. Vide supra 311.

394 *τότε κέν μιν ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος*] Tres codices *τότε καί μιν*. Etiam ipsam cepit matronam Jovis. *Κὲν λάβεν*, non est cepit, sed cepisset.

416 *Ἦ ῥα, καὶ ἀμφοτέρῃσιν ἀπ' ἰχὼρ χειρὸς ὀμόργνυ*] Schol. Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος χειρὸς, Ζηνόδοτος χερσίν*. Recte Aristarchus. Quippe *ἀμφοτέρῃσι* in se includit *χερσί*, ut Od. *κ*, 264,

Αὐτὰρ ὅ γ' ἀμφοτέρῃσι λαβὼν ἐλλίσσετο γούνων.

χειρός vero, quia ibi locus vulneris, ut supra 336, *Ἄκρην οὔτασε χεῖρα*. Porro Scholiastes, *ἰχῶ, ὡς ἵδρωτα, ἱδρῶ, οὕτως ἰχῶρα, ἰχῶ*. Et inde Eustathius *ἰχῶ, κατ' ἀποκοπὴν ὅλης συλλαβῆς, ὡς κυκεῶνα κυκεῶ, Ἀπόλλωνα Ἀπόλλω*. *Τὸ δὲ γράφειν ἰχῶρ' κατ' ἀποκοπὴν μόνου τῆς* (sic) *ᾱ οὐκ ἀρέσκει τοῖς παλαιοῖς διὰ τὴν καινότητα*. Recte quidem, quod non *ἰχῶρ'* pro *ἰχῶρα*: quod sine exemplo est. Neque tamen necesse *ἰχῶ*: sed potius *ἰχώρ* neutrum, ut *σκώρ ἐέλδωρ* et alia: vide supra v. 340. Quod posteriores, et non Aeolenses, *ἰχώρ* masculino dixerunt, parum aut nihil huc valet.

422 *Τρωσὶν ἅμ' ἑσπέσθαι*] Ex quinque codicibus quattuor, *ἅμα σπέσθαι*, ut Od. *χ*, 324, *Σοὶ δ' ἄλοχόν τε φίλην σπέσθαι καὶ τέκνα τεκέσθαι*.

424 *τῶν τινα καῤῥέζουσα Ἀχαιϊάδων*] Valeat hiatus et lege, *τῶν τινα καῤῥέζουσ' ἂρ Ἀχαιϊάδων*. Vide Od. *φ*, 160.

425 *καταμύξατο χεῖρα Faραιήν*] Schol. Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος καταμύξατο διὰ τοῦ α*. Scilicet ab *ἀμίσσω*; quaedam ergo *ἐκδόσεις* habebant *κατεμύξατο*, a *μύσσω*. Male.

451 Ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' εἰδώλῳ] Cum a *Feídw* sit, apud nostrum *Feídwλον*, et idcirco dederit Ἀμφὶ δὲ *Feídwλον*. Intrudebant τὸ ἄρ, quia inviti tot hiatus videbant; qui posthac nulli erunt.

461 Τρώων δὲ στίχας] Schol. Ms. οἱ μὲν Τρῶας, οἱ δὲ Τρῳάς. Τρωίας δὲ στίχας ἐν τῇ Σινωπικῇ καὶ Κυπρίᾳ καὶ Ἀντιμάχου σὺν τῷ ι. Ἡ κοινὴ, ᾗ συντίθεται καὶ ὁ Ἀσκαλωνίτης, Τρῶας ὡς Κᾶρας. Inde Eustathius, Διττὴ γραφή, Τρωὰς et Τρῶας. Nulla mentio hodiernae lectionis Τρώων. Certe, unus Cantabrigiensis, duo Harleiani, Τρωάς; quod adscisci-mus.

465 κεῖται ἀνὴρ ὅν τ' ἶσον] Ex infinitis locis constat vera lectio, ὃν *Fῖσον*.

470 μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου] Lege ut ubique alias, μένος θυμόν τε ἑκάστου.

477 οἵ πέρ τ' ἐπίκουροι ἔνειμεν] Schol. Ms. ἔνειμεν. οὕτως ἡ Ἀριστάρχου. Ergo aliae forte ἔνεσμεν.

487 ἀψῖσι λίνου ἁλόντε πανάγρου] Locus mendosissimus. Semper est ἁλόντε prima brevi. Et quid hic facit numerus dualis? Corrigo,

Μήπως ὡς ἀψῖσι λίνου πανάγροιο *Fαλόντες*.

Ἄγρα prima brevi Od. μ, 330: ergo recte πανάγροιο secunda brevi.

489 οἱ δὲ τάχ' ἐκπέρσουσ'] Duo Harleiani ἐκπέρσωσ' recte. γένησθε καὶ ἐκπέρσωσι; utrumque subjunctivi modi.

491 τηλεκλητῶν γ' ἐπικούρων] Delendum γ', cum plerisque codicibus et editione prima.

492 κρατερὴν δ' ἀποθέσθαι ἐνιπήν] Meliores codices, χαλεπήν.

500 ὅτε τε ξανθὴ δημήτηρ] Schol. Ms. Πτολεμαῖος τοὺς δωδεσυλλάβους (sic) στίχους ἐκτιθείς, φησὶ καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως γράφεσθαι,

Ἀνδρῶν λικμώντων εὖτ' ἂν ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ.

501 κρίνει ἐπειγομένων] Libri fere omnes κρίνῃ. Sed rectius κρίνει, ut φορέει, ὑπολευκαίνονται.

507 Τρώεσσιν ἀρήγων] Schol. Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος ὀξυτόνως Ἀρηγών· δῆλον ἐκ τῆς πλαγίου Ἀρηγόνες. Il. δ, 7. Sed Ἀρήγων participium, Ἀρηγών nomen ut mox 511.

516 μετάλλησάν γε μὲν οὗτοι] Omnes codices οὔτι. Recte.

528 ἐφοίτα πολλὰ κελεύων] Eustath. γρ. μακρὰ κελεύων. Nostri codices πολλά.

542 υἱε Διοκλῆος Κρήθωνά τε Ὀρσίλοχόν τε] Lego Κρήθωνά τ' ἂρ Ὀρσί. ["An leg. Κρηθάονά τ'?" struck out.] Immo versus nothus et delendus.

546 ὅς τέκετ' Ὀρσίλοχον, et 547. Ὀρσίλοχος] Sic hodie codices. At Schol. Ms. ὁ πρόγονος διὰ τοῦ τ̄. ὁ παῖς διὰ τοῦ σ̄. καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ οὖν διὰ τοῦ τ̄. φ, 16. Legit ergo hic Ὀρτίλοχον et Ὀρτίλοχος. At contra Pausanias in Messen. deducit Ὀρσίλοχον a majore Orsilocho, ut Glaucum nepotem a majore Glauco. Il. ζ, 154.

567 Μέγα δέ σφας ἀποσφήλειε] Schol. Ms. συσταλτέον σφας διὰ τὸ μέτρον.

568 καὶ ἔγχεα ὀξυόεντα] Lego ἔγχη ὀξυόεντα.

576 ἔνθα Πυλαιμένεα ἑλέτην] Lego λαβέτην, ut supra 159.

587 τύχε γὰρ ψαμάθοιο] Codices fere omnes, τύχε γάρ ῥ' ἀμάθοιο. Sed Homerus saepe ψάμαθος, nusquam nisi hic ἄμαθος.

596 τὸν δὲ ἰδών] Codex Harleianus, τοὺς δέ. Recte. Hectorem et Martem; quem vidisse se indicat, v. 604.

603 τῷ δ' αἰεὶ πάρα εἷς γε θεῶν] Lego πάρα τίς γε θεῶν.

605 μενεαινέμεν ἴφι μάχεσθαι] Μενεαινέμεν, pro μενεαίνετε, consulto supposuerunt veteres ad evitandum hiatum: ignari scilicet Aeolicae *F*.

Feίκετε, μηδὲ θεοῖς μενεαίνετε Fῖφι μάχεσθαι.

644 Οὐδέ τέ σε Τρώεσσιν] Omnes codices οὐδέ τί σε. Recte. ἄλκαρ τι ἔσεσθαι.

646 ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ δμηθέντα] Unus tantum codex ἐμοῦ, ceteri omnes ἐμοί. Recte, ut mox 653 ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ δαμέντα.

656 *καὶ τῶν μὲν ὁμαρτῆ*] Aristarchus et alii *ἁμαρτή* vel *ἁμαρτῆ*, et hodie codices plures.

662 *πατὴρ δέ τι λοιγὸν ἄμυνεν*] Lege *πατὴρ δ' ἔτι*, ut libri aliquot. Schol. Ms. *Προαναφωνεῖ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Σαρπηδόνος διὰ τοῦ ἔτι.*

683 *Σαρπηδὼν Διὸς υἱὸς ἕπος τ' ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπε*] Colon hoc *ἕπος τε* &c. saepe venit; vocali tamen semper praecedente. Mendose igitur hic *υἱὸς ἕπος τε*. Corrigo, verborum ordine mutato;

—χάρη δ' ἄρα Foι Διὸς υἱός
Σαρπηδὼν προσιόντι, Fέπος δ' ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔFειπε.

703 *ὕστατον ἐξενάριξεν*] Meliores et plures codices *ἐξενάριξαν*. Sic v. 711, 712, *τοὺς* et *ὀλέκοντας*, Hectorem sc. et Martem.

706 *Αἰτώλιον Οἰνόμαόν τε Οἰνοπίδην θ'*] Cum ubique sit *Foῖνος*, in derivatis quoque retinebitur *F*. Lege ergo

Αἰτωλὸν Foινόμαόν τε Foινοπίδην θ' Ἕλενον.

722 *Ἥβη δ' ἀμφ' ὀχέεσσι*] Omnes codices *ὀχέεσφι* genitivo singulari. Recte.

723 *χάλκεα, ὀκτάκνημα, σιδηρέῳ ἄξονι ἀμφίς*] Sic libri; sed hiatus isti depravationem indicant. Corrigo

χάλκει', ὀκτάκνημα, σιδηρέου ἄξονος ἀμφίς.

729 *τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀργύρεος ῥυμὸς πέλεν*] Scripti editique *πέλεν*: sed omnino legendum *πέλει*: ut supra *εἰσὶ* et *ἐντέταται*. Nempe currus Junonis ex Homeri personâ perpetuus et sempiternus est.

739 *πάντῃ φόβος ἐστεφάνωτο*] Eandem ob rationem lege *ἐστεφάνωται*, ut supra *ἐντέταται* non *ἐντέτατο*. Et quidem unus Harleianus et Eustathius in Notis, *ἐστεφάνωται*.

748 *θοῶς ἐπεμαίετ' ἄρ' ἵππους*] Idem versiculus iterum venit *θ*, 392: et utrobique codex unus et alter habent *θοὰς ἵππους*: sed rectum est *θοῶς ἐπεμαίετο*.

756 *ἐξήρετο καὶ προσέειπε*] Omnes praeter unum codices *ἐξείρετο*. Quod rectum et Homericum est, *εἴρετο*, non *ἤρετο*. Et sic Hesychius.

757 *τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα*] Alia *ἔκδοσις τάδε ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα.* Vide infra 872. Videtur melior lectio.

764 *Τὴν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς*] Codex Academicus ex alia quadam *ἐκδόσει*

τὴν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

768 *οὐκ ἄκοντε πετέσθην*] Lege *ἀϝέκοντε*, ut supra et semper : quippe ubique est Aeolicum *ϝεκών.*

772 *θεῶν ὑψηχέες ἵπποι*] Sic et Longinus hunc locum profert Ὑψηχέες; atque ita Hesych. Etym. Eustathius. Sed ex his aliquot agnoscunt variam lectionem, *ὑψαύχενες.* Et cum ubique sit *ϝηχή* cum digammo, rectum erit *ὑψαύχενες.* Neutrum nisi hic apud nostrum occurrit. Codices nostri universi *ὑψηχέες.*

786 *ὃς τόσον αὐδήσασχ'*] Schol. Ms. *ἔν τισιν οὐκ ἦν ὁ στίχος διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.* Et sic Eustathius. Recte.

791 *νῦν δ' ἔκαθεν πόλιος*] Editio Florentina mendose, Νῦν δ' *ἑκάς.* At quinque codices *νῦν δὲ ἑκάς.* Vestigium Aeolismi. Quippe hic, ut semper, ab Homero venerat, Νῦν δὲ *ϝεκάς.*

792 *μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου*] Lege et hic et ubique, *μένος θυμόν τε ϝεκάστου.*

797 *Ἀσπίδος εὐκύκλου, τῷ τείρετο, κάμνε δὲ χεῖρα*] Eustathius, *γράφεται Ἀσπίδος ἀμφιβρότης,* et *τείρετο γρ. τρίβετο.* Schol. Ms. *Ἀρίσταρχος τείρετο· αἱ δὲ κοιναὶ τρίβετο.* Et sic tres hodie codices *τρίβετο.*

798 *κελαινεφὲς αἶμ' ἀπεμόργυ* (sic)] Academicus et duo Harleiani *αἶμ' ἀπομόργνυ.* Sic *β*, 269 *ἀπομόρξατο.* Ita supra 416 *ἀπ' ἰχὼρ χειρὸς ὀμόργυ* (sic). Et *ὀμορξάμενος* bis, ter. Sed nusquam apud nostrum, *μόργνυμι* (sic) *μόρξατο* sine incremento.

808 *ῥηιδίως· τοίη τοι ἐπιτάῤῥοθος ἦα*] Pro *τοι* meliores et plures *οἱ.* Sed totus versus est rejiciendus. Schol. Ms. *ὁ στίχος οὐ καθόλου εὕρηται ἐν ταῖς Ἀριστάρχου, ἐναντίος γὰρ ἐστι τοῖς προκειμένοις.* Nempe quomodo Minerva tum *ἐπιτάῤῥοθος*, cum v. 802 jusserat eum non *πολεμίζειν* nec *ἐκπαιφάσσειν.*

813 *δαΐφρονος Οἰνείδαο*]

827 *Μήτι σύ γ' Ἄρηα τὸν δείδιθι*] Sic unus Harleianus. Recte.

838 *μέγα δ' ἔβραχε φήγινος ἄξων*] Eustathius, *οἱ παλαιοὶ Πήδινος ἄξων*. Sic versum citat Etymol. et Hesychius in *Πῆδος*. Sed Virgilius *φήγινος*: Post valido [nitens] sub pondere faginus axis.

844 *ἐνάριζε*] Plerique codices *ἐνάριξε*, ut v. 842.

848 *Κεῖσθαι ὅθι πρῶτον*] Codex Academicus *κεῖσθ' ὅθι μιν πρῶτον*, ut *β*, 722, *ὅθι μιν λίπον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν*.

852 *μεμαὼς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι*] Codex C. C. et unus ex Harleianis *ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἑλέσθαι*. Recte. Quippe *ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι* est animam amittere: animam vero eripere est *ἀπὸ* vel *ἐκ θυμὸν ἑλέσθαι*. Vide supra 317, *μ*, 250, &c.

857 *Νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, ὅθι ζωννύσκετο μίτρην*] Scholiastes Ms. *Αἱ Ἀριστάρχου κατὰ δοτικὴν Μίτρῃ*. Recte. Nam *ζωννύσκετο* est cingebatur, non cingebat. Unus tamen locus Il. *ψ*, 130 *χαλκὸν ζώννυσθαι*: sed ibi alii codices *χαλκῷ*. Ceterum ne hiatus deformet versum, lego *Νείατον ἐς κενεῶν', ὁπόθι ζων*.

860 *Ὅσσον τ' ἐννεάχιλοι ἐπίαχον ἢ δεκάχιλοι*] Sic scripti editique, Quantum novies mille clamant. Sed *ἐπιάχω* est acclamo, non clamo, et semper est *Ϝιάχω*. Dedit Poeta

Ὅσσον κ' ἐννεάχιλοι ἐϜίαχον ἢ δεκάχιλοι.

Quantum novies mille hominum clamarent sive clamare possent.

872 *τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα*] Schol. Ms. *γράφεται, τάδε ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα, ὅ ἐστι φθοροποιά*. Et sic unus codex C. C. ut et idem codex supra v. 757. Vide Etymologicon Magnum in *Ἀΐδηλος*.

874 *χάριν δ' ἄνδρεσσι φέροντες*] Scholiastes Ms. *χάριν ἄνδρεσσι φέροντες. Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ σὺν τῷ δ'*. Placet absque *τῷ δ*. Et sic codex C. C. et tres Harleiani.

879 *Ταύτην δ' οὔτ' ἔπεϊ προτιβάλλεαι*] Sic libri omnes ignorantia *τῆς* (sic) *F*. Sed legendum *ταύτην δ' οὔτε Ϝέπει*.

880 [881] *ὑπέρθυμον Διομήδεα*] Schol. Ms. Ὑπέρθυμον· Ἀρίσταρχος Ὑπερφίαλον. Quod irato magis convenit: licet omnes hodie libri *ὑπέρθυμον*.

893 *σπουδῇ δάμνημ' ἐπέεσσι*] Corrige ex Aeolismo, *δάμνημι Fέπεσσι*.

895 [6] *Ἐκ γὰρ ἐμεῦ γένος ἐσσὶ, ἐμοὶ*] Lege *γένος ἦες*. Sed duo ex Harleianis optimi, *γένος ἐσσὶν*.

898 *πάλαι ἦσθα ἐνέρτερος Οὐρανιώνων*] Scholiastes Ms. Ἀρίσταρχος Νέρτερος, *ὁ δὲ* Ζηνόδοτος Ἐνέρτερος. Quomodo Aristarchus *νέρτερος* in hac lectione; ut syllaba versui defuerit? Ergo hoc voluit, Aristarchum legisse *ἦσθά γε νέρτερος*, Zenodotum *ἦσθά γ' ἐνέρτερος*. Vide *o*, 225. Sed idem duo Harleiani, *πάλαι ἦσθας ἐνέρτερος*.

900 *φάρμακα πάσσων*] Optimus ex Harleianis, *φάρμακ' ἔπασσεν* et sequens versus in margine est. Nempe olim *ἠθετεῖτο*. Sed extat supra v. 402.

903 *περιστρέφεται κυκόωντι*] Herodianus apud Eustathium et Hesychius. Recte a *τρέπω* non a *στρέφω*. [Sic: the reading of Herodianus which Bentley approves is *περιτρέφεται*].

906 *Πὰρ δὲ διὶ κρονίωνι καθέζετο κύδεϊ γαίων*] Gloria exultans post tantum dedecus? Scholiastes Ms. *κύδεϊ γαίων. ὡς ἀλλοπρόσαλλος ἤδη ἐπιλέλησται ὧν πέπονθεν. Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ ἀθετεῖ*. Recte, ut censeo, Aristarchus.

Z. VI.

4 *Μεσσηγὺς Σιμόεντος ἰδὲ Ξάνθοιο ῥοάων*] Scholiastes Ms. *πρότερον ἐγέγραπτο,*

Μεσσηγὺς ποταμοῖο Σκαμάνδρου καὶ Στομαλίμνης·

ὕστερον Ἀρίσταρχος ταύτην εὑρὼν ἐπέκρινε. Χάρης δὲ γράφει

Μεσσηγὺς ποταμοῖο Σκαμάνδρου καὶ Σιμόεντος.

15 *ὁδῷ ἐπὶ οἰκία ναίων*] Tollet hiatum digamma, ut semper, *ὁδῷ ἐπὶ Fοικία ναίων*.

16 *Ἀλλά οἱ*] Lege, ut ubique, *Ἀλλά Fοι*.

24 *σκότιον δέ ἑ γείνατο μήτηρ*] Iterum huc adscisce *F*, *σκότιο*[*ν*] *δέ Fε*.

29 *Ἀστύαλον*] Ut ubique est *Fάστυ*, ita hic erit *Fαστύαλον*.

31 *Τεῦκρος δ' Ἀρετάονα δῖον*] Scholiastes Ms. *Τεῦκρος δ' ἂρ Ἐτάονα δῖον· γράφεται καὶ Ἀρετάονα*. Eustathius, *Ἀρετάονα, ἢ ἂρ Ἐτάονα*. Neutrum nomen alibi hic occurrit. Placet *Ἐτάονα*: qui *Ἐτάων* a *Fέτης* esset—*Fετάονα*. Unus tantum Harleianus, *ἄρ' Ἐτάονα*. (*Τεῦκρος δὲ Fετάονα δῖον*.)

33 *Ἔλατον δὲ ἄναξ*] Sine hiatu lege, ut semper, *δὲ Fάναξ*.

34 *παρ' ὄχθας*] Strabo hunc versum legit, *παρ' ὄχθαις*.

38 *ἵππω γὰρ οἱ*] Tollet hoc *λαγαρόν*, si accedit digamma *γάρ Foι*.

39 *Ὄζῳ ἐνὶ βλαφθέντι μυρικίνῳ*] Legerim *ὑφ' ἕν, ἐνιβλαφθέντι*, ut Il. *o*, 647, *τῇ ὅ γ' ἐνιβλαφθεὶς πέσεν ὕπτιος*. Et sic Eustath. Text. et Not.

40 *Ἄξαντ' ἐν πρώτῳ*] Ubique placuit Homero et Aeolibus digamma *Fάξαντα*.

43 *πὰρ δέ οἱ ἔστη*] Supra recte v. 41, *οἱ ἄλλοι*: illi alii: sed hic ubi *οἱ* est sibi, digamma hiatum tollet, *πὰρ δέ Foι ἔστη*.

53 *τῷ θεράποντι*] Recte Eustathius et Textu et Notis, *ᾧ θεράποντι*, hoc est *Fῷ*, suo.

54 *ἔπος ηὔδα*] Scribe ut semper *Fέπος*.

NOTES ON LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

[Words marked * are not found in the lexicons of Georges or Lewis and Short. (F.) denotes that the word is printed in De Vit's *Glossarium*.]

Alapari. Add to my former note Placidus p. 3 (Deuerling) *alapari est alapas minari...vel pro iactantia.* I should add that my description of the manuscript in which the word is found was inaccurate. It is now at St Petersburg, and the translation which it contains of the Epistle of St James was published in 1883 by Belsheim.

Ballena. This (not *balaena*) is the spelling of B in Plautus Rudens 545, of the Pithoeanus of Juvenal 10 14, and of good manuscripts of Paulus p. 31. The fancied etymology from *βάλλειν* (Isid. 12 6 7) may have given rise to, or encouraged, this orthography.

**Crepacula*, a rattle: Gloss. Epinal. *crepacula claedur: id est tabula qua a segetibus territantur aves.* (F.)

**Debrutesco*, to begin to be foolish: Osbern's Panormia (Mai Cl. Auct. 8) p. 179 *debrutescere desipere.* (F.)

**Decipulosus*, adj. from *decipulum:* full of snares: Osbern p. 179. (F.)

**Dementatio*, abstr. from *dementare*, Osbern p. 177 *dementatio insania.* (F.)

**Dementicus* = *demens:* Osbern p. 180. (F.)

Demorator. I was in error in attributing this word (in Mart. Capella) to Mr Bywater's conjecture. He had pointed out to me that it was the manuscript reading.

**Dentaria, ferrum unde medici dentes tollunt*, Osbern p. 172. (F.)

**Dentosus,* full of teeth, Osbern p. 172. (F.)

Depubes. Add Gloss. Labb. *depuber* (? *depubes*) *ἄνηβος.*

**Diatim,* adv. from *dies:* Osbern p. 172 *diatim de die in diem, vel per singulos dies.* (F.)

**Disgrex,* adj., separated from: Osbern p. 181 *disgreges, segreges, divisi, separati: disgrex segregus.* (F.) See Löwe, Prodromus p. 383.

**Dulcisapus,* adj., sweet-tasting: Osbern p. 173. (F.)

**Edaculus,* adj. dim. from *edax,* Osbern p. 192. (F.)

**Educamen = nutrimen, fomentum,* Osbern p. 199.

**Egesto,* freq. of *egero,* Osbern p. 198 *egestare egerere.* (F.)

**Emanceps = e servitute liberatus,* Osbern pp. 193, 335. (F.)

**Epulaticus = epulis plenus,* Osbern p. 200. (F.)

**Escosus = escis plenus,* Osbern p. 192. (F.)

**Exancorare, navem solvere:* Osbern p. 193. (F.)

Expiatorius is quoted only from Augustine: add Serv. Aen. 3 264, *meritos honores, congruos, id est expiatorios.*

**Exprodo:* Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, Hild. and Papias, *exprodere excludere, exprodita exclusa.* (F.)

**Exsumptuo,* to make poor: Gloss. Hild. *exsumptuavit pauperavit:* see Löwe, Prodromus p. 425. (F. under *exustuavit.*)

**Falcĭto,* to prune: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 and 7: see also Löwe, Prodromus p. 384. (F. under *falceto.*)

**Favillus,* dim. from *favus:* Osbern p. 242 *favillus parvus favus.* (F.)

**Feraculus, aliquantulum ferax:* Osbern p. 242. (F.)

**Fictim,* fictitiously: Osbern p. 240. (F.)

**Fomen, fomentum, nutrimentum, alimonia:* Osbern p. 241. (F.)

**Fotilis,* that can be nourished (?), or nutritious (?) Osbern p. 241 *fotilis nutribilis.* (F.)

**Fracticius, qui cito frangitur:* Osbern p. 242.

**Fuscamen, nigredo:* Osbern p. 241. (F.)

**Galmum, galmula, galmilla.* In Osbern p. 262 *galmula* is glossed as = *herba illa quae similis est porro:* in the Epinal Glossary we have *galmum molegn: galmilla limmolegn.*

**Glaucedo = glaucitas,* greyness: Osbern p. 263. (F.)

**Glis, glitis.* Osbern p. 264 *glis terra tenax: glistis humus:*

glissis mala dumus (probably for *glistis, mala humus*). *Gliteus* or *glitteus* is explained = *terrenus* in the same glossary pp. 251, 264. (F.)

**Guttosus, guttis plenus:* Osbern p. 262. (F.)

**Ignibulum = turibulum:* Osbern p. 289. (F.)

**Ignicremus = igne crematus:* Osbern p. 289. (F.)

**Imbumentum,* first instruction: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 7 *imbumentis documentis, ab imbuit docuit.* (F.)

**Implutio,* abstr. from *impluo,* raining into: Osbern p. 430. (F.)

**Incorpor,* bodiless: Osbern p. 290. (F.)

**Inerticus,* idle, remiss: Osbern p. 292. (F.)

**Inexistimabilis,* beyond calculation: Ti. Donatus on Aen. 6. 489 *inexistimabilem numerum.*

Infertilis: add Serv. Aen. 4 212 *terram...infertilem.*

**Infoco,* to put into the fire: Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6 *ignicare infocare.*

**Insilentia,* unrest, want of repose: Gloss. Epinal. *insilentia inquietudo:* for which Gloss. Amplon. p. 338 (as printed by Oehler) wrongly gives *insolentia.*

**Itineralis,* a grammatical term = expressive of motion: Cledonius p. 25 (Keil) *itineralis praepositio* (such as *ad* or *in*).

**Iovarium,* a receptacle for rain: Osbern p. 290 *imbricum Iovarium.*

**Laeter-tra-trum = laevus,* left. Von Ponor, in the *Ungarische Revue* 1882 1 p. 88 foll. has pointed out that this form, with *laetrorsum,* leftwards, must be restored from the best MSS. to Paulus p. 117 (Müller).

Laserpicium. In Plautus Rudens 630 B spells *lasserpicium:* and Caper Orth. p. 100 (Keil) according to C, a MS. of the ninth or tenth century, gives *lasser piceum.* In Plautus Pseud. 816, *eo lasarpici libram pondo diluunt,* the first syllable is so sharply accented as to suggest that either this spelling should be adopted, or another, namely *lacsirpicium.* For Solinus 27 48 says *dictum est primum lac sirpicium, quoniam manat in modum lacteum: deinde usu derivante laser nominatum.* And in the corresponding passage Isid. 17 9 27 we read *cuius sucus primum dictus est lacsir, quoniam manat in modum lactis.* If this was the

real form, nothing would have been more natural than that the Romans should have mistaken *lacsirpicium* for *lac sirpicium*. There may have been two words, *lacsir* and *sirpe*, which became confused in the process of etymologizing.

**Lecebra* or *lacebra*, an enticement, allurement. The Notae Tironianae give *laecebra*, which may point to *lacebra* as the right form: *lecebra* is found in Gloss. ap. Mai Cl. Auct. 6, Gloss. Hild. and Labb. (F. inaccurately.)

Pinsor = pinsitor: Serv. Aen. 1 179. Lewis and Short quote it erroneously from Varro ap. Non. p. 152. The word, like the supine *pinsum* and part. *pinsurus*, is derived from the form *pindo* which is quoted in Gloss. Labb.

Plano, to explain. This is Halm's very probable conjecture in Script. Carminis de Figuris ap. Rhet. Lat. Min. p. 63, *singula versu Et prosa et versu pariter planare virorum*, the manuscript reading being *placare*.

**Praeceratus*, waxed at the end. Ti. Donatus on Aen. 1 727 *funalia debemus accipere faces ex funibus praeceratas*.

**Recrispo*, to curl back. Poet ap. Serv. de Centum Metris p. 466 (Keil) *tenera recrispat aura tremulos sinus freti*.

**Restio παλιμφύειν*. If this gloss can be trusted, *restibilis* will be a verbal adj. derived from *restire*, and must be scanned *restĭbilis*. *Re-stio* will be formed from a lost verb *stio* = to plant or fix, the base of which, *sti-*, may appear in *sti-va sti-pes* and *sti-rps*. Varro L. L. 5 39 says *ager restibilis qui restituitur ac reseritur quotannis:* should *restitur* be read for *restituitur*?

**Rumo*, the old name of the Tiber: Serv. Aen. 8 63, 90.

**Satyrographus*, a writer of satyric drama. Comm. Cruq. Horace A. P. 240.

Sectarius vervex (Plaut. Capt. 820) is explained by Paulus p. 336 (Müller) as *qui gregem agnorum praecedens ducit*. I do not know why this explanation should be rejected by modern scholars, who translate *sectarius* gelded. May not the word be derived from *sec-* to follow, or, (which virtually comes to the same thing) from *secta* a road? In that case *sectarius* will mean "who leads the way."

Substantia in the sense of power, ability, with gen. of the

gerund: Ti. Donatus Aen. 5 687 *qui enim praestandi habet substantiam:* 6 493 *substantia clamandi.*

**Succendium,* fuel (?). It is explained as = *fomentum* by Gloss. Epinal, Amplon. p. 377, Mai Cl. Auct. 6 and 7.

**Superliminium,* the space above the *limen,* Serv. Aen. 3 351.

Venialis as a technical term in rhetoric = apologetic, assuming an attitude of apology: Serv. Aen. 3 615, 4 333, Fortunatianus 2 p. 105 (Halm, Rhet. Lat. Min.), Iulius Victor ib. p. 392, use the expressions *venialis status, adsumptio.*

Vulnerábilis, vulnerable: Serv. Aen. 6 57 *quasi ad solum vulnerabilem locum.*

NOTES ON A FEW OF THE GLOSSES QUOTED IN HAGEN'S *GRADUS AD CRITICEN.*

P. 1. *Lupercus sacerdos gentilium qui deos archanum sacra fani celebrat. Fauni* Hagen: for the rest read *sacra Fauni celebrat, qui deus Arcadum.*

P. 2. *Faratria fertilem.* Read *feretrium:* Gloss. Amplon. p. 332 *feretrius fertilis.*

P. 14. *Feronia, dea cogorum.* Hagen emends *Tuscorum:* perhaps we should read *lucorum:* Aen. 7 800 *viridi gaudens Feronia luco.*

P. 25. *Fessum aetate femen, vel fassum sine viribus.* Read *fessum aetate, senem, vel lassum, sine viribus.*

P. 35. *Iurgo, glutto.* Read *lurcho.* (*Gurgo* Hagen.)

P. 37. *Versibus, calidus, artificiosus.* Probably not for *versutus* (Hagen) but *persibus.* Varro L. L. 7 107 *sub hoc (verbo persibus) glossema 'callide' subscribunt.* Paulus p. 336 (Müller) *sibus callidus sive acutus.*

P. 50. *Cuturno fasto.* Hagen emends *cothurno, fastu.* Perhaps *cuturneum* (= *gutturneum*) *flasco.* For *gutturneum* see Paulus p. 98, Placidus p. 49 (Deuerling).

P. 53. *Exprobat improperat.* Hagen rightly changes *exprobat* into *exprobrat,* but *improperat* requires no alteration.

P. 57. *Feratas crudes:* not *ferratas sudes* (Hagen) but *trudes:* Aen. 5 208.

IUS GENTIUM.

Sir Henry Maine in his *Ancient Law* p. 47 foll. gives the following account of this important expression:

After remarking that the foreigners, who came in great numbers to Rome, could not have cases of their own decided by the Roman *ius civile*, he proceeds: The Romans "set themselves to form a system answering to the primitive and literal "meaning of *Ius Gentium*, that is, a Law Common to all nations. "*Ius Gentium* was, in fact, the sum of the common ingredients "in the customs of the old Italian tribes, for they were *all the* "*nations* whom the Romans had the means of observing, and "who sent successive swarms of immigrants to Roman soil. "Whenever a particular usage was seen to be practised by a "large number of separate races in common, it was set down as "part of the Law Common to all Nations, or *Ius Gentium*.... "The *Ius Gentium* was accordingly a collection of rules and "principles, determined by observation to be common to the "institutions which prevailed among the various Italian tribes... "The *Ius Gentium* was merely a system forced on his (the "Roman's) attention by a political necessity. He loved it as "little as he loved the foreigners from whose institutions it was "derived and for whose benefit it was intended. A complete "revolution in his ideas was required before it could challenge "his respect, but so complete was it when it did occur, that "the true reason why our modern estimate of the *Ius Gentium* "differs from that which has just been described is, that both "modern jurisprudence and modern philosophy have inherited "the matured views of the later jurisconsults on the subject. "There did come a time, when, from an ignoble appendage of "the *Ius Civile*, the *Ius Gentium* came to be considered a great "though as yet imperfectly developed model to which all law "ought as far as possible to conform."

Puchta (*Inst.* 1 § 83, pp. 304 foll.) gives a somewhat different exposition of the matter.

He starts from the *Ius Fetiale,* and assumes that in the ancient treaties between Rome and Carthage there must have been clauses regulating the relations arising from the intercourse of the private citizens of the allied states. Then, after discussing the institution of *recuperatores* and the appointment of the *praetor inter peregrinos* (B.C. 267), he goes on: "Es "bildete sich aus jenen ersten beschränkten Anfängen des "Fremdenverkehrs, aus den particulären Landesrechten der "Peregrinen, die bei ihren Rechtstreitigkeiten zur Sprache "kamen, und aus den Ansichten der Römer selbst über das, "was unter den gegebenen Umständen als gerecht und passend "erschien, ein allgemeines römisches Peregrinenrecht."

If, for instance, a *peregrinus* claimed a piece of property before the tribunal of a Roman praetor, he found that he could not, not being a Roman *civis*, use the *formulae* of the Roman *ius civile:* so that the case was decided according to universally accepted principles, or (if so be) according to the law recognized by the state or nation to which the *peregrinus* belonged. Puchta proceeds: "Das römische *ius gentium* ist das Recht welches "Rom den *Gentes*, also den Völkern ausser dem römischen, "in ihren Gliedern, die vor den römischen Behörden Recht "suchen, gewährt. Zugleich liegt in dem Wort, dass es ein "allgemeines, nicht bloss für ein einzelnes Volk bestimmtes "Recht ist. Es ist endlich auf dem Grund einzelner fremder "Rechte entstanden, aber erst auf dem römischen Boden, unter "dem Einfluss römischer Ansichten, durch die Römer selbst "zu diesem allgemeinen Character ausgebildet worden...

"War es doch in der That selbst römisches Recht, wenn auch "aus nicht rein-römischen Principien gebildet...Es war nur "ein kleiner Schritt, in dem *Ius Gentium* ein allgemeines Recht "zu erkennen, und zu schliessen, *quod civile non idem continuo "gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet.*"

His conclusion is summed up thus:

"Das *Ius Gentium* hat zwei Seiten: einmal ist es das allge- "meine Peregrinenrecht, nach welchem die Römer die Rechts- "verhältnisse von Personen beurtheilten, für die das *Ius Civile* "keine Anwendung fand: die Grundlage dieses Rechtes waren "wirkliche Peregrinenrechte, nur nach dem Bedürfniss allge-

"meiner Anwendbarkeit und unter dem Einfluss römischer "Auffassung mannigfaltig modificirt und erweitert.

"Dann aber ist es das Recht, welches in den erweiterten "allgemeinen Rechtsansichten des römischen Volks seinen Ur- "sprung hat, das also nicht auf eine künstliche Art, durch "Speculation oder gelehrte Forschung, gemacht, sondern durch "die innere Macht des in seiner Bildung fortschreitenden "Volksgeistes hervorgetrieben ist."

These two theories, it need hardly be pointed out, are widely divergent. Sir Henry Maine regards the *Ius Gentium* as originally "the sum of the common ingredients in the customs "of the old Italian tribes": Puchta regards it as a law essentially Roman, though formed partly out of non-Roman elements, administered to the *gentes* or non-Roman peoples. Both Sir Henry Maine and Puchta think that the idea expressed by *ius gentium* underwent a change, that from meaning the law of, or the law administered to, foreigners the expression came to connote universal law, or the law which lies at the foundation of all particular codes: but Puchta thinks this change easy and natural, while Sir Henry Maine supposes that it required "a "complete revolution" in Roman ideas.

A third and again quite a different account of the matter is that of Professor E. C. Clark (*Practical Jurisprudence*, p. 358).

"Taken as a whole, Cicero's, which seems not improbably to "have been the first, *ius gentium*, is in its origin a *ius naturae*, "a philosophic ideal....It is something which should rightly, "but may not actually, form part of the law of a particular "nation. Springing from the 'partnership of all mankind,' it "forbids the sharp practice which a national law will often "allow. It is in fact little removed from the theoretical law of "the older Stoics....

"The theoretical *Ius Gentium* becomes more and more "identified with parts of existing systems in general, and in "particular with that part of the Roman system which turned, "from the old national rules, towards reasonableness and equity. "It would perhaps be more correct to say that the former "theory of the *ius gentium* was replaced by a new one, for the "later classical jurists probably concerned themselves as little

"with the examination and comparison of different actual "systems as did Cicero and his Stoical teachers."

Professor Clark, therefore, supposes that a change took place in the application of the term, but in an opposite direction to that indicated by Puchta and Sir Henry Maine.

The difficulty of the question led me to examine all the passages in which I could find that the expression occurs. Some which I shall quote have not, so far as I know, been brought fully into consideration before. For the numerous instances quoted from the Digest I am indebted to Voigt's treatise *Das Ius Civile und Gentium der Römer*, but the arrangement of them is my own.

The propositions which I shall attempt to establish are the following:

(1) *Ius Gentium* is a popular, as well as a legal, phrase.

(2) Its legal usage is pre-Ciceronian, and is essentially the same as the popular usage.

(3) No essential change took place at any time in the application of the term.

(4) In its application to transactions between states or communities, there is no evidence that *ius gentium* had any necessary connection with the *ius fetiale* or the institution of *recuperatores.*

(5) In the legal writers the phrase is mostly applied to certain simple cases of contract, of action, and of ownership.

(6) The word *gentium*, as Professor Clark says, bears the same meaning as in the phrases *nusquam gentium, minime gentium, ubi gentium*, and thus *ius gentium* means the common law or usage of the world.

(7) *Ius gentium* has certain points of agreement with, and certain points of difference from, *ius commune* and *ius* or *lex naturae. Ius gentium* is a Latin and popular, *ius naturae* a Greek and philosophical expression.

(1) In the following passages *ius gentium* is used in a non-legal sense.

Sallust Jug. 22 4 *Adherbalem dolis vitae suae insidiatum: quod ubi comperisset, sceleri eius obviam isse. Populum Roma-*

num neque recte neque pro bono facturum, si ab iure gentium sese prohibuerit: (from exercising the natural right of self-defence, or following the universally established law of self-defence).

Cicero Rosc. Am. § 143 *putat* (*Sex. Roscius*) *homo imperitus morum, agricola et rusticus, ista omnia quae vos per Sullam gesta esse dicitis, more, lege, iure gentium facta:* (he thinks that such acts are quite usual and natural).

Har. Resp. § 32 *lege naturae, communi iure gentium sanctum est, ut nihil mortales a dis immortalibus usu capere possint* (by common usage).

Rab. Post. § 42 says of winter, that it is a season when *omnia bella iure gentium conquiescunt* (by universal usage).

Sallust Hist. 3 62 17 *neque discordias, ut illi criminantur, sed earum finem volens iure gentium res repeto, et si pertinaciter retinebunt, non arma neque secessionem, tantum modo ne amplius sanguinem vestrum praebeatis censeo.* (In accordance with common right or justice. The words seem to have nothing to do with the *ius fetiale,* as will appear below).

Seneca Ben. 1 9 4 *quae emeris vendere iuris gentium est* (is matter of common usage).

Justin 16 2 7 says that Ptolemaeus made his younger son his successor *contra ius gentium,* in violation of ordinary custom: so 34 3 7 *regnum quod iure gentium maiori fratri cesserat.*

Quintil. 7 1 46 *pater intestatus duos nos filios reliquit: partem iure gentium peto* (according to common right)...*Hanc communem omnium legem adornabit.*

Curtius 6 42 15. Philotas while being tortured *deos patrios, gentium iura nequiquam apud surdas aures invocabat* (the laws which all acknowledge).

Tacitus H. 4 32 (Curius) *egregium inquit, pretium laborum recepi, necem fratris et vincula mea et saevissimas huius exercitus voces quibus ad supplicium petitus iure gentium poenas reposco* (in accordance with common justice).

In all these passages *ius gentium* has the meaning of an usage *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus:* an usage universal, and which no one would think of impugning who was not prepared to do what is unnatural, or without moral precedent.

(2), (3) Passing to the legal uses of *ius gentium*, I will first quote the passages which give a general description of its character, and then those which exhibit it in application to details.

Cicero De Off. 3 § 69 *maiores nostri aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt. Quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet.*

De Rep. 1 § 2 *unde ius aut gentium, aut hoc ipsum civile quod dicitur?*

Part. Orat. § 130 *propria legis et ea quae scripta sunt, et ea quae sine litteris aut gentium iure aut maiorum more retinentur.*

De Off. 3 § 23 *neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum...eodem modo constitutum est, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri.*

According to Cicero's statement, then, which I see no reason, as Professor Clark does, to question, the formal distinction between *ius gentium* and *ius civile* was made by "his ancestors", that is, I suppose, by the theoretical lawyers of the second century B.C. And the distinction consists in this, that *ius gentium* is universal and unwritten, while *ius civile* and the laws of particular states are special and are written.

Gaius 1 1 (= Inst. 1 2 1) says, *omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est, vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium [ipsius] civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur.*

The correspondence between the view of Gaius and that of Cicero is so striking that I cannot but suspect that both writers are building on the definitions of the older jurists. If so, there is no need to suppose (with Puchta and Sir Henry Maine) that any essential change took place at any time in the conception of *ius gentium*.

(4), (5) But, to make the matter clearer, let us see to what kinds of transactions the phrase is actually applied. Let us first take the case of transactions between one state and another; secondly, that of transactions between individuals: thirdly, that of institutions or usages which are said to be *iuris gentium;* fourthly, that of things, places, &c. said to be subject to *ius gentium.*

(*a*) Transactions between one state and another. In this connection I find several instances in which the phrase is used with reference to the treatment of ambassadors:

Sallust Jug. 35 6 *fit reus magis ex aequo bonoque quam ex iure gentium Bomilcar, comes eius qui Romam fide publica venerat.* (Here *ius gentium,* or universal usage, is mentioned as in conflict with natural equity.)

Livy 1 14 1 *legatos Laurentum regis Tatii propinqui pulsant, cumque Laurentes iure gentium agerent,* &c. So in the same connection 2 4 7, *ius gentium valuit:* 8 5 2 *legatus iure gentium tutus:* 21 10 6 *ius gentium sustulit.*

In exactly the same sense Tacitus Ann. 1 42 uses the expressions *hostium quoque ius et sacra legationis et fas gentium rupistis.*

But I find no evidence that the expression was ever used in reference to the *ius fetiale.* The old formula of this *ius* given by Livy 1 32 says nothing of *ius gentium:* and the nearest approach to such an expression in this connection is, so far as I know, to be found in Cicero De Off. 3 § 108, *cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia.* But *iura communia* cannot certainly in this context be identified with *ius gentium.* It must mean, according to ordinary Latin usage, the rules observed by the contending parties.

Again, I find no evidence that the phrase *ius gentium* was ever used in connection with the suits arising between the Romans and foreigners under the institution of *recuperatores,* though I do not deny, of course, that the *ius gentium* or known usage of all mankind may have served as a guide in such cases.

(*b*) Transactions between individuals. Obligationes.

Emptio, venditio, &c., which according to Gaius 3 135 foll. are *consensu.*

Inst. 1 2 1 *ex hoc iure gentium et omnes paene contractus introducti sunt, ut emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, depositum, mutuum, et alii innumerabiles.* Compare Dig. 2 14 7 pr. *iuris gentium conventiones quaedam actiones pariunt, quaedam exceptiones. Quae pariunt actiones...emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, commodatum, depositum, et ceteri similes contractus:* so in Greek Dig. 48 22 15 *ὁ περιοριζόμενος τὴν πολίτειαν ἀπολλύει, οὐ μὴν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδικῶν νόμων τῆς πολιτείας στερεῖται, τοῖς ἐθνικοῖς δὲ κέχρηται· ἀγοράζει γὰρ καὶ πωλεῖ, μισθοῖ καὶ μισθοῦται κ.τ.λ.*[1]

So 18 1 12 *est autem emptio iuris gentium, et ideo consensu peragitur et inter absentes contrahi potest et per nuntium et per litteras.*

18 1 34 1 *omnium rerum quae quis habere vel possidere vel persequi potest, venditio recte fit: quas vero natura vel gentium ius vel mores civitatis commercio exuerunt, earum nulla venditio est.*

19 2 1 *locatio et conductio cum naturalis sit et omnium gentium, non verbis sed consensu contrahitur, sicut emptio et venditio.*

Traditio.

Fragm. Vat. 1 47 *civili enim actione constitui (usus fructus) potest, non traditione, quae iuris gentium est.* Dig. 41 1 9 3 *haec quoque res quae traditione nostrae fiunt, iure gentium nobis adquiruntur: nihil enim tam conveniens naturali aequitati est quam voluntatem domini volentis rem suam in alium transferre ratam haberi.* Comp. Gaius 2 65 *apparet quaedam naturali iure alienari, qualia sunt ea quae traditione alienantur, quaedam civili: nam mancipationis et in iure cessionis et usucapionis ius proprium est civium Romanorum.*

Acceptilatio.

Dig. 46 4 8 4 *et servus accepto liberari potest, et tolluntur etiam honorariae obligationes, si quae sunt adversus dominum.*

[1] Comp. 48 19 17 1, of convicts and state-exiles.

Quia hoc iure utimur, ut iuris gentium sit acceptilatio, et ideo puto et Graece posse acceptum fieri, dummodo sic fiat ut Latinis verbis solet, ἔχεις λαβών κ.τ.λ.

Certain other forms of *obligatio.*

Gaius 2 93 *sed haec quidem verborum obligatio 'Dari spondes? Spondeo,' propria civium Romanorum est, ceterae vero iuris gentium sunt, itaque inter omnes homines, sive cives Romanos, sive peregrinos, valent: et quamvis ad Graecam vocem expressae fuerint, velut hoc modo, δώσεις, δώσω, κ.τ.λ. etiam hae tamen inter cives Romanos valent, si modo Graeci sermonis intellectum habeant; et e contrario quamvis Latine enuntientur, tamen etiam inter peregrinos valent, si modo Latini sermonis intellectum habeant. At illa verborum obligatio 'Dari spondes? Spondeo' adeo propria civium Romanorum est, ut ne quidem in Graecum sermonem per interpretationem transferri potest, quamvis dicatur a Graeca voce figurata esse.*

Compare Dig. 44 7 14, 45 1 1 2, 46 2 1, where *naturalis* and *civilis obligatio* are distinguished.

Gaius 3 132 says of *arcaria nomina* (in which *rei, non litterarum obligatio consistit*), *non ipso nomine, sed numeratione pecuniae obligantur: quod genus obligationis iuris gentium est.* We may here compare Dig. 16 3 31 *bona fides quae in contractibus exigitur aequitatem summam desiderat: sed eam utrum aestimamus ad merum ius gentium, an vero cum praeceptis civilibus et praetoriis? Veluti reus capitalis iudicii deposuit apud te centum; is deportatus est, bona eius publicata sunt: utrumne ipsi haec reddenda an in publicum deferenda sunt? Si civile ius et legum ordinem, magis in publicum deferenda sunt, &c.* 50 17 84 1 *is natura debet, quem iure gentium dare, oportet, cuius fidem secuti sumus.*

Actions.

Dig. 23 2 68 *iure gentium incestum committit, qui ex gradu ascendentium vel descendentium uxorem duxerit.*

(*c*) Institutions and usages.

Gaius 1 52 *in potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum. Quae quidem potestas iuris gentium est: nam inter omnes peraeque*

gentes animadvertere possumus dominos in servos vitae necisque potestatem habere. Patria potestas, on the contrary, is *proprium civium Romanorum* (ib. 55). Compare Dig. 1 5 4 2, 5 1 foll.

So certain consequences of slavery in the case of one parent are *iuris gentium;* Gaius 1 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89.

Tutela is also *iuris gentium:* Gaius 1 189.

(*d*) Ownership of certain things and places. Dig. 41 1 1 1: 6 1 23 pr. *qui aut iure gentium aut iure civili dominium adquisivit:* 41 3 45 *ad optinenda loca iuris gentium publica.*

The sea. Marcianus Dig. 1 8 2 4 pr. *dum tamen villis et aedificiis et monumentis abstineatur, quae non sunt iuris gentium sicut et mare.*

The shore. Dig. 18 1 51 *litora...nullius sunt, sed iure gentium omnibus vacant.*

Booty taken in war. Dig. 41 1 5 7 *quae ex hostibus capiuntur, iure gentium statim capientium fiunt.*

Alluvial deposit. Dig. 41 1 7 1 *quod per alluvionem agro nostro flumen adicit, iure gentium nobis adquiritur.* Comp. Gaius 2 65 foll.

(6) We are now in a position to ask what was the original meaning of the expression. As I have said above, I believe that *ius gentium* meant *the usage of the world, of all mankind,* and that it was in all probability first employed as a quasi-technical expression by the lawyers of the second century B.C., Cicero's *maiores.* They originally intended to express by it such customs or usages as the Romans found, in the experience which they would pick up away from Italy in war or commerce or travel, or in their intercourse with *peregrini* in Italy itself, to be universally observed. These usages would naturally be connected in the main with war and commerce, and thus *ius gentium,* when the term is applied to the dealings of Romans with foreigners, is used mostly of the laws of war and of transactions involved in a state of war, or of commerce and transactions connected with it, such as *obligationes* of various kinds. The sea, as being the property of no state or person in particular, is *iuris gentium:* in other words, at sea only such usages are considered binding as all states are agreed upon. So of the

shore and alluvial deposits: they belong to no one and may be claimed by anyone, for all allow the claim.

I cannot agree with Puchta that the *ius gentium* was exclusively a product of Roman law applied to the dealings of the Romans with the *peregrini* who came to Italy. This theory seems to me too narrow, because it ignores the fact that while, after the first Punic war, many foreigners came to Italy and Rome, many Romans and Italians also went abroad, and came into constant contact with the inhabitants of Greece, Macedonia, Syria, and Africa. In the numerous details of commerce and general intercourse which would be brought across his path, the Roman would find some practices or usages universally prevalent, and these he referred to the category of *ius gentium.* Such importance had they assumed in the eyes of the jurists of the second century B.C., that *ius gentium* was formally distinguished from *ius civile,* as universal, informal, often unwritten usage to special, formal, recorded enactments.

(7) The last question for consideration is, What is the relation of *ius gentium* to *ius commune* and *lex naturae?*

In accordance with the meaning of the word *communis, ius commune* by itself should mean *the law or usage acknowledged by the speaker or writer in common with certain other persons whom he is addressing, mentioning, or thinking of:* and this is in fact the case, as will be seen by the following examples:

Cornificius ad Herennium 2 § 14 (speaking of the interpretation of the letter of a document): *aut cum iure communi aut cum rebus iudicatis dissentire:* (the standard of justice or right which you and I acknowledge).

Cicero Verr. Actio 1 § 13: *Siculi neque suas leges neque communia iura tenuerunt* (the rules of law common to them and ourselves).

De Off. 3 § 108, *totum ius fetiale et alia iura communia:* (rules observed by both of the contending parties).

Caecin. § 9: *Ne diutius de controversia nostra et de communi iure dubitetis. Et si forte videbor altius initium rei demonstrandae petisse, quam me ratio iuris eius, de quo iudicium est, et natura causae coegerit, quaeso ut ignoscatis.* Here *de iure*

communi means, apparently, the law which, as citizens, we all acknowledge.

Ib. § 94: *Ut non minus hominem ipsum quam ius commune defensum velitis.* Here, the case falling entirely within the sphere of Roman law, Cicero could hardly have said *ius gentium* without exaggeration and inaccuracy. Compare De Leg. Agr. 2 § 61, *volt se in communi atque in eodem quo ceteri iure versari.*

No doubt in the *De Haruspicum Responsis* (§ 32) Cicero uses the expression *lege naturae, communi iure gentium,* just as Seneca (Contr. 1 14 p. 63 Bursian) says, *iniquum est conlapsis manum non porrigere: commune hoc ius generis humani est.* But in these two instances the addition of *gentium* and *generis humani,* which determine the sphere of *commune*, make all the difference.

Lex and *ius naturae* are philosophical phrases, imported from Greece.

Voigt has, in my opinion, correctly conceived the difference between *ius naturae* and *ius gentium,* where they differ. *Ius gentium* is usage actually existing everywhere: *ius* or *lex naturae* is an ideal law, a law that may or may not exist in universal practice, but which is in any case to be wished for. Thus it may often coincide with *ius gentium,* but may sometimes differ from it.

Cicero, it must be observed, generally uses *lex naturae* in a context where he intends to give a philosophical tinge to his writing. Thus in the *De Inventione,* a treatise which, it must be remembered, is in great part a translation from the Greek, we have (2 161) *naturae quidem ius esse, quod nobis non opinio sed quaedam innata vis adferat:* ib. 67 *naturae quidem iura minus ipsa quaeruntur ad hanc controversiam: quod neque in hoc civili iure versantur et a vulgari intellegentia remota sunt: ad similitudinem vero aliquam aut ad rem amplificandam saepe sunt inferenda.* Tusc. Quaest. 1 § 30 *consensus omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est:* Rep. 1 § 27 *nec civili nexo sed communi lege naturae.* In the *De Legibus,* the phrase, it need hardly be said, occurs often.

In the *De Haruspicum Responsis* l. c. and De Off. 1 § 23

Cicero says *lege naturae, communi iure gentium; natura, id est iure gentium,* as if wishing to explain the less familiar by the more familiar term.

Justin (21 1 2) uses *naturae ius* of the right of an eldest son to the succession, having in two other places used *ius gentium* of the same thing. On the other hand in the Institutes (1 2 1) *ius naturale* is opposed to *ius gentium* as natural or ideal right to universally established usage, and Ulpian (Dig. 1 1 1) distinguishes *ius naturale* as the habits of animals from *ius gentium*, the practice of mankind. In most cases, however, in later Latin the two expressions are virtually synonymous.

HENRY NETTLESHIP.

THE INTERPRETATION OF TRAGEDY—WITH NOTES ON THE OEDIPUS TYRANNUS OF SOPHOCLES.

The publication of the first of eight volumes which are to constitute Professor Jebb's large edition of Sophocles, is calling fresh attention to a subject which has an abiding interest for English scholars,—the interpretation of Greek tragedy. The following pages are devoted, not to the superfluous task of estimating a work so universally prized, but to the purpose, first, of stating briefly some general principles, which however obvious, have seldom been thoroughly applied, and secondly of discussing, with light borrowed from Prof. Jebb's translation and commentary, the meaning of some disputed passages in the Oedipus Tyrannus.

I may be permitted, however, at the outset, to express my own share in the satisfaction with which all scholars must hail the first instalment of this important work. And I do so the more heartily, not only because of the generous terms in which Mr Jebb has spoken of my contribution to the study of Sophocles, and the gentle courtesy with which he has treated me throughout, but also because the new editor is one who, having justly gained the ear of the scholastic world, is able by his enviable lucidity of statement, and by the rare effectiveness of his expository style, to obtain general currency for opinions which, although true, are not for that reason the more likely to meet with acceptance, if less advantageously set forth.

I.

Why is the language of Tragedy so difficult and so continually an occasion of dispute? The fact is surely un-

deniable that, roughly speaking, for one place in Homer or Plato (not to speak of Lysias or Xenophon) where the meaning is disputable, there are twenty such in Aeschylus or Sophocles and ten in Euripides. Many scholars appear to be satisfied with a brief and facile way of accounting for this inequality. They are contented with saying that the tragic texts are exceptionally corrupt. And some will praise the logical clearness and grammatical coherency of the great masters, which is to be restored to them for our benefit by the certainty of conjecture. But the explanation only suggests new difficulties. For if this logical and grammatical perfection were so transparent and so indubitably recoverable, how came it ever to be lost? What led the scribes, who have preserved for us with comparative faithfulness the deepest thoughts of Plato, to make such havoc of the tragedians, if the language of those great poets was such as no reader could fail to understand? This difficulty is not met by the hypothesis of 'playhouse interpolation.' For if our present copies corresponded to those authorized for performance even in late classical times, we should not for that reason expect them to err on the side of obscurity. Nor does any theory of subsequent corruptions account for the significant fact that the meaning of Aeschylus was called in doubt by the contemporaries of Aristophanes.

It may be not altogether idle if, as a preliminary step, we try (as Plato might say) to 'take hold of the matter as a whole'; i.e. to consider whether there may not be some kinds of difficulty, which are inherent in the language, not only of Greek tragedy, but of serious dramatic writing generally. Analogies are not necessarily unreal because remote—as the repeated comparison of Sophocles to Virgil is enough to shew—and great tragedy has been so rare, that however diverse may have been the conditions of its two greatest moments, we may fairly look for points of correlation between them.

Confining our attention for the present to linguistic difficulties, one thing is certain. The English reader of Shakespeare in the 19th century (it was still more so in the 18th) requires to be 'edified by the margent' far more frequently than the reader of Spenser or Bacon or Sir Walter Raleigh.

Now the text of Shakespeare is allowed to be by no means pure: but the fact here stated would remain even if all the passages annotated by Dyce were left out of view. Of ten fairly educated persons taken at a venture, how many could paraphrase at sight without hesitation or error a soliloquy of Hamlet or Macbeth, or even a speech of Portia or Bassanio? Many lines which no competent editor has suspected of corruption are yet by no means clear to the average reader now-a-days. And yet Shakespeare must have been intelligible to his own contemporaries. This apparent anomaly becomes less strange when it is considered that the language of dramatic poetry is necessarily (1) idiomatic, (2) condensed, (3) helped out by action.

(1) The dramatic poet in virtue of his function stands nearer to the living language of men than any other literary artist. In giving form to his creations, he must continually draw afresh from the running waters of vernacular speech, with which his work has a direct vital relation. And the material which he thus borrows he must fuse again with the intensity and subtlety of ideal emotion before he can find an appropriate vehicle for his conceptions. Here are two great factors, which must both be recognized—the spontaneous, instinctive, fancy which gives its stamp to current parlance, and the refining influence of poetic feeling—two elements which are obviously distinct, yet whose operations it is difficult, and for a remote period well-nigh impossible, adequately to discriminate[1]. For example, the use of the preposition 'of' with abstract substantives to denote an attribute was manifestly a conversational idiom in the time of Shakespeare. Yet in employing it so frequently as he does, he may have had a literary motive. This is less clear, however, than the fact, which is most in point, that for the modern reader this habit (whether of 'idiom' or 'idiotism') has thrown some obscurity over such lines as

> "And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,
> With windlasses and with assays of bias—"
>
> "That makes calamity of so long life."

[1] See my edition of Sophocles, Vol. I. pp. xii, xiii of preface to 2nd edition.

"And in a pass of practice
Requite him for your father."

The subjunctive mood was more used then than now—but in such expressions as "Now follows that you know"—"Live a hundred years, I shall not find myself so fit to die"—"Prove it so, Let Fortune go to hell for it," &c., there is a specially Shakespearian turn, which is not always caught by the intelligent reader.

This point in its relation to Greek tragedy has been lately treated independently by two scholars of marked ability, Dr W. G. Rutherford and Mr A. W. Verrall. Dr Rutherford in an introductory chapter of his New Phrynichus has argued forcibly in favour of the theory that the so-called Ionic element in tragedy is really a 'survival' from the earlier spoken dialect of Attica[1]. This bears out the conception of Herodotus, that the Attic people were simply a branch of the Ionic race, only differing from the rest in having retained their first seats and in their possession of rational and political liberty. Mr Verrall, on the contrary lays stress on the other element, that of artistic refinement, and, in the lyrical portions of the tragic drama especially, would account for coincidences with earlier literature and for other peculiarities, by the poet's effort to give beauty to his work through subtleties of association.

As formerly said, I believe both factors, the vernacular and the literary, to have been operative. And while the attempt to assign to either its due value would be the work of a 'laborious and not too fortunate man,' the fact as generally stated is sufficient for the present purpose.

(2) Only it should be remembered that *refinement* in tragedy runs mainly in the direction of *condensation*. For in the idealization of emotion concentration and intensity are all-important. Those who had the high satisfaction of seeing Salvini's Lear, cannot fail to have observed, if they consulted the *libretto*, how the speeches were inevitably lengthened in transferring them to Italian. And if any one attempted to express in other words

[1] He has not yet succeeded, however, in curing English scholars of the fixed habit of regarding "Attic Greek" as the basis from which the other dialects have somehow sprung.

(say) the soliloquy of Macbeth, beginning "If it were done, when 'tis done," the paraphrase, if approximately adequate, would be much longer than the original.

Once more (3) in dramatic writing, the language is only one amongst several conjoint modes of expression, and even of the language, the written words are only a part. Plays are made to be acted, not merely to be read[1];—it is no cause for wonder, therefore, if they lose something, not only of their effect, but of their meaning, for the cursory reader. When Portia says to Bassanio,

> "That only to stand high *in your account*
> I might in beauties, virtues, livings, friends,
> Exceed account,"

the superficial reader is apt to understand 'in your esteem.' But those who have seen a worthy Portia and heard her tones, cannot fail to know, with every deeper student, that her wish is that she may constitute an important item amongst her husband's possessions.

An error, which the liveliness of action should obviate, though it is natural in the closet-student, is to read in Twelfth Night ii, 2, 15, "She took *no* ring of me," for "She took the ring of me." When the scene is realized, the reasons in favour of the older reading, though even Dyce pronounced them over-subtle, most commend themselves as simple and natural. The fine sisterly tact of Viola, and the poverty of the repetition, when (if '*no* ring' is read) she afterwards observes to herself what she has just said to the steward, are then too obvious to be missed.

In King John iv, 2, 233 (to cite one more Shakespearian instance) many students have no doubt concurred with Dyce, who in his second edition reads '*And* turned an eye of doubt upon my face.' To make '*As*' in the traditional reading bear the force of '*As much as to*' seems to them 'impossibly harsh.' But no one who has tried to realize the speech, even in dramatic recitation, can fail to see that a fine point is missed, or rather spoiled, by the new reading.

[1] See an article on Mr Browning's Agamemnon in the *Edinburgh Review* for April, 1878, vol. 147, especially pp. 420—424, 436.

Professor Jebb has shewn by his citations from the record of the Harvard performance, and by many happy touches in his notes, how fully he appreciates this aspect of the art of interpretation. And if here and there I feel compelled to differ from him on this very ground, the points of difference are few and unimportant in comparison of the extent to which we are agreed. Greek tragedy, indeed, dispenses almost entirely with the necessity of 'stage directions.' Yet places are not wanting where they would be convenient. Some trouble might have been saved if El. 610 *ὁρῶ μένος πνέουσαν* had been accompanied with a note to the effect: "The Chorus (*observing Clytemnestra's attitude*)." And in O. C. 1250, I venture to think that the true and not recondite meaning of the words *ἀνδρῶν γε μοῦνος, ὦ πάτερ* has escaped most commentators for want of some such direction as "Antigone speaks this in her father's ear."

We have hitherto considered causes of *difficulty*, the recognition of which is necessary to right interpretation. There is a further consideration which is no less essential, and in common with the preceding is fully acknowledged by Mr Jebb. I urge it with more confidence because in doing so I but follow in the footsteps (*μετόπισθε κατ' ἴχνιον*) of Mr Matthew Arnold. The words used by Milton[1] in contrasting the study of poetry with that of logic and philosophy, apply to tragic poetry (and especially to the lyric parts of tragic poetry) in the highest degree. And all Greek poetry is 'more simple, sensuous and passionate,' not only as compared with logic but also with oratory. It has indeed 'a logic of its own,' if the term be not inappropriate to the expression of feeling. And it has also a rhetoric of its own. But this rhetoric is more condensed and passionate than the rhetoric of the agora.

To gauge the difference between rhetorical and dramatic eloquence it is only necessary to glance at the 3rd Act of Julius Cæsar, perhaps the most effective *representation* of successful oratory in the compass of dramatic literature. Yet how much is there which in the actual oration would have been differently put! At how many points would expansion have taken the place of concentration, breadth of refinement;—repetition, re-

[1] In the *Tractate of Education.*

capitulation, preluding,—that of subtle transition? Might not Antony's topics have furnished forth a speech of three hours or sixty pages? Are the words

"Now lies he there,
And none so poor to do him reverence"

turned or arranged as the speaker would have arranged and turned them?

Be this as it may, the remark of Milton may be applied to many things in Shakespearian criticism. The law of simplicity, for example, forbids the reading (Macb. v, 2, 22) 'My *may* of life,' and the notable emendation 'his leaded pole-axe' in Hamlet i, 1, 63. The law of sensuousness (or ἐνάργεια), that is of vivid and *appropriate* imagery, confirms "Will *chair* me ever or disseat me now,"[1] and "If that Fortune's quarrel[2] do divorce it from the bearer," and (as I cannot but think) condemns the interpretation of "foes that strike beside us" (Macb. v, 6, 28) as "enemies that miss us purposely." The rule of passionateness, or truth of feeling, still more decidedly condemns the punctuation of the early folios in Macbeth, ii, 2,

"Making the green one, red,"

while it joins with the rule of simplicity to explode Fechter's monstrous rendering of Oth. v, 2, 1,

"It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul,"

viz. 'for I am black'!

In suggesting the existence of remote analogies between the language of Shakespeare and that of certain portions of the Greek drama, I do not forget the great difference not only in language but in form and structure between the masterpieces of the ancient and the modern world. The idioms and modes of thought[3] are different, the means of condensation are different,

[1] Macb. v.

[2] i.e. Cross-bolt. Hen. VIII; ii, 3, 14. W. N. Lettsom's emendation of 'that quarrel fortune.'

[3] Yet even particular comparisons are not useless. Shakespeare is more careless about his negatives than any Greek writer could ever be. Such downright slips as "No, nor a man that fears you less than he" (Cor. i, 4), "Who cannot want the thought" (Macb. iii, 6), "E'en daughter welcome in no less degree" (As you like it, v, 4, with Professor Dowden's punctuation) are beyond the limits even of Greek freedom. Nor would a Greek have

the conditions of representation are widely different, the strain of feeling is as different as the imagery through which it is conveyed. But the truth remains, and has an important bearing on interpretation, that Greek tragedy no less than English is idiomatic, concentrated, made to be acted more than read, and above all simple, sensuous and passionate.

We might thus proceed to formulate a series of '*canons*,' which although less easy of mechanical application than those of Dawes, are in no degree less certain. 'The language of Tragedy,' we might say, 'is (1) idiomatic, (2) condensed and pregnant, (3) histrionic and dramatic, (4) simple, (5) sensuous (i.e. picturesque and figurative), and (6) impassioned.' And it might be shown, how on the 1st and 5th of these grounds (besides being nearly contemporaneous) the language of Herodotus, as I have elsewhere shown[1], presents many points of affinity to the tragic diction. For although often the reverse of condensed, it is everywhere (1) idiomatic and spontaneous and (5) concrete, picturesque and figurative.

But to carry such a method into detail might only lead to a new kind of pedantry. And in discussing some of the difficulties which are still felt by critical readers of the Oedipus Tyrannus, I shall merely take for granted the general truth of what has here been said. In all such discussions, minute points of grammar and palæography must necessarily hold the foremost place. But it is all the more important that the student should be reminded, as Professor Jebb continually reminds him, that the language has all the characteristics of the most perfect tragic poetry.

For this reason and with a view to clearness, I shall add to the Greek of each passage the corresponding part of Prof. Jebb's prose version, and this even where it does not exactly represent my own opinion.

said with Professor Huxley "No event is too extraordinary to be impossible." Yet these lapses (if such they are) throw a light on certain tendencies which are apparent also in Greek, though not to such an extent as to justify the traditional reading of Ant. 4. *οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀλγεινόν, οὔτ' ἄτης ἄτερ.*

[1] Soph. Vol. I. p. 88 (2nd ed., see also p. 2 of 1st ed.)

II.

I will first touch on one or two places where the reading is not in question, and the only doubt is one of interpretation.

Ll. 673, 4:

> στυγνὸς μὲν εἴκων δῆλος εἶ, βαρὺς δ' ὅταν
> θυμοῦ περάσῃς.

"Sullen in yielding art thou seen, even as vehement in the excesses of thy wrath."

I put this foremost, because it is one of many places in which I have had the satisfaction of finding my own judgment confirmed by Prof. Jebb's authority, while, if I am not mistaken, the majority of commentators are against us. In this instance, the minority, if so be, also includes Dr Kennedy, who adds, "no other meaning is here possible." Brunck, Wunder, Dindorf, Tournier, and others, however, follow the Scholiast's interpretation, δῆλος εἶ ἀηδῶς εἴκων· ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἔλθῃς τῆς ὀργῆς, τότε βαρέως οἴσει τὸ πρᾶγμα· οἷον μετανοήσεις καὶ ἄδικα [δρᾶσαι ?] ἐνθυμηθήσῃ. Erfurdt was here the first to hit on the true sense. "Constat enim, περᾶν non solum transire, sed etiam progredi significare, ut Oed. Col. 155, 6, 886 (?)." I would add that (1) apart from the merely verbal question, the structure of the antithesis is peculiarly Greek,—one member of it being not immediately in point,—and (2) that the construction which is thus confirmed is also commended as more *idiomatic*, *pregnant*, *simple*, and *impassioned* than the other.

Ll. 687, 8:

> ὁρᾷς ἵν' ἥκεις, ἀγαθὸς ὢν γνώμην ἀνήρ,
> τοὐμὸν παριεὶς καὶ καταμβλύνων κέαρ;

"Seest thou to what thou hast come, for all thy honest purpose, in seeking to slack and blunt my zeal?"

Schneidewin broke l. 688 in two, understanding τοὐμὸν παριείς to mean "neglecting me." Dr Kennedy also renders

παριείς by "neglecting[1]." Mr Jebb avoids this and other frigidities by observing (1) the *tense* of the participles, and (2) the relation of the participles to the verb, as well as by joining τοὐμὸν κέαρ. He has thus preserved the compact, round, smooth, strong phrase.

Ll. 997, 8:

> ὧν οὕνεχ' ἡ Κόρινθος ἐξ ἐμοῦ πάλαι
> μακρὰν ἀπῴκειτ'.

"Wherefore my home in Corinth was long kept by me afar."

Mr Jebb's note on this place is worth transcribing:

"ἐξ ἐμοῦ, ='on my part': ἡ Κόρινθος ἐξ ἐμοῦ μακρὰν ἀπῴκειτο, ='Corinth was inhabited by me at a great distance,' meaning, 'I took good care not to go near my old home at Corinth.' This implies as the corresponding active form, ἐγὼ μακρὰν ἀπῴκουν τὴν Κόρινθον, I inhabited Corinth (only) at a great distance, *i.e.*, shunned inhabiting it at all: where the paradoxical use of ἀποικεῖν has been suggested by contrast with ἐνοικεῖν. The phrase is one of those which, instead of saying that a thing is *not done*, ironically represent it as *done* under a condition which precludes it; as here the condition expressed by ἀπὸ precludes the act described by οἰκεῖν."

This is admirably put. But should it not be also noted as a general feature of Greek grammar that the relation of the passive verb to its subject is less fixed in Greek than in other languages? The requirement that the subject of the passive voice should be the accusative in regimen after the corresponding active verb is relaxed so as to include first the "internal object," then the remote object as expressed by the dative, and, lastly, some relations which are properly expressed by the genitive. Thus we get not only πιστεύομαί τι (I am entrusted with a thing), χαλεπαίνομαι (I am the object of anger), but also (e.g. in Herodotus) βασιλεύομαι, τυραννεύομαι, ὑπό τινος. And although ἀπῴκειτο here, as Dr Kennedy remarks, is an exceedingly "bold use of the passive voice," may not the phrase be simply equivalent to ἀπῴκουν μακρὰν τῆς Κορίνθου?

[1] Or "disparaging" as in his prose version. July 31st, 1884.

Ll. 10, 11:

τίνι τρόπῳ καθέστατε
δείσαντες ἢ στέρξαντες;

"In what mood are ye placed here, with what dread or what desire?"

Professor Kennedy says on στέρξαντες, "Linwood's version 'desiring' is unquestionably wrong." Professor Jebb has judged otherwise. He has also seen that ὡς θέλοντος ἂν κ.τ.λ., is to be joined with φράζε, and that the interrogative is continued with the participles. I believe this interpretation to be not only perfectly sound, as regards the Greek, but alone consistent with the situation and with truth of feeling[1].

I might enlarge in a similar vein of commendation on many other passages[2], but to avoid monotony I will now pass on to some of the comparatively few places where I am moved to dissent in perusing this edition.

Ll. 320, 1:

ἀφές μ' ἐς οἴκους· ῥᾷστα γὰρ τὸ σόν τε σὺ
κἀγὼ διοίσω τοὐμόν,—ἢν ἐμοὶ πίθῃ.

"Let me go home; 'twill be best that thou bear thine own burden to the end, and I mine—if thou wilt heed me."

That Prof. Jebb relies on this interpretation is shown by the fact that nothing is said about these lines in the Commentary. And that the construction here implied is excellent Greek is no less indisputable than that the other construction, which Professor Kennedy sanctions, is equally so. But the difference is this. In Mr Jebb's version Teiresias reasons with Oedipus, whereas, according to the more usual interpretation, he gives utterance to his own deep feeling:

"Let me go home! For so,—if you obey me in that,—it will be less hard for both of us to bear our several burdens to the end."

[1] Vid. infra sub fin.

[2] I would call attention especially to Prof. Jebb's treatment of ll. 153, 293, 402, 411, 425, 525, 541, 572, 762, 795, 987, 1138, 1214, 1271, 1286, 1320, 1453, 1463:—also to his renderings of ll. 1182, 1291, where his interpretation differs from that given in my edition.

This assumes a suppressed *οὕτως*, which is resumed in *ἦν ἐμοὶ πίθῃ*. Prof. Jebb's rendering lays more stress on *ῥᾷστα*. But the chief difference is that the conjunctions, *τε... καὶ*, are in the one case cumulative, as in l. 150, *σωτὴρ θ' ἵκοιτο καὶ νόσου παυστήριος*, in the other adversative, as in l. 50, *στάντες τ' ἐς ὀρθὸν καὶ πεσόντες ὕστερον*. Now the latter of these modes is more akin to oratory. The former in this passage appears to me more suitable, because more expressive of feeling.

A precisely similar doubt about *τε...καὶ* occurs at the close of the last stasimon.

Ll. 1221, 2:

> *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀνέπνευσά τ' ἐκ σέθεν*
> *καὶ κατεκοίμησα τοὐμὸν ὄμμα.*

"Sooth to speak, 'twas thou that gavest me new life, and through thee darkness hath fallen upon mine eyes."

τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν εἰπεῖν in this sense might prelude an unusual statement in *speaking*, but is not such a *façon de parler* somewhat cold for *singing?*

And while "Sleep, Death's Brother" is undoubtedly often put euphemistically for Death (as in Ant. 832, 3 *ἇ με δαίμων ὁμοιοτάταν κατευνάζει*) it does not follow that Sleep can be put for calamity generally, still less for a calamity that is vicarious. The Thebans are not sorrowing for themselves, nor have they cause to do so, although the head of the Cadmeian race is fallen. But in closing their lament over the ruined king, it is natural that they should revert to the loyal attachment which he earned once for all when he overthrew the Sphinx, and thus relieved at once their breasts from oppressive fear and their eyes from anxious watching.

"Yet to speak truly, it was thou that didst restore my soul and broughtest slumber to mine eye[1]."

[1] On the other hand in ll. 1422, 3, where Mr Jebb prefers on the ground of simplicity to read *οὐχ ὡς...οὐδ' ὡς...*, may not the *τε*'s denote a merely verbal opposition, as in O. C. 1139 *οὔτ' εἴ τι μῆκος, κ.τ.λ.*

L. 707: *σὺ νῦν ἀφεὶς σεαυτὸν ὧν λέγεις πέρι.*

"Then absolve thyself of the things whereof thou speakest."

"*ἀφεὶς σεαυτόν*, an appropriate phrase, since *ἀφιέναι* was the regular term when the natural avenger of a slain man voluntarily released the slayer from the penalties."

Is any legal phrase really appropriate here? Jocasta at this point is eager, not that Oedipus should be absolved of a shadowy charge, still less released from penalties incurred, but that he should "cast himself loose" from all anxieties arising out of prophecy. This general meaning is simpler, more poetical and more in character than the specific legal sense.

In proceeding to consider some of the places where Prof. Jebb allows the necessity of resorting to critical emendation, it may be well to observe in passing that the comparative spareness of his critical notes is in itself a significant fact.

I take first the curious reading *πεταῖος ὁ ταῦρος* in l. 478, which the editor rightly assumes to be nearer to the original text than the intelligible but prosaic and unmetrical *πέτρας ὡς ταῦρος*, which succeeded to it[1].

The conjecture *ἰσόταυρος* was communicated to me by Professor Lushington some time after the appearance of my first edition and is mentioned in my notes of 1879. I was not then aware that it had been suggested by Martin in 1858. It is unquestionably a fascinating emendation. But, as Professor Jebb truly observes, *ἰσόταυρος*, if accepted, can hardly be referred to the *position* of the outlaw, but must measure the intensity of some *attribute* such as wildness or fierceness, which is not distinctly indicated by the context.

I am still inclined to plead for the emendation which I proposed in 1874, *καὶ πέτραισιν ἔναυλος*:—"For he roams under

[1] Prof. Jebb has not observed that this phrase is obelized in my text. On re-examining the MS. (in May, 1884) I see no ground for changing the report which I have given of this place and of ll. 35, 48, 101, 117, 134, 257, 260, 294, 310, 360, 516, 598, 797, 917, 935, 1031, 1264, 1353, 1491, although different from that of Prof. Jebb. I have, however, been made aware of some inaccuracies, which seem chiefly to have arisen in preparing my collation for the press. And in l. 742, L certainly has *χνοάζων*, not *χνοάζον*.

covert of wild woods, faring through caves and making his lair among rocks." The transition from the idea of motion to that of a resting place (which is changed continually) would be sufficiently defended by comparing the "zeugma" in Phil. 158, 9, *τίν' ἔχει στίβον, ἔναυλον ἢ θυραῖον.* Cp. also Her. IX. 37 § 5 (story of Hegesistratus) *ἀπέδρη ἐς Τεγέην, τὰς μὲν νύκτας πορευόμενος, τὰς δὲ ἡμέρας καταδύνων ἐς ὕλην καὶ αὐλιζόμενος.*

The bull is in possession of the verse, and there is much to be said in favour of his retention (not as a metaphor, of course, but as a simile). The image may seem to be naturally followed up with that of the breeze (or gadfly) in *ζῶντα περιπο-τᾶται.* But after all is not his presence rather inconvenient *dans cette galère?*

I would interpose a general remark. If, as Prof. Jebb truly says, the text of Sophocles is like a country with good roads but with the bridges broken here and there, it follows that conjecture should be seldom allowed, but where it is allowed, it should be permitted to have a certain range. For on the supposition of a few inveterate errors, where an error is manifest it is not unlikely to prove complicated, and the correction which requires but a slight change may be less probable than one which is more bold but perfectly suited to the context[1]. The *uncertainty* of all conjecture is of course premised. And the highest probability is still attained where complete adaptation to the context is combined with a close following of the *ductus litterarum.*

[1] By way of example, let it be supposed that in l. 134 the marginal *τήνδε θεσπίζει γραφήν* had prevailed in the struggle for existence over *τήνδ' ἔθεσθ' ἐπιστροφήν*, and that the true reading had consequently disappeared; and then that an ingenious editor had conjectured *τήνδε θεσπίζεις ῥοπήν*, "thou dost oracularly institute this change (in favour of the dead)." He might argue that Creon in reporting the oracle had adopted a somewhat oracular tone, that *ῥοπή*, a favourite word in tragedy, precisely expresses the change in the aspect of affairs which is produced when Apollo's word is "thrown into the scale," and that the scribes, misunderstanding this, had substituted for it the prosaic *γραφήν*—the technical word for an indictment. And if by some miracle of divination, another editor had conjectured *τήνδ' ἔθεσθ' ἐπιστροφήν*, his theory would have to be rejected because, however plausible, it would diverge too far from the traditional reading

τηνδεθεσπιζει γραφην·
τηνδεθεσ(θε)πι(στ)ρ(ο)φην.

In l. 741 Prof. Jebb accepts Nauck's emendation,

τίνος ἀκμὴν ἥβης ἔχων,

"and how ripe his manhood."

He says "No exception can be taken to the phrase τίνος ἀκμὴν ἥβης as = 'the ripeness of what period of vigorous life.'" —I am not fond of drawing hard and fast lines; but surely ἥβη can only mean either (1) "youth" or (2) "youthful vigour." In the latter sense it may be the *attribute* of any period of vigorous life, but cannot denote the period itself. As to the Syntax here, it is not without diffidence that I defend what Prof. Jebb condemns as bad Greek. But I believe that the text is really sound and that the construction is to be explained by supplying either the copula ἦν from the preceding verb, or, more fully, τοιαύτην φύσιν εἶχε. The return to the participle from the finite verb is less common than the "return to the indicative," but it is not infrequent in Herodotus (see esp. VII. 91 λαισήϊά τε εἶχον ἀντ' ἀσπίδων, καὶ κιθῶνας εἰρινέους ἐνδεδυκότες, V. 86 § 3 λέγοντες, VI. 13 § 2, VII. 10 § 1, 21 § 1, VIII. 83 § 2, 89 § 2).

And if a dash or break is interposed, as if a new thought had occurred to the speaker, the paratactic form with the conjunction δέ does not add much difficulty. Cp. especially Her. VII. 155 § 2 ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, καλεομένων δὲ Κυλλυρίων. A more formidable difficulty lies in the use of the noun ἀκμὴν, which seems to assume the answer "He was in the prime of life." This is met, however, by observing (1) that the form of expression is chosen from a motive of courtesy[1], and (2) that Oedipus eagerly hopes for an answer which will assure him that the grey-beard who was felled by his staff was other than the King of Thebes.

The little stasimon or "hyporcheme," ll. 1086—1109, contains at least three acknowledged difficulties. One of these, that of giving a subject to αὔξειν, is cleverly removed by the change from Οἰδίπου to Οἰδίπουν, which has occurred inde-

[1] Cp. the use of propitiatory epithets, e.g. ὦ Διὸς ἀδυεπὲς φάτι, where the auspicious nature of the response is assumed, although unknown.

pendently, as it seems, to Mr Blaydes and Prof. Jebb. I do not admit that the anticipation of ἡμᾶς is "impossibly harsh," but the meaning now assigned to *αὔξειν* is certainly satisfactory and in accordance with Pindaric use. It may perhaps be urged *per contra* that the change of subject from (ἡμᾶς) *αὔξειν σέ* to (σε) *χορεύεσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν* is more natural than that from Oedipus to Cithaeron: cp. Hdt. v. 24 § 5 *ὡς σὲ ἰδέειν τε καὶ ἐς λόγους μοι ἀπικέσθαι*:—also that if Οἰδίπουν is read the arrangement of the words will hardly allow this name to be separated from *πατριώταν*.

The other difficulties are removed by Prof. Jebb with a simultaneous change in strophe and antistrophe. I have already said that the bolder method in emendation may be sometimes justified. But it is manifest how greatly the hypothesis of a two-fold corruption increases the uncertainty of correction in a lyric passage. And our editor is therefore wise in not admitting his conjectures into the text. He assumes with Dindorf that the metre of ll. 1090, 1101 (3 of *στρ.* and *ἀντ.*) is that given by the inferior MSS. in l. 1101 (3 of *ἀντ.*), and supports this by comparing the 1st strophe and antistrophe of the parodos in the Trachiniae, where there is a similar blending of anxiety and hope, and a somewhat similar interweaving of the rhythms ⏑ ∪ – – and ⏑ ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ –. But the analogy of situation is not so close as to convince us that they must be combined in the same proportions, and the trochaic trimeter catalectic

⏑ ∪ – – ⏑ ∪ – – ⏑ ∪ –

is a good strong line, of which other examples may be found in Sophocles, as well as several in Pindar. Prof. Jebb argues that *οὐκ* has been inserted *metri gratiâ*. But *ἔσῃ* must have been at the same time transposed. And is not this too much to attribute to the metrical skill and zeal of scribes who allowed *ἤ σέ γε θυγάτηρ* to stand? The scribe of V in reading *οὐκέτ' ἔσῃ* might with equal plausibility be supposed to have introduced the "choreic dactyl" purposely. Then granting that *τὰν ἐπιοῦσαν* is good Greek, is not *τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν* more likely to have been a gloss on *αὔριον* than *vice versâ*? We are told that *αὔριον* is always an adverb, i.e. that *τὰν αὔριον* must = *τὴν*

αὔριον ἐσομένην. This is granted, of course. But may not αὔριον in poetry at least, like ἐχθές, be used with some latitude? (Cp. 'Night's high noon' in English poetry.) Or, if this is denied, is the dramatic figment of "to-morrow's full moon" more arbitrary than that of "to-night's παννυχίς" in the Antigone (ll. 152, 3)?

In the antistrophe Prof. Jebb reads

3 ἤ σέ γ' ἔφυσε πατὴρ
4 Λοξίας;

"Or was Loxias the sire that begat thee?"

This is very close to the "*ductus litterarum*." Cp. e.g. the v. rr. in Oed. Col. l. 204, τίς σ' ἔφυ, τίς σ' ἔφυσε, τίς ἔφυς. But it is hardly nearer than Arndt's

3 ἤ σέ γ' εὐνάτειρά τις
4 Λοξίου

which has the further advantage of accounting for the MS. variation.

For ατειρατις might easily pass into ατηρατης, a seeming dittographia, whence τις would first be lost, then be restored as a marginal reading, and finally replaced, but in the position required by the new reading

ἤ σέ γε θυγάτηρ,

which (supposing γε at first to have been written at full) had been simply obtained by substituting θ for ε and Γ for Ν,—no great price to pay for such a 'brilliant' emendation!

Neither Lachmann's πατρός *supra* nor Prof. Jebb's πατὴρ seems to me entirely happy. Besides diluting the sense beyond what is suitable for lyric purposes, πατὴρ as here used implies a somewhat awkward 'prolepsis'. And on the same ground I still uphold the Scholiast's 1st interpretation of παιδὶ καὶ πατρί in l. 1209[1].

The use of σέ γε here recalls a place where Prof. Jebb rightly retains the vulgate reading, which—needlessly, though not without MS. evidence—had been disturbed by Dr Kennedy and myself.

[1] In this I am glad to find myself at one with Dr Kennedy.

Ll. 445, 6:

ὡς παρὼν σύ γ' ἐμποδὼν
ὀχλεῖς,

"While here, thou art a hindrance, thou, a trouble."

Prof. Jebb remarks with perfect justice,—'lectio σύ γ' ut librorum fide ita suâ vi commendatur, quippe quæ optime conveniat indignantis fastidio.' But the 2nd '*thou*' in his translation strikes me as slightly over-emphatic. For here and in l. 1101 ἤ σέ γε κ.τ.λ. we have merely the idiom so common in Herodotus, where the antithesis of two *actions* leads by a sort of attraction (οἷον ῥύμῃ τινὶ) to an explicit use of the pronoun, whether as object or subject, although unemphatic. (See esp. Her. VII. 50 § 1, ib. 10 § 22.) I would also observe that the particle γε in both passages, while grammatically adhering, if you will, to σέ and σύ, really modifies not the pronoun but the verb, or the whole sentence.

That the incidence of the emphasis suggested by a particle does not wholly determine the position of the particle is shown by the different uses of εἰ καὶ noticed by Mr Jebb in his Appendix, Note VII. But his explanation of εἰ καὶ μὴ κλύεις τῶν ἀγγέλων is hardly clear. And Aj. 1121 εἰ καὶ ζῇς θανών, where καὶ belongs to the whole phrase, ought to be distinguished from Trach. 71 εἰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔτλη, where it emphasises τοῦτο. In Thuc. v. 45, I still maintain that the 'hyperbaton' is more likely than the separation of καὶ from its word by a long sentence interposed διὰ μέσου. And I believe that the difficulty in Plat. Rep. VI. 500 A ἦ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται is to be similarly explained. Mr Jebb himself has well observed on O. T. 543 that in ungrammatical (or extra-grammatical) idioms, the order and collocation of the words is the best guide. On this ground (that of natural arrangement) I cannot accept Hartung's emendation of l. 1526, while I still doubt the genuineness of l. 329. And both on this account and for the cæsura I would suggest in l. 1310 the slight further change

διαπωτᾶται φθογγὰ φοράδην.

This same rule (that of the arrangement of words) commends Prof. Jebb's interpretation of l. 198, 9, as improved by

Hermann, *τελεῖν γὰρ εἴ τι νὺξ ἀφῇ τοῦτ' ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἔρχεται*, 'for if night leave aught undone, day follows to accomplish this.' It avoids the sin of breaking the continuity of the short line. But Dr Kennedy and the Saturday Reviewer are perhaps right in objecting to the parenthesis and change of subject. The passage gains in force, if *Ἄρης ὁ μαλερός* is made the subject of *ἔρχεται* as of the other verbs. Although the change is too great to be made confidently, I would now suggest

τελῶν γὰρ εἴ τι νὺξ ἀφῇ
ὧδ' ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἔρχεται,

'for he is coming hither with the return of Day to finish aught that Night hath left undone.'

The metrical doctrines of Dr J. H. Heinrich Schmidt, which Prof. Jebb has expounded with great brevity and clearness and with a grace that is all his own, have in two places suggested to him a new line of emendation, by enabling him to assume the occasional equivalence of ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ and ‒⏑ ⏑ in choreic rhythms[1]. Thus in ll. 867, 877 he makes

⏑: ‒⏑ ⏑ ‒ ‒ ‒ ⏑
δι' αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες =

⏑: ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ‒ ‒ ⏑
ἄκρον ἀπότομον ὤρουσεν

and in ll. 1210, 1220 (running two verses into one),

⏑: ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ‒ ⏑ ‒
πατρὶ θαλαμηπόλῳ =

⏑: ‒⏑ ⏑‒ ⏑ ‒
*γὰρ *ὥσπερ *ἰάλεμον,*

so gaining room for a very fascinating emendation[1].

Any tolerable solution of the difficulty in ll. 867, 877, requires that *δι' αἰθέρα* should be in some way equivalent to ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, possibly by a licence analogous to that which

[1] On similar grounds may not *λαΐειον τέκνον* in O. T. 1216 bear the scansion ‒ ⏑ ‒ ⏑ ⏑ ‒ ⏑ ‒, and in Trach. 115 may we not scan *κύματ' εὐρεῖ πόν-τῳ* thus ‒ ⏑ ⏑ ‒⏑ ⏑ ‒ ‒? So in El. 1084 *νώνυμος ὦ παῖ παῖ* may be answered by *νῦν ὑπὸ χεῖρα ναίεις*. See Ar. Ran. 1314.

applies to words of 4 short syllables in Epic Greek. By inserting *ἄκρον* Prof. Jebb at once completes the numbers and gives a substantive to *ἀκρότατον*. The latter requirement he regards as essential. I can only say that I do not feel this, and that any substantive which has hitherto been suggested for the place appears to me intrusive. The most ingenious attempt in this direction is the conjecture of Wolff

*ἀκρότατα *γεῖσ' ἀναβᾶσ'*

where *γ* is read for *μ* instead of reading *ο* for the second *α* as in the vulgate text. But the change, however slight, lies open to the obvious criticism that the vague suggestion of a high place is more suitable to the context than the coping of a wall or tower. And it cannot be meant that the power of the neuter adjective to stand alone is denied to the superlative degree[1]. The scanning of this place as printed in my edition is indefensible. But the reading there adopted is, I still think, probable enough. And it has the advantage of keeping the minute correspondence of *phrasing* which is peculiarly noticeable in this ode. Cp. for example

εἴ μοι | ξυνείη | φέροντι |
μοῖρα | τὰν εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν | λόγων |
ἔργων τε πάντων | ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται |
ὑψίποδες | οὐρανίαν |
δι' αἰθέρα | τεκνωθέντες | ὧν Ὄλυμπος

with

ὕβρις | φυτεύει | τύραννον |
ὕβρις | εἰ πολλῶν ὑπερπλησθῇ | μάταν |
ἃ μὴ πίκαιρα | μηδὲ συμφέροντα |
**ἀκρότατον | εἰσαναβᾶσ' |*
*ἀπότομον | *ἐξώρουσεν | εἰς ἀνάγκαν*[2].

[1] Cp. Her. VII. 121 § 1 *ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐπυνθάνετο συντομώτατον εἶναι*, Plato Theaet. 175 D, *ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς*—Phædo 89 A, *ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ.*

[2] For a similar reason (correspondent phrasing) I prefer *νομάδος ἐπὶ *πόας* (suggested in my first edition) to **μονάδ' ἐπιποδίας* in l. 1350. Cp. Cassandra's epithet *ποιονόμων* in Aesch. Ag. 1170.

Ll. 1219, 20:

δύρομαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἰάλεμον χέων
ἐκ στομάτων.

"I wail as one who pours a dirge from his lips," i.e. "Oedipus is to me as one who is dead."

No one who has any feeling for scholarship or poetry can fail to admire this emendation, and none but a true scholar and poet would have thought of it. But in refusing to give to ἐκ a pregnant force (as in ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) Prof. Jebb detracts a little from the probability of his brilliant conjecture. The flaw which most critics have felt in the MS. reading is the flatness of ἐκ στομάτων, without an epithet, beginning the new line. Hence Burges's ὡς | περίαλλ' ἰὰν χέων found little acceptance, and Erfurdt's ἰακχίων being rejected, Wecklein proposed ἰαλέμων ἐκ στομάτων. But although later authorities show that ἴάλεμος could be used adjectively, there is no sufficient ground for assuming that ἰάλεμον στόμα was a possible combination, though ἰάλεμος ᾠδή might be so. I have sometimes thought of an emendation here, which I have some hesitation in mentioning, lest the phrase should appear 'stranger still.' Εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν—for the last word on this passage has not yet been said:—

δύρομαι γὰρ ὡς περίαλλα *χαλκέων
ἐκ στομάτων.

'As from lips of brass, beyond all others ringing loud'

(ὡς softening the use of χαλκέων for 'loud-resounding,' for which cp. esp. Hesiod Scut. 243 χάλκεον ὀξὺ βόων).

1031. Τί δ' ἄλγος ἴσχον†' †ἐν κακοῖς† με λαμβάνεις;

'And what pain was mine when thou foundest me in distress?'

Is it necessary to obelize ἐν κακοῖς? Let us hear Prof. Jebb. "The ἐν κακοῖς of most MSS. is intolerably weak: '*what pain* was I suffering when you found me *in trouble?*' From the ἐν καιροῖς of L and another good MS. (a most unlikely corrup-

tion of so familiar a word as *κακοῖς*) I conjecture *ἐγκυρῶν*, 'when you lighted on me.'" [1]

The note of the Scholiast, though not quite satisfactory, appears to me to suggest a sufficient defence of *ἐν κακοῖς*, which, as Bellermann points out, it proves to be the traditional reading.

The tone of l. 1030 implies that besides (1) the general misfortune of exposure, the child was suffering from (2) some particular harm. Far from being 'intolerably weak' the reference of Oedipus in his reply to (1) the general, as well as to (2) the particular trouble, is full of pathos. Cp. Phil. 312, 313 *ἐν λιμῷ τε καὶ κακοῖσι*, 'Hunger added to my (other) woes.'

Then as to the probability of corruption: (1) *ἐν καιροῖς* is not only unmetrical but unconstruable: (2) in all the conjectures there is (to my mind) a loss of simplicity. More than one critic has thought of *ἀγκάλαις*, and the Saturday Reviewer suggests the exquisite but too Euripidean change *τί δ' ἄλγος ἴσχον τἀγκάλισμα λαμβάνεις*. Better than both of these is the variant given by the diorthotes of M (Ambr. G. 56 sup.) *γρ. ἐν χεροῖν*. Wecklein, supposing *ἐν καιροῖς* to be a gloss, points, as I presume, at *ἐν τύχαις*. But the change from *κακοῖς* to *καιροῖς* is in fact one of the most natural of MS. corruptions. ιc and κ are constantly confounded (as Mr Verrall knows) and from ιc to ιp the way is dangerously smooth. This therefore is one of the few places in which the consent of the inferior MSS. may be held to preponderate over the authority of L.

In another passage where Prof. Jebb adheres to L, I agree with Par. A.

l. 1446: *καὶ σοί γ' ἐπισκήπτω γε καὶ προστρέψομαι.*

'Yea; and on thee will I lay this charge, to thee will I make this entreaty.'

'*προτρέψομαι* A, V^3, V^4 al.'

The question here is not one of MS. authority, for the confusion of *προ* and *προσ*, especially before *τ*, is so constant that the difference is insignificant[2]. Prof. Jebb rightly says, 'The

[1] Dr Kennedy holds that this should be *ἐγκύρων*. But though *ἐγκυρεῖν* is not found in Tragedy, the simple verb *κυρεῖν* is common enough, and Her. VII. 218 has *ἐνεκύρησε*.

[2] Therefore, although I must repeat

reading προτρέψομαι must be judged by the context.' But when he adds 'This strain of lofty admonition seems little in accord with the tone of the broken man who has just acknowledged Creon's unexpected goodness (1432) and is now a suppliant (cp. 1468),' I am disposed to appeal from the remote to the immediate context. Before line 1468 is reached there has been a manifest change of mood. The tone of all the former portion of the speech, especially of lines 1446—1458, bespeaks a sort of gloomy exaltation, as of a man who being 'placed apart' (l. 1415) 'by his unwitting crimes and his awful sufferings' speaks of human obligations with an impartial absoluteness as from another sphere[1]. By and by he is again softened when he thinks of his children. But is the speech in which these successive passions sweep over Oedipus to be preluded by a line in which he anticipates them both? Or should he '*entreat*' Creon to bury 'her who lies within,' as if this could now be regarded by him in the light of a personal favour? I venture to think that the dark grandeur of these lines, especially the climax in ll. 1449 foll., has lost something in Prof. Jebb's rendering.

I have purposely reserved for the last place the discussion of two well-known difficulties in the earlier part of the proclamation of Oedipus, ll. 216—232.

Ll. 219—221:

> ἀγὼ ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐξερῶ
> ξένος δὲ τοῦ πραχθέντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν
> ἴχνευον αὐτός, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.

"These words I will speak publicly, as one who has been a

that in l. 134 the first hand of L wrote προαοῦ θανόντος (sic), I do not dwell on the fact as of much significance. I still think, however, that πρὸς is there more appropriate than πρό, because more in keeping with the image conveyed by ἐπιστροφήν, "you have given us this sudden turn (so as to act) in the interest of the dead" (ὥστε πρὸς τοῦ θανόντος ἵστασθαι). Cp. Ant. 1111, ἐπειδὴ δόξα τῇδ' ἐπεστράφη. From its literal meaning of 'from the side of' πρὸς (in Her. &c.) comes to mean 'towards.' It is consistent with the tragic uses of language to suppose a similar extension of the corresponding figurative use, which has not yet passed into a mere fixed usage.

[1] So the pride of Othello flashes up in the socket before his death.

stranger to this report, a stranger to the deed; for I could not have tracked it far by myself, if I had not had some clue."

"*οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν | ἴχνευον αὐτός* justifies *ἐξερῶ*; 'As one who has no personal knowledge of the matter, I must make this appeal to you Thebans for any information that you can give me; for I could not have tracked the matter far *alone* (*αὐτός*), *μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον*, if I had not had some clue; *νῦν δ'*, but as it is (having *no* clue),—*ὕστερος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, for it was only subsequently to the date of the crime that I became a Theban—I address myself to *you*.' 220 *οὐ γὰρ ἂν | ἴχνευον ...μὴ οὐκ ἔχων...* I prefer to regard the protasis as *εἰ μὴ εἶχον* implicit in *μὴ οὐκ ἔχων*. As *ἴχνευον ἄν, μὴ ἔχων* (if I had not), could represent *ἴχνευον ἄν, εἰ μὴ εἶχον*, so *οὐχ ἴχνευον ἄν, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων* could represent *οὐκ ἴχνευον ἄν, εἰ μὴ εἶχον*." The interpretation of *νῦν δ'* here contradicts that of *μὴ οὐκ ἔχων*. 'If I had not' implies 'and I have.' And the explanation is otherwise wanting in clearness and point. I maintain (1) that *οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἴχνευον* justifies not *ἐξερῶ* but *ξένος*, which the repetition marks as the emphatic word,—'A stranger; it could not be otherwise; I could not &c.' (*οὐ* resumes the negation in *ξένος*); (2) that the 'suppressed protasis' (which confused the Scholiast) is to be sought not in the epexegesis *μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον* but in *αὐτός*, sc. *ἰχνεύων*, i.e. *εἰ αὐτὸς ἴχνευον*[1], and (3) that the force of the participial clause with *μὴ οὐκ* is not hypothetical but *causal*[2]. 'For I could not have tracked it far, if I had made the search by myself, because I had no clue to guide me.' Oedipus means to say that until the matter was brought before him in his public capacity as a Theban citizen, he was in total ignorance of it. For the chance wayfarer coming from Corinth was out of all connexion with the death of Laius, and could not be expected to probe a tale which had no significance for him. Mr Jebb objects, in his Appendix, Note v., that 'Oed. has just heard, for the first time, of the mysterious murder.' It is not the first time he has heard that Laius is dead. But is not this just one of those phrases, so neatly characterized by Prof. Jebb

[1] Not simply *εἰ ἴχνευον*.

[2] In this I find myself anticipated by Dr Kennedy.

in his note on l. 997 'which instead of saying that a thing is not done, ironically represent it as done under a condition which precludes it'? I.e. when Oedipus says 'I could not have inquired *far*,' &c., he means 'I could have no knowledge of a matter in which I had no part.' This use of *οὐ μακρὰν* = 'not at all,' should long since have been recognized as a *litotes* parallel to the familiar uses of *οὐ μᾶλλον, οὐχ ἧσσον*, &c. In El. 323, *ἐπεί τἂν οὐ μακρὰν ἔζων ἐγώ*, for example, no difficulty would have been found, if it had been seen that Electra simply means 'I could not have lived.' The force of the clause *μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον* and its relation to the sentence are best illustrated by the two parallels cited from Herodotus by Prof. Jebb. On hearing of the numbers of the Ionian fleet the Persians were afraid (Hdt. VI. 9) *καταρρώδησαν μὴ...οὐ...τὴν Μιλησίην οἷοί τε ἔωσι ἐξελεῖν, μὴ οὐκ ἐόντες ναυκρατέες*. This participial clause would be represented not by *εἰ μὴ ἦσαν ν.*, but by *ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἦσαν* (or *διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι*) *ν.*; and the *causal* relation, expressed by *ἐπεί*, is indicated by the use of *μή*. The other passage is still more nearly analogous: H. VI. 106, *εἰνάτῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν, μὴ οὐ πλήρεος ἐόντος τοῦ κύκλου*. The Spartans procrastinated, when summoned by the Athenians to Marathon, because they could not make an expedition before the full-moon: "on the ninth day of the month, they said, they would not go forth, because the moon was not then full." This might have been otherwise expressed: *οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐξελεύσεσθαι, εἰ εἰνάτῃ δέοι ἐξέρχεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μήπω πλήρη εἶναι τὸν κύκλον.*

Ll. 227—232:

> *κεἰ μὲν φοβεῖται, τοὐπίκλημ' ὑπεξελεῖν*
> *αὐτὸν καθ' αὑτοῦ· πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν*
> *ἀστεργὲς οὐδέν, γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής.*
> *εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἐξ ἄλλης χθονὸς*
> *τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ*
> *κέρδος τελῶ 'γὼ χἠ χάρις προσκείσεται.*

'And if he is afraid, I bid him to remove the danger of the charge from his own path; for he shall suffer nothing else unlovely, but only leave the land, unhurt. Or if anyone knows

an alien, from another land, to be the assassin, let him not keep silence, for I will pay his guerdon, and my thanks shall rest with him besides.'

By simply changing *ὑπεξελὼν* | *αὐτὸς* to *ὑπεξελεῖν* | *αὐτὸν* Prof. Jebb claims to have removed all difficulty from ll. 227—230.

He says "I find the key to the true sense in Thuc. 4. 83 (Arrhibaeus, the enemy of Perdiccas, makes overtures to Brasidas, and the Chalcidians exhort Brasidas to listen): *ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ δεινά*, 'they impressed upon him that he must not *remove the danger from the path of Perdiccas*' by repulsing the rival power of Arrhibaeus. *ὑπεξελεῖν τὰ δεινά* = to take them *away* (*ἐκ*) *from under* (*ὑπό*) the feet,—from the path immediately before him: *τῷ Περδίκκᾳ* being a dat. commodi. So here: *κεἰ μὲν φοβεῖται, and if he is afraid* (as knowing *himself* to be the culprit) *then I bid him* (*κελεύω* continued from 226) *ὑπεξελεῖν τὸ ἐπίκλημα* to take the peril of the charge out of his path *αὐτὸν καθ' αὑτοῦ* (by speaking) *himself against himself*... Instead of a dat. commodi *αὑτῷ* (corresponding to *τῷ Περδίκκᾳ* in Thuc.) Soph. has written *καθ' αὑτοῦ*, because self-accusation is the mode of doing the act expressed by *ὑπεξελεῖν*, which implies *κατηγορῆσαι*. The pregnant *καθ' αὑτοῦ* is rendered still less harsh by the fact that *τοὐπίκλημα* precedes. There is no 'aposiopesis' or 'suppressed clause': we have simply to carry on *κελεύω*."

Prof. Jebb here brings out with great vividness the meaning of *ὑπεκ* in this and many other places (Her. *passim*, Plat. Rep. 9, 567 B *ὑπεξαιρεῖν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον*). But, as he construes the passage, *καθ' αὑτοῦ* is in no way substituted for *αὑτῷ*. Nor is *αὑτῷ* the 'dativus commodi' required. For by going into exile, the murderer does not clear himself of the charge (the word 'danger' is imported from Thucydides), but he does remove out of the path of the state (*ὑπεξαιρεῖ τῇ πόλει*) the imputation conveyed in the message brought by Creon *μίασμα χώρας ὡς τεθραμμένον χθονὶ ἐν τῇδε* (l. 97). And the missing *πόλει* is resumed in *γῆς* infra.

At the risk of forfeiting the last particle of the respect which

Mr Margoliouth seems once to have entertained for me, I must reiterate my belief that the text is sound, and is sufficiently explained by the old glosses, *σημαινέτω* or (better) *μηνυσάτω*. This is merely to carry on *κατὰ σύνεσιν* the sense not of *κελεύω* alone but of *κελεύω σημαίνειν* in one expression.

Such an ellipse is fully justified by Aj. 1200 *ἥντιν' αἰτίαν προθείς*: O. T. 1155 *τί προσχρήζων μαθεῖν*. See above p. 196.

A construction is thus given to *καθ' αὑτοῦ*. And the only point remaining doubtful, is the relation of the participle to the verb.

(1) 'Let the man himself, if he is afraid, (inform) spontaneously against himself by removing the imputation from the state. He shall receive no further annoyance, but shall depart unmolested (*ἀσφαλὴς*) from the land.' The concluding words (*γῆς...ἀσφαλής*) resume explicitly the meaning ('by voluntary exile') implied in *ὑπεξελών*.

(2) If it were allowable to understand the aorist participle *proleptically* (but the fear of Professor Goodwin is before our eyes[1]) the lines might be construed: 'Let the man himself, if he is afraid, (inform) against himself, *and so remove* the imputation from the state. For he will be banished from the land, but shall have no further harm.'

The case of the murderer being thus disposed of, and that of the ordinary Theban citizen being taken for granted (as sufficiently covered by ll. 224—6), there remains the supposition that if the murderer is an alien, the only person who can inform against him may be an alien too. In that case he needs to be assured of his reward—for the curse on the citizens will not equally affect him.

This case is met by ll. 230—232.

Here Prof. Jebb explains *ἄλλον* 'another [*i.e.* other than one of yourselves, the Thebans].' And this is plausible at first sight. But on consideration it seems more logical and less tautological to take the pregnant phrase to mean *εἴ τις ἐξ ἄλλης χθονὸς οἶδεν ἄλλον* [*καὶ μὴ ἑαυτὸν*, another and not himself as in the former case] *ἐξ ἄλλης χθονός* to be the author of the deed. This point, however, is of less consequence and I

[1] See however Her. VII. 106 § 1, 164 § 2.

maintain it with less of confidence than those which immediately precede.

There are other difficulties of the Oedipus Tyrannus still awaiting decision, which must be reserved for a future edition of Sophocles.

Meanwhile, let me conclude this paper with four fresh attempts at 'bridge-making,'—two in the Trachiniae and two in the Electra.

Trach. 116—8:

οὕτω δὲ τὸν Καδμογενῆ
†τρέφει τὸ δ' αὔξει† βιότου
πολύπονον ὥσπερ πέλαγος Κρήσιον.

It must be owned that the words *τρέφει τὸ δ' αὔξει* are indefensible—even if construable, they are not *smooth*—and the letters *δ' αὐξ* are written over an erasure in L. I now propose, as a conjecture just worth mentioning,

τροπαῖς ταράσσει.

'Even so our Cadmus-born is *harassed with vicissitude* by, as it were, a Cretan sea of labours, which constitutes his life.'

Trach. 1015, 6:

οὔτ' ἀπαράξαι κρᾶτα βίου θέλει
μολὼν τοῦ στυγεροῦ, φεῦ, φεῦ.

In this passage there are two strong indications of corruption. The numbers break the antistrophic structure which prevails throughout the dochmiacs in this passage elsewhere; and the explanation of the scholiast manifestly presupposes a different text. His words are *οὐ πῦρ, οὐδ' ἔγχος: λείπει, προσαγαγών, ἀπαλλάξει με τοῦ ζῆν. οὐδ' ἀπαράξει: οὐδεὶς ἐκείνων, φησὶ, βούλεται ἐλθὼν τὴν κεφαλήν μου ἀποτεμεῖν, καὶ ἐλευθερῶσαι τοῦ μοχθηροῦ βίου.*

From this and from the metres of infr. 1042—4 (although all attempts must be hazardous) I venture to 'rewrite' as follows:—

οὐδέ μ' ἀπαλλάξαι[1]
κρᾶτα τεμὼν βίου τοῦ στυγεροῦ μολὼν
οὐκ ἐθέλει· φεῦ, φεῦ.

'Nor wills to come and, with a mortal stroke,
Release me from my hateful life. Woe, woe!'

El. 1085 ff.

ὡς καὶ σὺ πάγκλαυτον αἰῶνα κοινὸν εἵλου,
τὸ μὴ καλὸν καθοπλίσασα δύο φέρειν ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ,
σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε παῖς κεκλῆσθαι.

The Scholia make nothing of this passage, and Hermann is unsuccessful. I cannot believe that αἰῶνα κοινὸν can mean either (1) death, or (2) the life of all men, or (3) the life of misery which Electra shares with her father. Yet κοινὸν is such a favourite word with Sophocles that the 'heavy hand' of criticism has hitherto spared it here. I am inclined to think, however, that forbearance has for once been mistaken, and that a thorough consideration of the preceding scene will support the conjecture

αἰῶν' ἄοικον.

The passage will then run thus, according to my view:

ὡς καὶ σὺ πάγκλαυτον αἰῶν' *ἄοικον εἵλου,
τὸ μὴ καλὸν *καθαγνίσασα δύο φέρειν *ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ,
σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε παῖς κεκλῆσθαι.

'As thou, too, hast chosen a homeless life of tears, if so thou mayst purge away the evil thing and win a two-fold praise at once for wisdom and the noblest piety.'

See especially lines 817, 8; 1052.

Lastly in El. 563, 4:

ἐροῦ δὲ τὴν κυναγὸν Ἄρτεμιν, τίνος
ποινὰς τὰ πολλὰ πνεύματ' ἔσχεν Αὐλίδι,

after many vain attempts to find at once a good meaning and a probable subject for ἔσχεν, I propose to read ᾖξεν instead:

[1] V[3] (Ven. 467) gives ἀπαρράξαι (sic).

"Then ask the huntress Artemis, in punishment for what offence those violent winds rushed forth on Aulis."

L. CAMPBELL.

Postscriptum.

The preceding pages had been written and were partly in print before I had an opportunity of seeing Professor Butcher's article on Jebb's Oedipus in the Fortnightly Review for June; and the whole (except some of the footnotes) was already in type when I read Professor Kennedy's Studia Sophoclea, P. II. I may now add a few words in reference to each of these contributions to the interpretation of Sophocles.

Some of Professor Butcher's observations on the language are an eloquent exposition of views which I am glad to think are now less unfamiliar than they were ten years ago, when I was accused of "undue exaggeration" in my endeavour to state them. But if some crudities (which I have long since acknowledged) gave colour to this charge at the time, I had hoped to obviate this impression by increased care and caution in my second edition. And it is not without surprise that I find myself still accused of contradictory interpretations, of setting an author above the genius of the language, and so forth. The conspicuous candour of Prof. Butcher's criticism induces me to say so much in my defence.

The question of "binary constructions" (the term is James Riddell's) is after all a subordinate one. And if, for example, in O. T. 233, 4,

εἰ.....τις ἢ φίλου
δείσας ἀπώσει τοὔπος ἢ χαὐτοῦ τόδε

the Glasgow Professor connects the genitives with ἀπώσει, while he of Cambridge with equal confidence attaches them to

δείσας, is there not some room for 'Tertium Quid,' who suggests that it may have relations with both, or, if with one only, then it is 'virtually repeated' (a good phrase of Dr Kennedy's) with the other? Again, instead of speaking of ungrammatical idioms, it may be prudent to adopt Sidney Walker's distinction between natural and artificial grammar (Crit. Exam. § 3). But the thing intended is the same.

Of the second series of Studia Sophoclea I will only say that the venerable author seems to be unaware of the extent to which one recent editor is agreed with him. In perusing his book I felt more than once tempted to exclaim *θὲς καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων*, or *κινδυνεύω ἔξω τῶν πάντων εἶναι*. If some impartial critic who is acquainted with the subject should think it worth his while to reckon up the points of agreement in the three editions of the Tyrannus here chiefly referred to, he will probably find that the places in which two of the three coincide are more numerous than those in which any one of them agrees with any recent foreign edition. The following lines are amongst those on which Professor Kennedy and the present writer agree in differing from Professor Jebb; O. T. 98, 101, 258, 283[1], 320, 1, 421, 677, 790, 1209.

Dr Kennedy again argues stoutly in favour of Schneidewin's explanation of ll. 10, 11, which by joining *ὡς θέλοντος ἂν*, *κ.τ.λ.*, to what immediately precedes, gives the usual meaning to *στέρξαντες* without the entire pointlessness of saying 'If you are contented, tell me so, for I am willing to content you.' But the connexion after all is feebler than in Prof. Jebb's rendering. And the meaning 'whereon your hearts are set,'—which suits the context,—is really supported by O. C. 1094, where the use of *στέργω* bears only a fallacious resemblance to the Latin idiom 'amabo te.' On the other hand a doubt may be raised, whether the meaning now assigned to *καθέστατε*, 'are ye set here,' is permissible for this form, though common enough in the aorist *κατέστην*.

L. C.

[1] In the Prose Version attached to Studia Sophoclea P. II.

AESCHYLEA.

THE following random guesses occurred to me in a recent reading of Aeschylus. They may take their chance amongst the mass of conjectures.

For some defence of the method (?) which underlies them, see the remarks on p. 195, supra.

Pers. 329,

For τοιῶνδ' ἀρχόντων [νῦν] ὑπεμνήσθην πέρι

Read τοιῶνδε ταγῶν τῶνδ' ὑπεμνήσθην πέρι.

S. c. T. 315,

For κατὰ(ν) ῥίψοπλον ἄταν

Read κάρτα ῥίψοπλον ἄταν,

(i.e. not merely throwing down the shield but losing the πάγχαλκα τέλη.)

S. c. T. 364,

For τλήμονες εὐνὰν αἰχμάλωτον
ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχοῦντος, ὡς
δυσμενοῦς ὑπερτέρου,
ἐλπίς ἐστι
νύκτερον τέλος μολεῖν

Read λέκτρον ἦλθον αἰχμάλωτον
ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχοῦντος, ὡς
δυσμενοῦς ὑπερτέρου,
ἤλπισάν τε
νύκτερον τέλος μολεῖν.

S. c. T. 437,

For καὶ τῷδε κέρδει κέρδος ἄλλο τίκτεται

Read καὶ τῷδε κόμπῳ κέρδος ἄλλο τίκτεται.

S. c. T. 982,

For ἀπώλεσεν δῆτα

Read καὶ μάλ' ἀπώλεσεν.

Choeph. 956. For ἐποίχεται read ἐπείγεται. (i.e. 'Hastens on his own account.')

Eum. 521,

For τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν φάει
καρδίαν ἀνατρέφων

Read τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν βάθει
καρδίας δέος τρέφων.

Eum. 553. By transposing φαμὶ we get

τὸν ἀντίτολμον δὲ καὶ παραιβάταν
τὰ πολλά φαμι παντόφυρτ' ἄνευ δίκας.

Eum. 940,

For φλογμός τ' ὀμματοστερὴς
φυτῶν τὸ μὴ περᾶν ὅρον τόπων

Read φλογμόν τ' ὀμματοστερῆ,
φυτευτῶν μὴ περᾶν ὅρον τόπων.

I may be allowed to add the following, which have been printed elsewhere.

Suppl. 162—173,

For ἆ Ζήν, Ἰοῦς ἰὼ
μῆνις μάστειρ' ἐκ θεῶν

Read ἆ Ζήν, Ἰοῦς ἰῶ
μῆνιν μάστιν τ' ἐκ θεῶν.

Choeph. 574,

For ἐρεῖ σάφ' ἴσθι καὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς βαλεῖ

Read ἅπαξ ἐπιστῇ καὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς φανῇ.

L. CAMPBELL.

THE "CODEX MORI" OF THE ILIAD.

Among the books in the "Bentley" class in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, is a MS. of the Iliad marked R 16, 35, which appears at one time to have belonged to the great critic, as it was presented to the College with other books of his by his nephew and namesake in 1757. A comparison of readings shews that it is none other than the "Codex Mori", collated by Barnes for his edition of the Iliad (1711), and named from its then possessor, John Moore, Bishop of Ely, who played a part in the great Bentley litigation. Heyne followed Barnes in his readings, but evidently never saw the original. Bentley also collated it in his copy of the Poetae Graeci which was lent to Heyne; but the Codex itself seems to have been entirely forgotten[1], nor has it ever been described. Heyne indeed makes a serious blunder (vol. III. p. xcvii.) in saying "habet quoque Scholia antiquiora, e quibus Bentleius ea, quae criticum usum habent, sedulo elicuit." In quoting Bentley he also in the earlier books ascribes to the Lipsiensis, L, of which Bentley had a collation, several readings which belong to this MS., but are not marked, as in the later books, by the letter M. The MS. has no Scholia, and the "Schol. MS." of Bentley is no doubt the Harleianus. A reference to La Roche, *Homerische Textkritik* p. 466, and Hoffmann, 21^{tes} *und* 22^{tes} *Buch der Ilias*, zweite Abt., p. 4, will shew that a short description is desirable.

The MS. is on thick shining paper, with a watermark which, Mr E. M. Thompson tells me, can hardly be earlier than the fifteenth century. There are 651 leaves, if I have counted right, containing a life of Homer, a "hypothesis" of the Iliad, a διαίρεσις ποιητῶν, the whole Iliad, 12 lines to a page, and

[1] Must we say "because it was in England"?

two epigrams on Hector. There is an argument prefixed to each book (except xxiii.), and a separate heading to the "Catalogue" in Book ii. 495. The line at the foot of each page is numbered in Bentley's hand. The writing is very elegant and clear, only a few contractions being used. The iota subscript is generally omitted and there is a good deal of itacism. The accentuation is on the whole careful. There are no scholia whatever, but a few variants in the margin by the first hand, and some corrections interlined by a second.

Of the former may be mentioned the following: B 206 appears in the margin, followed by the word *νόθος*. E 336 in marg. *γρ. χαλκῷ* (for *δουρί*). E 398 inserted in margin—an accidental omission. E 738 marg. *γρ. βάλετ' αἰγίδα*—the text has *ἀσπίδα*. Z 199 added in margin. Of interlineations by the second hand I observe B 293 *παρὰ* written over *σύν*, and Z 237 *πύργον* over *φηγόν*. In B 218 *συνωχηκότε* (*sic*) is a reading of the second hand; the original *ω* has been scratched out and *η* written in its place.

Barnes's collation is so inaccurate as to be worse than useless, as will appear from the following comparison of the MS. with the variants quoted in La Roche's apparatus criticus from Heyne. Book i., line 4, *dele* the note of interrogation. 20 *λύσαιτε*, not *λῦσαί τε*. 298 *μαχέσσομαι*, not *μαχήσομαι* (this is not Barnes's but La Roche's mistake: he seems to have misunderstood Heyne's words—vol. iv. p. 91—and the four other MSS. there named ought no doubt also to be placed on the other side of the account). Bk. ii., 12 *πασσυδίη*. 38 *ᾔδη*, not *ᾔδει*. 335 *ἐπαινέσαντες*, not *-νέσσ-*. Book iii. 305 *εἶμι ποτὶ Ἴλιον* (Barnes gives *ποτ' Ἴλιον*, Heyne *πρὸς Ἴλιον*). Book iv. 25 *ἔειπες* (not *ἔειπας*). 66 *πειρᾷν*, not *-αν*. 92 *ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα*, not *προσέφη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη*, which Heyne apparently takes from Bentley, not noticing that he quotes it only from "Cant."

The blunder in the crucial line A 20 is so gross and wilful that I doubted the identity of the MS. till convinced beyond a doubt by the coincidence of the two interlineations by the second hand mentioned above, both of which are noticed by Barnes.

To give a general idea of the character of the MS. I add a careful collation of the first 150 lines of Book v. with La Roche's text (not noticing mere omissions of *iota subscr.*). 3 *γένοιτο, ἠδὲ.* 5 *ἀστέρι ὠπορινῶ.* 10 *ἱερεὺς.* 12 *ἀποκριθέντε—ὡρμηθήτην.* 13 *ἀφ' ἵπποισιν.* 15 *ῥὰ.* 21 *καταμένοιο.* 28 *ὄχεσφιν.* 30 *προσηῦδα.* 33 *ὁποτέροισι.* 36 *καμάνδρῳ.* 38 *δ' ἄναξ.* 40 *στραφέντι.* 44 *Θώρου* (?)*—ἐκ τ' ἄρνης.* 49 *καμάνδριον αἴμονα.* 52 *τε* om., ins. man. 2, *οὔρεσι* man. 2, *ουρεϊ* man. 1? (eras.). 53 *γε* om., ins. man. 2. 54 *ἦσι—πρὶν ἐκέκαστο* (*γ'* ins. m. 2). 55 *δουρικλυτὸς.* 60 *ἁρμονίδεο.* 64 *οἳ.* 66 *κατὰ—διαπρό.* 69 *Ἀντίνορος.* 70 *ῥὰ—μὲν* om., ins. m. 2. *—πύκας.* 72 *δουρικλυτὸς.* 75 *κονίῃ.* 77 *καμάνδρου.* 83 *ἔλαβε.* 86 *ὁμιλέει.* 89 *ἐέργμεναι* (*sic*). 98 *τυχὸν.* 96 *ἀμπεδίον.* 104 *δῆθ' ἀνασχήσεσθαι.* 108 *καπανήιος.* 109 *καταβήσαιο.* 110 *ὄφρα μοι.* 111 *ἂρ—χαμάζε.* 112 *παρ.* 114 *διὸς τέκος ἀτρυτώνη* (errore pro *βοὴν ἀγ. Διομ.*). 115 *κλῦθι μοι —τέκον.* 117 *αὖτ' ἐμὲ* (*ἐ* supras. m. 2) *φίλε'.* 119 *με φησὶ.* 326 *ἱπότα.* 128 *γινώσκῃς.* 136 *ἕλε.* 140 *ἔρημα.* 141 *ἀγχηστῖναι.* 142 *βαθείης.* 146 *κληΐδα.* 147 *ἐέργαθ'* (the apostrophe is doubtless a mere slip, in place of the ordinary compendium for *εν*). 148 *πολύειδον.* 153 *ὅ δ' ἐτείρετο.* 158 *δια.*

It will be seen that the critical value of the codex is by no means high: and to judge from an examination which I made of part of Bk. xxi. the copyist got still more careless as he advanced in his task. A collation of the whole MS. would clearly not repay the labour.

Our MS. is intimately connected with the "Vindobonensis 39", La Roche's G, as will be seen from the following variants in the first book, which are quite or almost peculiar to these two; other instances may be found on almost every page. 120 *λεύσσατε.* 239 *ὅρκος ἐσεῖται.* 268 *ὀρεσκώεσσι.* 324 *δώωσιν.* 338 *μάρτυρες.* 351 *ἠράσσατο.* 444 *ἱλασσώμεθα.* From the description given of G by La Roche (*Hom. Textkritik* p. 472, no. 92) it would seem that the resemblance extends to the material and writing; so that I strongly suspect them to be the work of the same hand. In any case they must be from the same source, and have no independent authority.

WALTER LEAF.

PLATONICA.

Phaedrus 231 D *καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἱροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἄν σοι ἡ ἔκλεξις εἴη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐκ πολλῶν ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.*

The argument is as follows: 'If you choose from *οἱ ἄλλοι*, i.e. the *μὴ ἐρῶντες*, you will choose from a larger number, and in the larger number (*ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*) you will be more likely to find a friend to suit you; consequently, you will be more likely to find a friend to suit you amongst the *μὴ ἐρῶντες*; in other words, *ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις*.' The text, as it stands, is however illogical, the middle term *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς* unexpectedly appearing in the conclusion, which is marked as such by the word *ὥστε*. Now this *ἐρωτικός* of Lysias is nothing, if not scrupulously and even pedantically observant of logical propriety. Hence, substituting *ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις* for *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*, I would read *ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.*

republic 490 C *Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν;*

So reads C. F. Hermann, following Paris. A and other codd. Bekker and Stallbaum (not without manuscript authority) read *ἀναλαμβάνοντα*. Madvig comments: "Nulla hic *ἀνάγκη*. Scrib. certissime: *πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναβιβάζοντα τάττειν*; in orchestram et pulpitum escendere iubentem"; and this emendation is accepted by the Zürich editors. It seems to me however that

ἀναγκάζοντα is both intelligible and appropriate. In the previous passage which is here referred to, 485 A—486 E, the "necessity", *ἀνάγκη*, of the several characteristics of the philosophical nature is repeatedly insisted upon; see in particular 486 E *Τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι; Ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.* It is in allusion to this that Socrates asks *Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν*; 'and now what need is there again to marshal the remaining characteristics of the philosophic nature, and again *to insist upon their necessity?*'

sophist 219 C *Τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τό τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν, κτλ.*

At 219 A the Stranger proposes to divide the arts into two kinds. Of these two kinds, the one, *ποιητική*, is described in the sentences which begin *Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ ξύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, κτλ*; the other, *κτητική*, is described in the sentence which begins with the words quoted above. It is therefore necessary to write, in place of *τὸ δὴ μαθηματικόν, τὸ δὲ μαθηματικόν, δέ* answering to the *μέν* of *Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητόν, κτλ.* I am anticipated here by Heindorf: but as Bekker, Stallbaum, C. F. Hermann, the Zürich editors, and Campbell have neglected the older scholar's curt remark "Sensu postulante *δὲ* reposui pro *δή*", it seems worth while to call attention to it and to justify it.

sophist 225 B *Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ ξυμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὂν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν οὔτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.*

"Non *αὐτό*, quod Edd. habent", says Heindorf, "sed *αὐτά* scribere post *ξυμβόλαια* ratio iubebat; sed quod sequitur *ταῦτα*,

non ego Stephani suasu sine libris mutem in *τοῦτο*. Ut h. l. *ταῦτα* post *ὅσον*, sic post *ὅ, τι ἂν* sequitur *ταῦτα* Xenoph. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3, 46. Similiterque Plato *de legg.* III. p. 678 E. Cf. Xen. *Oecon.* 9, 12." On the other hand Stallbaum in his critical note writes "*περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται*] Par. H. Flor. b. *αὐτά*. Dein *τοῦτο* pro vulg. *ταῦτα* recepi ex Par. CEH. Flor. a. b. c." It seems to me that Heindorf is right in his apprehension of the words *εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως, κτλ*, and therefore in his preference of *αὐτά*: but that he has not succeeded in justifying *ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος*. Hence, accepting *αὐτά*, I would place the comma, not before, but after, *ταῦτα*: thus—*εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως* περὶ αὐτὰ πράττεται ταῦτα, [i.e. *περὶ τὰ ξυμβόλαια πράττεται,*] *θετέον μὲν εἶδος, κτλ.*

sophist 249 B. Ξ. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο [sc. τὸν νοῦν] ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν. Θ. Πῶς; Ξ. Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἄν; Θ. Οὐδαμῶς. Ξ. Τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν; Θ. Ἥκιστα.

It is clear that *ἄνευ τούτων* in the Stranger's third utterance stands for *ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτό*. Hence, at the beginning of his second utterance, substituting *τὰ* for *τό*, read Τὰ *κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτό, κτλ.*

sophist 256 D Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα.

Having shown that "*κίνησις* is *ὄντως οὐκ ὄν*, and at the same time *ὄν*, because it participates in the *ὄν*,"—*ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὂν ἐστι, καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει*,—the Eleate, in the sentences extracted above, proceeds to include in his view *στάσις, ταὐτόν, θάτερον*: "Thus of necessity the *μὴ ὄν* exists, not only in the case of motion, but generally in the cases of all the

kinds; for, otherness, by making each one of them other than the *ὄν*, makes it *οὐκ ὄν*. Consequently we shall be justified in speaking of all of them as *οὐκ ὄντα*, and, at the same time, in virtue of their participation in the *ὄν*, as *ὄντα*." That this is the sense is clear. But I am inclined to question certain details of the received text:

(1) The punctuation is faulty. The paragraph consists of three sentences, *Ἔστιν ἄρα—τὰ γένη, κατὰ πάντα γὰρ—οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ*, and *καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ—ὄντα*. Of these, the first gives to the remark about *κίνησις* a general application, so far as concerns *μὴ ὄν*; the second justifies the first; the third echoes what has been said about all the *γένη* so far as concerns *μὴ ὄν*, and at the same time takes account of *ὄν* also; so that it is an extension of the first sentence, not, like the second, a mere explanation of it. Hence whereas the editors place the larger stop after *κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη*, and the smaller stop after *οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ*, the smaller stop should be placed after *κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη*, and the larger one after *οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ*.

(2) The particular statement about *κίνησις*,—*ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι, καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει*,—and the general statement about all the *γένη*,—*καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα*,—are constructed upon the selfsame lines. Does not the parallelism require that ὄντως *οὐκ ὄντα* should be substituted for οὕτως *οὐκ ὄντα*?

(3) The phrase *εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα* is surely inadmissible. What we want, is, I conceive, *εἶναί τι καὶ ὄντα*: "have existence and are existents".

I would write then, *Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ. καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ* ὄντως *οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί* τι *καὶ ὄντα.*

politicus 270 E *καὶ τῶν μὲν πρεσβυτέρων αἱ λευκαὶ τρίχες ἐμελαίνοντο, τῶν δ' αὖ γενειώντων αἱ παρειαὶ λεαινόμεναι πάλιν*

ἐπὶ τὴν παρελθοῦσαν ὥραν ἕκαστον καθίστασαν, τῶν δὲ ἡβώντων τὰ σώματα λεαινόμενα *καὶ σμικρότερα καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ἑκάστην γιγνόμενα πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς παιδὸς φύσιν ἀπῄει, κατά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀφομοιούμενα· τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη μαραινόμενα κομιδῇ τὸ πάμπαν ἐξηφανίζετο.*

In the retrograde process here described, the hair of the old man as he passes into the prime of life becomes darker, the cheeks of the grown man as he passes into youth become smoother, and the frame of the young man as he passes into childhood becomes smaller, until at last it dwindles into nothingness. In this last transition however, it is further mentioned that the body becomes smoother. Surely there is something inartistic in the reintroduction of the change by which the previous transition was characterized, especially as the very same word is used—*αἱ παρειαὶ λεαινόμεναι, τὰ σώματα λεαινόμενα.* What is wanted, is, I think, not *τὰ σώματα* λεαινόμενα, but *τὰ σώματα* λεπτυνόμενα.

HENRY JACKSON.

June 2, 1884.

IN PURIS NATURALIBUS.

(Read before the *Cambridge Philological Society*, 4 *May*, 1882.)

In a paper read before our Society on the 20th of May 1875 (*Journal of Philology* VI 174-5) I shewed that this phrase originated with the schoolmen of the middle ages, and continued to be current in scholastic divinity after the reformation.

Thus in Bellarmine *de gratia et libero arbitrio* l. v c. 6 (*disputationum tom.* IV Colon. 1619 fol. col. 679) we read:

Praeterea natura humana dicitur infirma, si comparetur ad sanitatem iustitiae originalis, in qua condita fuit: nam absolute non est minus sana, quam esset, si in puris naturalibus crearetur: haberet autem homo, in puris naturalibus conditus, uires ad seruanda praecepta naturalia; igitur et nunc habet.

Respondeo, natura humana non solum infirma est, quia caret sanitate iustitiae originalis, sed etiam, quia ex condicione naturae, ut alibi demonstrauimus, internum et naturalem morbum habet concupiscentiae carnalis, quem non habuisset si in originali iustitia permansisset, habuisset tamen, si in puris naturalibus condita fuisset. natura autem infirma potest quidem omnia, quae posset sana, sed non sola; eget enim auxilio, quo non egeret, si sana esset. quo modo corporaliter aegrotus potest iter facere, sed in equo, uel certe cum baculo, cum alioqui sanus idem iter pedibus et sine baculo confecisset. itaque si homo in puris naturalibus consideretur, quoniam etiam tunc infirmus esset propter morbum ex condicione naturae promanantem, non haberet uires, quibus sine adiutorio Dei posset omnia mandata seruare; sed tamen uel auxilium non defuisset, uel homo non sua culpa aliquando cecidisset.

Bp. Andrewes XCVI *Sermons*[5] Lond. 1661 fol. p. 697 After these, those two main Heresies, that so mightily troubled

the Church: First, that of the *Manichee*, who brought a *necessity* upon all things by meanes of his *duo principia:* making men secure how they lived, because it was ordained what should become of them. Secondly, the other of the *Pelagian*, who ascribed to mans *free-will*, and ability *to keep Gods Lawes;* and thereby made void the grace of *Christ.* Both these were but two bastard slips of corrupt *Philosophy:* The former, an *imagination* issuing from the sect of *Stoicks*, and their *fatal destiny.* The latter, from the sect of the *Peripateticks*, and their *pure naturals.*

Richardson cites from Bp. Hall (*St Paul's Combat*) It is with depraved man *in his impure naturalls*, that we must maintaine this quarell.

Romulus and Tarquin, first written in Italian by the Marques Virgilio Malvezzi. And now taught English, by H. L^d. Cary of Lepington: the second edition. London: Printed by I. H. for Iohn Benson, and are to be sould at his shopp under S^t. Dunstons Church Fleet street. 1638. 12^mo. p. 270 The opinion which was held of *Brutus* his foolishness, stood him in good stead; they thinke it forebodes something, to heare one speake so well, who they hardly did beleeve could speake; his speech was then of so much more force, by how much it was formerly thought full of weaknesse: they looke for no cunning in a man, whom they judge in his *puris naturalibus.*

Jeremy Taylor *Liberty of prophesying* (Lond. 1647 4to) s. 18 n. 5 pp. 224-5 But whether they have originall sinne or no, yet take them *in puris naturalibus*, they cannot goe to God, or attaine to eternity: to which they were intended in their first being and creation, and therefore much lesse since their *naturals* are impair'd by the curse on humane nature procur'd by *Adams* prevarication. And if a naturall agent cannot *in puris naturalibus* attaine to heaven, which is a supernaturall end, much lesse when it is loaden with accidental and grievous impediments. ibid. n. 15 p. 230 neither Infants nor any man *in puris naturalibus* can attain to a supernaturall end without the addition of some instrument or meanes of Gods appointing ordinarily. ibid. n. 31 p. 244 As Infants by the force of nature cannot put themselves into a supernaturall condition (and there-

fore say the *Paedo-baptists*, they need Baptism to put them into it:) so if they be baptized before the use of reason, before the *works of the Spirit*, before the operations of Grace, before they can throw off *the works of darknesse, and live in righteousnesse and newnesse of life*, they are never the nearer: From the paines of Hell they shall be saved by the mercies of God and their own innocence, though they die *in puris naturalibus*, and Baptism will carry them no further.

Jer. Taylor *An answer to a letter written by the R. R. the L^d. B^p. of* Rochester. *Concerning the chapter of* Original Sin *in the* Unum Necessarium (London, R. Royston 1656 12mo) p. 13 For so far I admit this *pain of loss*, or rather a deficiency of going to Heaven, to be the consequence of *Adam's* sin, that by it we being left *in meris naturalibus*, could never by these strengths alone have gone to Heaven. ibid. p. 15 For when I affirm that Infants being by *Adam* reduc'd and left to their *meer natural state*, fall short of Heaven; I do not say they cannot go to Heaven at all, but they cannot go thither by their naturall powers, they cannot without a new grace and favour go to heaven.

Jeremy Taylor *Unum Necessarium* c. 6 s. 1 § 3 (VII 243 Eden) Man being left in this state of *pure naturals*, could not by his own strength arrive to a supernatural end. ibid. s. 7 § 86 (p. 290) Natural agents can effect but natural ends, by natural instruments: and now supposing the former doctrine, that we lost not the divine favour by our guilt of what we never did consent to, yet we were born *in pure naturals*, and they some of them worsted by our forefathers, yet we were, at the best, born but *in pure naturals*, and we must be born again. ib. § 87 lest He leaving us, we be left as Adam left us, *in pure naturals*, but in some degree worsted by the nature of sin in some instances, and the anger of God in all. ib. c. 7 s. 4 § 18 δ It [original sin] hath left us *in pure naturals*, disrobed of such aids extraordinary as Adam had. ib. c. 8 s. 1 § 2 *ad fin.* (p. 342) This is the state of a natural man *in his mere naturals*, especially as they are made worse by evil customs and vile usages of the world. ib. s. 2 § 16 (p. 348) A man not only *in pure naturals*, but even placed under the law, is called carnal.

Sorbière, *Relation d'un voyage en Angleterre* (Colon. 1666 12mo) p. 90 Je ne prétends point aussi faire servir ce crayon à vous représenter une infinité d'excellens hommes que j'ay admirez en Angleterre ; & ce que je me suis figuré des autres ne regarde que ceux qui sont demeurez *in puris naturalibus*, qui n'ont point adouci par estude, ny par raisonnement, ou par d'autres habitudes dans les pays estrangers, ce qu'ils ont naturellement de rude dans le leur. Compare Tho. Spratt *Observations on* Monsieur de Sorbier's *voyage into England* (London, printed for John Martyn and James Allestry, printers to the Royal Society, 1668. 12mo) p. 191, where he says that Dr Wallis (p. 185 misprinted Willis pp. 186, 188, 189) esteemed Sorbière, from his frequent mention of Descartes and Mersennus, as a man of some real and solid knowledge. P. 191 But nothing could he get from him, except only some few Philosophical terms, and ends of Poetry, as *In puris naturalibus, Ex aequo et bono, contundantur grosso modo.*

It would be interesting to learn when the phrase, thus used by Sorbière as a mere *purpureus pannus* of conversation, assumed its present grotesque signification, given e.g. by Heyse-Mahn *Fremdwörterbuch*[12] (Hannover 1859) *im natürlichen Zustande, ohne Bekleidung, nackt.* Dan. Sanders *Fremdwörterbuch* (Leipz. 1871) *so wie Gott Einen geschaffen, nackt.*

In Wieland's introduction to his translation (first published 1782) of Hor. epist. I 16, we find the phrase in its modern acceptation. No one will accuse Wieland of studying the schoolmen or Bellarmine ; he is witness that exactly one hundred years ago the degradation of this abstruse term of technical divinity was complete.

Denn die Pedanterei, jedem guten Freunde, oder dem ersten dem Besten, der ihm in den Wurf kommt, mit einer strengen moralischen Predigt auf den Leib zu rücken, wird unserm Dichter niemand zutrauen, der ihn halbweg kennt. Einem alten Kamaraden hingegen, dem wir uns selber immer *in puris naturalibus* gezeigt haben, lässt sich bei Gelegenheit schon so ein vertraulich Wort ins Ohr sagen.

J. E. B. MAYOR.

ALLOQVIMVR IN SENECA *EP.* 121.

SEN. ep. 121 (al. 122, beginning *litigabis*) § 4 non desistam persequi nequitiam et adfectus efferatissimos inhibere et uoluptates ituras in dolorem conpescere et uotis obstrepere. quid ni? cum maxima malorum optauerimus et ex gratulatione natum sit, quicquid *adloquimur*. So Haase (Leipzig, Teubner 1853). The first edition (Strassburg n. d. circa 1470 fol. in Trin. coll. library, class mark vi^{c} 4 3 fol. 197) has also *alloquimur*. An ed. in the univ. library (Taruisii Bern. de Colonia 1478 fol.) omits this epistle; at least it is not in its place. Intervening editions (Erasmus, Bas. 1513 fol. St John's; 1529 fol. Trin.; C. S. Curio, ib. 1557 fol. univ. libr.; Prallius, ib. 1573 fol. Trin.; Lipsius, Antv. 1605, Trin.; ib. 1607 fol. *penes me*; Gronovius, Amst. 1672; Bipont 1809; Fickert, Leipzig, 1842) read *obloquimur*. All Fickert's mss., if I understand him, read (*ad-* or) *alloquimur*. Bentley on Hor. epod. 13 18 forbids the Latins to imitate the Greek παραμύθιον ἀτυχίας. *Sane* alloqui *est* solari, *et* alloquium *et* allocutio *est* consolatio: *sed ea semper ad personam aegram referuntur, numquam (ut hic uolunt) ad aegritudinem ipsam.* Bentley was not aware of the evidence for *alloquimur* in our passage; he has no note upon it in his '*Hand-exemplar*' in the university library. The same excuse cannot be made for Madvig, who says (advers. II 512) adloquimur. *sic codices (aut* alloquimur) *et Haasius, sine sensu; perspicuum est enim, stultitiam uotorum humanorum ex eo ostendi, quod, quae nunc lugeamus et quibus liberari cupiamus, ex uoto nobis acciderint, et cum gratulatione accepta sint. sed quod Fickertus* [!] *substituit,* quicquid obloquimur, *etiam prauius*

est; nihil enim aliud est nisi: quicquid contra (*quos aut quod?*) dicimus. *suspicor fuisse:* quicquid AMOLIMVR. *nam* lacrimamus *nimis longe abit.* The *obloquimur* no doubt was suggested by *obstrepere* above; it certainly is devoid of sense. But Madvig's *amolimur* (or *lacrimamus*) is utterly flat and pointless. He assumes that *alloquimur* means 'we address'. He ought to know that *gratulor* and *alloquor* are elsewhere contrasted, as 'congratulation' and 'condolence'. Muretus, Bentley and all the lexx. cite Sen. Tro. 619 620 'alios parentes *alloqui* in luctu decet, tibi *gratulandum est,* misera, quod nato cares'. Lambinus. Klotz and Corradini cite VM. II 7 § 6 nostra urbs...imperatorum proprio sanguine manantes secures... ex castris publice speciosas, privatim lugubres duplici vultu recepit, incerta *gratulandi* an *alloquendi* officio fungeretur.

I have examined all the passages, cited in indexes, where the verb or its substantives occur, and have found no other place than this of Seneca in which the object of the verb is a thing. But the genitive *aegrimoniae* in Horace is authority sufficient, for no one will make it depend on *malum.*

The evidence is collected by Victorius var. lect. VIII 23, Muretus var. lect. II 4, Lambinus and Bentley on Hor. epod. 13 18, and in the lexx. under *allocutio* (esp. Catull.), *alloquium, alloquor.* See Ov. tr. I 5 3 4. 8 18. IV 5 3. P. I 6 18. f. III 611. Liv. IX 6 § 8 neque illis sociorum comitas vultusque benigni et *adloquia* non modo sermonem elicere, sed ne ut oculos quidem attollerent aut *consolantes* amicos contra intuerentur, efficere poterant.

VM. IV 6 E § 3 velut *allocuturae* perituros viros.

Auson. periocha Il. XVIII quem [Achillem] vi doloris affectum *consolantibus* verbis mater *alloquitur.* Cf. Symm. ep. VI 36.

Servius on Verg. Aen. X 860 ADLOQVITVR MAERENTEM proprie *alloquitur* dixit: est enim *adloqui* consolari.

In the Old Latin Io. evang. 11 31 παραμυθούμενοι is represented in cod. Corb. by *adloquebantur,* vulg. *consolabantur.* In the vulgate *allocutio* occurs three times = παραμύθιον Wisd. 3 18, and = παραμυθία ib. 19 12. = παραίνεσις ibid. 8 9.

Haase cites in his index one or two passages of Seneca which are to the point.

ep. 98 § 9 egregie itaque uidetur mihi Metrodorus dixisse in ea epistula, qua sororem amisso optimae indolis filio *adloquitur*: 'mortale est omne mortalium bonum'.

cons. ad Polyb. 14 § 2 nullus itaque melius has *adloquendi* partes occupauerit.

cons. ad Marc. 1 § 6 omnia in superuacuum temptata sunt: fatigatae *adlocutiones* amicorum.

cons. ad Heluiam 1 § 3 ita in re noua haesitabam uerebarque, ne haec non *consolatio* esset, sed exulceratio. quid quod nouis uerbis nec ex uolgari et cotidiana sumptis *adlocutione* opus erat homini ad *consolandos* suos ex ipso rogo caput adleuanti?

Thus we see that a reading supported by all mss. and by the *editio princeps*, can within a few years be supplanted by another, which gives no sense; that this intruder can pass muster with Erasmus, Muretus, Lipsius, Gronovius, and all scholars for some 350 years or more; that when the original is at last restored, the foremost Latin critic of the day can condemn it unheard, though the common lexicons furnish certain evidence in its favour, and though it rescues a fine expression of Horace from murder at the hands of Bentley.

The general thought of the passage is that of Juvenal's tenth satire.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

NOTES ON PLIN. *EP.* I 5 3 AND ON JUVENAL I 144—6.

In the third volume, just published, of Madvig's *aduersaria*, are many certain emendations. But there is a mixture of chaff with the wheat. As editors are apt to assume that all a consummate critic's conjectures are alike entitled to a place in the text, I lose no time in defending the received reading in two passages.

Page 215. "**Plinius minor.** Ep. 1 5 3 (de M. Regulo post Domitiani mortem timido propter conscientiam scelerum commissorum): Lacerat Herennium Senecionem, tam intemperanter quidem, ut cet. Necessario scribendum lacerarat et propter rem et propter ea, quae praecedunt, plusquamperfecta fouerat et exsultauerat."

This seemed convincing, until I examined the foregoing and following context:

§ 2 Rustici Aruleni periculum fouerat, exultauerat morte, adeo ut librum recitaret publicaretque, in quo Rusticum insectatur atque etiam Stoicorum simiam appellat; adicit Vitelliana cicatrice stigmosum. § 3 agnoscis eloquentiam Reguli. lacerat Herennium Senecionem, tam intemperanter quidem, ut dixerit ei Mettius Carus 'quid tibi cum meis mortuis?'

Contrast the *consecutio temporum* 'fouerat adeo, ut recitaret,' with 'lacerat, tam intemperanter, ut dixerit.' Plainly *lacerat*, like *appellat* and *adicit*, describes the contents of the book. 'Cicero *says* in the Offices,' is the regular form of citation in all languages.

JUVENAL I 144—6.

hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus,
et noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas
ducitur iratis plaudendum funus amicis.

Madvig (p. 249) seems long ago to have been puzzled by this passage:

"unam hic ponam de Iuuenalis loco coniecturam olim errore a me omissam. Nam I 144 sic editur: Hinc (ex luxuriosis cenis et gulae intemperantia) subitae mortes atque intestata senectus cet. Subitas mortes effici cenandi luxuria nihil mirum est, sed quid ea ad testamenta impedienda pertineat, non intellego, neque magis, cur senum maxime testamenta in hac re appellentur. Quid potest, si sententia uerborum explanetur, stultius aut peruersius dici quam propter cenandi intemperantiam senes testamenta non facere? Una littera mutata efficitur recta et apta sententia: atque **infestata** senectus. Senectus subitis his et praematuris mortibus infestatur, paucique aut nulli eam consequuntur. Eodem pertinent sine ulla testamentorum significatione, quae subiciuntur (it noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas cet., ubi superstitiose restitutum est et, quasi haec coeant, non dico apte, sed tolerabiliter: Hinc subitae mortes ... et noua n. t. p. c. fabula c.)."

To me it appears that *infestata*, absolutely used, is intolerably bald, whereas *intestata* is imperatively required by verse 146. Why are the friends angry? Because there is no will. The *senex orbus*, surprised by death, had no time to make one. See my notes on Juvenal III 129, IV 19, X 202 and ind. *s. vv.* 'captator,' 'orbus.' The fortune-hunters, *captatores*, gather around the carcase: *uultur est, cadauer exspectat.* Cf. Sen. ep. 68 § 10 *digerere in litteram* senes orbos. Cic. parad. § 39 *hereditatis spes quid iniquitatis inseruiendo non suscipit? quem nutum* locupletis orbi senis *non obseruat?* Thus I have accounted for *intestata* and *senectus*. Nor can I

allow that *et* is corrupt: *hinc subitae mortes* [oriuntur] *et funus ir. pl. am. ducitur* runs well, whereas the three lines without the copula seem to me *harena sine calce.*

[Since the above was in type, I find, to my great joy, that I can agree with Madvig in restoring *it.* I now feel that the two verbs *it, ducitur,* each beginning its line and its clause, have the effect of *anaphora,* than which a sentence needs no stronger cement. That *it* is more likely to have been corrupted into *et,* than the converse, is obvious; *per cunctas cenas* goes more naturally with *it* than with *noua fabula.* The table-talk of verse 145, over which no tear is shed, is the sudden death of the intestate Dives; *coruos delusit hiantes;* no one mourns for him; no one pities the fortune-hunters, grumbling over their lost hook and bait. *It noua per cunctas* suggests the rapid, wild-fire, spread of gossip; the *ducitur* of 146 the slow procession of the *funus plaudendum* (not *lugendum*); the whole picture, compressing entire pamphlets of Lucian into a narrow compass, ends with a happy *ἀπροσδόκητον—amicis.* Not unlike is the desertion of Seianus; *gaudent omnes; numquam, si quid mihi credis, amaui hunc hominem.*]

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

HORAT. *SAT.* I. 9. 39; 75.

Mr Verrall in the last number of this Journal (vol. XIII. p. 56) has very ingeniously suggested that we should in ver. 39 read *sta re* for *stare, sta* being a colloquial form for the abl. fem. of *iste*. He translates the passage *Inteream si aut ualeo sta re aut noui ciuilia iura* 'may I be confounded, if I have either any talent in that way or any knowledge of law'. By this means we get a satisfactory meaning for *ualeo*, and get rid of the difficulties which Mr Verrall thinks seriously beset *stare*.

It would doubtless be no very bold conjecture to read the full form *ista;* and even the introduction of the short form *sta* in Horace has already been suggested by Lachmann on Lucr. III. 954 (p. 197), who proposes *nempe modo sto* for *nempe modo isto* in *Epist.* II. 2. 163, on the ground that the general rule of almost all poets was not to put an acute syllable (except with hiatus) after an iambic word ending in a vowel. He gives other instances of this short form of *iste*, chiefly from the MSS of Nonius. Corssen (*Aussprache* II. 629) gives a long list of passages from Plautus, which appear to suggest this pronunciation. Lucian Müller, in his *de re metrica* p. 304 and his edition of Horace, approves of the pronunciation *modo sto*, though he writes *modo isto*.

The word *iste* in different cases occurs (according to the Index to Bentley's Horace) in 25 other places of the Satires and Epistles and in one of the Epodes. In 22 of these places the full form is requisite for the metre: in the remaining 4 we have (all at the end of the line) *pugnantiaque istis, quid simile isti, effugere istinc, cena sine istis*, where few persons would elide the initial *i* and lengthen the *e* before *st*, in face of Horace's habit of using *e* short before *-st, sc;* e.g. *Sat.* I. 2. 71; II. 3. 43, &c. No doubt *o* in *modo isto* and in Mr Verrall's *ualeo ista* has

more claim than a short *e* to survival in the conflict with the following pronoun. But, whatever was the pronunciation, I conceive Horace (or his copyists) would *write* the full form of the pronoun in these two lines, as he, or they, did in the 25 other places; and as the MSS give no hint of *ista re* in our passage, I am disposed to see whether there is any great difficulty in treating *stare* as an infinitive.

Mr Verrall rightly rejects the old interpretations of *si valeo stare*, viz. 'if I am strong enough to stand so long' (so Com. Cruq.), or 'if I can stop' (so Porph.). But the third rendering given with these by Mr Palmer, 'if I am able to appear as an advocate in court' (*stare* = *adesse* in the technical sense), is rejected by Mr Verrall as not supported by sufficient evidence.

Now the truth is, *stare* has a technical meaning in law and one of a kind very suitable to this passage. It means 'to appear in court' not as an advocate, but as a party. I have discussed the use of the intransitive *stare* and the transitive *sistere* in this connexion in my *Introduction to Justinian's Digest* p. ccxxvii, and will here only quote three or four instances of its use. Ulpian in Dig. II. 11, l 4 § 1, *Plane si uinculis uel custodia militari impeditus ideo non stetit, in ea erit causa ut exceptione utatur.* 'Clearly if a man has not appeared, because he was in chains or under guard, he will be entitled to plead this excuse'. Dig. xlv. 1. l 81 pr. *Qui alium sisti promittit, hoc promittit id se acturum ut stet.* 'One who promises another's appearance, promises this, that he will procure that the other do appear'. But more useful instances are in Gaius and Cicero, which illustrate not merely this word, but other parts of the narrative of Horace. Gaius says (IV. 185) *cum autem in ius uocatus fuerit aduersarius neque eo die finiri potuerit negotium, uadimonium ei faciendum est, id est, ut promittat se certo die sisti. Fiunt autem uadimonia quibusdam ex causis pura, id est sine satisdatione, quibusdam cum satisdatione, quibusdam iureiurando, quibusdam recuperatoribus suppositis, id est ut, qui non steterit, is protinus a recuperatoribus in summam uadimonii condemnetur; eaque singula diligenter praetoris edicto significantur,* i.e. 'when our opponent has been summoned into court 'and the matter cannot be finished on that day, an engagement

'to appear must be made, that is, he must promise his appear-'ance on a day fixed. Such engagements are made in four 'different ways: in some cases a simple promise is sufficient, in 'others sureties are given, in others the promise is made on 'oath, in others judges are set up who should at once give 'judgment for the amount specified in the agreement against 'the party not appearing. The details are given in the prae-'tor's edicts'. The passage from Cicero is *Quinct.* 6 § 25. Quinctius and Naevius had a dispute on a matter of partnership. Several arrangements for a trial (*uadimonia*) were made and put off. At length they meet and separate again, without, as Cicero says, any further arrangement for a trial. Naevius professed to have helped himself, and to have now no claim on Quinctius. Quinctius determined to visit the scene of the partnership business in Gaul and for the present reserved any claim he might have on Naevius. Naevius waited till Quinctius was on his road and then suddenly summoned his friends (as if a *uadimonium* had been made between Quinctius and himself) *ut ad tabulam Sextiam sibi adsint hora secunda postridie. Ueniunt frequentes. Testificatur iste P. Quinctium non stetisse et stetisse se: tabulae maxime signis hominum nobilium consignantur, disceditur. Postulat a Burrieno praetore Naeuius ut ex edicto bona possidere liceat.* 'Naevius requests the presence 'of his friends at the *tabula Sextia*' (what this was, I do not know) 'at 7 o'clock the next morning. They come in numbers. 'Naevius declares in their presence that Quinctius has not 'appeared and that he himself has appeared. A document is 'drawn up setting forth this fact, and his friends, particularly 'men of position, put their seals to it. The meeting then 'breaks up. Naevius applies to the praetor Burrienus for leave 'to seize Quinctius' property in accordance with the terms of 'the praetor's standing edict'.

The reading *stetisse* is that of all the MSS. The editors, wrongly applying Gell. XI. 14, have substituted *stitisse* (see *Introd. Just. Dig.* p. ccxxvii). We have the word *steti* here used in the most formal manner possible of a party's appearance in accordance with an alleged *uadimonium*. We have also *adesse* used of the presence of Naevius' friends, not as advocates (which

is only one application of the word out of many) but as witnesses to a solemn declaration of a fact. And finally we have the consequences of non-appearance in this case, viz. an application, which the praetor grants, for a formal seizure of all the deserter's property. I think these passages are enough to establish this technical meaning of *stare*. The Digest will furnish more if required.

Mr Verrall rightly demands a full and authorized meaning for *ualeo*. Now *ualere* is very commonly used of action or opinion legally good and competent. *Ualet mancipatio, prius testamentum non ualet, exceptiones* ('pleas') *ualent, ualet sententia* &c., are ordinary expressions. I cannot at this moment produce an instance of *ualere* used with a personal subject in this sense. But then it is not a common occurrence which would require a personal use. I see no objection to such a use, and therefore translate the words of Horace: 'Hang me if 'I am either competent to appear as a party concerned or know 'law to assist you as counsel: i.e. I am not plaintiff, defendant, 'or surety, and I am not a lawyer, so that my presence is quite 'superfluous, and, as I have told you, I have some business in 'hand'. This interpretation gives a clear and pertinent distinction between the two clauses (they are clauses with *aut... aut*), whereas Mr Verrall's tends to make them tautologous.

I pass now to another passage in this satire. On verse 75 Mr Palmer notes: 'The plaintiff was on his way to court and 'finds his man strolling away from it. Why did not the *aduer-* '*sarius* allow the defendant to let judgment go by default? 'Because though in case of default the plaintiff obtained '*possessio bonorum* of the defendant, this was incomplete for a 'year: in case of arrest, judgment in full was summary'. He refers to Dr Maguire's article in *Hermathena*, vol. III. p. 133, but evidently misunderstands it, and this explanation (unlike those of Mr Palmer generally) is from the beginning to the end utterly wrong. The *possessio bonorum* was not 'incomplete': it was a mere guardianship which neither 'in a year' nor in any other time ripened into ownership (Dig. XLI. 2. 1 3 § 23; 1 10 § 1); judgment was not 'summary in case of arrest'

any more than in case of appearance on bail; and 'summary judgment' is in no sort of opposition to 'incomplete possession'. Incomplete hearing of a case belongs to one category and imperfect title to property to another.

But the question put by Mr Palmer is pertinent, though a precise answer is far from easy. We know nothing of the matter except what Horace tells us, and, when a poet tells an anecdote, one cannot be sure that he uses expressions in the precise technical sense. On *uadimonium* generally, as on many other points of procedure in classical times, our information is very meagre, and consists mainly of inferences from occasional allusions. In the present case we neither know the nature of the suit, nor the kind of *uadimonium* entered into (cf. Gai. IV. 185 quoted above). It is not clear whether Horace's acquaintance was plaintiff or defendant. The expression *perdere litem* is a regular expression for the plaintiff (cf. Gai. IV. 11; 30; 60; 123); but *respondere* is as regularly used for the defendant. *Rem relinquere* is not so technical, and might be used for either, whether you take *rem* as the property in dispute (and even *lis* = *res* Var. L. L. VII. 93; Cic. *Mur.* 12 § 27 fin.) or as the suit itself. But the final proceedings make it difficult to suppose Horace's acquaintance to be plaintiff. Defendants are rarely anxious to force plaintiffs into court. Most writers agree in making the bore to be defendant, and I shall call him so.

Again it is not clear whether before the end of the satire the *aduersarius* had already been at the court and the defendant's delinquency was ascertained, or, as Mr Palmer supposes, the *aduersarius* was on his way to the court and anticipated the delinquency. We do not know at what hour the defendant was bound to appear (apparently some time after the end of the third hour *quarta iam parte diei praeterita*), nor at what time non-appearance would be accounted default. (If the practice of the Sicilian courts in a trial before *iudices* is evidence, it would not be till the tenth hour. Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 17 § 41; and see the XII tables quoted at end of this article.) The time occupied by the conversation described from ver. 38 to 74 need not have been long, but then a poet is not a *verbatim* reporter and may well have given only salient passages.

But Apollo did not save Horace from much, if he took the whole day about it and thus prevented Horace completing his stroll or call. Half an hour between ver. 38 and ver. 74 seems to me enough.

Before we can give any answer to Mr Palmer's question we must make some assumption as to the position of the *aduersarius*. Had he been in court and got judgment in the suit by default of the defendant? or was he proceeding to enforce the special terms of the *uadimonium*? or was he simply baulking the defendant's manifest intention to break his engagement?

1. Had the plaintiff actually got judgment by default of defendant? No: for until the defendant had appeared and joined issue, the praetor could not hear the case. The words *rapit in ius* show that the case had not yet left the praetor: the issue was not settled, and therefore *iudices* were not appointed. Moreover *uadimonium* applied to proceedings *in iure:* there is no clear evidence of its applicability to proceedings *in iudicio* (Rudorff *Rechtsgeschichte* II. § 64 p. 214, Keller *Civil-Proz.* n. 541—554 ed. Wach).

2. Was the plaintiff proceeding on the conditions of the *uadimonium* itself? Among the kinds of *uadimonium* mentioned by Gaius IV. 185 (quoted above p. 234) is one which seems specially suitable. Suppose the defendant to have agreed that, if he did not duly appear, he should be treated just as if judgment had actually been given against him, and that *recuperatores* already named should proceed immediately to assess the damages. Now in the next section (IV. 186) Gaius tells us that in the case of a suit to enforce a judgment-debt the penalty stipulated in the *uadimonium* was to be the value of the matter in dispute (*quanti ea res est*), in most other suits it was not more than half the value. The expressions *perdere litem* and *relinquere rem* become thus very appropriate. On this supposition the *aduersarius* would be acting in enforcement, not of a judgment-debt, but of an equivalent penalty due on breach of the *uadimonium*. But if *recuperatores* were already appointed, the next step would be to apply to them (*protinus condemnetur* Gai. IV. 185), and this would hardly be called *in ius rapit*. Karlowa (*Civil-Prozess* p. 320) supposes

that the *uadimonium* contained nothing about *recuperatores*, and that the plaintiff in dragging the bore into court was applying for an order from the praetor for his private imprisonment (*duci*) till the amount claimed was paid. Dr Maguire, in the paper referred to by Mr Palmer, supposes the *recuperatores* to have required some instructions from the praetor. Neither supposition seems to be supported by positive evidence of such cases.

3. Was the plaintiff simply anticipating and baulking a breach of the *uadimonium*? He might be either coming to the court himself to keep the engagement (as Mr Palmer suggests), or might have been already at the court (as Orelli supposes), and before bringing on the case heard of the defendant being in the neighbourhood and come to find him. *Casu uenit obuius illi* seems rather better suited to a purely accidental meeting than to the happy result of a purposed search. And the time which had elapsed since the defendant passed the temple of Vesta was probably too short to have established default in appearance. On the other hand *perdere litem* would on this supposition have either to refer to the forfeiture stipulated in the *uadimonium*—a use for which one would like some precedent—or to have only a loose meaning. For the consequence of non-appearance (apart from the penalty of the *uadimonium*) was not an adverse judgment in the suit, but treatment as a bankrupt. The plaintiff, if he chose to push matters to extremes, would, on the default of the defendant being duly ascertained, apply for an order from the praetor for the possession of all the defendant's property. This was the course actually adopted by the plaintiff Naevius against Cicero's client Quinctius (Cic. *Quinct.* 6; 15—17). The order appears to have been granted almost as a matter of course, the applicant taking the order at his own peril. If he was acting unjustifiably in so doing, the alleged defaulter could, on shewing good cause of absence, get the order rescinded, and could retaliate by bringing an action against the plaintiff for insult (*iniuriarum*). See Keller *Semestr.* I. 79 sqq.; Bethmann-Hollweg *Civil-Proz.* § 106 (= II. p. 561 sqq.). All the creditors of the defendant had a right to join in this possession, which was not in itself a benefi-

cial occupancy, but only a means of inducing the defendant to appear and come to terms. If he kept out of the way, after a certain interval there was a formal sale and division of the proceeds. (Gai. III. 78 sqq.: Dig. IV. 5, 21 § 2.)

Supposing however this third alternative to have been the true one, why should the *aduersarius* not leave the defendant alone and apply for the order in bankruptcy? If any one reads the speech *pro Quinctio*, he will see that there were serious difficulties attendant on such an order, and that none but a very litigious plaintiff would be eager to incur the risk. The suit in question could not have been a very important one, or the defendant would hardly have relinquished it even for Horace's company and the chance of an introduction to Maecenas. The defendant was not in hiding, and he had not fled the country (cf. Cic. *Quinct.* 19 § 60): the plaintiff actually meets him in the street. An order in bankruptcy, even if granted, would not be maintainable; it was out of proportion to the case, and the defendant might perhaps be able to shew a good excuse. Further the plaintiff would probably have to wait some time at the court for the judicial ascertainment of the default and the consequent application to the praetor. It was a far safer and shorter process to secure the defendant's presence so that the case might be heard and decided. A plaintiff with a good case would hardly hesitate to do so.

Dr Maguire sees an answer to Mr Palmer's question in the words of Paulus Dig. II. 4. l 19 *si ex publico conspiciatur, recte eum in ius uocari Iulianus ait,* and apparently takes *recte eum uocari* as meaning that 'a summons was the right course', as if the *aduersarius* had no choice, as soon as he met Horace's acquaintance in the street. Perhaps under the circumstances he had not; but *recte eum uocari* means only that a summons was legal, not that it was the only legal proceeding; and the words *ex publico conspici,* at least in this context, imply that the summoner was in the street and the summoned in the house. The passage refers to the case of a man keeping close to avoid a summons. A man's house was his castle in Roman as in English law, and no one could penetrate into it to serve a summons on the occupant. But "if he allowed himself to be

seen from a public place Julian held that he might legally be summoned". Our case is quite different. The bore is not hiding at home: the case is not one of an original summons, but of proceedings after a *uadimonium*, and we require neither Julian nor Paul to tell us that an original summons might be served on a man when, like the bore, he is walking openly in the streets.

According to Gaius IV. 183 sqq. the first appointment was *in ius uocatio* as in old times. When the defendant had thus once been in court, the Praetor arranged for his future appearance by a *uadimonium*. But in Cicero we read of *uadimonium* only: that appears to have, probably by voluntary agreement, superseded the original summary procedure even for the first appearance. Anyhow there is no cause to doubt that this passage of Horace was quite in accordance with practice, and that on breach of a *uadimonium*, whether the breach were actual or plainly imminent, the right of compulsion revived. (Cf. Bethmann-Hollweg § 83 n. 8).

The XII tables which illustrate ver. 76 by the extract preserved in Porphyrio's note, *si in ius uocat, ito; ni it, antestamino, igitur em capito*, contain in a fragment given by Gell. XVII. 2. § 10 words which appear to illustrate ver. 37. *Ante meridiem causam coiciunto: cum peroranto ambo praesentes. Post meridiem praesenti litem addicito* (I give the passage, as Schöll has after others restored them). "After noon assign the disputed thing to the party still present" seems to fit exactly the case in which the bore had *perdere litem*. But, apart from the difficulty of dealing with such mutilated parts of a law, we have to face first the fact that these words relate to proceedings *in iudicio* and not *in iure* (Bethm.-Hollweg i. p. 187) and thus conflict with *uadato* as well as *in ius rapit* (see above p. 237); secondly it is hardly reasonable to suppose that three good hours (from end of 3rd hour to past noon) had elapsed between ver. 35 and ver. 74; thirdly the extent in which the XII tables were operative in Horace's time is unknown. It may however be that the words of the old law, well known to Romans, have given a colour to Horace's narrative, and occasioned the use of technical terms without precise accuracy.

29 *Oct.* 1884. HENRY J. ROBY.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

IV *THE THEAETETUS.*

§ 1 *Introductory.*

In the foregoing papers I have endeavoured to shew:

(1) that in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, Plato, seeking to resolve certain Zenonian paradoxes of predication and at the same time to provide a theory of knowledge, postulates an idea, at once separate and immanent, wherever two or more particulars are called by the same name;

(2) that in the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*, the Zenonian paradoxes of predication having ceased to trouble him, he is enabled to dispense, not only with the hypothesis of the idea's immanence, but also with the assumption that every general name implies the existence of a corresponding idea;

(3) that accordingly, whereas the *republic* and the *Phaedo* had recognized ideas of relations (likeness and unlikeness), of artificial products (chairs and tables), and even of things mean, contemptible, and bad (mud, dirt, fever), relations are now distinguished from the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* and placed in a class by themselves, while artificial products are treated as mere combinations of products of nature, and things mean, contemptible, and bad are seen to be products of nature in states of contamination and degradation;

(4) that these rejections leave, as the true successors of the ideas of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, natural types, i.e. certain eternal and immutable models (*παραδείγματα*), to which natural products, fashioned in their likenesses, more or less closely approximate;

(5) that, the idea being a thought which is eternally present in the universal mind, (or which would be eternally present in the universal mind, if in passing into time and space it retained its universality), particulars are the same thought imperfectly actualized by finite minds in time and space;

(6) that, though the ideas are not directly knowable by us, their existence makes an approximation to knowledge possible, inasmuch as it gives us the assurance that the infinity of transient, variable, imperfect, particulars may be redistributed according to the types in the likenesses of which they are fashioned;

(7) in short, that the later theory of ideas is a theory of natural kinds having for its basis a thoroughgoing idealism[1].

To what dialogue shall we now look for further evidence? The fifth hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, in which the μὴ ὄν is interpreted in the spirit of the *sophist*, seems to direct us to that important dialogue; or rather, as the dialogue plainly cannot be dissociated from its surroundings, to the trilogy of which it is the central piece. In the present paper then I propose to examine the *Theaetetus*, not in the expectation of obtaining much in the way of positive contribution to the later theory of ideas, but in the hope of fixing the relations in which this dialogue stands to those which more directly concern me.

Now in the first paper of the present series (*Journal of Philology* x 259) I remarked that "the *Parmenides* seems to me to lead the way to the later doctrine just as the *Theaetetus* had led the way to the earlier." Further investigation has however caused me to repent of this *obiter dictum*. When the words in question were written, I was still content to argue that, inasmuch as Socrates' critique of former theories is plainly

[1] I take this opportunity of supplying an omission in my exposition of the *Philebus*. The instances of μικτόν alleged at 25 E ff and 31 C—ὑγίεια, ὥρα, γαλήνη, ἁρμονία—are neither ideas, nor things, but states or conditions of things. It may perhaps be thought that this fact militates against the ascription of the idea to the γένος in question, and consequently against the resolution of the idea into πέρας and ἄπειρον. In order to meet this possible objection, I would remark that Plato is here arguing from the imperfect excellence which is discoverable in the world of γιγνόμενα to the perfect excellence of the world of ὄντα: πέρας, limitation, which is the cause of the one, is also, he infers, the cause of the other.

preparatory to the exposition of the theory of ideas, the *Thaetetus* could only belong to a time when that theory was still a novelty, and therefore must necessarily have preceded the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. I now perceive that the elaborate inquiry contained in the *Theaetetus* might be introductory, not to that first sketch of the theory of ideas which we find in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, but to the more exact teaching of later years. Hence, in the present investigation of the doctrine of the *Theaetetus*, one of the ends which I have in view is the discovery of evidence which will enable me to connect the dialogue with the *republic* and the *Phaedo* on the one hand, or with the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus* on the other[1].

§ 2 *Theaetetus* 151 D—187 A

οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

The argument of the *Theaetetus*, which deals with the question What is Knowledge? falls immediately and obviously into three divisions. In 151 D—187 A Plato examines the theory that Knowledge is Sensation. The rejection of this doctrine prepares the way for the theory that Knowledge is True Opinion, which theory is discussed in 187 A—201 C. This in its turn gives place to the theory that Knowledge is True Opinion accompanied by a Definition, 201 C—210 B. With the overthrow of this theory the conversation ends[2].

In the present section I propose to examine the first division of the dialogue so far as is necessary in order to disengage any element of positive doctrine which it contains. Incidentally I shall take occasion to express an opinion about some subordinate

[1] Should it appear that the *Theaetetus* contains traces of the later doctrine, a third hypothesis will not be excluded. It is conceivable that the dialogue, which has been thought to be, at any rate in parts, a notable example of the literary style of the earlier period, having been originally written as an introduction to the earlier theory of ideas, was afterwards converted into an introduction to the later theory, the preface being added, perhaps, to distinguish the second edition from the first.

[2] In the preparation of this paper I have had constantly in my hands the first edition of Professor Campbell's helpful and suggestive commentary.

matters: but I shall endeavour as far as possible to avoid superfluous details. In particular I shall try not to entangle myself in the interminable controversy about Plato's handling of Protagoras.

When to the question What is Knowledge? *Theaetetus* replies Knowledge is Sensation, Socrates immediately remarks—Your theory of knowledge is then identical with the theory propounded by Protagoras. For, if Man is the Measure of all things, so that hot, cold, &c, exist only in relation to the sentient subject, each sensation, inasmuch as there is nothing objective with which to compare it, must necessarily be accounted true. Sensation and Knowledge are then identical.

Here in asserting that knowledge is sensation Theaetetus means that sensation is entitled to rank as knowledge. What then is Socrates' meaning when he identifies Theaetetus' *οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις* with Protagoras' *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, that dictum being to all appearance intended by its author as a declaration of scepticism? Socrates means, I think, that Theaetetus and Protagoras agree, both in holding *ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί*, and in resting this proposition upon the doctrine of flux; and that the superficial difference between the two positions, however wide and however important, will disappear in the course of the inquiry. Accordingly we shall presently see Theaetetus, without change of his principles, compelled to admit that 'knowledge must not be looked for in sensation'; in fact, that he has been throughout a Protagorean without knowing it.

Now Theaetetus' position is the position of all the preSocratic philosophers, with the solitary exception of Parmenides. Starting from the doctrine of flux, and in some sort acknowledging the fallibility of the senses, they had notwithstanding constructed upon the evidence of sensation systems professedly scientific. Protagoras drew the sceptical inference from which they shrank, and thereupon deserted physics for culture. Plato accepted the Heraclitean principle and the Protagorean con-

sequence so far as sensibles are concerned, and deserted physics accordingly; finding a substitute however, not in culture, but in metaphysics.

All these doctrines—the inchoate relativism of Heraclitus, the unconscious relativism of the other physicists, the unlimited relativism of Protagoras, the limited relativism of Plato—are duly represented in the first part of the *Theaetetus*. In so far as Plato's predecessors assert the relativity of the present impressions of sense, they have his hearty approval: but when, explicitly or implicitly, they give to the doctrine of relativity a wider application, he notes the extension, and reserves the point for further study.

The results obtained in the first part of the dialogue are then briefly as follows:

(1) Protagoras is right in thinking that the Heraclitean theory of flux, so far as it applies, makes knowledge an impossibility;

(2) the physicists who confine themselves within the four corners of the theory of flux are therefore, though they do not know it, sceptics in disguise;

(3) Plato himself accepts the Heraclitean theory of flux so far as sensibles are concerned, and infers that mere impressions of sense are not knowledge;

(4) he notes however that sensation does not account for the whole of the soul's furniture: for, besides the present impressions which it receives through the senses, soul *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς* compares those impressions, and in this way becomes aware of being and not-being, of likeness and unlikeness, of sameness and otherness, of one and number, of odd and even, &c; and to this same class of *πρὸς ἄλληλα* belong also *καλόν, αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν, κακόν*: it will be necessary therefore to inquire whether knowledge, which has been vainly sought in the present impressions of sense, is attainable in this newly discovered region.

Having thus briefly indicated the tenour of this part of the argument, I proceed to comment upon certain details.

In the first place it seems worth while to discriminate those doctrines and arguments which Plato distinctly attributes to Protagoras from those which he as distinctly does not attribute to him.

It will be remembered that, when the Protagorean maxim is brought into the conversation, Socrates proceeds to extract from it the doctrine of the identity of sensation and knowledge, first, in a summary way, by means of a trite example; secondly, by a long and elaborate argument, which includes the exposition of the doctrine of flux and the development from it of a theory of sensation, and only at 160 D arrives at the point already reached summarily at 152 C. Now the original statement of the doctrine of Man the Measure is distinctly attributed to Protagoras,—*φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;* Θ. *Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.* Σ. *Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί; ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;* Θ. *Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως*: and the instance of the wind is introduced with the phrase *ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ*. So far then, I conceive Protagoras to be expressly quoted or referred to, though he is of course not to be held responsible for the process by which Socrates elicits from his doctrine the doctrine propounded by Theaetetus.

On the other hand Plato indicates—I venture to think, beyond the possibility of doubt—that the *μακροτέρα ὁδός* of 152 D—160 D is not Protagorean. When the Platonic Socrates conjectures that in private Protagoras' exposition must have been of a different sort,—*Ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν*; 152 C,—he seems to me expressly to relieve the historical Protagoras of all responsibility so far as concerns the argument which follows: and this interpretation finds support in the sequel, when mention is made of 'the theory *which we attribute* to Protagoras,'—*ἃ τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν*, and when the theory of sensation, revealed at 155 D ff, is assigned to certain *κομψότεροι*, who plainly are not the previously mentioned disciples of the great sophist.

At 157 D however there is a sentence which carries us back to Protagoreanism proper: Λέγε τοίυυν πάλιν, says Socrates to Theaetetus, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν: Theaetetus assents. Now the admission that Man is the Measure, not only of hot and cold, heavy and light, &c, but also of ἀγαθόν and καλόν, is not countenanced by anything in the preceding argument 152 D—157 D: and at 166 A ff, where Socrates offers his conjectural defence of Protagoras, this extension of the doctrine is withdrawn, at any rate so far as concerns ἀγαθόν. Yet when at last Theodorus is compelled to act as his friend's representative, Socrates' criticism assumes Protagoras to include within the scope of the doctrine, not only present impressions of sense, but also ἀγαθόν and something more, and it is in virtue of this assumption that the attack is successful. Thus Plato distinctly holds Protagoras responsible for the inclusion of ἀγαθόν within the scope of the doctrine, Protagoras' direct concern in the theory refuted at 168 C—171 C being clearly marked by the enforced entrance into the conversation of his friend Theodorus.

It would seem then that, according to Plato, Protagoras, in his advocacy of the doctrine of Man the Measure, either expressly included, together with present impressions of sense, ἀγαθόν and the like, or at least did not expressly exclude them. When to the original exposition of the maxim at 152 AB this statement is added, we have, I think, the sum of the doctrine which can be attributed to Protagoras on the authority of the *Theaetetus*. Plato alone is answerable for the rest, and, if I understand him aright, he plainly acknowledges his liability.

Nor will it surprise us that Plato should include in his survey conjectural developments of a theory which in all probability was vaguely conceived and loosely expressed. Plato's purpose in the *Theaetetus* is not eristical, but dialectical. He is anxious, not, to triumph over his antagonists, but, to elicit from their speculations whatever elements of truth they contain. The march of thought has for him a greater interest than the halts of particular thinkers: and in studying the march of thought he is ever seeking for the clue which is to guide him

in his onward progress. Hence we are prepared to find that he deals with the systems of his predecessors in the liberal temper which befits the philosopher, looking rather to the spirit of their teaching than to its letter. At the same time we expect also to find that he distinguishes carefully between the statements and the admissions to which his predecessors have distinctly committed themselves, and the inferences to which in his opinion those statements and admissions point: and, as it seems to me, this expectation is amply satisfied in the present instance.

But if this is the true Protagoreanism, who are the 'incomplete Protagoreans' whose theory is represented by Socrates in his conjectural defence? Who was it who maintained, that, while all *φαντάσματα* are equally true, one *φάντασμα* is better than another, and that the *σοφός* is one who by his *λόγοι* causes good *φαντάσματα* to take the place of bad ones, thus reforming the soul of the individual or the laws of a state by a process similar to that of the physician or of the farmer? The origin of this modified theory, which Socrates maintains with spirit and effect, is, I think, clearly indicated in the concluding paragraph of his *ῥῆσις*. Still speaking in the character of Protagoras, Socrates proceeds: 'Thus, whether you will or no, you must submit to be a measure yourself, the theory being saved by the considerations which I have now adduced. If you have objections to urge, urge them, either in continuous discourse or by means of question and answer, as you please. But remember! there must be nothing unfair in your interrogatory, as it is the height of absurdity that one who makes virtue his aim should be perpetually unfair in argument. By unfairness I mean neglect of the difference between disputatious argument, in which quips and quirks are admissible, and dialectical discourse which seriously and soberly promotes the improvement of the interlocutor.'

The warning contained in the sentences here paraphrased is surely characteristic of Socrates himself and of no one else: and when the clue is found, tricks of Socratic conversation are immediately discoverable in the references to the *ἰατρός* and the *γεωργός*, and in the remarks about the haters of philosophy.

Indeed this passage seems to me to describe, precisely and exactly, the relation in which the historical Socrates stood to the historical Protagoras. Both of them despaired of philosophy or science: but whereas Protagoras, giving to the doctrine of Man the Measure a universal application, devoted himself to the pursuit of 'culture' in the individual, Socrates, making a reservation in favour of *ἀγαθόν* and the like, found, in the pursuit of an *ἀρετή* of a different sort, something to occupy his energies, and, at any rate partially, to satisfy his aspirations[1].

Further this paragraph is not without importance in another way, inasmuch as it embodies a Platonic tenet: for Socraticism is rather incorporated in Platonism than superseded by it; and accordingly, even when, as in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, Plato proclaims knowledge and philosophic virtue to be the ends which he seeks, places are still kept in his system for Socrates' substitutes—*δόξα ὀρθή* and *δημοτική τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*.

I now come to a matter which, for my main purpose, is of superior importance. It has been already pointed out that, when at 152, having already shown summarily that the doctrine of Theaetetus may be regarded as a corollary of that of Protagoras, Socrates proceeds to a further study of their connec-

[1] That these 'incomplete Protagoreans' represent Socrates himself, appears also in *Cratyl.* 386 A ff, a passage which bears important resemblances to that before us. Asked by Socrates whether he accepts the Protagorean theory of Man the Measure, Hermogenes replies that there had been a time when he was a Protagorean, but that he now holds only a qualified Protagoreanism; *Ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.* Further questions lead Hermogenes to determine the character of his dissent. He holds that men may be good or bad, and that they are good or bad according as they are wise or foolish; this view he frankly admits is inconsistent with the theory of Protagoras which makes one man as wise as another. The position described is then precisely that of *ὅσοι μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν.* Now Hermogenes was notoriously a pupil of Socrates, and to all appearances in sympathy with Socrates' teaching. It will be observed further that the passage in the *Cratylus* confirms my view of the teaching of Protagoras, as Socrates says plainly that, if there are such things as *φρόνησις* and *ἀφροσύνη*, Protagoras' maxim cannot be true.

tion, he plainly acknowledges that he has no authority for attributing what follows to Protagoras, and takes upon himself the whole responsibility of the exposition. Here then, if anywhere in this part of the dialogue, we may hope to find a positive contribution to the Platonic system. Accordingly I attempt a detailed analysis of the passage.

152 D—153 D. Socrates conjectures that esoterically Protagoras rested his doctrine upon the theory ὡς ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. This theory, Socrates continues, has the support of all the σοφοί except Parmenides, as well as of the principal poets, tragic and comic. And it may further be urged in its favour that being (so called) and becoming have their origin in motion, whilst not-being and destruction have their origin in rest: thus, heat and fire, life, health, perfection of body and soul, are produced by the one and destroyed by the other.

153 D—155 C. The doctrine of flux having thus been stated and justified, Socrates proceeds to build upon it a theory of sensation. As so-called existence, i. e. becoming, depends upon motion, it would appear that what we call colour is to be regarded, not as anything in the eye or out of the eye, but as something which is generated when in a particular instance the eye encounters an appropriate motion. The theory finds confirmation in the fact that the same colour produces different effects upon different men and even upon the same man at different times. Warmth and size are similarly relative to the percipient subject; and in case this view should still present any difficulty, it is further pointed out that numbers and magnitudes are greater or less in relation to one another[1].

155 D—157 B. But in order that we may arrive at the Protagorean explanation of these paradoxes, we must further develop our theory of sensation. With a view to this, having first satisfied ourselves that no uninitiated materialist is present, we will disclose

[1] See below, p. 267.

the mysteries of certain κομψότεροι. They too build their theory of sensation upon the doctrine of flux, maintaining that the all is motion, but that there are two sorts of motion, both of them infinitely numerous, whereof the one, i.e. the object, has the power of acting, and the other, i.e. the subject, the power of being acted upon. Their union produces an infinite progeny of twins, each pair consisting of an αἰσθητόν and an αἴσθησις. For example, the eye as πάσχον and a visible object as ποιοῦν, which are each of them a slow motion in one place, unite and produce quick motions from place to place, namely, sight proceeding from the eye, and whiteness proceeding from the visible object. It is thus that the seeing eye and the white thing are generated. Similarly the hard and the warm are not independent existences (αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά), but the products of the union of two primary or slow motions. Further the ποιοῦν and the πάσχον themselves are not independent existences, as there is no ποιοῦν until it meets a πάσχον, no πάσχον until it meets a ποιοῦν. Thus, as we said at the outset, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεται, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον: so that it is a mere inaccuracy of speech when we speak of a thing as τι, του, ἐμοῦ, τόδε, ἐκεῖνο, or describe it by any name which implies fixity, the right terms to employ being γιγνόμενα, ποιούμενα, ἀπολλύμενα, ἀλλοιούμενα. This rule holds, not only in the case of particulars, but also in that of aggregates of particulars, such as man, stone.

[This developed theory of sensation reappears at 182 A, where we are reminded that αἴσθησις and ποιότης are quick motions between πάσχον and ποιοῦν, and that the πάσχον and the ποιοῦν themselves, have no independent existence, becoming respectively αἰσθανόμενον and ποιόν τι only when they meet and so generate αἴσθησις and αἰσθητόν. But it is now further remarked that the quick motions, which take place between the two slow motions (i.e. the changing object and subject), themselves undergo slow motion or change; so that whiteness, for example, and the corresponding sensation, themselves experience flux.]

157 C—159 E. In reply to a question put by Socrates, Theaetetus gives a guarded assent to the doctrine τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν, not noticing, as it would seem, that, whereas the previous inquiry had been concerned only with the present impressions of sense, ἀγαθόν and καλόν are here ranked with them. However this may be, Socrates proceeds to complete the doctrine by including within its scope dreams and

other delusions of sense: for, though at first sight it may be imagined that these are exceptions to the rule laid down by Protagoras and accepted by Theaetetus, it presently appears that, inasmuch as Socrates sleeping is different from Socrates waking, and Socrates ill different from Socrates well, the present impressions of sleep and delirium are just as real as any other present impressions.

159 E—160 E. Thus in sensation generally subject and object exist only in relation to one another: whence (1) my sensation, since it is part of my being, is true for me, and, as Protagoras puts it, I am the judge of what is to me, that it is, and of what is not to me, that it is not; and (2) as according to this doctrine I cannot be deluded or in error, I may be said to have knowledge of that of which I have sensation. It would appear then that the three doctrines, *πάντα ῥεῖ*, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, and *ἐπιστήμη αἴσθησις* form a consistent whole.

Plainly the stress of the argument here summarized is borne by the theory of sensation attributed to the *κομψότεροι*, and accordingly upon this theory I now propose to comment.

In the first place it will be noticed that the theory is thrice stated, and that at each repetition something is added. The original statement asserts that colour is neither the *προσβάλλον* nor the *προσβαλλόμενον*, but something generated between them in each particular instance; it does not however explain the relation of sight to that which sees, colour to that which is seen; still less does it deny the existence, apart from the act of seeing, of that which sees and that which is seen. When we come to the second statement, the materialists having been in the interval excluded, we find that the theory has grown apace. Object and subject are now mere capacities of acting and being acted upon, actualized only in conjunction, and then only in so far as sensation and quality are generated between them. When again we reach the third statement, we learn further that during their brief existence sensation and quality themselves experience change.

Now Plato makes it abundantly clear that he regards this theory of sensation as a corollary of the doctrine of flux. The moment he has completed his exposition of that doctrine he

proceeds to apply it to the phenomena of vision: Ἑπωμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, he says at 153 E, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ὑμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσηκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι, φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός. At 156 A, where the theory of sensation is restated and augmented, Plato is careful to note that he still starts from the fundamental doctrine of flux. At 182 A, where the theory of sensation appears for the third time, Socrates introduces it in order to the settlement of the claims of the Heraclitean theory of knowledge, thus implying that the theory of sensation is a necessary consequence of Heraclitus' characteristic dogma; while the addition here made to the theory of sensation is introduced expressly on the ground that the doctrine of flux requires it. Plato holds then that the acceptance of the doctrine of flux *ought* to carry with it the acceptance of this theory of sensation, not only as it is originally stated at 153 D—154 A, but also as it is developed at 156 A—157 C, and as it is completed at 182 A—D.

At the same time he seems to indicate that, though the developments of the theory of sensation which are introduced at 156 A—157 C and 182 A—D are necessary consequences of the doctrine of flux, those developments did not originate with the preSocratic philosophers, and would not have been acknowledged by them. Before divulging the mysteries of the κομψότεροι, he bids Theaetetus look about him, lest any of the uninitiated should be within hearing: 'these are they,' he continues, 'who attribute existence to that alone which they can grasp with their hands, refusing the title to actions, generations, and generally what is invisible.' Now it matters comparatively little whether Plato in his description of the materialists is thinking of any particular school: but it is very important that we should draw the inference which is plainly intended; namely, that the κομψότεροι are not materialists. And when we come to consider the doctrine which the κομψότεροι hold, we find accordingly that materialism has no place in their system, sensation and quality being κινήσεις, while the

πάσχον and the *ποιοῦν* with which they are connected are *δυνάμεις* actualized only when through their conjunction sensation takes place.

Who then are these immaterialists, the *κομψότεροι*? They are not preSocratics: for all the preSocratics who made *κίνησις* the basis of their speculations (and with such alone we are here concerned) were materialists, and consequently, while they would have accepted the first statement of the theory of sensation, 153 D—154 B, have no part in the 'mysteries' in question. It would seem then that these *κομψότεροι*, who hold the theory of sensation, not as originally stated at 153 D—154 B (in which form the preSocratics might, and did, accept it), but as developed at 156 A—157 C and 182 A—D (in which form the preSocratics did not and could not accept it), must needs belong to the Socratic succession, though Socrates himself, i.e. the historical Socrates, is plainly not included.

Now since Schleiermacher (*Platons Werke* II i 127), it has been commonly supposed that Aristippus is referred to in the first half of the dialogue: and in justification of this view it has been customary to cite Sextus Empiricus *adv. math.* VII 191 ff *φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναικοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ [βεβαίως] ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστιν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινὰ λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι..... τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται. ἔνθεν καὶ εἰ χρὴ ταληθὲς λέγειν, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικὸν τάχα μέν ἐστιν ὄν, οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν.* In all this however there is no evidence that the Cyrenaics were acquainted with the 'mysteries' of the *κομψότεροι*, i.e. that part of the second statement of the theory by which the second statement is differentiated from the first. In short, there is here no evidence that the Cyrenaics regarded *ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον* as *δυνάμεις*. On the contrary Sextus says plainly that they assumed the actuality of subject and object,

denying only the accuracy of the former's apprehension of the latter[1]: whence it would seem that they must be ranked, not with the *κομψότεροι*, but with the *ἀμύητοι* by whom the theory of sensation was entertained in its original shape.

That the *κομψότεροι* are not the Cynics may be taken for granted, even if we are not prepared to identify the *ἀμύητοι* with Antisthenes and his followers. It has not, I think, been suggested that Plato is here thinking of the Megarians; and for my own part I can see nothing to encourage such a notion.

It only remains then to suppose that this theory of sensation, which, though strange to the *ῥέοντες*, is here regarded as a necessary consequence of the doctrine of flux, originated with Plato himself. Accordingly I hope hereafter to show that in one stage of its development the Platonic system found a place, not only for the doctrine of flux, but also for its corollary, the 'mystical' theory of sensation.

One other matter there is to which I must recur hereafter: I mean the *πρὸς ἄλληλα* of 185 A ff—*οὐσία, μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ἕν, ἀριθμός, ἄρτιον, περιττόν.* The very list suggests a reference to a certain stage of Platonic development: but it will be convenient to defer comment upon these categories, as well as the further study of the theory of sensation, until at the end of the present paper I proceed to collect such evidence as is available in regard to the relations of the *Theaetetus* to other dialogues.

§ 3 187 A—201 C

κινδυνεύει ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

It has been remarked that, in the course of the discussion of Theaetetus' first hypothesis, *οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις*, another element, distinct from the present impressions

[1] Elsewhere (*adv. math.* VI 53) Sextus makes the Cyrenaics deny existence to anything besides *πάθη*; *οἵ τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης φιλόσοφοι μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν.* But this statement, as Zeller points out *Ph. d. Gr.* II i 300, is inexact: "Diess ist jedoch ungenau: die Cyrenaiker können nach dem vorstehenden nicht geläugnet haben, dass die Dinge existiren, sondern nur, dass wir von ihrer Existenz wissen."

of sense, comes into view, and is reserved for further investigation.

It is the inquiry into the relativism of Protagoras which brings this element to light. Siding with the 'incomplete Protagoreans', Socrates shows that the doctrine of Man the Measure, while it holds good in respect of present impressions of sense, is not applicable to *ὑγιεινόν*, *συμφέρον*, *ἀγαθόν*, or generally to anticipations of the future: for example, the physician can form a better opinion about the future sensations of the patient than the patient himself; Protagoras is a better judge than any of us can be about the effect which his arguments will produce when we hear them.

At 184 B Socrates recurs to the element in question. It is not through the several senses, but *δι' αὑτῆς*, that *ψυχή* apprehends the existence of the objects of two senses, the difference of those objects, the identity of each with itself, their number, their likeness, or their unlikeness. It is not through the appropriate sense, but *δι' αὑτῆς*, that *ψυχή* apprehends the existence of two contrary objects of the same sense, their contrariety, and the existence of their contrariety. It is not through the senses, but *δι' αὑτῆς*, that *ψυχή*, reflecting upon the past and the present with an eye to the future, apprehends *καλόν*, *αἰσχρόν*, *ἀγαθόν*, and *κακόν*. The attempt to find knowledge in sensation having failed, we must then look for it next *ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὅ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα*; that is to say, in the process which takes place when *ψυχὴ αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς* apprehends *οὐσία*, *μὴ εἶναι*, *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀνομοιότης*, *ταὐτόν*, *θάτερον*, *ἕν*, *ἀριθμός*, *ἄρτιον*, *περιττόν*, &c.

Remarking that the process here described is called *δοξάζειν*, Theaetetus hazards the conjecture that Knowledge is True Opinion. This hypothesis Socrates proceeds to examine in the second part of the dialogue, interposing however an inquiry into the nature of False Opinion.

First, it is supposed that everything is either known or not known, the intermediate states of learning and forgetting being left out of account. In this case there cannot be such a thing as False Opinion, because it is impossible at once to know and

not to know the same thing. 188 A—C. [Whence it appears that, in the as yet undiscovered region of *ἐπιστητά*, error in respect of their *οὐσία, μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης*, &c, is impossible: the knowledge of the *ἐπιστητά* carries with it the knowledge of their relations.]

Secondly, it is suggested that False Opinion consists in opining what is not, *τὰ μὴ ὄντα*. But when this phrase is strictly interpreted in the sense of 'what is non-existent', the suggestion immediately falls to the ground. 188 C—189 B. [Every sentence in this paragraph betrays a consciousness that, though *ψευδῆ δοξάζειν is not τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν*, if by *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* we mean 'what is not-existent', *ψευδῆ δοξάζειν is τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν*, if by *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* we mean, as in the *sophist*, 'what is other than the fact'.]

Thirdly, it is thought that False Opinion is an exchange of opinion which takes place in the mind: this however cannot be, so long as by assumption it is impossible at once to know and not to know the same thing. 189 B—190 E. [In other words, so long as we ignore the states of learning and forgetting, which are intermediate between absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance, no place can be found for False Opinion.]

Accordingly, abandoning the postulate introduced at 188 A, we start afresh. And now we perceive that False Opinion occurs in the conjunction of sensation and thought, through the imperfections of the latter. Opinion is an unspoken proposition which purports to represent the relations of sensibles, and it is false if it fails to do so. For example, Socrates and a stranger are different persons: but if Theaetetus sees at a distance an object which is in reality the stranger, he may take it for Socrates, because his recollection of Socrates' appearance, when he is at a distance, is only imperfect.

There is however another case in which False Opinion is possible. Hitherto we have supposed error to be impossible in regard to objects of thought: but we now observe that it may occur in the addition of two numbers: and, seemingly, here too it is the imperfection of thought which is the cause. As we cannot confound good and bad, and yet, through the imperfection of our notions of them, may attribute them wrongfully to

particulars, so we cannot confound eleven and twelve, and yet, through the imperfection of our notions of them, may make a mistake in the addition of seven and five. [In fact, numbers, though they are not sensibles, resemble sensibles in virtue of their plurality, and thus occupy that position, intermediate between ideas and sensibles, which Aristotle expressly attributes to the Platonic *μαθηματικά*.]

The result of this investigation is then that, whereas *δόξα* is an unspoken proposition which purports to represent the relations of particulars, whether sensible or mathematical, it may fail to represent those relations, and in that case is false.

Having thus cleared up our notions about Opinion and especially about False Opinion, we proceed to inquire whether, as Theaetetus supposes, Opinion which is True is Knowledge: in other words, whether, in order that an unspoken proposition may be regarded as knowledge, it is sufficient that it should represent the fact, i.e. the relation of certain sensibles. In this stage a familiar example immediately disposes of Theaetetus' hypothesis. The orator by his persuasive speech may bring a jury to believe that certain events happened as indeed they did happen. The belief thus produced is a true opinion, but no one would think of giving to it the name of knowledge. Mere truth is then insufficient to convert opinion into knowledge.

It is easy to see that this second part of the dialogue is a necessary sequel to the first part. The first part showed that, while Sensation was relative, Opinion was not so. Consequently, while the claims of Sensation might be summarily dismissed, the claims of Opinion must be reserved for further examination. It now appears that, though opinions, i.e. judgments which purport to represent the relations of sensibles, may be true or false, opinion which is true is not therefore knowledge. Thus the second hypothesis shares the fate of the first. At this point however it occurs to us that *δόξα ἀληθής* might, perhaps, by the addition of some further assurance, be raised to the higher status. To the consideration of certain attempts to provide such an assurance, Socrates addresses himself in the third part of the dialogue.

§ 4 201 C—210 D

τὴν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι.

At this point Theaetetus suddenly remembers hearing some one say that Knowledge is True Opinion together with a λόγος, those things only whereof there is a λόγος being *ἐπιστητά*. Socrates wonders whether the theory mentioned by Theaetetus is one which he has himself heard propounded by certain persons: namely, (1) that the primitive elements, of which we and other things are constructed, have no λόγος, being capable of being named, but not of carrying predicates, even such predicates as *ὄν, μὴ ὄν, αὐτό, ἐκεῖνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον, τοῦτο*; for, as these predicates are universally applicable, they are distinct from the elements, while the elements, if they could be described at all, must, as elements, be described apart from all other things; but (2) that combinations of elements have a λόγος, which is in fact a combination of the names of the elements. Thus, according to this theory, the elements are *ἄλογα, ἄγνωστα, αἰσθητά*, while their combinations are *γνωσταί, ῥηταί, ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξασταί*; and without λόγος, there may be truth, but there cannot be knowledge. Theaetetus having admitted that the doctrine is familiar to him in this form, Socrates proceeds to examine the hypothesis, that, while elements are unknowable, combinations of elements are knowable. A combination of elements is, either an aggregate composed of them, or something which proceeds from them, having a nature of its own. But if the combination is an aggregate of elements and is knowable, the elements must be knowable also: and if the combination is not an aggregate of elements, but a distinct nature, it is after all one and indivisible, in fact an element, and therefore by hypothesis unknowable.

Thus the theory of Socrates' *τινές*, that *στοιχεῖα* are *ἄλογα* and therefore *ἄγνωστα*, while *συλλαβαί* have *λόγοι* and therefore are *γνωσταί*, falls to the ground; but it still remains to examine the less complex theory of Theaetetus' *τις*. Accordingly Socrates asks what is meant by the term λόγος? Three interpretations appear to be possible:

(1) λόγος may mean the expression of thought in spoken words. But, as every δόξα may sooner or later be uttered aloud, the addition of λόγος in this sense of the term will not convert δόξα ἀληθής into ἐπιστήμη.

(2) λόγος may mean the enumeration of the elements of which the thing in question is constituted, in opposition to the enumeration of larger divisions. Reflection shows however that correct enumeration in one instance is consistent with incorrect enumeration in another, and when this happens we cannot possibly regard the correct enumeration as knowledge. Thus there may be an ὀρθὴ δόξα μετὰ λόγου which is not ἐπιστήμη.

(3) λόγος may mean the mark by which the thing in question is distinguished from other things. For example, the sun may be distinguished from all other things by the statement that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies: this then may be regarded as its λόγος. Thus it would seem that 'one who to a right opinion about anything adds its distinguishing mark, will thereby become possessed of Knowledge, where previously he has had no more than Opinion.' But how can we be said to have right opinion about a thing so long as we are unable to distinguish it from other things? Surely in the absence of the distinguishing mark we should be thinking, not of that thing only, but of those others also from which it has not been distinguished. It would seem then that we already possess a right opinion about the distinguishing mark. And how about the distinguishing mark which is added? Are we expected to have a right opinion of it or to know it? In the one case knowledge consists in adding, to the right opinion which we already possess as to the distinguishing mark of a thing, a new right opinion: in the other, knowledge consists in adding to right opinion knowledge, the very thing which we are attempting to define.

The third theory having thus collapsed, Socrates consoles Theaetetus with the reflection that the debate has relieved him of a mistaken opinion.

This last section of the dialogue contains one obvious reference to contemporary philosophy. Probably few nowadays deny that the theory of sensible στοιχεῖα which are ἄλογα and therefore ἄγνωστα, and συλλαβαί which have λόγοι and consequently are γνωσταί, is the property of Antisthenes. Now if the τινές, whose doctrine is stated by Socrates, are to be identified with a particular school, that of the Cynics, would it not seem that the τις, of whom Theaetetus speaks, is also capable of particular identification? Apparently the commentators take for granted that, as in the course of the discussion Theaetetus accepts the 'dream' of Socrates as an interpretation of his own, the τις of the one and the τινές of the other are indistinguishable. This seems to me to be a mistake: for, though in 201 D—206 B the theory of Socrates' τινές is used to interpret that of Theaetetus' τις, after the overthrow of the theory of the former it is still found necessary to examine the theory of the latter. Thus the theory that Knowledge is δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου has an independent existence; and the identification of the τινές with the Cynics, so far from making a search for the τις superfluous, rather proves the need of it. Of whom then is Plato thinking when he makes Theaetetus speak of some one who had identified knowledge with δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου? Plato is thinking, I imagine, primarily of Socrates, secondarily of himself.

It will be remembered that the 'incomplete Protagoreans', whom I have identified with Socrates, recognize, not only αἰσθήσεις, but also δόξαι, which δόξαι may be good or bad. Now the δόξα which the historical Socrates accounted good was a δόξα ἀληθής accompanied by a λόγος, which λόγος was the enumeration of the characteristics exhibited by a few acknowledged instances. Plainly this is the ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ λόγου of Theaetetus' τις, interpreted, as at 206 E, 207 C, in the sense of the enumeration of elements (ἡ διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδος). And a little consideration will shew that, if the status of ἐπιστήμη is claimed for the χρηστὴ δόξα which, according to the historical Socrates, constitutes wisdom, precisely the objections raised in the *Theaetetus* are valid against its pretensions. For, firstly, this view is practically identical with that of the Cynics, and is therefore open to the criticism by which they have been over-

thrown: and secondly, the Socratic λόγος is an enumeration for the correctness of which there is no guarantee. The 'good opinion' of Socrates is not then to be regarded as knowledge. Nor indeed did Socrates represent it as such, his position being throughout that of a philosophical agnostic. Nevertheless it is reasonable that Plato, who in the *Theaetetus* is submitting to examination all previous theories of knowledge, that of the Eleatics alone excepted, should distinguish between the 'wisdom' which was Socrates' substitute for knowledge, and knowledge properly so called. To draw this distinction is, I conceive, the purpose of the passage upon which I have been commenting.

This is not however the only possible interpretation of the theory of Theaetetus' τις: two other interpretations are offered. One of them, that which makes δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου mean no more than 'the vocal expression of true opinion,' is plainly introduced only for the sake of precision, and need not delay us. The other, 'λόγος is the mark by which the thing in question differs from other things,' τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, deserves serious attention.

When Plato was still no more than a Socratic, when he still had no higher ambition than the construction of Socratic definitions with a view to consistency of thought and of action, he already perceived that the method pursued by his master was capable of improvement. Whereas Socrates in framing his general definitions (λόγοι, ὑποθέσεις) had been content to observe a few positive instances and note their common characteristics, Plato was not satisfied until he had first ascended to the genus and next divided it into its species, so as to distinguish the species sought from other species allied to it. The definition thus attained was, of course, no more than a Socratic λόγος or ὑπόθεσις: but for the construction of a λόγος or ὑπόθεσις, the new instrument, διαίρεσις, was a manifest improvement upon the traditional ἐπαγωγή. Of the conscious use of διαίρεσις in Plato's Socratic period we have clear proof in the *Euthyphro* 12 C, where, having discovered that ὅσιον is a part of δίκαιον, Socrates proceeds to inquire what part of δίκαιον it is, and

presently ascertains that it is *τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν*[1].

When Plato passed out of the Socratic stage, and, beginning to dream of a theory of knowledge, devised the theory of ideas, the Socratic λόγος or *ὑπόθεσις*, sought by means of *διαίρεσις*, still found a place, though naturally only a secondary place, in the system. The λόγος is all that Plato has as yet achieved,—*πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν* 506 E,—when in the *republic* he looks forward to the establishment of a scheme of ideas in virtue of the ascent to the *ἀγαθόν*: it is the λόγος upon which he falls back as a *δεύτερος πλοῦς* in the *Phaedo*,—*ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν* 99 E: and *διαίρεσις*, which, to borrow a phrase from the *Theaetetus*, *τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου λαμβάνει ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει*, is the process by which the λόγος is obtained, 102 D E.

Now the λόγος of *ὅσιον* in the *Euthyphro*, and the λόγος to which the Platonic Socrates, disappointed of his hopes, has recourse in the *Phaedo*, are λόγοι in the third of the three senses given to the word in the *Theaetetus*, and differ from the *ὑποθέσεις* of the historical Socrates precisely as the third λόγος of the *Theaetetus* differs from the second. That is to say, while the Socratic *ὑπόθεσις* is an enumeration of the characteristics common to several positive instances, the λόγος of the *Euthyphro* and the *Phaedo*, being obtained by *διαίρεσις* of the genus, is the statement of the characteristic difference. Accordingly, when in the *Theaetetus* Plato shows that *δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου*, λόγος being the statement of the characteristic difference, is not

[1] Σ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; E. Ἔμοιγε. Σ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδ' ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή. E. Τοῦτο τοίνον ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος. *Euthyphro* 12 D E.

ἐπιστήμη, because (1) the λόγος is itself a δόξα, and (2) the ἀληθὴς δόξα includes the λόγος, he completes his criticism of the Socratic 'Begriffsphilosophie' by a notice of the modification of its method which he had himself introduced. It is true that Plato had never claimed for λόγος the rank of knowledge, so that he has nothing to retract. But, as before, in speaking of Socrates, so here in speaking of himself, he properly points out that a method which leads only to λόγοι cannot pretend to be scientific.

Thus neither the αἴσθησις to which the preSocratics (with the exception of Parmenides) had trusted, nor δόξα ἀληθής founded upon αἴσθησις, nor the ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ λόγου of the Socratics, either as originally conceived by the master, or with the additions devised by the pupils, is entitled to take rank as ἐπιστήμη.

§ 5 *Results.*

The lesson taught in the *Theaetetus* is, that no system based upon the theory of flux can without inconsistency allow 'knowledge' of sensibles: whence it follows that the physicists (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus) are Protagoreans without knowing it, and that the Socratics, in whom we recognize incomplete Protagoreans, are well advised in not claiming for their ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ λόγου the higher status of ἐπιστήμη. It is then not the Protagorean element, but the non-Protagorean element, which Plato seeks to eliminate from the teaching of his predecessors, his end being the presentation of a perfectly developed theory of flux. For, his quarrel with the physicists is, not, that they build upon that theory, but, that, doing so, they shrink from its weightiest consequence. He is indeed a better Heraclitean than Heraclitus himself, as appears when the theory of sensation passes from the ἀμύητοι to the κομψότεροι, to be by them developed in accordance with the fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian.

There is then for Plato no 'knowledge' either of sensibles, or of their relations, and the addition of a λόγος, whether obtained by Socratic ἐπαγωγή or by Platonic διαίρεσις, can have no magical effect. Hence he must either renounce the pursuit of knowledge, or posit, distinct from sensibles, existences which are not, like them, mutable and transient. Between these alternatives there can be no hesitation. He posits existences, immutable and eternal, and calls them ideas. Accordingly we find him insisting, in the *Parmenides* that one who does not, upon consideration of the whole case, allow the existence of εἴδη of things, each thing having an εἶδος which is determinate, immutable, and eternal, will have no object to which to direct his intelligence, and his dialectical faculty will accordingly be wasted; and in the *Timaeus*, that the recognition of a difference between δόξα ἀληθής and νοῦς (which difference is proved by arguments similar to those of *Theaetetus* 201 A—C) carries with it as a corollary the acceptance of the theory of ideas[1].

The *Theaetetus* is then intended to prepare the way for, and to lead up to, the theory of ideas, or, to speak more precisely, to the fundamental proposition of that theory, 'besides sensibles, there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas.' We have seen however that at different periods of his philosophical

[1] Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. *Parmenides* 135 B. ὧδε οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψῆφον· εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής ἐστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἴδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὥς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὁπόσ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ὁμολογητέον ἓν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα εἶδος ἔχον, κτλ. *Timaeus* 51 D.

In this connection it is worth while to compare Aristotle's well known statement: συνέβη δ' ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις λόγοις ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων ἐπιστήμην. *metaphysics* M 4. 1078 b 12.

development Plato interpreted this fundamental proposition in different ways, conceiving, when he wrote the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, (*a*) that 'every plurality of things called by a common name has an idea corresponding to it,' and (*b*) that 'things are what they are by the immanence of the idea,' whereas, when he wrote the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*, he held (*a*) that there are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of *ὁπόσα φύσει* only, to the exclusion of *τὰ πρός τι, ἀποφάσεις*, and *σκευαστά*, and (*b*) that the particular stands to the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος* in the relation of *μίμημα* to *παράδειγμα*. We have seen too that the later date of the doctrine of the three dialogues last named is proved, not only by its greater maturity, but also by the references which those dialogues contain to the two dialogues first named, and by the testimony, in this respect irrefragable, of the well-informed Aristotle. It is therefore necessary to inquire whether the theory to which the *Theaetetus* is preparatory, is the earlier doctrine of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, or the later doctrine of the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus*; in short, whether the idea, as conceived in the *Theaetetus*, is an immanent universal or a natural type.

The following considerations seem to me to be decisive.

(1) At 155 B Socrates comments upon the case *ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τοὐναντίον παθόντα ἐν ἐμαυτῷ, σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μέν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος*. Now in the *Phaedo* 102 B—D Plato discusses 'with legal precision' (*ξυγγραφικῶς*) the case *ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῇς μείζω εἶναι*, and decides that the phrase *ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπερέχει Σωκράτους* is incorrect, the truth being that Socrates has in him *σμικρότης* (i.e. the idea of short) as against *μέγεθος* (i.e. the idea of tall) which is in Simmias. Let the doctrine of the *Phaedo* be applied to the case put in the *Theaetetus*, and we have this result: 'When we say that Socrates is at one time taller than Theaetetus and at another time shorter, we mean that he has in him at one time the idea of tall and at another time the idea of short', so that a change has taken place in him in the interval, namely the substitution of one immanent idea for another. Such is the explanation which the Socrates of the

Phaedo would give of the case stated in the *Theaetetus*. The Socrates of the last named dialogue needs however no such artifice. Expressly remarking that no change has taken place in himself, he recognizes in the growth of Theaetetus a sufficient explanation of the fact that, whereas at one time he is taller than Theaetetus, at another he is shorter. That is to say, he is aware that the words 'tall' and 'short' describe the relations in which he stands to something else, and that the intervention of the immanent idea is wholly unnecessary. It would seem then that the *Theaetetus* belongs, not to the period of the *Phaedo*, when Plato saw no way of meeting the Zenonian paradox of predication except by the assumption of an immanent idea for every general term, but rather to the period of the *Parmenides*, when clearer views about relation had enabled him to discard the theory of immanence, and to erase great and small, like and unlike, &c, from the list of the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*.

(2) It has been already remarked that the 'mysteries' of the *κομψότεροι*, i.e. so much of the theory of sensation as is not introduced until after the exclusion of the uninitiated materialists, cannot be assigned to any of Plato's predecessors or contemporaries, and that he must therefore be held responsible for this speculation. Now, whereas according to the *ἀμύητοι* object and subject are *ὄντα*, (so far as anything can be so designated,) and generate sensation when they come into proximity, according to the *κομψότεροι* object and subject are potentialities, the one having the power of acting, the other of being acted upon[1], and are themselves generated or actualized

[1] *ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.* 156 A. These sentences immediately recall the well known passage in the *sophist* 247 D; *Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκός, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις*: but it will be convenient to defer the consideration of it to a future occasion.

When Campbell in his commentary on *Theaetetus* 156 A remarks "In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily 'matter', Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples" [i.e. the *κομ-*

in the process of sensation. For example, in vision, the meeting of the potentialities generates, not so much, sight in the eye and whiteness in the object, as rather, the seeing eye and the white object. Thus until the potentialities, object and subject, meet, there is in actuality neither object nor subject; *οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι.....ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον.* 157 A: and when they meet, the resultant sensation and quality are not independent existences; *τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὴν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα.* 182 A. Plainly the view here taken of subject, object, and their relations, is wholly irreconcilable with the teaching of the *republic* and the *Phaedo:* for in those dialogues, the theory of the immanent idea being dominant, it is *ποιότης*, immutable and indestructible, which makes the thing *ποιόν τι*, while the existence of the *ποιότητες* apart from the thing itself, the *τόδε τι*, is of the essence of the doctrine, because otherwise Plato sees no escape from the Zenonian paradox of predication[1]. The doctrine of the *Theaetetus* is then different from that of the *republic* and the *Phaedo.*

But, if the 'mysteries' are utterly inconsistent with the teachings of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, they are, I conceive, not merely consistent with that of the *Timaeus*, but even necessary to its completion. On a previous occasion, *Journ. of Phil.* XIII 21 ff, I tried to show that in the last named dialogue Plato

ψότεροι] "believe not indeed in a world of *νοητὰ εἴδη*, but in a hidden process underlying appearances," and "The 'disciples of Protagoras'" [i.e. the *κομψότεροι* again] "are evidently contemporaries of Plato," he approximates to my theory, which sees in the doctrine of the *κομψότεροι* an unqualified idealism; in fact, the idealism of Plato himself.

[1] Compare *republic* 507 E, *Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς* [i.e. in the objects], *ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.* If this passage is to be strictly interpreted, it indicates contentment with the view which the Socrates of the *Theaetetus* rejects; while if it is not to be strictly interpreted, the laxity of the statement seems to me inexplicable on the hypothesis that Plato was already acquainted with the 'mysteries' of the *κομψότεροι.*

resolves *αἰσθητά* into two potentialities, *ταὐτόν*, i.e. eternal modes of thought, and *θάτερον*, i.e. position in space and time: but in reconstructing the theory of sensation I had only a few scanty hints upon which to rely. Now, in the *Theaetetus*, I find a theory of sensation which is exactly what was wanted to complete the system of the *Timaeus*. Whence I conclude that the two dialogues belong to the same period, and further that they are intended to supplement one another[1].

(3) In the concluding pages of the first part of the dialogue, 184 B—187 A, white and black, shrill and deep, which are perceived by the soul through the eyes and the ears respectively, and cannot be perceived through any other sense than those which are respectively appropriated to them, are emphatically contrasted with certain *κοινά*, which are perceived by the soul *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς*, without the intervention of the senses. As specimens of these *κοινά*, which, as they may attach to two sorts of sensibles, cannot be perceived by either sense, Socrates mentions *οὐσία* and *τὸ μὴ εἶναι*, *ὁμοιότης* and *ἀνομοιότης*, *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον*, *ἕν* and *ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθμός*, *ἄρτιον* and *περιττόν*: and to this list of the judgments which soul pronounces upon a sur-

[1] It is to observed that the perpetual flux of *αἰσθητά*, which is presupposed in the *Theaetetus*, is an important element in the physics of the *Timaeus*, and that in that dialogue an ingenious theory is propounded to account for it. It may also be noted that the passage about the salutary effects of motion,—Σ. Τί *δέ*; *ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται*; Θ. Ναί. Σ. Ἡ δ' *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινησέοιν ὄντοιν, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἄ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται*; Θ. Καὶ μάλα. 153 B,—which passage is introduced in order to justify the doctrine of flux, has its echo in *Timaeus* 89 E *τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐν ἀργίᾳ διάγον καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεων ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀσθενέστατον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἐν γυμνασίοις ἐρρωμενέστατον*. Compare 88 D.

The eclecticism of which we have an instance in this appropriation of the Heraclitean doctrine of flux, is characteristic of the later theory of ideas. So long as Plato hoped by ascent to the *ἀγαθόν* to convert Socratic *ὑποθέσεις* into accurate and certified representations of ideas, and thus to pass through ontology to the sciences, he could afford to neglect the speculations of his predecessors. But when it became plain that knowledge of the ideas presumed the study of particulars, so that he must pass through the so-called sciences to ontology, it became necessary for him to study, criticize, and mutatis mutandis absorb, the results which his predecessors had reached.

vey of sensibles in comparison with one another (*πρὸς ἄλληλα*) *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν*, *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, are presently added. Further, it is observed that all these notions are reached, not by the study of sensibles taken singly, but by the comparison of them[1].

Now in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* all general predication is held to imply the immanence in the individual of corresponding ideas: things are like and unlike, good and bad, by reason of the immanence of ideas of like, unlike, good, bad, just as things are horses or men by reason of the immanence of ideas of horse or man. In short, no distinction is made between substances and relations.

The *Parmenides* however has for one of its principal purposes the revision of the list of the ideas, and in the course of that revision it appears that there are no *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of *ὅμοιον*, *ἀνόμοιον*, &c, nor, presumably, of *ἀγαθόν*, *κακόν*, &c. Accordingly the *Timaeus* recognizes *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of the four elements, and of the several species of animal and vegetable, but of nothing else. Moreover in the *Parmenides* the list of relations, which have not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, numbers amongst its most prominent members *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*, *ὅμοιον* and *ἀνόμοιον*, *ταὐτόν* and *θάτερον*, *ἕν* and *ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθμός*, *ἄρτιον* and *περιττόν*.

Surely the declaration that these notions are obtained by comparison, implies that the *Theaetetus* belongs, not to the period of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, when likeness, unlikeness, &c, were regarded as qualities attached to individuals taken separately, but to the period of the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*, when *εἴδη*, i.e. *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, were no longer recognized in the case of relations[2].

[1] Σ. Τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν; Θ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. Σ. Ἔχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως; Θ. Ναί. Σ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. 186 A B. It will be noticed that this passage recognizes the *οὐσία* of *ἐναντιότης*, and thus contains the germ of a doctrine which is prominent in the *sophist*; I mean the doctrine of the *κοινωνία* of the *μέγιστα γένη*.

[2] It is true that *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*, *ὅμοιον*

In these three instances then, all of them manifestly important, we find the Socrates of the *Theaetetus* at variance with the Socrates of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. In each case the *Theaetetus* shows a clearer apprehension of problems which had been unsatisfactorily handled in the other two dialogues: and in each case an approximation to the teaching of the *Parmenides* or the *Timaeus* is observable. Indeed in one of the three instances, the theory of sensation, the *Theaetetus* is found to fill a gap in the exposition of the *Timaeus*, and to fill it just as we should expect it to be filled. It seems to me then certain that, when the *Theaetetus* was written, Plato had outgrown the doctrine of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. Further, it seems to me probable that the doctrine of the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timaeus* had already taken definite shape. In this last respect I hope to strengthen my position when I proceed to the examination of the *sophist* and the *politicus*.

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and ἀνόμοιον, &c, which in the *Parmenides* are studied in connection with the ideas, are in the *Theaetetus* studied in connection with sensibles. But 188 A—C serves to connect the two investigations. It there appears that, when we are concerned with ἐπιστητά, error about their relations is impossible. Thus ὄν and μὴ ὄν, ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, &c, are discoverable in the region of ἐπιστήμη, as well as in that of αἴσθησις, with this difference, that, whereas the relations of αἰσθητά are δοξαστά, the relations of ἐπιστητά are themselves ἐπιστητά.

ON THE FORMS OF DIVINATION AND MAGIC ENUMERATED IN DEUT. XVIII. 10, 11.

Part I.

It was long ago remarked by Ewald (*Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, i. 230) that this passage is meant to give a brief general summary of all the worst kinds of divination current at the time of the author, and that the arrangement of the several kinds is not so accidental as it appears at first sight to be. Certainly this is what the context would lead us to expect; the author lays down the principle that the prophetic word is the one legitimate guide of Israel in the cases where other nations used divination, and his solemn warning that all other ways of consulting the divine powers are heathenish is accompanied by a list of forbidden practices, not with a view to rhetorical effect, but to give the prohibition precision, and leave no doubt as to what is included in it. It must be remembered that there were in the time of the Deuteronomist two reasons for making this law very clear and express; on the one hand the old popular faith had been shaken by the victories of Assyria, and men were tempted to look elsewhere for the light and help which they seemed to seek in vain from Jehovah; on the other hand, the prophetic party, to which the writer belongs, had escaped the conclusion that Jehovah was weaker than the gods of Assyria, or had deserted His people without cause, only by reasoning that in the ordinary practices of religion the people had really forsaken Jehovah, that these practices, though nominally directed to Jehovah, were in their nature heathenish, and could not be

regarded as real Jehovah-worship. The law of Deuteronomy aims therefore not merely at expelling new foreign practices, but at the purification of current religion from traditional usages, unworthy of Jehovah because they were in character similar to or even derived from the Canaanite Baal-worship.

With this twofold object in view it was necessary for the writer to be very explicit; the illegality of an old usage is not so readily inferred from general principles, that it was safe to leave the reader to fill up the details.

Too much weight must not be laid on the fact that he regards all the forbidden practices as derived from the old inhabitants of Canaan; earlier writers (in the source of the Pentateuch known as JE) assume, and doubtless with historical correctness, that many forbidden superstitions existed even in patriarchal times. But the old superstitions of Israel were of the general Semitic type and therefore closely akin to Canaanite usages. It is the theory of the author that what is blameworthy from the standpoint of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah had always been foreign to the religion of Jehovah, and so all practices of the popular religion akin to Canaanite nature-worship, and condemned as such by the prophets, naturally appear to him as directly borrowed from the Canaanites. Very many of them no doubt were actually borrowed in this way; but the syncretism of Jehovah-worship and Baal-worship would not have gone on so freely as it did if there had not been a stratum of common religious ideas underlying both faiths, and derived from original Semitic tradition. Thus it was possible for many things to pass from the Canaanites to Israel without offence to the mass of the nation; in fact the class stigmatised by Isaiah, Micah and Jeremiah as diviners was in the view of the masses a class of perfectly orthodox prophets of Jehovah. It was an old principle in Israel that divination expressly heathenish—*i.e.* connected with the worship of foreign gods—was illegal (see for example 2 Kings i.) but this did not necessarily exclude the use of many base superstitions in nominal connection with Jehovah-worship. We may be prepared to find that some of the practices forbidden in Deuteronomy were viewed as quite legitimate in older times; in point of fact the only prohibition of the kind in

the older legislation of the Book of the Covenant (of which Deuteronomy is a new and enlarged edition adapted to the standpoint of the One Sanctuary) is directed against a single kind of witchcraft (Exod. xxii. 18), presumably a kind notoriously and visibly heathenish, as will appear more clearly below.

The greater fulness of the list in Deuteronomy is thus perfectly intelligible, and Ewald appears to be justified in supposing that we shall get further towards an understanding of the obscure points in it if we keep in view that the accumulation of particulars is not mere rhetoric, but a deliberate, and therefore presumably an orderly enumeration, of all the main arts which are rejected as spurious substitutes for prophecy.

I prefix these remarks to the observations I have to offer on the items of the list because many current explanations can hardly be seriously maintained except on the hypothesis that the list is made up at random.

The first thing forbidden is a superstition which had a ghastly prominence in the seventh century, and therefore well deserves the place of dishonour. It is only necessary to observe with Ewald that the mention of the sacrifice of children in this context shews that it was used to obtain an oracle. This sacrifice and oracle were both of an extraordinary kind; the items that follow refer to ordinary practices and may be looked at by themselves. The first is קסם קסמים. The word *qōsēm* is that most commonly used for a diviner in general, and might conceivably stand here also in a wide sense, as not parallel to but including some or all of the following species. But this is rendered unlikely by verse 14, where the writer, desiring to say in general "thou shalt not hearken to diviners," does not employ *qōsĕmīm* alone but says אל־מעוננים ואל־קסמים, using the two first items of his general list in inverted order. He seems therefore to distinguish these as two leading species of divination. So too in Num. xxiii. 23 קסם and נחשׁ are plainly distinct though cognate things: see also 2 Kings xvii. 17. Similarly נחשׁ and עונן appear together in Lev. xix. 26. We have thus three terms heading our list which appear to be all distinct and yet all closely associated:

(1) קסם *qōsēm.* (2) מעונן *mĕʿōnēn.* (3) מנחש *mĕnaḥēsh.*

According to the Massoretic division of verses we have a fourth species to be closely joined with these, viz., מכשף. But reasons will appear hereafter for reserving this difficult word till the other three have been discussed.

Now it is to be observed first of all that the three closely allied forms of divination now before us, which head the list of *ordinary* forms of that art, are all of great antiquity, and that two of them, if not all three, bear names which at one time must have had an unobjectionable sense. For in Prov. xvi. 10, "*qesem* is in the lips of the king, and his mouth faileth not in judgment," the sense cannot be other than that his decisions have the value (or at least the irrefragable character) of a divine oracle. Again as regards נחש *naḥash* it is hardly likely that Gen. xliv. 15 represents Joseph as charging himself with an illegitimate practice, and 1 Kings xx. 33 shews that this word, like *qesem*, had entered common life in a quite harmless sense: "to catch at a favourable indication." In the case of מעונן *mĕʿōnēn* the argument is less direct; but those are hardly in the wrong who identify the tree of the *mĕʿōnĕnīm* Judg. ix. 37 with the tree of the revealer (*Mōreh*) in Gen. xii. 6, and (according to the LXX) Deut. xi. 30. Here it is true, in the vicinity of Shechem, we are upon ground that long remained Canaanite; but the innocent term occurs in the later document; if the *mĕʿōnēn* was originally Canaanite he at least passed into a good Hebrew *mōreh.* In these three terms therefore we are on the ground either of primitive Semitic religion or of practices that date from long before the prophetic period. We can now take up the words one by one.

(1) קסם *QŌSĒM.*

This is the most general word for a diviner, and appears sometimes to include species distinguished from it in our passages. Thus Balaam is the *qōsēm* in Josh. xiii. 22 (compare Num. xxii. 7). But he seeks *nĕḥāshīm*, Num. xxiv. 1, and probably also *kĕshāphīm*, according to Kuenen's ingenious emendation

[לכ]שפי[ם] or [לכ]שפי[ו] in Num. xxiii. 3. So too the spiritual prophets habitually apply the name *qōsēm* to their opponents. We must therefore conclude that *qesem* denotes the most prevalent and typical form of divination. Now among the ancient Semites a divine oracle was sought in matters of hard decision, especially in judgment, and clearly this is the region to which *qesem* belongs in Prov. xvi. 10. But again there is abundant evidence that among the Hebrews in the oldest times the typical form of divine decision was by the lot, or other such oracle at the sanctuary, and it is therefore very important to observe that in Ezekiel xxi. 26, when the king of Babylon uses *qesem*, the method employed is the lot by arrows, combined with the use of teraphim and the inspection of the viscera of a victim. But it is to the first of these processes that the name *qesem* more specially belongs; it is plain that in verse 27, הקסם ירושלים, *qesem* can only mean the lot or arrow on which the word Jerusalem was written. Now it was long ago observed by Pococke (*Specimen* ed. White, p. 318) that this passage is to be illustrated from the old Arabic *istiqsām*, استقسام بالأزلام prohibited in the Koran (Sura v. 4), *i.e.* the procuring of a divine sentence by drawing a lot at the sanctuary with headless arrows (*azlām*). Although Pococke is quoted by Gesenius (*Thes.* p. 1224) Mühlau and Volck desert this analogy without a word, and follow Fleischer in Delitzsch's Isaiah (chap. iii. ver. 2) in giving to *qesem* the sense of a magical formula of conjuration or the like. It is therefore worth while to call attention again to the marked features of this Arabic form of divination, which are pretty fully known from a variety of sources[1]. The lot was a sacred one and belonged to sanctuaries in which there was an idol. It was drawn in the presence of the idol, for Imraulqais, discontented with the reply of the god, breaks the arrows and dashes them in his face. In this case, it seems, the enquirer himself drew the lot, but this does not appear to have been the

[1] See in general Nowairi in Rasmussen's *Additamenta*, p. 75 and in particular, for the oracle of Hobal at Mecca, Ibn Hishām, p. 97, Azraqī, p. 73; for that of Dhu'lkhalaṣa at Tabāla, *Aghāni*, viii. 70; Yāqūt ii. 463.

usual course. The oracle of Hobal was in the hands of the priest (*sādin*) who received a fee of 100 dirhams and a victim for slaughter (*jazūr*). The last feature shews that the lot was accompanied by a sacrifice. Now these features exactly agree with what we read in Ezek. xxi.: the king of Babylon does not, as Gesenius supposes, practise three kinds of divination, but he draws the lot before the idol (*terāphīm*) and in connection with a sacrifice. In Ezekiel the arrows are shaken (קלקל). Nowairi tells us that they were whirled about (*yojīlūnahā*). *Istiqsām* and *qesem* are therefore identical processes, and the word has nothing whatever to do with magical conjurations.

But further, in view of the innocent use of *qesem* in Proverbs *l. c.*, it is to be noted that the sacred lot of the Arabs is precisely similar to the old priestly lot among the Hebrews. The Arabs, we are told, used it in all the considerable affairs of life where divine guidance was desired, as before a circumcision, a marriage or a burial. But its most important uses seem to have been to decide a controversy between two persons, to determine who was liable to pay a bloodwit, and to decide to what family a man of doubtful descent should be reckoned. Quite similar are the uses of the priestly lot in ancient Israel (1 Sam. ii. 25; Josh. vii. 14 *sqq.*; 1 Sam. xiv. 41; Ezra ii. 63; Prov. xvi. 33, xviii. 18); and the form of the Hebrew lot was hardly different, for it also, in old time, required an ephod (plated image) or teraphim for its operation (Judges xvii. xviii.; 1 Sam. xiv. 18, LXX, etc.; see Vatke *Bib. Theol.* p. 267 and Wellhausen *Prolegomena*, p. 134 *sq.*).

According to all this the *qōsēm* is primarily one who gives forth an oracle or decision of God by the sacred lot, or some analogous token. Originally there can have been little difference between a *qōsēm* and a *kōhēn* or priest, the latter word also meaning properly a soothsayer. But the priesthood in Israel passed through a great development between the time of Micah's priest and that of the well-organised Levitical priesthood which is described in Deut. xxxiii. and in Hosea as entrusted with weighty public duties of ritual and law. In the time of Isaiah a private priest like Micah's Levite would certainly have passed as a *qōsēm*, not as a *kōhēn*. And probably the ordinary diviners

were pretty much of this kind; from 1 Sam. xv. 23 and Zech. x. 2 one is led to conclude that they still divined with the aid of teraphim, and that *qesem* and teraphim fell into disrepute together. This result suits every passage in which it seems at all permissible to fix upon the root a connection with some definite form of divination; the false prophets are called *qōsĕmīm* by Micah Jeremiah and Ezekiel, not in a strict sense, but merely in contumely, and partly at least because they gave oracles for money (Micah iii. 11). Of course when a whole class of superstitious practices, of which *qesem*, technically so called, was the most notorious, came to be placed in contrast to true (*i.e.* to spiritual and ethical) prophecy, this enlargement of the sense of the word became natural; in 1 Sam. xxviii. the verb is even applied to divination by the *ōb*, *i.e.* by ghosts. And so in the Septuagint *qōsēm* is commonly rendered by the quite general word *μάντις*[1].

The comparison between the Hebrew and Arabian data is so convincing as to the real history of the word קסם that but for the great name of Fleischer it would be hardly necessary to waste a word on the rival theory that the word first meant a magical formula and then came to denote divination. The basis of this theory is that in Arabic the forms II and IV of the verb are used of magical conjuration. But this usage appears to be quite recent (compare the examples in Dozy *Suppl. s. v.*) and it is not denied that it is derived from أقسم "swear," or rather, since II and IV are both used in this sense, from قسامة "an oath," just as in Syriac ܐܣܩܕ is to exorcise. Now in Bokhārī iv. 219 *sq.* (Būlāq vocalised edition) there is a very

[1] It does not appear that the large sense of קֶסֶם can be certainly shewn to occur before the new type of prophecy which began with Amos had raised its claim to be the only legitimate vehicle of revelation. Balaam is called קסם only in the postprophetic passage Josh. xiii. 22; and though in Num. xxii. 7, the elders of Moab take קסמים in their hand when they go to visit him, the mention of the elders of Midian in this verse shews that it has been touched by a hand later than the Priestly Code, to which Num. xxv. and xxxi. belong. The account of Saul and the witch of Endor is of uncertain date, but Wellhausen has shewn that it does not belong to the original thread of the story of Saul's last campaign and death.

instructive paragraph headed "The *qasāma* in the time of heathenism," containing a story which is said to give the origin of the practice so named, and which at any rate exactly explains its function.

A man of the Banū Hāshim had hired himself as a camel-herd to a member of another family of the Qoreish, and received his deathblow from his master out in the desert, for a trifling offence. As he lay dying, however, he was able to tell his story to a by-passer and give him instructions to proceed to the Feast at Mecca, and there take the proper means to bring his murderer to account, by publicly calling first on the Qoreish, then on the Hashimites, and finally on Abū Ṭālib as head of the latter, and then relating what he knew. Abū Ṭālib being thus publicly charged with the case offers the accused three choices; either to pay a blood-wit of 100 camels, or to bring fifty of his kin to take an oath to his innocence, or the blood-revenge. The man's kin consented to take the oath; one of the fifty however bought himself off by a payment of two camels, which Abū Ṭālib accepted, and a second was excused because his mother was a Hashimite. The others took the oath, and all of them died before a year went round. Here, therefore, the oath is like the lot, simply an appeal to the divine sentence, and beyond doubt was taken at the sanctuary; compare the oath لا والذى مسحت ايمن كعبته "nay by him whose Ka'ba right hands stroke" (Soyūṭī *Muẓhir* ii. 137) with the ceremony of stroking the Ka'ba with hands dipped in unguent at the oath described by Ibn Hishām, p. 85: see also Exod. xxii. 10.

Thus from every point of view we find that *qesem* is in its primary religious sense a divine sentence, literally a divine division (قَسْم). As a division it is primarily a sentence between man and man, and so the word belongs to the primitive Semitic conception that the Deity alone can decide between freemen, and control the absolute lawlessness of the desert. This is, so far as we can trace it, the most fundamental conception of religion (as distinct from mere magical superstition) which the Semites possess, and so the universal religious use of the root

קסם—it belongs also to Ethiopic and to the Aramaic dialects—is perfectly intelligible.

From the Aramaic usage some additional light may be gathered. In heathen Aram, where no prophetic revelation arose to degrade older religious beliefs to the region of superstition, derivatives of ܩܣܡ, which is only a dialectic variant of קסם, became the typical names for revealer and revelation in general. This is plain even from the usage of Christian writers; *qāṣōm* is usually kept quite distinct from *ḥarrāsh* "sorcerer" and such words, and was the usual name for the *μάντεις* of the Syrian pagans. So Isaac of Antioch, i. 212 "There were in Bethḥūr *qāṣōmē* who professed the knowledge of hidden things, but they never predicted the calamity of the city; the tyrant who was chief over these pagans had his confidence in *qeṣmē*," etc. So too Bar Bahlul (MS. of Cambridge University Library) gives indeed a variety of definitions for ܩܣܡ and ܩܣܡܣܡ, but they all belong to the region of soothsaying and divination, and the definition common to all the sources of the glossary is that the *qāṣōm* is the Arabic عرّاف, كاهن or كهّان, and his art عرافة or كهانة[1].

But the most authoritative statement of what ܩܣܡ meant to the Aramaean pagans is derived from one of themselves, Abu'l Ḥasan Thābit ibn Qorra (died A.H. 288, *Fihrist* p. 272), from one of whose Syriac works Barhebraeus (*Chron.* p. 177) quotes verbally as follows: "To whom did the godhead shine forth, giving *qeṣmē* and instructions about the future, save to the illustrious[2] of the heathen?" *Qesm* therefore is an *oracle*

[1] "Sacerdotalis functio" in Castle is simply a mistranslation of this; عرافة for the art of the *'Arrāf* has escaped Dozy ii. 117. The other synonyms are مبخّت, which Dozy has from Peter of Alcala, منجّم, صاحب زجر, and جزّار a word which the Lexx. know only in the sense of a slaughterer, and which may be compared with the גַּזְרִין of the Book of Daniel.

[2] Or is محتدا here rather = أطبّاء which in Ibn Hishām i. 19, 2, is a kind of soothsayer?

or divine revelation in general. Against this it cannot for a moment be set that Christians, to whom magic and *μαντεία* were alike heathenish, so that the *qāṣōm* is classed with sorcerers charmers and writers of amulets (Overbeck *Ephr. Syr.* etc. p. 212, 217, Lagarde *Reliquiae* 31, 131), may sometimes obliterate the lines of distinction between the several forbidden arts (*e.g.* Is. Ant. i. p. 186, l. 191) or that we even find such a gloss as Bar Bahlul's

قسما[1] ة قوصا ساحر

For ساحر witchcraft is the idea under which all these hidden arts must ultimately fall for those who ascribe them to Satanic agency. And this was the Christian idea; again to quote Bar Bahlul:—

قوصا ة هن بزا هنه هنه بلكه هنه قاذا
حلا هنهتا قصا السائل العرّاف قوصا ة هنه قاذا
ذاله هنه انقا بعوهنه حكسها بهتا اه هنتوصا
ما يفعله العرّاف

To the latter part of this gloss I shall return presently.

But while *qāṣōm* is the most general word for a revealer among the heathen Aramaeans and *qesm* the most general word for divine revelation, indications are not wanting to shew that here also the root had originally, and never quite lost, a more specific sense; and in point of fact the specific kinds of *qesm* of which we have notice, are either connected with the sanctuary and the priestly oracle, or bear traces of having been originally so connected.

Here also we may begin with a piece of evidence which may be regarded as coming from the heathen Aramaeans themselves.

At the June feast of the Harranians (*Fihrist.* p. 322, Chwolson *Ssabier* ii. 26) a sort of torch was lighted, and the

[1] So read with the MS. Lex. of the India Office. The Cambridge MS. has قسعا. For this and several other unpublished glosses I am indebted to Prof. W. Wright.

[2] Rather *qṣāmā* in sing.

priest drew an omen as to whether the feast was acceptable to the gods, by observing whether the torch kept its light while fifteen times in succession he fired off twelve arrows and gathered them up creeping on all fours. Here the expression is وهو يقصم اى يتفأل and the first of these synonyms, which has to be explained by a real Arabic word, is plainly the technical term of the Harranians themselves, *i.e.* our ܨܡܝ. The same phrase recurs at p. 325 of omens drawn from the eyes, mouth and movements of sacrificial victims after the head is severed[1]. So the word is technical for omens connected with the ritual of the sanctuary, and it is somewhat remarkable that in one of these the arrows still have their place. Arrows however appear in various ways in Semitic divination; comp. 2 Kings xiii. 17 *sqq.* with Lane *s. v.* عق.

Another hint of some importance may be got from the gloss in Hoffm. *Opusc. Nest.* p. 115, l. 15,

ܩܘܛܝ ܕ ܟܠ ܐܟܦ ܒܝܬ ܐܠܗ ܐܟܦ ܩܛܝ ܨܡܝ

Here the small chapels called *prakkē* are distinguished from the immediately preceding *gaybē*, which are "spacious houses to worship idols and eat and drink before them," and the chapels are not only houses of idols but houses of *qāsōmē*. Some further light perhaps may be thrown on this divination in small chapels. The Syriac word can hardly be separated from the Hebrew פָּרֹכֶת, the vail of the Holy of Holies, and from the פרכם of the painted inscription of Citium (*C. I. S.* fasc. 1, p. 93 *sqq.*). The word is the Assyrian *parakku*, which was given as "altar" by Schrader in *Z. D. M. G.* xxvi. 35, but now appears rather to mean a cella or shrine (Schrader *K. A. T.* 2nd ed. p. 390, Halévy *Mélanges*, p.

[1] This kind of omen appears, degenerated into a charm, in Lagarde *Rel.* p. 134, l. 16, where the priest Addai consults Jacob of Edessa about "those who complain of their sicknesses to the stars or betake themselves for aid to a solitary tree, or a fountain of water, or seven fountains [cp. Nöldeke, *Litt. Centralbl.* 1879, col. 363], or sea-water, or a bone from a wall [?] *or the dried head of a beast*, or rhododaphne or other roots from the earth, or iron, or gold; or value thunders and lightnings or fire flying in the heaven, or keep and value the right fore-leg of a wolf or a broken pot, or other miserable and petty things."

187)[1]. Thus we have the *qāsōm* connected with the shrine in which stood the idol or the sacred stone (*βαιτύλιον*), which was half altar, half idol. Such shrines might be of the nature of tents (2 Kings xxiii. 7), they include therefore the portable chapels, of which Selden has collected evidence in his *De Diis Syriis*, Synt. i. cap. 6. And precisely in the case of these portable shrines we have evidence that they were used to give an oracle: Servius on *Aen.* vi. 68: "*ξόανα id est* simulacra brevia quae portabantur in lecticis et ab ipsis mota infundebant vaticinia, quod fuit apud Aegyptios et Carthaginienses." The same kind of oracle was found at Heliopolis and at Hierapolis (Macrob. i. 23, 13, *De Dea Syr.* § 36; see for further details Bouché-Leclercq, iii. 401 *sqq.*), and was known in Greece in a degraded form; the movements of *βαιτύλια* being taken as divinatory, though it was not clearly understood that they were simply the rude stone "godboxes," originally half idol, half altar, of Semitic heathenism, so that this divination is not generically different from the *qesem* by teraphim.

Let us next look at the gloss of Bar Bahlul already quoted, in which *qesmē* are said to come from devils and be administered by men "who give oracles with barley-bread or the stones of fruit." We know from Pollux ix. 128 that apple-pips were used by the Greeks to divine the disposition of a lover, but something more formal is meant here, and possibly the Greek practice, like other trivial superstitions, is a survival of some old divination in an attenuated form. In the Syrian practice one sees that the kernels are used by a regular class of diviners who claim diabolic aid. Now devils are what the heathen gods were degraded into by Christianity, and so the conclusion lies near that here again we have a ritual for consulting a deity. As regards the barley-bread, at least, this can be made very

[1] Ephraem Syrus on Ezek. xx. 29 takes *prakk* to mean an idolatrous altar, apparently knowing that the word stands for במה; but the Peshito seems to use it only where altar or *βῆμα* seemed unsuitable. In the case of a *βαιτύλιον* idol and altar are only varieties of one idea; as the Arabic *anṣāb* and the Hebrew *maṣṣeba* = *bēth-ēl* (Gen. xxviii. 22) shew. Comp. Porph. *De Abst.* ii. 56 where speaking of Dumaetha (Dūmat al-Jandal) he mentions *τὸν βωμὸν...ᾧ χρῶνται ὡς ξοάνῳ.*

probable. Another gloss given both by Bar Bahlul and in the India Office MS. supplies additional details,

صوفا ي دقيق شعير كسر خبز يتكهن بها

Now divination "by barley-meal and crumbs of bread" is identical with the *ἀλφιτομαντεία* and *κριθομαντεία* of the Greeks, a form of divination important enough to give to Apollo, according to Hesychius, the epithet *ἀλευρόμαντις*. It is therefore a real oracle connected with the worship of the god, and that the material is barley-meal is to be explained by the fact that barley cakes were used in antique meal-offerings (*e.g.* the *ψαιστά* in the Dipolia at Athens, Porph. *De Abst.* ii. 30), and that barley in the form of *οὐλαί* belonged to every Greek sacrifice. The meal-offering had great importance in ancient times both in Greece and among the Semites, being connected with the presentation of firstfruits. Now Apollo is very specially a god to whom firstfruits are paid (A. *Θαργήλιος*); and at the May feast of the Thargelia bread and other preparations of the new grain figured, just as at the parallel spring feast of unleavened bread among the Hebrews. So too we have the *χρυσᾶ θέρη* at Delphi, and the firstfruits sent from afar to Delos (Herod. iv. 33), where stood an ancient altar which like the table of shew-bread received no bloody sacrifice and no offering by fire (Theophr. in Porphyry *ut supra* c. 28). It is in connection with meal-offering and firstlings that we have to look for divination by barley-meal; for the gift and prayer of the worshipper and the response of the god go together; and so in one or other form we find in very many worships omens by which it is indicated whether the god accepts the sacrifice and so promises good to the offerer (comp. Gen. iv. 5). Now we have the Semitic oracle from barley only in a late form, but its original connection can hardly have been different; among the Hebrews the firstfruits included barley-bread, 2 Kings iv. 42; and a meal offering of barley is retained, even in the later law, for the antique ritual of Num. v. 15, while among the Harranians barley cakes figure in the ritual of the 20th Adar (*Fihrist*, p. 324, l. 29, see also l. 1). The divination from fruit-stones may also belong to a similar ritual; dates, as an element in eastern agriculture scarcely second to corn, appear in

the ritual of the Harranians (*Fihrist*, p. 325 l. 1 *sq.*, and Chwolson's note, vol. ii. p. 253) and the Romans too had learned to make presents of dates in honour of the gods at the Saturnalia or feast of ingathering (Plin. XIII. 9 [46] quoted by Löw, *Pflanzennamen* p. 111). At the Harranian festival of the marriage of the gods on the first of the "Date month" (Adar 30) dried dates with hard stones قَسْب were divided among the worshippers, and everyone put under his pillow at night seven of these in the name of the seven gods, with a fragment of bread and salt for "the god who touches the bellies." This perhaps is a hint as to one way in which divination could be practised with the elements named in our gloss.

It seems worth while to ask whether these glosses of Bar Bahlul do not throw some light on the obscure form of divination, practised by women, which Ezekiel describes in ch. xiii. 17 *sqq.* and which, according to ver. 22, was directed to obtain responses by which men were made glad or sorry, *i.e.* assurances of divine favour or the opposite. In this process some kind of appurtenances were tied to the arm and put on the head. The former (כסתות) Ephrem Syrus explains as amulets (*qmîʿē*) which they wore and so brought forth responses from their arms, after the fashion of the ἐγγαστρίμυθοι and peeping wizards of Isa. viii. 19. This he hardly has out of his own head; the translation "amulets" at least is traditional, for in the Hexapla on our passage we find that ὁ Ἑβραῖος renders כסתות by *φυλακτήρια*, which is really the same thing—even the Jewish phylacteries were amulets and the verb קמע is used of them (see Buxtorf *s. v.*). The phylacteries are survivals of old superstition, and their use in prayer may be taken as shewing what that superstition was. They are appurtenances to make prayer more powerful, and so we must take it here also that these women invoked the deity—obviously for an omen. But what kind of omen? Verse 19 seems to tell us: "ye profane Me with My people for (or with) handfuls of barley and crumbled pieces of bread." This is usually taken to mean simply for the poorest pay. But the expression is very precise and the gifts mentioned are not accidental, they are such as constituted the *aparchae*, such altar-gifts as the

poorer priests lived by (1 Sam. ii. 36, 2 Kings xxiii. 9). Taking all these indications together and comparing the Syriac divination with the same elements, we seem to gather that we have here also a kind of omen which in its first origin was drawn from the gifts of firstfruits at a—Canaanite or Hebrew—sanctuary, with the aid of prayer, such as habitually accompanied rites from which an oracle was sought. As the oracle is from crumbs or handfuls such as were put upon the altar (Lev. ii. 6) we have here a fresh confirmation of the conjecture that the omen is primarily one of those which denote the acceptance of an offering. Of course when the thing sank to be an illicit art this reference would fall away and only the form remain.

Fragmentary as these indications are, and uncertain when taken one by one, their evidence all tends in one direction, viz. to shew that the specific practices distinguished as *qeṣmē* have in their origin a *sacral* character, and are connected with the temples, altars and feasts of the gods. They are, to use the old Semitic phrase, given to those who appear before God in his sanctuary, and so all are in principle analogous to the sacred lot. This character necessarily appears very much disguised, because we have evidence of most of the methods only in a degenerate form; but the accumulation of particulars can hardly be accidental. And the force of the argument is increased when we note that though the glosses sometimes treat *qeṣmē* as if they were the same thing with omens in general (ܢܝܢܐ) yet when we get a list of divinatory practices non-sacral omens are distinguished from them. For this there is an instructive passage in Lagarde *Reliquiae*, p. 131, where Addai asks "about priests who" write amulets and practise various magical arts "and practise *qeṣmē* (ܩܨܡܐ) and seek auguries (ܡܢܚܫܢܐ) also by birds, and observe also their cries, and observe also days and seasons, and also chances and accidental occurrences, and also marks on the bodies of persons, and furthermore interpret dreams, with other wickednesses:" see also *ibid.* p. 31 compared with *Rel. Graec.* p. 11, where an equivalent for *qāṣōm* seems unfortunately to be wanting.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

NOTE ON HOMERIC GEOGRAPHY.

Βορέης καὶ Ζέφυρος, τώ τε Θρῄκηθεν ἄητον (Il. IX. 5).

This line has been generally regarded as proving that the author of the *Iliad* was a native of Asia Minor. The argument was first used (so far as I know) by Robert Wood, in his *Essay on the Original Genius of Homer*. The west wind, he pointed out, blows from Thrace if the point of view is in Ionia, but not if it is in European Greece. 'The Thracian mountains must form the background, thence the tempest is to burst on the Ægean Sea, which has its proper stormy colouring: while the Ionian shore covered with sea-wreck, by a succession of waves breaking on its beach, will make the fore-ground, where the Poet views, admires, and describes the whole' (p. 21, ed. 1775).

The inference, like so many similar criticisms, depends on the degree of accuracy which we are justified *à priori* in ascribing to our author. If Homer makes his west wind blow from Thrace, does it follow that Thrace lay to the west? Let us compare the language used in a parallel case by a writer of the age of the Antonines. The island of Sardinia, according to Pausanias (X. 17. 6), is said to be protected from the two winds now in question by the mountains of Corsica (*τὸν Ζέφυρον οὖν καὶ Βορέαν ὑπὸ τῆς Κύρνου κωλύεσθαι νομίζουσι μὴ καὶ ἄχρι τῆς Σαρδοῦς ἐξικνεῖσθαι*). A glance at the map will show that the west wind, at least, does not blow from Corsica to Sardinia. Is it not *a fortiori* probable that Homer fell into a similar error?

Let me add a word on the metrical value of the word Βορέης. The common supposition, that the ε here has the force of a *y*, seems very unlikely. But as the Attic form is Βορρᾶς, we may fairly infer a Homeric Βοῤῥέης,—confined however to Books IX. and XXIII.

D. B. MONRO.

A NEWLY IDENTIFIED FRAGMENT OF EPICURUS ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ[1].

PART of the second book of Epicurus *περὶ φύσεως*, as has long been known, is preserved in the Herculanean papyrus-roll no. 1149, published in 1809 in the Naples edition, Coll. Prior, vol. II. The legible remains of the roll, as there given, consist of 6 "fragments," 11 "columns," and the title; each col. and frag. forming the upper half of a page. Of the original papyrus, the best preserved part, containing the cols. and title, was sent to England in or about 1809, and is now in the British Museum.

The engraved facsimile in the Naples edition (with the exception of the 6 frs.) is evidently a reproduction of the lead-pencil facsimile made under J. Hayter's direction at Naples, brought by him to England on his return in 1809, and now with the rest of his facsimiles in the Bodleian Library. But though engraved directly from Hayter's copy, the Naples facsimile does not always reproduce it with perfect accuracy. For instance, in col. 10, l. 4, where Nap. gives *διαΛύσεως*, Hayter's copy has *διαΔύσεως*; and the context shews that the latter is right. (Epicurus is discussing the possibility of the *εἴδωλα making their way through* obstructions.) As a rule, however, Nap. faithfully repeats Hayter's facsimile, which appears from internal evidence to be exceptionally accurate.

Gomperz[2] has recently pointed out that another of the Herculanean rolls, no. 1010, is a *duplicate copy* of the *same*

[1] Read at a meeting of the Oxford Philological Society, Oct. 31, 1884.

[2] *Neue Bruchstücke Epikurs*, Wien, 1876.

book of Epicurus *περὶ φύσεως*. A facsimile of this roll is published in the Naples edition, Coll. Alt. VI. p. 69 sq. It contains 17 fragments, and the title επι · ογρο · || ⊐ερι⊅γ—. The pages are much mutilated, and the facsimile is obviously inaccurate; but it helps to fill a few lacunas in 1149.

Gomperz[1] has also identified as forming part of Epic. *περὶ φύσεως* a third papyrus, no. 993 (published in facsimile in the Naples edition, Coll. Alt. X. 104 sq.), consisting of 16 cols., in which a few lines only at the bottom of each page are legible. But as far as I know, it has not hitherto been noticed that 993 is *the lower part of the same roll of which* 1149 *forms the upper part.* This fact, which might be suspected from the similarity of their appearance and contents, is proved by the duplicate 1010, which in several cases bridges over the gap between corresponding portions of 1149 and 993, and gives in the same page parts of the text of both. The roll 1149—993 was probably broken in two at the time of its discovery; and the two parts, not being known to be connected, were differently numbered and unrolled at different times. The same thing has taken place in the case of several other rolls, e.g. 1150—336 (Polystratus *περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως*), 157—152 (Philodemus *περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς*), and 19—698.

By combining the contents of the three numbers, it is possible to restore an appreciable part of the text of the last part of the book. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to determine the connections between the cols. of 1149 and those of 993.

A comparison of the last col. of each with the last fr. of 1010 shews that 993, col. 16 immediately precedes 1149, col. 11, and must therefore form the bottom of the last page but one of the roll. Hence, if the cols. were in both parts continuous, the arrangement throughout could at once be determined; but in order to find out whether this is the case, it is necessary to examine the original papyri. The originals of 993 and of 1010 are at Naples, and I have not seen them; but in that of 1149, which I have examined, it is evident that the cols. are *not* all

[1] *Wiener Studien*, 1879, p. 27.

of them continuous. Their arrangement may be shewn thus (cols. included in a single undivided piece of papyrus being bracketed together):



Thus several cols. *are certainly* lost between cols. 2 and 3; and one or more cols. *may* be lost at each of the breaks 3—4, 5—6, 8—9.

If we start with the assumption that the cols. in both parts are continuous from the end backwards, we find that the resulting combinations *as far back as* 993, *col.* 14 are satisfactory in sense, and most of them are proved correct by the correspondence of the duplicate 1010. This part of the arrangement, therefore, may be taken as settled. The same may be said of another combination some pages further back, viz. $\begin{matrix} 1149 \\ 993 \end{matrix} \left\{ \begin{matrix} 4\ 5 \\ 9\ 10 \end{matrix} \right\}$; for the sequence 993. 10—1149. 5 is proved correct by the duplicate 1010. 7; 1149. 4 and 5 are seen to be continuous in the original papyrus, and the sequence 993. 9—1149. 4 yields the words (*o*)*ὐθὲν ἀντ*(*ὶ*) ‖ *μα*(*ρ*)*τυρε*(*ῖ τοῖς φ*)*αινομένοις*, which give a sense too satisfactory to be due to accident.

But among the intermediate cols. (i.e. those between 1149, col. 5 and 993, col. 14) there is evidence of some dislocation; for the attempt to read the cols. consecutively fails. The first of these sequences, 993. 11—1149. 6, might *perhaps* be made to yield a sense; but 993. 12—1149. 7 produces an impossible combination of words; and 993. 13—1149. 8 not only makes no sense, but is directly disproved by the duplicate 1010. 14, which corresponds to 1149. 8, and at the same time gives a few lines immediately preceding it, from which 993. 13 entirely differs. The text may be read as follows:

1010. fr. 14 { *— ἰσχυρὰ* (*πε*)*ραιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο* ‖ *νόντων* (?) *στερεμνίων* etc.; } 1149 col. 8

while the concluding words of 993, col. 13 are *ἐν τρόπῳ τινὶ πρὸς τὰς* (*ἰσ*)*χ*(*υ*)*ρὰς* (?) *προσπίπτειν· καθ*.

It follows from these facts that a loss of one or more cols. must have taken place in both parts of the roll, but at different points, —in 1149, somewhere between cols. 5 and 9, and in 993, somewhere between cols. 10 and 14. In 1149, it is certain from the original papyrus that such a loss is possible at two points only,—after col. 5, and after col. 8. It would be desirable to examine the original of 993 also; but without doing so, we may get some further light from the correspondences of 1010 in this part of the roll, which may be represented as follows:

1010. fr. 6 = 1149, col. 4
„ fr. 7 = { 993, col. 10 / 1149, col. 5
„ fr. 8 = 993, col. 11
„ fr. 9
„ fr. 10
„ fr. 11
„ fr. 12
„ fr. 13 = 1149, col. 7
„ fr. 14 = 1149, col. 8
„ fr. 15 = { 993, col. 14 / 1149, col. 9

The comparative length of a page of the two rolls can be easily ascertained from the last cols. Each complete col. of 1010 contained about 20 lines, of about 13 letters each; and each complete col. of the other roll contained about 25 lines of 14 letters each, or was nearly equivalent to $1\frac{1}{3}$ pages of 1010. Now assuming the frs. of 1010 to be given in their right order in the published Naples facsimiles, the space between corresponding lines of 993. 11 and 993. 14 is found to be represented by 7 pages of 1010, which must be equivalent to 5 pages of 1149—993; therefore, between these points two cols. of 993 must be lost.

Similarly, the space between corresponding lines of 1149. 5 and 1149. 7 is found to be represented by about $5\frac{1}{2}$ pages of 1010, which should be equivalent to four pages of 1149—993; therefore, between these points two cols. of 1149 must be lost. Moreover, 993. 11 is proved to be the next page to

993. 10, by the fact that the two correspond to consecutive frs. (8 and 9) of 1010, and that words which on this hypothesis are a page apart in 993 are found to be at the right interval ($1\frac{1}{3}$ pages) in the two frs. of 1010. On similar grounds it can be proved that in 1149, cols. 7 and 8 immediately precede col. 9; and the original papyrus of 1149 shews col. 6 to be continuous with cols. 7 and 8. Thus the following arrangement is established:

$$\begin{matrix} 1149 \\ 993 \end{matrix} \left\{ \begin{matrix} 5 - - 6\ 7\ 8\ 9 \\ 10\ 11 - - - - 14 \end{matrix} \right\}.$$

It only remains to place 993, cols. 12 and 13. As was shewn above, 993. 13 cannot precede immediately 1149. 8; therefore, it *must* precede immediately either 1149. 7 or 1149. 6. But as the former arrangement produces the impossible combination of letters *καθα||ρεμνιοις*, the other alternative (which gives a possible sense) must be adopted.

The connection between the two parts of the roll from 993. 9 to the end is thus determined as follows:

$$\begin{matrix} 1149 \\ 993 \end{matrix} \left\{ \begin{matrix} 4\ 5 - - 6\ 7\ 8\ 9\ 10\ 11 \\ 9\ 10\ 11\ 12\ 13 - - 14\ 15\ 16 \end{matrix} \right\};$$

and the correspondences with the duplicate roll 1010 may be given thus:—

993. 9
1149. 4 = 1010. 6
$\left.\begin{matrix} 993.\ 10 \\ 1149.\ 5 \end{matrix}\right\}$ = 1010. 7
993. 11 = 1010. 8

993. 12	1010. 9
	„ 10
993. 13	„ 11
1149. 6	„ 12

1149. 7 = 1010. 13

1149. 8 = 1010. 14
993. 14 } = 1010. 15
1149. 9 }
993. 15 } = 1010. 16
1149. 10 [1010, page lost.]
993. 16 }
1149. 11 } = 1010. 17.

If the fragments of the two rolls are arranged on this plan, it will be found that the legible parts of 1010. 9 to 12 coincide with lost or illegible parts of 1149—993, and thus the absence of duplicates in this part of the papyri is explained. But even here a slight trace of the identity of the two rolls is preserved. Assuming the above arrangement to be correct, 993. 13. l. 1 should nearly coincide with 1010. 11. l. 2. Now examining the two rolls at this point, we find in 1010, CMIENTAICEΞωΘECIN, and in 993, C/···TAICET····IN. The resemblance, though hardly sufficient of itself to prove the two pages duplicates, strongly confirms the conclusion already arrived at.

At the next step backwards, we come to another breach of continuity; for the sequence 993. 8—1149. 3 fails to make sense. This is most likely to be explained by the loss of one or more cols. in 1149 at the break in the papyrus between cols. 3 and 4. In the earlier cols., I have not succeeded in establishing any connections (with the doubtful exception 1010. 2. ll. 1 to 3 = 1149. 3. ll. 12 to 14); so that the right arrangement is determined only from 993. 9 to the end of the roll. The text cannot be finally settled without a fresh examination of the originals of 1010 and 993 in the Naples Museum; but the following may be offered as a provisional restoration of the last part of the roll, based on the evidently inaccurate facsimiles of these two numbers published in the Coll. Alt.

993, col. 9.

— κωλυομε-·····ΝΩC ὑπὸ τῆς·IC··θ··
παραλλαγῆς, τὸ δὲ (π)ερ(ὶ τὰ ε(ἰδω)λα οὕτως
ἔχειν (φ)άσκειν (ο)ὐθὲν ἀντ(ι)-

1149, col. 4. *μα(ρ)τυρε(ῖ τοῖς*

1010, fr. 6. *φ)αινομένοις. (κατ)αφα(νὲς) ‖ οὖν πᾶ(σι)ν γί(νετ)αι ὅτι τὰ εἴδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον κέκτ‖ηται κατὰ τὴν (φορ)άν. καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ δέ τινι τρόπῳ ἔσται περὶ τῆς ταχυτῆτος τῶν (ε)ἰδώλω(ν) ἀ(πό)δειξιν ποιήσα(σθαι.) ἐπειδὴ γὰ(ρ) ····· (τα)χὺς · οὐ μόν(ον) ὁ (?) τ(ὴν ? κο)υφότητα —*

[about 3 lines]

993, col. 10.

— ραε ····· τον περλι · γ ··· ε ·· ωc

1010, fr. 7. *καὶ το(ῖς εἰδώ?)λοις ὑπάρχει καὶ ‖ αὕτη ἡ δύναμις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο ταχ-*

1149, col. 5. *έως ἐκπ(έτεσ?)θαι, τὸ (δὲ) εἴδωλον (οὔ,) ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ(ξω)στικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσθαι · ον (?) (τὰ ?) δ᾽ εἴδωλα μὴ (?) κα(τ)ά γε τὸν ἐξωστ(ι)κόν· κατὰ μέντοι τὸ περιλαμ(β)ανόμενο(ν) ε · θ ·· ε ·· ιμογ κ(ε)νοῦ (?) δι ··· γνιzηc ··· τδce ··· κ(ε)ν(ό)τητα καὶ λεπ(τότ)ητα καὶ μι(κρότη ??)‖-*

1010, fr. 8. *τα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον ἀδύνατον ἐπι · τ ··· θην πολλὰς επιλα*

[2 lines ?] *κ (στε)ρέ-*

μν(ιο)ν(?)

τ ·· πράττ(ει)ν (?), πῶς (ο)ὐχί, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἔχ(ε)ι τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτῆτος, νομ(ισ)τέον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχ(ε)ιν—

[about 8 lines]

1010, fr. 9. *τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τῶν ἁπάντων (?) ····· μαγ ·· πρότερον φέρεσθαι—*

[about 8 lines ?]

993, col. 12.

— \cφο ·· μικκαcez · νθει ··· γο ·· μενραγ¯ ·· αιλγτ ιι(· τ ···· παρασκευάζειν (?) οὐκ (?) εὔοδον το/ ·· γ

[about 3 lines ?]

1010, fr. 10. *καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν* ει · · cιτ · ε . *συμμέτρως ἐχούσαις* · · ερε [4 lines] *τῆς ἐξω-στικῆς* · · ορ[· ειcη · · λο · · ηc *λαμβανούσης* [1 line] *ποιουντα-*

[about 8 lines]

1010, fr. 11. 993, col. 13. *μεγα μῆκος περιλαμβάνου-σαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξω θέσιν* (?) *καὶ οὐ* αν[· (μεν (?) *ἐν τρόπῳ τινὶ πρὸς τὰς* (*ἰσ*)*χ*(*υ*)*ρὰς* (?) *προσπίπτειν καθ' ἅ-*

1149, col. 6. (*π*)*αντας ὁ*(*μοῦ*? *το*)*ὺς* (*τρό*)*πους οὓς θεωροῦ*(*με*)*ν τὰς ταχυτῆτας* (*ὑπ*)*αρχούσας σώ-μα*(*σιν*)· (*ὅθε*?)*ν εὐεπί*(*β*)*λε*(*πτο*)*ν ὅτι καὶ τ*(*ὰ*) *εἴ*(*δωλ*?)*α* [1 line] *εἰς μακροὺς* (*πόρ*?)*ους περαιοῦν,* (*εὐε*)*πίβλεπ*(*τ*)*ον* (?) · · · · ηην · · · · ην

[little or no interval]

1010, fr. 11 fin. (*εἰ*)*δώλω*(*ν*) *φύσις* · · ατα · · · · · · · ·

1010, fr. 12. *διὰ παντὸς πόρου* (?) *τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ* α · · γωce

[about 12 lines]

1149, col. 7.

1010, fr. 13. — (*στε*)*ρεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός, πλὴν οὐχὶ τῷ ἐκ σωμάτων πολ‖λῶν εἰς βάθος πεποίησθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὴν τοῦ ἔνδοθεν* (*κ*)*ενοῦ* (?) *διάτασιν ‖ τὴν* (*αὐ*)*τὴν ἔχειν, λέγειν τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως πως, ὡς—*

[12 or 13 lines]

1010, fr. 14. ηcιν *ἰσχυρὰ* (*πε*)*ραιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο-*

1149, col. 8. *νόντων* (?) *στερεμνίων, τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν.* (*οὐδ*)*ὲ*(*ν*?) *γὰρ ἂν μᾶλ*(*λο*)*ν ἔνδοθέν τι πολύ-κενον, ὅμοιον* (*δὲ*?) *φύσε*(*ι τῷ*) *μὴ πο*(*λ*)*υκένῳ, δύναιτο,* (*διὰ τῶν τοί*?)*χων* (*περ*)*αιοῦν, τὴ*(*ν*) *ἔξ*(*ω θέσι*?)*ν διασώζει*(*ν*) *ὡς*(?) *στερέμνιον—*

[about 3 lines]

1010, fr. 15.

— (τ)ῶν μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τ(ι)νὰ—

[2 or 3 lines]

993, col. 14.

— (λ)έγω (?) δ' ο(ἶ)ον (?) ε .... καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλω τρόπῳ

1149, col. 9.

(τ)ὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντα, ἥπερ ἔνιαι ἔξωθεν μὲν ἀλλη(λοῦ)χοι φύσεις (ἔ)νδοθε(ν δὲ) πολύκενοι δύ(να)νται τὰς (πορείας? δ)ιὰ τῶν (σ)τερεμνί(ω)ν φύσε(ω)ν λαμ-

1010, fr. 16.

βάν(ε)ιν· οἷο(ν ?) δή φημι βλ(έ)ποντες, (ἐ)πὶ (?) τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ τοῦτο (ἐ)γχει(ρ)οῦσιν κατ(α)δοξά(ζε)ιν, διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυ(μία)ν τ(ή)νδε (?) τῆς λε-

πτότητος τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσ(ηγ)ορ(ο)ῦντες—[3 lines]—

993, col. 15.

δύνασθαι (φέρε ?)σθαι διὰ τῶν (στ)ερεμνίων φύσεων (σ)υμβέβηκεν ἥπερ τὰς ἀντιτύπεις

1149, col. 10.

διὰ τῶν ἐκείνων (?) συνκρίσεις, ἐὰν μή τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως ὃν ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν δεικνύῃ δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντ(α). δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρη(κ)α, καὶ τὴ(ν) εἰς τοῦτο τ(ὸ) εἶδος γεγονυῖ(α)ν οἰ(κ)ονομίαν ἡμ(ῖ)ν ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι συντελ(ὲς) πρὸς τὸ γνῶν(αι)—[5 or 6 lines]

993, col. 16.

—(δέ)δεικτα(ι) μὴ (?)

1010, fr. 17.

μ(ό)ν(ο)ν ὅτι ε . π . . . , (ἀλ)λὰ καὶ ὅτι τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέ-

1149, col. 11.

βηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰς φορὰς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσι(ν) κέκτησθα(ι). τὰ δ' ἁρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν ταῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξιμεν.

1149. 8 init. The facsimile gives ωντων.

In 993, col. 16, perhaps ὅτι ἔ(σ)τι(ν) should be read.

993, col. 16 fin.: *τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι*: cf. Epic. Epistle to Herodotus, in D. L. x. 48 init., *ἡ γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει.* The whole passage D. L. x. 46 to 48 closely resembles these fragments, and is evidently a summary of Epic. *περὶ φύσεως* Bk. II.

At the bottom of 993, col. 16, are the words *Μάρκου Ὀκταουίου*, written in a peculiar semi-cursive hand. It is noticeable that the same subscription *Μάρκου Ὀκταουίου* occurs at the end of another roll also (no. 1150—336, Polystratus *περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως*), and in both cases the name is in *the same hand-writing*, which is different from that of either text. The explanation must be that Marcus Octavius was the name of a former owner of both rolls,—perhaps the bookseller from whom Piso or Philodemus bought them.

W. SCOTT.

LEXICOGRAPHICAL NOTES II.

carbasus: commentators and lexicographers, except Georges, agree in giving, as the primary sense of this word, 'a very fine flax, grown in Spain.' The references cited to prove this are, however, mostly wrong. Liddell and Scott cite Dion. Hal. 2. 68 (the story of the vestal Aemilia) and Schol. Ar. Lys. 734, but in both cases the word denotes simply 'clothing,' and there is no allusion to Spain or to very fine linen. The use of the word in the first passage is, however, of interest, since it recurs in the story of Aemilia as told by Propertius 5. 11. 54, and Valerius Max. 1. 1. 7, though with the slightly altered meaning of a 'cloth or napkin'. Lewis and Short, again, and De Vit refer to Pliny 19. 10, Catullus 64. 227, and Columella 10. 17 (not 18). The latter speaks only of noxia carbasa succo, repeating Vergil's dictum that flax exhausts the soil. The line of Catullus has long been corrected from 'carbasus obscura dicat ferrugine Hibera' (the only reading our lexicographers know) to the MSS text carbasus obscurata dicet (Ellis) or decet (Lachmann, Bährens &c.), so that Hibera is not here the epithet of carbasa. The one right reference is Pliny 19. 10 (omitted by Georges): Hispania citerior habet splendorem lini praecipuum, torrentis in quo politur natura qui alluit Tarraconem. Et tenuitas mira ibi primum carbasis repertis. Hence Marquardt (*Privatleben* 2. 471 *n.*) infers that the word, which is, of course, of oriental origin, was early brought to Spain by Phoenician traders. But Pliny's words scarcely mean this, and, in any case, the latin word itself was probably borrowed from the greek. For, though it actually occurs in latin earlier than in greek, it seems to have reached the greeks at the time of Alexander's conquests, and the adjective carbasinus in Caecilius is apparently greek.

In pre-augustan literature, the word means 'flaxstuffs',

especially 'sails', sometimes 'clothing' (cloth, sailcloth, Tuch, Segeltuch). (1) Ennius 560 Vahl.: carbasus alta uolat pandam ductura carinam: (2) Caecilius com. 138 R. (Non. 548): carbasina molochina &c., of clothing: (3) Varro vit. pop. rom. 4. 14 (Non. 541): carbasineo tegi, again of clothing: (4) Catullus 64. 227 (above)[1]. In Mr Ellis' explanation of this line there is a small error; 'obsc. ferr. Hib.' cannot mean 'dyed with iron', for the Greeks and Romans used no mineral dyes (Marquardt, *Privatleben* 2. 490, Blümner, *Gewerbe u. Künste* 1. 224). It is true that the Egyptians used iron salts and other minerals for dyeing (see *e.g.* Villiers Stuart's *Funeral Tent of an Egyptian Queen* p. 6); but, even as late as the Elder Pliny (35. 150), Egyptian dyed stuffs were 'mirabili genere' to the Romans. Mineral dyes were similarly unknown in Northern Europe even in the middle ages. In Catullus, then, 'Hibera' is otiose, iron being common in Spain, and 'obsc. ferr.' = ferrugineae, a word which no more means 'dyed with iron' than cerinae means 'dyed with wax', or anthracinae 'dyed with coal' (Nonius 548, 549). (5) Lucret. 6. 109, of the awnings over the theatre, called carbasina vela by Pliny 19. 23. (6) Cic. Verr. 5. 30 and 80: velis carbaseis tabernacula. These seem to be the only passages where carbasus occurs in pre-augustan latin.

In Augustan writers, besides the older senses of sails &c. (Verg. A. 3. 357, 4. 417 &c.), the word denotes "fine linen" (or cotton) either for clothing or in the special sense of a cloth or napkin, as, be it noticed, in the two later versions of the story of Aemilia referred to above, in Tib. 3. 2. 21, Prop. 5. 3. 64 &c. Possibly Pliny's carbasa of mira tenuitas are some kind of fine linen wares, invented and manufactured in Spain, the flax country of western Europe. A study of the latin writers born in Spain might furnish parallels to this. It would perhaps be more natural to render ibi primum carbasis repertis by 'since flaxplants were first found there', but, with our present text (as given by Detlefsen and the Teubner editors), this gives no sense. My view may however be supported by the fact that

[1] Riese, the latest editor of Catullus, whilst rightly reading 'obscurata' insists on explaining carbasa as 'feineres Segeltuch'. Clearly it means only 'sails'.

Pliny in the next sentence speaks of a special kind of flax, Zoelicum, which had been imported into Italy.

The error of the lexicographers—if error it be—in their account of carbasus, is as old as the later glossaries. Papias, *e.g.*, has the following "*carbasus:* lini species mollissimi et candidissimi, sed nunc pro uelis ponitur: nullo humore corrumpitur, nulla aetate uincitur. *carbasa:* uela de carbaso lino. *carbasus:* pannus." But the word occurs seldom in the glossaries. Suïdas has *καρπασινοί*, the Amplonian[1] *carbasus:* tumor ueli a uento factus and *carpassini:* gresgroem (?), and "Placidus" (Mai 6. p. 556)—id est uela navis; per u scribi decet (caruasa)—gives a new spelling for late latin. What is the relation of carbasus to the words *arbasus -eus* given in Du Cange as taken from the popular speech, I cannot say.

The following words &c., taken from the fifth volume of Keil's *Gramm. Lat.* (pp. 494—594), are not in Georges[2].

biremus: Dub. Nom. 572. 25, biremas dicebant antiqui naues.

cocturnix: Dub. Nom. 573. 13, = coturnix; see Munro Lucr. 4. 639.

corbes: according to Dub. Nom. 574. 11, the phrase 'corbes messorias' is Cato's, as well as Cicero's. For the supposed nom. *corbs* (Fragm. Bob. 561. 34) see below.

crocodilus: add a ref., for the form corcodillus, to Dub. Nom. 575. 15.

corneliatim: "Asper" 552. 15, quoted without ref.

cyma: add the hendecasyllable, quoted Dub. Nom. 574. 1, from the probably Ciceronian writer Volumnius (Teuffel 192. 4; ed. 4).

dimersio: Aug. reg. 523. 23, sic 'subter fluctus' mergor: si ex litore motus fiat in dimersionem, accusatiuus est. Perhaps we should read *de*mersionem (for which see Georges).

[1] Ed. Oehler.

[2] In a recent number of *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, Dr Georges, while reviewing some 'Notes on Lexicography' from this *Journal*, remarks "Ich muss mich gegen d. Ansinnen verwahren, alle Glossen in mein Wörterbuch aufzunehmen. Mein Buch ist kein Thesaurus." It may be proper to say, therefore, that when forms or words are pointed out as "omitted by Georges", this is done under no misconception of the scope of his *Handwörterbuch*, but because his lexicon is the only one correct enough to be made the basis of a Thesaurus. (Cf. Wölfflin's *Archiv*, 1 p. 21.)

lasar: this spelling (not laser) in Aug. reg. 499. 35; Dub. Nom. 558. 35.

lien: Aug. reg. 498. 15, lien quod est splen; "Palaem." 538. 21, lien liene. (See *rien* below.)

magnus: abl. pl. magnabus, Fragm. Bob. 557. 4, antiqui ob sexum discernendum in femininis magnabus, pudicabus, &c.

monoclita: technical term in Fragm. Bob. 564. 27.

multiceps: Aug. reg. 502. 41 foll., quoted without ref.

nescio: fut. nescibo, "Palaem." 544. 14, sic dicimus, seruio seruiam et seruibo, nescio nesciam et nescibo. Scibo is common.

nidificor: Aug. reg. 513. 39, quoted as deponent, without ref.

pariambus: "Asper" 548. 32, = pyrrhic. Cf. Quintil. 9. 4. 80, Cledonius Keil 5. 30. 22, Mar. Vict. 6. 44. 13, &c.

peristromum: Dub. Nom. 586. 6, = peristroma.

rien: "Palaem." 538. 21, rien riene, lien liene. Rienes is a parallel form to renes, the only ex. of either in the singular being apparently rien in Plaut. fragm. ap. Fest 277.

semicaput: Aug. reg. 498. 25, ut caput, sinciput, semicaput. The word, however, looks more like a gloss on sinciput, than a later collateral form.

septimplex: Aug. reg. 504. 19, septuplex exclusum est, quia septimplex latinum est (so the best MS).

sum: Aug. ars 494. 26, docti quidam temporis recentioris et essendo et essendi et essendum et essens dixerunt. Priscian attributes ens to Caesar.

Two other words *della* (a punic word = carex, Aug. ars 496. 10) and *boethema* (Aug. reg. 501. 24) can hardly be called latin. The nominatives *scrobs, scobs, nubs, corbs, orbs* (Fragm. Bob. 561. 34 foll., &c.) are apparently grammarians' inventions. The writer of the Fragment says as much of the first three, and there is only grammatical testimony for the other two (Priscian &c.). Similarly the genitives *facieum specieum* (Fragm. Bob. 563. 10, specieum pro specierum, facieum pro facierum; sed modo non utimur hac enuntiatione) are devoid of authority, though Charisius and Diomedes support the latter, which is given by Georges.

F. HAVERFIELD.

ON CATULL. LXI. 227, PROP. V. 2. 39, AND 4. 47.

CATULL. LXI. 225 sqq.

MSS. 'At boni
Conjuges bene vivite et
Munere assidue valentem
Exercete juventam'.

For this the reading *assiduo* is generally substituted, but even with this correction 'munere assiduo' as Mr Ellis points out is a strange expression.

Perhaps MVTVE ASSIDVEI was by confusion of TV and N read as MVNE ASSIDVEI; a copyist perceiving that this needed an additional syllable would naturally add 're' to complete the word.

Prop. v. ii. 39 sq.

MSS. '*Pastorem* ad baculum possum *curare*, vel idem
Sirpiculis medio pulvere ferre rosam'.

For this Paley corrects on Ayrmann's conjecture

'*Pastor me* ad baculum possum *curvare*',

an exceedingly inharmonious rhythm, and with no apparent reason why '*ad* baculum' should have supplanted the more natural '*in* baculum'.

Perhaps the original may have been

'Pastor *ov*em ad baculum possum curare, etc.'

='A shepherd I can tend my sheep, stretched beside my crook or, &c.'

This involves only the insertion of the two letters OV which may have dropped out either from careless copying or, if dictated, from a slurred pronunciation.

Prop. v. 4. 47:

MSS. 'Cras, ut rumor ait, tota *pugnabitur* urbe'.

The sense, as Prof. A. Palmer suggests, seems to demand some word of exactly opposite meaning to 'pugnabitur'. Perhaps 'purgabitur', though I can quote no instance elsewhere of such an impersonal use. For the Parilia as purgamina cp. Ov. Fast. IV. 640

'Luce Palis populos *purget* ut ipse cinis'.

C. B. HULEATT.

P.S.—Since the correction of the proof of my proposed emendation of the text of Prop. v. 4. 47 the kindness of Mr Robinson Ellis has pointed out to me the following parallel use of the passive of purgo.

Censorinus de die natali xxii. 'Februum autem non idem usquequaque dicitur: nam aliter in aliis sacris februatur, *hoc est purgatur.*

C. B. H.

CORRECTIONS.

Vol. XII. p. 267, note. The passage of the *Panegyricus Berengarii* is taken *word for word* from Statius, Theb. VII. 223, and of course therefore proves nothing for the existence of Propertius at the time when the *Panegyricus* was written.

Vol. XII. p. 296. The bust at West Park, described as being "perhaps that of a Roman Emperor", is an Athena, of the same type as the Lionhelmed Athena in the Villa Albani (see the *Academy*, Jan. 1885).

Vol. XIII. p. 61, l. 7 from below. The reading of Syro-Hex. is ܘܚܙܐ ܠܗ, agreeing not with the Targum but with the Greek.

Vol. XIII. p. 144, lines 22, 23, read "et Timon[e] de Cleanthe, apud Diogenem Laertium in Clean."

Vol. XIII. p. 191, s. v. *alapor*. For "a mediaeval translation of St James iii. 14 in a manuscript at Corvey," read "an ancient translation from the MS. *ff*[1] *Corbeiensis* now at St Petersburg, published in 1883 by Belsheim."

Vol. XIII. p. 193 s. v. *demorator*. For "conjectured by Mr Bywater," read "found in the Bamberg and Reichenau MSS., and approved by Mr Bywater."

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